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ABSTRACT
Offsets have taken centre stage in defence trade. To date, more than 78 countries around
the world practice offsets and outstanding offsets obligations run into billions of US
dollars However, why have offsets gained such a momentum? Increasingly, both sellers
and buyers in the arms trade view offsets as an efficient and effective economic
compensation tool to justify arms deals. Buyers, consider offsets as a catalyst for
industrial and technological development, employment, creation of value-added
activities and skills development. Sellers, on the other hand, perceive offsets as
providing product differentiation and competitive advantage in an already tough defence
market. The question, though is whether, do offsets really work as claimed? The
purpose of this dissertation is to empirically verify the above proposition by evaluating
the effectiveness of defence offsets in developing a defence industrial and technological
base, using Malaysia’s defence industry as a case study.
This study employs a Multi-Method or Triangulation Methodological approach
(comprising survey, archival sources and participatory observation) to gather data.
Fieldwork research employing questionnaires and interviews were undertaken as part of
a survey of Malaysian defence companies, international defence contractors and
relevant offsets-related government and non-governmental agencies. These data were
further substantiated and consolidated via archival sources, such as government and
company reports and also participatory observation.
Research analysis indicates that offsets have provided mixed results, in the case of
Malaysia. The successes have been mainly focused on technology capability-building
and human resource development, limited to through-life-support of the defence
equipment and the ancillary systems purchased. Morover, offsets have been
successfully used to diversify into civil sectors, mainly aerospace and electronics
sectors, leading to increased exports, jobs, backward linkages and technology
enhancement in these sectors. However, offsets have had minimal effect on creating
joint-production, collaborative activities and R&D programmes, requisites for the
process of Malaysianisation. Further, offsets have also been less than effective in
iv
increasing employment, and dual-use technology programmes that could provide long-
term impact on Malaysia’s economic growth.
Overall, Malaysia’s offsets policy has been pragmatic and flexible. The government has
played a vital role in ensuring that the offsets policy operates in tandem with Malaysia’s
national aspirations. Yet, offsets have had a limited impact on developing and
sustaining Malaysia’s defence industrial and technology base. The offsets policy aim
and objectives have not been clearly reflected in the offsets process and implementation.
As defence offsets will continue to be of an essence in Malaysia’s defence procurement
activity, initiatives should be taken to review the offsets policy and implementation
processes. The review should augment the effectiveness of offsets in developing
measurable and value-added programmes that build a sustainable and competitive
Malaysian defence industry. To this end, and based on the research findings of this
study, a number of important policy recommendations are advanced to raise the
effectiveness of Malaysia’s offsets policy.
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1.1 The Rise of Offsets
Traditional arms trade deals have been transformed into professionally managed
economic transactions. At the core of this process, lie offsets; an economic
compensation package that has become a permanent feature of international business.
Today, offsets are an inherent feature of the global procurement system. Often,
negotiations to get the best offsets deals eclipse the focus on the technical aspects of
arms procurement. Offsets, however, are not without criticism and suspicion. While the
proponents of offsets argue that they create economically viable and strategically
relevant growth, the opponents, on the other hand, believe offsets create distortions.1
Yet, the subjectivity, non-transparency and relevance of offsets make a systematic
attempt to study the subject irresistible and challenging. This unique trading mechanism
has gained prominence in the area of development economics, triggering research
activity among practitioners and scholars of the development community.
Why have offsets gained such attention and publicity in the past two decades? The
reasons are several. First, there was a massive reduction in world wide defence budgets
since the early 1990s. Figure 1.1 illustrates the falls in world military expenditure since
1988.2 The reductions were mainly due to the re-prioritisation of military expenditure
following the perception of a benign security environment after the disintegration of
Soviet Union. Governments were mainly interested in upgrading systems rather than
purchasing new weapon systems. Since 2000, there have been increases in defence
spending mainly reflecting the surge in the US defence spending, responsible for almost
80% of the increase in 2005. This sudden increase is attributable to the aftermath of
9/11 to combat terrorism and the costly military spending in Afghanistan and Iraq. The
overall reduction in defence spending has turned the market into a buyers’ market,
encouraging buyers to seek greater value for money in the form of offsets. The buyers’
hard-nosed tactics have placed defence contractors under tremendous pressure to
20
provide state-of-the-art defence equipment as well as granting other accompanying
benefits.
Second, the reduction in defence budgets has created aggressive arms exporting policies
to offset the loss of domestic development and production.3 Defence contractors which
had multiplied in numbers during the Cold War, were now out of business due to the
lack of demand for newer equipment. Defence companies, especially from the Eastern
bloc, began to suffer from serious debt. There were increasing pressures to keep the
defence industry alive as well as sustain jobs. Besides restructuring, mergers,
consolidation and rationalisation, defence contractors were also forced to introduce
more innovative strategies such as offsets in an increasingly competitive business
environment.
Figure 1.1: World Military Expenditure, 1988-2005
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Military Expenditure, 1988-2005,
[online], (SIPRI, Stockholm, 2006), (Accessed: 11 March 2007), Avialable via: http://web.sipri.org.
Third, the global defence industry was further challenged by changes emanating from
the revolution in military affairs or transformational warfare.4 Diminishing defence
budgets, rising weapons costs, downsizing and the consolidation in defence industries
led defence ministries and military organisations around the world to upgrade existing
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systems. The change process has been towards leaner forces, with greater specialisation,
emphasising computer-driven developments in sensors, information processing,
communications, control and precision weapons, at the technological heart of the
RMA.5 This has caused great financial strain on defence contractors to increase
investment into research and development, thus further escalating equipment costs.
Defence suppliers have had to create product differentiation by introducing offsets to
gain competitive advantage in the defence industry market.
Finally, the shift in international political economy towards globalisation and
liberalisation has forced many nations to rethink national development goals.
Government priorities were directed towards other sectors of development, such as
health, education and social welfare due to the limited financial resources. Nations
continued to suffer from the barriers to defence trade, not least because the arms trade is
not covered under the WTO6 free trade regulations. Newer challenges, such as
restrictive government policies on arms exports and comprehensive rules for the sharing
of sensitive technologies, especially by the United States (US) further restricted the
arms market. For politicians, offsets were seductive, as they could be partially used to
justify military purchases.7
World transactions involving offset deals amounted to billions of dollars, with most
offsets transactions occurring in the developed countries, mainly within Europe. From
1993-2005, US prime contractors alone entered into 538 offset agreements totalling
USD 56.6 billion or 71.2% of export contract value compared with total defence exports
of USD 79.5billion.8 From this data, 286 offset agreements were signed with European
countries, totalling $36.8 billion offsets value.9 By comparison, US defence contractors
signed 252 offsets agreements with Non-European countries totalling $19.8 billion
worth of offsets value.10 Overall, from 1993-2005, the UK has the highest offsets
obligations amounting to $3.9 billion (17.8%) of the total offsets value, followed by
Republic of Korea with 59 offsets agreements worth $5.2 billion and Taiwan with 39
offsets agreements worth $2.2 billion.11 Generally, Middle Eastern countries and most
countries in the Pacific areas with equally large export contract values demand lower
offsets than European countries. Of the 252 offsets agreements with non-EU countries,
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169 (68.5%) had offsets percentages of 50% or more but less than 100%.12 Only 15.5%
have offsets requirements in excess of 100% or more.13 Many other offset deals around
the globe are unaccounted for, not classified, or simply not documented, due to the
sensitivity of defence procurement.
1.2 Definition
Following this introductory scoping of the role of offsets, it is now necessary to define
the subject. The problem is that offsets mean different things to different people. There
is neither one specific terminology nor one definition of offsets. Each country labels
offsets differently. Figure 1.2 explains offsets as a subcomponent of countertrade.
Offsets are also known as Industrial Participation, Economic Enhancement,
Compensation Packages, Industrial Benefit Programmes and Countertrade Policy.
Generally, offsets are defined as an arrangement between a national government and a
foreign arms supplier to direct some benefits of the contract back into the purchasing
country as a condition of sale.14 Offsets comprise an entire range of industrial and
commercial compensation practices, plus inducements or conditions for the purchase of
military goods and services. These include co-production, joint venture, buy-back,
knowledge transfer, training, and investment, marketing assistance and counter-
purchase. Offsets can be direct or indirect but other elements such as counter-purchase
and structured finance have taken prominence of late. Developed countries normally
limit offsets to technology transfer. In contrast, in developing countries, offsets cover a
wider scope, including barter, counter-purchase and structured finance. Controversy
persists about including basic training and periodic maintenance during the warranty
period as part of an offsets deal. These definitions, suggest that offsets are mainly used
to improve and further enhance economic development.
This study will not include counter-purchase (purchase of commodities or finished
goods from the buyer country’s existing supplier base), nor will it include structured
finance in developing countries. Both are perhaps questionable in their effectiveness,
but they have no direct bearing on industrial and technological development.
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Figure 1.2: The Reciprocatory Trade Framework
Source: Johan Van Dyk, Denel Pty Ltd, South Africa, Introduction to Offsets, In: 02 Countertrade
Conference, Civil Service Golf Club, Kuala Lumpur, June 2001, (Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, 2001).
The complexities of offsets make them a challenging and innovative tool in
international arms trade. Offsets raise many issues involving the effects of policy, the
guidelines, objectives and goals, as well as processes and implementation. Many
countries are still struggling with the implementation of offsets. Questions are often
raised as to whether there is a ‘one size fits all’ formula that can be modelled to
implement offsets. Countries are still confused about offset objectives and have
reviewed their offsets policy objectives and goals several times.15 Questions also
abound regarding the effectiveness of offsets as a facilitating mechanism towards
industrial and technological development.
1.3 Offsets: Opposing Schools of Thought
Developed and developing countries seek offsets for political, economic, industrial,
trade, technology, and military reasons. Around 78 countries around the world practice
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views offsets as a facilitating mechanism towards industrial and technological
development; the latter views them as inefficient and costly.
1.3.1 Pro-Offsets
The pro-offsets school of thought argues that offsets have generally benefited
purchasing countries in terms of creating an indigenous defence industrial base,
advancing technology development, increasing defence–civil integration, expanding job
creation, promoting exports, enhancing human resource development and generating
high-value added backward linkages. However, for developing countries with smaller
defence industrial bases, offsets have been maximised for indirect purposes mainly for
spin-offs into civil sectors. Offsets have also, arguably, created ‘value-added’
manufacturing jobs in the backward supply chain, providing home-grown industry with
the opportunity to enhance competitiveness though collaboration and joint ventures with
supplier companies.17
1.3.1 Anti-Offsets
The anti-offsets school of thought views offsets as ‘economically inefficient’ and
market distorting.’18 They create a financial burden to buyer countries by adding an
extra ‘hidden cost’ thus further escalating defence equipment costs. The US Department
of Commerce, for example, claims that offsets are discriminatory, trade distorting and
against the interests of free trade.19 Two major studies undertaken to evaluate the impact
of offsets have resulted in negative conclusions. In the first of these studies, the US
government evaluated the impact of offsets on the US economy and its industrial base,
especially from the outflow of offsetting investment.20 The study claimed that US
subcontracting jobs and crucial technologies were lost due to the use of offsets in
foreign defence sales.21 A second study by York University on the UK Industrial
Participation Policy, specifically its impact on the UK economy, was also negative
about the impact of offsets.22
Recently, this negativism has found expression in policy statements. For instance, the
US National Defence Authorisation Bill 2005 proposed that offsets be outlawed, or at
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the very least curtailed. For example, evidence from the US defence industry indicates
that 469,000 jobs were lost as a result of offsets in the past 20 years.23 The US Defence
Department argues that weapon sales due to offsets sustained more than 40,000 U.S
jobs a year whilst only creating about 9,700 jobs overseas.24 This could be due to the
highly competitive and complex nature of defence technology. The massive decline in
US defence-related jobs is arguably due to the 1990’s major consolidation and
restructuring of the US defence industry. Notwithstanding such development, the jury is
still out as to whether offsets are a positive or negative force.
1.4 Offsets in Emerging Economies
Offsets have grown in popularity and are viewed by developing countries as a ‘third
way’, for technology acquisition and development.25 Offsets have the potential for
impacting on defence industrialisation, value creation through inter-industry linkages,
economic diversification, human resource development and product and process
localisation. The Newly Industrialised Group of Countries (NICs), including South
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan have displayed their ability to absorb new technology and
catch-up with developed countries. The developing countries have pursued roughly
similar paths of economic and industrial development, involving large-scale State
investments, technology imports, applied research and synergistic civil-military links.26
Yet, for these countries, the government has had a ‘visible hand’ in decision-making,
ensuring that successful technology transfer took place.27 Technology transfer initiatives
to these countries were mostly through foreign direct investment, joint ventures,
collaboration as well as offsets.
Efforts have been directed by many nations to position offsets at the core of defence
industrialisation. There is an increasing recognition that defence technologies should be
spun-off into the civil industries. Whilst suppliers have been reluctant to invest in high
tech plants, countries such as South Africa and South Korea have tried to create supply
chains through backward linkages into manufacturing industries. They have pursued
defence indigenisation to maintain national sovereignty and territorial integrity. For
instance, Japan aggressively pursued indigenous defence production or ‘kokusanka’ via
this method.28 South Korea and Taiwan have also been heavily involved in defence
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industrialisation, aimed at achieving autarky in arms production as part of their defence
policy and industrial objectives.29 Today, these countries have reached a higher level of
industrial capability as opposed to many of the other developing nations.
South Africa has also pursued defence industrialisation through its Defence Industrial
Participation Policy. Denel (Pty) Ltd, a leading South African defence company,
successfully built the tail sections of RAF Hawk fighter trainers, landing gear fuselage
sections for Gripen jet fighters, rudders and ailerons for BAE Systems aeroplanes.30 It
was claimed that R104 billion worth of industrial participation commitments in South
Africa would create approximately 65,000 jobs.31 Countries such as Singapore and
Indonesia have taken the middle road as their defence industries are not as large scale as
those of South Korea and Taiwan but are, nevertheless, wide ranging.32 However, others
like Malaysia see offsets as a major thrust for economic development and technology
acquisition with a specific focus on defence technology spin-offs, skills development
and the creation of backward linkages.33 Malaysia is also seeking defence
industrialisation through offsets, in similarity to both South Africa and the other NICs.
The question remains, though, whether Malaysia’s offsets objectives have been
achieved?
1.5 Research Problem
This study will focus on the effectiveness of offsets with a particular reference to
Malaysia. There are a number of strong reasons for undertaking this research. Firstly,
offsets are a relatively new trading tool in Malaysia, though other forms of countertrade
such as barter have long been in existence. Malaysia’s offsets policy, published in May
2006, has been constantly employed in all major defence procurements costing above
Euro 50,000 since 1990.34 Despite the huge value of transactions involved in Malaysia’s
offsets business, such as the Jernas short range missile from the UK , SUKHOI 30 from
Russia, the PT-91 Main Battle Tank from Poland, the M5-gun from South Africa, and
others, this subject has received very little academic attention. Offsets requirements
were formally introduced to Malaysia in 1992 with the purchase of the Hawk aircraft
from the United Kingdom.
27
Since 1992, offsets have featured as an essential ingredient in all major capital defence
purchases. In the past 11 years (1995-2006), Malaysia has spent around RM 100 million
on procurement of new weapons as well as upgrading old ones.35 This approach sought
to modernise the Armed Forces, eliminating some of the old and obsolete hardware of
the post cold war era. At the same time, Malaysia has sought to keep abreast of
advancements in global military technology. There was a need for modern equipment
with greater firepower and mobility as well as a concentration on C4I technologies,
electronic warfare and digitised soldiers with the ability to handle state-of-the-art
technologies.
Malaysia’s military expenditure for the period 1988-2003 is shown in Table 1.1.
Expenditure increased from 1989 onwards and only started to decline in 1997 due to the
Asian Financial crisis, but soared again in 2001 when the economy recovered. Most
capital purchases were undertaken in the years 2001 and 2002. A list of Malaysia’s
defence procurements are shown at Appendix A. Offsets obtained through these
purchases were mainly channelled towards the creation of a defence industry base, and
the promotion of backward linkages, employment, skill development in high technology
areas, marketing support, inward investments and counter-purchase. Malaysia’s offset
beneficiaries have been mainly from the Armed Forces, government agencies, defence
industry, civil industry, research think-tanks and universities.
The second reason for researching offsets is to respond to serious questions regarding
their short and long term impacts on Malaysia’s economy. Although it is claimed that
offsets do not cost money,36 it is obvious that transaction costs have to be factored into
the overall cost of equipments.37 Issues of this nature have been constantly debated, but
there are no empirical data to justify the seriousness of transaction costs. The proposed
research will evaluate the impact of offsets on Malaysia’s defence industrial and
technological development leading to capability development, employment, human
resource development, exports, industry competitiveness, sustainability of leading edge
supply chain management networks, industrial diversity, R& D capabilities, intellectual
property rights, patenting issues and design expertise.
28
Table 1.1: Malaysia’s Military Expenditure in US$ and as a Percentage of GDP



















Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military Expenditure
Database, [online], (SIPRI, Stockholm, 2004), (Accessed: 11 June 2004), Avialable via:
http://web.sipri.org.
Thirdly, Malaysia has allocated its offsets credits mainly to the defence sector with the
objective of creating a self-reliant defence industry. The aim is for Malaysia’s defence
industry to progress from initial support capabilities towards more ambitious design,
manufacture and production activities. However, despite support through offsets and
government contracts, the Malaysian defence industry has not really taken off. It is still
highly dependent on the government due to limited resources and industrial capabilities.
It is thus timely to evaluate whether the defence industry has really benefited from
offsets projects.
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Fourthly, offsets form part of Malaysia’s overall national development policy in tandem
with other government policies such as Procurement, Defence, Science and Technology,
the Industrial Master Plan, Five-Year Plans and Vision 2020. However, in reality,
offsets do not feature clearly in any of these documents. There is a need to explore the
overall offsets process and strategy to establish how it fits into the national development
strategy. 38
The fifth reason for studying offsets has regard to the important role that government
plays in the offsets process. The Defence Industry Division within the Ministry of
Defence was formed to oversee successful monitoring and implementation of offsets
policy. This organisation works closely with all other offsets organisations within and
without the country. However, most of the planning, negotiation and implementation
work is done on an ad-hoc basis. Invariably, offsets do not feature in the procurement
process until later. Malaysia’s economic development objectives are clearly stated in the
codified offsets policy, but the true intentions of these objectives are not reflected
clearly in Malaysia’s offsets implementation process. Further, the offsets policy itself
does not seem to have incorporated adequate incentives that could invite high value-
added offsets programmes into Malaysia. There is thus a need to review the overall
offsets policy as well as the processes to address these issues.
Sixthly, the uniqueness of offsets requires that a strategic partnership between various
parties, including Government, sellers, suppliers, buyers, local firms and third parties,
be established to ensure a ‘win-win’ set of outcomes. This calls for analysis to evaluate
the role, capability and commitment of these parties in ensuring the effectiveness of
offsets in the long term.
1.5.1 Study Aim
The aim of this study is evaluate the ‘effectiveness’ of defence offsets as a facilitating




This study’s enabling objectives are to:
i. Illustrate and evaluate the various offset models, frameworks, tools,
processes and mechanisms by cross reference to offset practices in other
selected developed and developing countries.
ii. Determine the factors that contribute towards an ‘effective’ offsets strategy.
iii. Discuss the development of Malaysia’s defence industry performance and
challenges.
iv. Critically analyse Malaysia’s current national offset policy, processes,
problems and strategies.
v. Assess the effectiveness of offsets as a tool for technological and industrial
development in Malaysia’s defence industry.
vi. Measure the impact of offsets on Malaysia’s defence industries.
vii. Evaluate industrial and technological progress achieved through offsets-
induced technology transfer.
viii. Propose policy recommendations towards an effective offsets model,
enabling offsets to play a more robust role in meeting Malaysia’s industrial
and technological development needs.
1.6 Study Value:
The literature is replete with writings on industrial and technological development, but
little of these writings focus on evaluating the impact of offsets. Stephen Martin
published a volume of papers on defence offsets in 1996 by Harwood Academic
Publishers (now Routledge) and eight years later in 2004, Brauer Jurgen and Dunne
Paul J, published another collection of papers on offsets entitled, Arms Trade and
Economic Development: Theory, Policy and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets by Routledge.
The newer collection was basically an update of the changes taking place in the
international environment and was mostly written by contributors to Martin’s earlier
publication. Keith Hartley had undertaken an empirical study evaluating the impact of
offsets on the UK’s defence industrial base and Ron Matthews had similarly evaluated
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the impact of offsets in Saudi Arabia. However, both of these researches had an
academic slant and were not policy-oriented research papers.
Additionally, organisations such as the American Countertrade Association (ACA),
Defence Manufacturers Association (DMA), Asia Pacific Countertrade Association
(APCA) and SMI run periodic conferences on offsets. Presentations by government
representatives, industry members and academicians at these conferences have become
important reference materials to evaluate the impact of offsets. However, these papers
are commercially biased. EPICOS, a Greek company, does provide a range of current
information on offsets and procurement-related materials on its website. However, the
site does not provide substantial statistical or empirical evidence to substantiate the
impact of offsets on individual countries.39 Most of the papers written on this topic have
been country-focused. Much has been written on offsets in Western Europe, Japan,
United States, Korea, South Africa and Taiwan, as well as countries in South East Asia,
such as Singapore and Indonesia.40 However, most of these studies have not examined
empirically the effectiveness of offsets on their industrial and technological
development.
Literature on Malaysia, mostly focuses on the impact of foreign direct investment, joint
ventures and globalisation on the civil sector, particularly manufacturing and
agricultural industry. Greg Fleker, for example, looked at the impact of American and
Taiwanese multinationals on Malaysia’s electronics industry and the impact of Japanese
and Korean industries on the heavy automobile industries.41 Felker criticised the 1990’s
FDI policies for providing weak local technological capabilities, low indigenous
participation, and shallow industrial structures with few linkages.42 Other research
examined the Malaysian Government’s selective interventionist role in the process of
industrialisation,43 import substitution policy, the allocation of fiscal incentives for
technological deepening and industrial growth,44 rent seeking behaviour, technology
policy, the strategy towards industrialisation, and the adoption of the ‘Look East
Policy45 towards industrialisation.
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Studies have also been undertaken evaluating industrial competitiveness, sustainability
and industrial diversity.46 Sanjaya Lall, for example, pointed out that R&D is an
important tool of competitiveness for absorbing and keeping up with advanced
technology, raising the sophistication, increasing local content and reducing the cost of
technology imports. He noted that whilst Malaysia was not at the stage of developing
frontier technology, R&D investment was still needed to feed into routine engineering
activity to improve quality, management, maintenance, adaptation and productivity.47 A
study by Masayuki Kondo argued that Malaysia’s National Science and Technology
policy has wrongly emphasised the element of science and not technology.48 He calls
for greater emphasis on technology policy with industrial orientation as a more effective
method to enhance industrial competitiveness.49
Due to the commercial and political sensitivity of offsets, there is a dearth of literature
on Malaysia’s defence industrialisation and offsets performance. In fact, there has been
no published data on the impact of defence offsets on Malaysia’s technological and
industrial development. This is an unexplored area and thus subject to much uninformed
debate. Offsets have been claimed to transfer high-end value-added technology into the
defence and civil sectors, promoting skills development and value-added employment in
Malaysia’s manufacturing sector.50 Observers are concerned as to whether these
developments are sustainable and long term.51 Thus, an evaluation of Malaysia’s offsets
performance is timely.
The Malaysian Group for High Technology (MIGHT) conducted a study in 2000
evaluating the impact of offsets. The study evaluated past offsets obligations leading to
policy recommendations as well suggestions for a structured offsets policy. The study
identified weaknesses in the offsets processes, including an absence of codified policy
and the lack of both consistent objectives and the monitoring of results.52 However, the
recommendations from this study were not adopted by the Malaysian government due
to the inaccuracy and inadequacy of data. Importantly, there was an absence of recent
important arms purchases in the Report and the lack of recognition that there had been a
re-delegation of the offsets function from the Ministry of Finance to six key ministries,
transforming the overall offsets implementation process.53
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In 2001 and 2003, respectively, consultants from Denel Pty Ltd, South Africa and the
Defence Export Services Organisation, (DESO), UK, through bilateral arrangements
were invited to advise on Malaysia’s offset strategy. However, the resultant advisory
reports were policy recommendations lacking in any empirical research. The present
study, therefore, will be the first to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of offsets as a
facilitating mechanism for supporting Malaysian industrial and technological
development in the defence sector.
1.7 Techno-Vision
Developing countries view offsets as a ‘third way’ for industrial and technological
development.54 Offsets are normally used to acquire sensitive, high-end and critical
technologies that cannot normally be purchased off-the-shelf. The first and second wave
of technology transfer was in the form of Import Substitution (ISI) and Export
Orientation (EOI) Industrial Policy. Developing countries associate economic progress
and development with industrialisation. Historically, these countries have transformed
from agricultural-based economies into modern diversified economies. These countries
often link the success and richness of the western world to industrial and technological
prowess.
In countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and the NICs, ISI was introduced to
develop indigenous capability. However, the failure of this strategy forced governments
to switch in the 1970s to a more labour intensive export-oriented industrial growth.55
Concessions and tax relief as well as various incentives provided an attractive platform
for inward investment.56 Although the switch to an export–oriented industrialisation
(EOI) strategy gave fresh impetus to industrial growth, the governments of these
countries realised that the MNCs were merely transferring obsolete technologies; there
was thus a major vacuum in terms of skills and capability.57 Many of these countries
now practice a combination of ISI and EOI strategies in their industrial and
technological development process.
Malaysia has moved in similar directions as other developing countries in its
industrialisation process. Malaysia’s geo-political position, attractive economic climate,
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pool of highly educated workers and broad panoply of government incentives made it a
potential regional technology development hub. Offsets have the potential to move
Malaysia up the high-end technology ladder. For successful technology transfer,
Malaysia’s primary purpose must be to provide a systematic offset strategy to create
sustainable and competitive industries, with localised capabilities to design, develop,
integrate, maintain, as well as use the knowledge to diversify into civil industries.
Appendix B explains Malaysia’s route to national prosperity.
Effectiveness is defined as producing the intended or desired results. Measurement of
effectiveness should be based upon attainment of goals and progress towards achieving
the intended objectives. Effectiveness in the context of this research refers to the
indicators that may assist in assessing a nation’s offsets objective(s). These indicators
will determine whether offsets have been more or less successful as a tool for
technological and industrial development in the identified areas.
There are four principal elements of Malaysia’s offset ‘model’: policy; implementation;
benefits; and goals. This conceptual model, called ‘Techno-Vision’, is abstracted from
Malaysia’s ‘Vision 2020’ policy, which aims to create both effective utilisation of
current technology and increased absorption of new technology to assist the
industrialisation process, enhancing Malaysia’s international competitiveness.58 The
‘Techno-Vision’ model at Figure 1.3 will form the conceptual model for this study.
The Techno-Vision model is divided into four principles. Firstly, at the policy stage, the
process begins by formulating an offsets policy which clearly defines the objectives,
processes and implementation mechanisms. Once the policy has been formulated,
offsets are then utilised as a facilitating mechanism for Malaysia’s industrial and
technological development. Offsets arguably provide the platform for the development
of high-end technology transfer into the defence sector to support defence
industrialisation, industrial diversification, value-adding supply chain activity, and
knowledge and skills development to undertake through-life support of equipment,
creating a competitive and sustainable industry in the long term.
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Figure 1.3: Techno-Vision Model for Malaysia
Source: Author
At the second stage, the transfer process cannot be materialised without cooperation and
commitment from various actors involved in the offset processes, namely, the
government, sellers, local firms and other relevant third parties. Offsets for developing
countries require a ‘strategic partnership’ as an underpinning factor for success. A
strategy is formulated for the parties to collaborate and form strategic alliances, which
will then converge towards an effective transfer process. The government acts as the
key player in driving and ensuring the effective implementation of policy by laying the
foundation for successful technology transfer. The government’s initiative and
commitment towards driving the overall offsets process is a critical element in ensuring
the effectiveness of the offsets mechanism. As offsets are a government-driven tool, the
latters’s direct involvement in policy planning and implementation is crucial for
ensuring the effectiveness of offset implementation. Local firms must be able to invest
in manpower training and R&D, and have the capability to absorb and commercialise
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT



































technology. Sellers and their governments will be evaluated in terms of their
commitment towards offsets implementation. Third parties assigned to undertake
offsets obligations on behalf of the main vendors play an important role in ensuring that
obligations are fulfilled.
At stage 3, once the policy and implementation is in place, there will be tangible outputs
or benefits in the identified areas, including technology development’ job creation,
skills development, industrial diversification’ value-added, inter-industry linkages,
export opportunities and marketing. Finally, at stage four, these benefits culminate to
create a sustainable and competitive indigenous Malaysian industrial base, underpinning
self-reliance.
1.8 Research Methodology
1.8.1 Foreword to Research Methodology
The section begins with a brief explanation of the reasons for conducting research and
the nature of research methodology. This is followed by an explanation of a research
philosophy, process, typology, design, and finally, the research plan. Research is not
just about collecting data or information without any purpose and without interpretation;
it is also a process of enquiry and investigation.59 Research requires a clear purpose as
to why it is being undertaken, as well as awareness of the application of systematic
techniques to pursue an investigation, the ability to interpret data and also the issues of
ethics and validity. A research methodology, on the other hand, refers to the procedural
framework within which the research is conducted. It describes an approach that can be
put into practise in a research programme or process.60
This study’s approach is undertaken based on a combination of reasons. These include
reviewing and synthesising existing knowledge on the subject of industrial and
technological development through offsets. There is a need to describe the Malaysian
offsets policy, explain the processes and implementation, understand the role of the
various players, the strengths and weaknesses of the policy, as well as the challenges
faced in obtaining a positive outcome. Finally, there is a need to analyse the research
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problem to obtain an outcome reflecting the impact of offsets on Malaysia.61 The
outcome is used to make policy recommendations to the Government of Malaysia and
other stakeholders. 62
1.8.2 Research Philosophy
According to Saunders, there are three major ways of thinking about research
philosophy-epistemology, ontology and axiology.63 Epistemology relates to the
acceptable knowledge in a study. Here, the issue is whether the social world should be
studied according to the same principles, procedures and ethos as the natural sciences.
There are two approaches of how one can approach empirical research which are
positivistic related to natural sciences, and phenomenological or interpretivism related
to social science.64 The positivistic approach is more commonly used in the natural or
physical sciences.65 This approach seeks to identify measure and evaluate any
phenomena and to provide a rational explanation for it. This explanation will attempt to
establish links and relationships between the different elements of the subject and relate
them to a particular theory or practice. Positivism is normally based on a quantitative
approach which relates to the collection and analysis of numerical data whereby results
are collated and presented statistically. This method concentrates on measuring data
using scale, range and frequency. These include surveys, experimental studies and
cross-sectional studies. The positivistic approach also adopts the deductive method
where research moves from general ideas or clear theoretical positions to specific
situations prior to the collection of data. Theories and definitions gathered will be
analysed and results presented based on the data collated. This method of research
deduces a hypothesis, tests that hypothesis and explains the causal relationship between
variables.
The phenomenological approach, on the other hand, looks at research from the
perspective that human behaviour is not as easily measured as in the natural sciences.
This perspective assumes that people will often influence events and act in
unpredictable ways that upset any constructed rules or identifiable norms. Research
methods are therefore chosen to try to describe, translate and explain events from the
perspective of people who are the subject of research. This perspective normally or
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often involves qualitative research, examining and reflecting on the less tangible aspects
of research such as perception, commitment and trust,66 and is often more difficult to
interpret and present findings. This phenomenological approach includes case studies,
interviews, action-research and grounded theory. Research philosophy to a large extent
influences the research methodology adopted for a particular research project. Here, the
inductive method is used where research moves from a particular situation to make or
infer broad general ideas and theories. Information and ideas are gathered from a range
of people and these data are then collated and the results analysed, and presented
leading to a new finding or otherwise.67
Ontology, on the other hand, deals with the nature of reality. This raises assumptions
about the way the world operates. There are two aspects to ontology: objectivism and
subjectivism. Objectivism asserts that social phenomenon and their meanings have an
existence that is independent or separate from actors. Subjectivism suggests that social
phenomena are created from perceptions and consequent actions of social actors.68
Through a continual process of social interaction, these social phenomenons are in a
constant state of revision. The role of value in all stages of a research process is of great
importance for credibility.
However, another line of argument to the whole research philosophy is to adopt the
pragmatic view where the determinants of the research philosophy are based on
pragmatism. A pragmatist argues that the most important determinant of the research
philosophy adopted is the research question. Further, if the research questions do not
provide a clear indication as to which method to use, the pragmatist approach may be
the best option.69
For the purpose of this study’s research, the pragmatist philosophy is adopted by
incorporating aspects of the positivistic and phenomenological approach as well as the
objectivist and subjectivist approach. The positivistic, deductive approach is used to
understand and gather information on existing theories through structured interviews
and questionnaires. Quantitative data include surveys using questionnaires and
structured and semi-structured interviews. The inductive approach is used to further
39
enhance the questionnaires and interview results. The positivistic approach is used to
obtain quantitative information in terms of value, types, categories of offsets
programmes and ranking in terms of impact on the Malaysian offsets recipient
companies. The semi-structured interview is also used to gather information from
supplier companies.
The phenomenological, inductive approach is used to gather qualitative data by
interviewing respondents in each firm to obtain further information on the extent to
which offsets have been effective, better understanding the operations of the firm as
well as the challenges it faces. The Qualitative methods are also used to observe
discussion and intent in meetings, sieve through minutes of meetings to identify
patterns, taking note of issues pertaining to the research. Qualitative data includes open
interviews and participatory observation.
The ontological aspects in this research employ a combination of objectivist and
subjectivist approaches. In studying the role of offsets and how they have impacted on
defence industry development in Malaysia, the study uses offsets managers in defence
companies as research subjects. The objectivist position is used by the researcher to
study the reality of the organisation in relation to current technology capability,
operating procedures, human resource capability and infrastructure. The subjectivist
approach seeks to obtain feedback through interviews; the perceptions of individual
offsets managers and how they interpret events and challenges faced due to the practice
of offsets.
1.8.3 Typology of the Research
Research can be classified in several ways. This study focuses on two issues: the level
of management activity and the nature of the research problem. Research types
according to the nature of the problem include exploratory, descriptive, analytical and
predictive methods. Exploratory research is undertaken when few or no previous studies
on the subject exist. The aim is to look for patterns, hypotheses or ideas that can be
tested which form the basis for further research. Descriptive research can be used to
identify and classify elements or characteristics of the subject. Analytical research often
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extends the descriptive approach to suggest or explain why or how something is
happening and finally predictive research aims to speculate on future possibilities, based
on close analysis of available evidence of cause and effect. This study uses a
combination of all research types against the levels of management activity as
summarised in Table 1.2, below.
Table 1.2: Level of Management Activity
Level Nature of Research
Strategic activity This includes research related to strategic planning and
marketing. An assessment of indicators that measure
critical elements of the economic, social, political and
technological environments is often undertaken using
approaches such as the Delphi techniques or nominal
group techniques. This type also includes policy
research such as how policies are formulated and




This type of activity deals with product and market
development, the enhancement of managerial functions
such as finance and human resource development, and
the implementation of the marketing mix. Data
generated through ongoing operations will feed into the
management decisions to be made.
Operational activity Operational activities have a narrow focus and deal
with day-to-day functioning of the organisation.
Research at this level is aimed at determining the most
efficient action given a specific set of circumstances.
Source: http://www.ryerson.ca/- mjoppe/ Researchprocess/TypologyofReserach.htm dated 8/11/2006
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In relation to the level of management activity, the research questions clearly suggest
that this study falls into strategic activity as policy-oriented research. A research
approach concerning a firm or industry is considered as management research but when
actions of governments are required, it becomes policy research.70 Majchrzak has
presented a typology of policy research based on action orientation and focus.71 Action
orientation is concerned with the utility of results. The focus is concerned with the
specificity of the research question whether the research question is specifically or
broadly defined.
Majchrzak has segmented policy research into four groups - basic policy research,72
policy analysis,73 technical research and policy research as per figure 1.4, below.
Technical research is focused on resolving a very specific, narrowly defined problem,
such as the impact of defence offsets on supply chains in Malaysia. Here, the case focus
is narrow with a high action orientation. Policy research, on the other hand, has a broad
focus with high action orientation. For example, a study on the impact of defence
offsets on Malaysia’s defence industrial and technological development may fall under
this category. This study is then a policy oriented research with a broad focus and high
action orientation and the findings of the research will be used to make policy
recommendations that could be used by the government to solve certain problems. This
research also provides policymakers with the required information and options to find
solutions to complex issues, and falls between technical and policy research in the
Figure 1.4 framework.
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Figure 1.4: Typology of Policy Research
Source: Majchrzak, Methods for Policy Research, Sage Publication, London, 1984, p.13.
The study is exploratory as there have been few studies on this subject, and none on
Malaysia. The descriptive approach is used to collect, analyse and summarise data on
the volume of offsets and scope of offsets, policy, processes and implementation
procedures. The analytical approach in this study includes analysing the data to evaluate
the impact that offsets have had on Malaysia’s defence industrial base as well as the
benefits accrued and costs derived from offsets. A predictive approach is finally taken to
speculate the outcome of the studies and suggests policy recommendations based on the
analysis of the available data.
1.9 Research Design
1.9.1 Multi-Method Strategy
As the present study requires in-depth research, using all of the above approaches, a
multiple research method is most likely to avoid bias in the results. Such an approach is
described as one of convergent, multi-method/multi-trait, convergent validation,
otherwise known as the Triangulation methodological method.74 This approach uses
mixed methods to capture a sense of reality.75 The term ‘triangulation’ is defined as

















and procedures in combination, as well as use of primary and secondary data to ensure
that a non-biased view is obtained from respondents.76
In business and management research, the term triangulation refers to evidence from
multiple sources, ensuring that a biased view is not obtained from one informant. The
essence of triangulation is to attempt to corroborate any evidence that is supplied either
by speaking to another individual or by document analysis.77 Data collection for the
present study consists of a combination of quantitative and qualitative method such as
surveys, interviews, case-study analysis, documents, reports, books, archival materials,
journals and newspaper clippings. Such combinations provide the researcher with a
solid grasp of data content as well as enhancing the credibility of research results. The
approach also improves the researcher’s judgement by collecting different kinds of data
on the same phenomenon. The triangulation method provides a more complete and
holistic portrayal of the unit under study.
There are several advantages in using a triangulation method for this study’s research.
Firstly, it allows for empirical evidence to be obtained from multiple sources such as
questionnaire, semi-structured, structured and open-ended interviews as well as via
participant observation, mutually reinforcing or otherwise the results from analysis. The
researcher is able to corroborate and be more confident of the results. The different
designs complement each other, with results obtained through the questionnaire from
Malaysian companies, and structured interviews with OEMs and open-ended interviews
with government and other agencies being cross-checked through participant
observation and the archival research method.
The researcher found that multiple sources of evidence can create several disadvantages.
The practice of combining both quantitative and qualitative approaches required the
researcher to spend additional time mastering both methods using different strategies
and having differing epistemological and ontological implications.78 Further, the
researcher needed to know how to carry out the full variety of data collection techniques
because if any of the techniques had been used incorrectly, the opportunity to address a
broader array of issues or to establish converging lines of inquiry might have been
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lost.79 Data collection using multiple sources was also found to be more expensive and
time-consuming as compared to collecting data from a single source.80 This study’s
research was conducted by adopting the multi-method research, as illustrated in Figure
1.5 below.
1.9.2 Archival Research
The initial research design used in this study was archival based (also termed
documentary secondary data).81 Saunders categorised this design into three subgroups,
namely, documentary data, survey-based data, and data compiled from multiple sources.
Figure 1.6 illustrates in detail the subgroups and the components within each group in
detail. Documentary written material concerned with organisational records, including
the recipient firm’s personal production, notes, emails and letters and websites. The
secondary data for this research were collected from the Malaysian Defence Industry
(MDIC) website, MITI, EPU and EPICOS website. Data were also obtained from
various government publications including the Vision 2020, New Economic Policy and
later the National Development Policy, Science and Technology Policy, Defence Policy,
Industrial Master Plan and the Five year Malaysia Plan. Archival data were also sourced
through access to government procurement contracts, MOUs on offsets, bilateral
defence industry meeting minutes, blueprints, HANSARD. Non-governmental reports,
including publications by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian
Development Bank. Finally, information was also sourced from conferences such as the
conference papers of SMI, American Association of Countertrade Conference, the
Countertrade and Offsets (CTO) magazine and other relevant internet sources.
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Non-written materials accessed include CD-ROMS of Malaysian and overseas defence
companies, CD-ROMs containing lists of Malaysian defence industry members, taped
press release and speeches of ministers and defence product launches at defence
exhibitions. Area-based reports for this research include the Malaysian Defence
Industry Bulletin produced by the MDIC, Asian Defence and Diplomacy which reports
on offsets and defence industry matters in Asia, and the Asia Pacific Defence Reporter
covering a wide range of news on South East Asia. Census data were also obtained from
the Malaysian Statistics Department on the Malaysian industry production capability
according to type of industry and from the Malaysian Industry Development Authority
(MIDA) on the 21st century performance and challenges to the Malaysian industries.
The MIGHT Report Survey 2002 was also used to validate the author’s primary data.
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Figure 1.6: Nature of Secondary Data
Source: Mark Saunders, Philip Lewis and Adrian Thornhill, Research Methods for Business Students, 4th
Edn, Prentice Hall, Harlow, 2007, p. 64.
1.9.3 Survey
Surveys, part of the deductive approach, are commonly used in exploratory and
descriptive research. In this respect, questionnaires, and semi-structured interviews were
used to obtain data. Survey methods included face-to-face discussion, telephone
interviews, questionnaires or a mixture of these. There are two main types of survey: a
descriptive survey which is concerned with identifying and counting the frequency of a
particular response among the survey group and an analytical survey which involves
analysing the relationship between different elements in a sample group. Structured
interviews, on the other hand, consist of a standardised interview, entailing the
administration of an interview schedule by an interviewer.Structured interviews provide
standardisation in both the asking of questions and the recording of answers. Structured
interview questions can be closed, close-ended, pre-coded and fixed choices.82
In this study’s research, two sets of survey questionnaires were employed to evaluate
the effectiveness of offsets - one on the Malaysian defence industry offsets recipients
and the other on the suppliers of defence equipment to Malaysia. The survey involved
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focused on both descriptive and analytical aspects whereby data were gathered by
counting the frequency of certain responses and analysing the relationship between
different factors involved in the research. There were face-to-face and telephone
interviews. Structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted with the defence
suppliers. Semi-structured and open-ended interviews were held with government
officials from the Ministry of Defence: Defence Industry Division, Procurement
Division, STRIDE, MOF, MITI, MIDA and MIGHT.
1.9.4 Participant Observation
The third method of data collection used in this study’s research was participation
observation, also called ethnography by some researchers. This is a qualitative type of
inductive research method. Participation observation refers to a technique where the
researcher becomes completely immersed in the situation which is being researched. In
participant observation, the researcher can take several roles. Gold divided researchers
into four types: complete participant; participant as observer; observer as participant;
and complete observer. Mark-Easterby, however, adapted this into a management
approach and classified the researcher role into researcher as employee, researcher as
the explicit role, interrupted involvement and observation alone. In this research, the
researcher acts as the employee, where the researcher works within the government
alongside the local companies and OEMs. The participant observation approach is
suitable to this research due to several reasons. Firstly, the researcher is employed by
the Ministry of Defence, Malaysia. The researcher has first-hand experience of policy
formulation as well as the process and implementation of offsets. The researcher’s work
experience in this field facilitated the observation method of data collection due to
familiarity with government officials, Malaysian companies and offsets recipients and
defence suppliers.
The researcher faced no problems obtaining access to the offices of MOD and local
companies. The MOD Secretary General (2003-2005) was responsive and championed
the project. A letter was issued by the Secretary General requesting industries to
cooperate and provide access to data. The researcher contributed during the fieldwork
through sharing of knowledge on the subject of offsets, conducting workshops and
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organising a conference to create awareness of offsets .Other observations included
analysing the minutes of various meetings and reviewing classified reports and
correspondence. The preliminary research findings were presented to the subjects of the
research through a workshop. The workshop themed ‘Making Offsets Work’ was held
in Kuala Lumpur on 12 July 2005. The workshop was received positively by the
participants. As some of the issues raised in the findings could be sensitive, the
researcher ensured that the names of individuals and organisations were kept
confidential.
Participatory observation was conducted at various levels, including attending high-
level policy meetings, workshops, conferences, attachments at the MOD and selected
local and overseas industries. Data collection was generated through participant
observation, including primary, secondary and experiential. At the primary level, data
were collected mainly using a diary and note-taking of what was said between research
subjects. At the secondary level, descriptive observation was undertaken through the
systematic reporting of events, mainly of conversations that took place during meetings
and discussions. The time, date and venue were recorded for diary purposes. A narrative
account was undertaken by immediately reflecting on the issues and identifying ideas
and key trends from the descriptive notes. Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter
and to safe-guard the identity of research subjects, no tape recordings were undertaken.
The researcher took an employee-researcher or participant observant approach to data
collection. Research subjects were aware of the researcher’s presence and were briefed
as to the research objectives. The researcher’s presence did not intimidate the subjects.
The researcher’s background and familiarity amongst research subjects mainly
government officials and representatives of Malaysian and overseas defence companies
helped build close rapport, gaining the trust of the target audience. In fact, many issues
were openly discussed in a positive manner. Many of the research subjects were
objective about the research and were willing to cooperate.
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1.10 Research Plan
This section describes the research plan in relation to the study methodology developed
in the previous section. Phase one of this research aimed to undertake a critical review
of the secondary literature to establish both the theoretical foundations as well as the
literature gap. A critical evaluation was done of the archival sources, encompassing
books, journal articles, newspaper clippings, specialist reports, and published and
unpublished government reports. Books and journals were mainly obtained through the
Cranfield Library and the inter-library loans from various places such as the Bodleian
library, British Library, Radcliffe Science Library, Oxford, and the JSCSC library at the
UK Defence Academy. Journal articles were sourced on-line via Cranfield University’s
A-Z resources: EBSCO, Taylor and Francis and Jane’s were the more relevant sites for
this study. Journals such as Defence and Peace Economics, International Technology
Development, Development Studies, and Jane’s Defence Weekly were frequently used
throughout this research. The literature base was used to explore the theories relating to
economic development, industrialisation, technological development, and the role of
offsets.
1.10.1 Pilot Study
Next, a pre-test or pilot study was conducted to detect possible shortcomings in the
design and use of the questionnaire. This was conducted through a pilot study of the
Malaysian beneficiary of the UK JERNAS Short Range Missile System offsets
programme. There are five beneficiaries: the Malaysian army; SME Aerospace; the
MMC Engineering enjoying direct offsets relating to the equipment; the Defence
Industry Division on offsets training and attachment; and the Malaysian Armed Forces
through indirect offsets involving the Electronic Warfare School. This was purposive
sampling based on the availability of data, the project nearing completion and the
researcher’s past work attachment to MBDA. The questionnaire was also circulated to
the Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, the Malaysian Defence Industry Council, DESO,
UK, and MBDA, UK for comments. The pilot study provided feedback on the structure
of the questionnaire and issues relating to the commercial sensitivity of certain issues.
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Malaysian firms had problems separating out the offsets and non-offsets impacts, as
most of them did not directly separate the two activities in their reporting system. Mary
Bell, DESO, UK, advised the author to reduce the number of questions as most
commercial firms will not have the patience nor time to complete a bulky questionnaire.
The questionnaires were later modified based on the various inputs provided.
1.10.2 Fieldwork
The fieldwork was jointly sponsored by BAE Systems, Cranfield University and the
British Council. Fieldwork to obtain data was undertaken in several stages. First,
through an attachment with the Defence Industry Division (DID), Ministry of Defence,
Malaysia, for a period of three months (30 April till 30 July 2005). During the
attachment, procurement and offset contracts were accessed to interrogate data on
procurement volumes, types of equipment purchased, as well as the type and numbers
of offsets recipients linked to the suppliers. Records obtained from the Ministry of
Defence indicate that up to 2000, there were 240 offset programmes involving 54
beneficiaries.83 Programme beneficiaries comprise the Malaysian Armed Forces, other
government and semi-government agencies, research organisations, universities and
defence and civil companies. Many of these beneficiaries are recipients of more than
one offsets programme.84 A detailed list of beneficiaries and the breakdown of the
programme up to the year 2000 is shown at Appendix C.
Questionnaires were sent out via e-mail and posted with instructions on how they
should be completed. Follow-up calls were made to ensure that the questionnaires had
reached designated parties, that they had understood and were able to complete them
without difficulty. Completed questionnaires, were then either emailed or collected
personally by the author during the industry fieldwork visits. Pre-appointments were
made to meet designated offsets programme managers or coordinator of firms, collect
the questionnaires and also to further probe for information. The set of survey
questionnaires was sent to 100% of the offsets recipient population. The target group for
the questionnaire were offsets programme managers of each company. The population
of defence-related firms in Malaysia is shown in Figure 1.6, comprising 46 firms
(100%) embracing eight aerospace, six maritime, three weapons, six automotive, 13
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ICT and 10 common user firms.85 However, not all of them are recipients or benefits
through offsets. Some 21 defence firms across the various sectors, excluding common
user items, were identified as offset programme recipients based on the MOD, Malaysia
records and the 2002 MIGHT Report. Questionnaires were sent out to the 21 firms,
100% of the offsets recipient population, and responses were received from 16 of these
firms, a response rate of 76%.86 The size, ownership and capability of these companies
varies from large government-owned companies with comprehensive infrastructure and
facilities to small, privately-owned firms, acting as mere trading companies. The full list
of identified companies surveyed and their background is as shown at Appendix D.
Most of these companies are private-owned, based in an identifiable industrial hub or
located close to Armed Forces’ infrastructure and support facilities. Geographical
distributions of the population where questionnaires were sent are shown in Appendix
E.
The questionnaire as per Appendix F contains two introductory letters, one from
Cranfield University and the other from the Ministry of Defence, supporting the
research. The questionnaire is divided into seven sections with several questions in each
section. The questions were prepared based on the research aim and key themes
identified through the literature review and theoretical framework. The questionnaire
has both open and closed questions. The closed questions have a combination of
different types of questions. These include lists questions as per questions 1.07 and
2.01; category questions as per questions 2.02, 2.03, 2.04 and 2.05 and ranking
questions as per question 4.06. Samples of open questions include questions 3.0-3.05,
where responses capture R&D issues as well as part E, questions 5.01-5.09 on the
impact of offsets. The Questions are focused on the following issues:
i. Capturing the impact of offsets on Malaysia’s defence industry.
ii. Evaluating offsets recipient company operations and human resource
development strategy.
iii. Evaluating indigenous firms’ technology development capability.
iv. Assessing the type and quantity of technology transfer through offsets.
v Analysing offsets policy and implementation issues.
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The questionnaire incorporated issues such as offsets processes, technology
development issues, research and development, supply chain management, skills
development, export expansion as well as seeking recommendations on the way forward
for these companies.






Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia (MOD), Malaysian Defence Industry Council,
[online], (MOD, Kuala Lumpur, 2006), (Accessed: 30 September 2004), Avialable
via: www. mod.gov.my.
Fieldwork also involved sending out a second set of open-ended questionnaires as per
Appendix G to 16 defence suppliers. 13 responded to the questionnaire. Some of the
responses to the questionnaire were received via email and some were physically
collected. There are three parts to this questionnaire with part 1 focusing on company
details, part 2 on offsets obligations and part 3 on supplier offsets strategy. In total there
are 26 questions and a table to be completed. The questions are all open-ended
questions. A list of the companies and their backgrounds are shown per Appendix H.
Follow-ups were made to ensure that respondents had received the questionnaire.
Responses were then obtained from those companies via email. In the case of the UK
suppliers to Malaysia, fieldwork trips were made to obtain more information. Visits
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were made to BAE Systems, Vickers (BAE land now), Westland Helicopters (Agusta
Westland now) and MBDA, UK. For other respondents, face-to-face interviews were
held with the supplier company offsets managers or country managers based in
Malaysia. The interviews were all conducted during the fieldwork survey.
Issues that were raised in response to questions in the open-ended questionnaire were
focused on:
i. Definitions of technology.
ii. Conditions for technology transfer and supplier government policies to
technology transfer.
iii. Views of Malaysian company capability, strengths, competitive positioning
and weaknesses.
iv. Cost of offsets (technology).
v. Sustainability of partnerships.
vi. Policy and implementation issues.
vii. Preference of offsets for developing countries.
Interviews were also conducted with defence contractors having offset obligations in
Malaysia, namely, from the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Russia, South Africa
and Brazil. The views of these foreign companies were obtained on the role of offsets in
facilitating technology transfer in Malaysia, the push and pull factors, local industry
capability in terms of technology absorption, research and development. Interviews
were aimed at identifying government policies and technology export restrictions,
including recent developments in the area of offsets.
Finally, interviews were conducted with Department Heads and key personnel in
offsets-related government and non-government agencies to obtain their views on the
role and effectiveness of offsets as a facilitating tool for Malaysian industrial and
technological development. Interviews were scheduled with the Secretary General,
Ministry of Defence and the Chief of the Armed Forces, Malaysia, to obtain their views
on the Ministry’s future policy. A list of the agency representatives interviewed is
shown in Appendix I. Interviews with representatives of government agencies angled
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in on issues related to the government vision, mission and objectives regarding
technology development, the role of offsets in national development policies,
indigenous technology development capability, and offsets policy and implementation
issues.
Field trips were also made to the Offsets Management Offices and related organisations,
including the UK DESO offsets office, Madrid ISDEFE offsets office and the Czech
Republic BAES offsets office to obtain their views on the impact of offsets in the
development of a local technological and industrial base. The organisations that were
approached are shown at Appendix J. The field trips, on the whole, provided
interesting points for pursuing a gap analysis between buyers, sellers and government,
as well as obtaining other offsets-related agencies views on the practices and challenges
of ‘effectively’ employing offsets in the technology transfer process. As the size of the
respondent population for this research effort was small (less than 50), no sampling was
undertaken. Follow-up research was undertaken through telephone interviews and
emails; this was because of the lack of proximity to respondents as well as the high cost
involved in travelling. 87
1.10.3 Data Access
Access to data occurred via permission from the Ministry of Defence, Malaysia. The
Defence Industry Division (DID) had the procurement and offsets contracts, offsets
obligation lists, and data on value and recipients of offsets projects. The MOD was also
extremely helpful in providing the support letter to interview offsets-related defence
firms’ representatives. Access to company documents and financial reports provided
information on firm strategy, vision, mission, objectives, financial status, human
resource development and research and development strategies, and also the types and
levels of technology transfer. Visits included evaluating the workforce and its
capability in terms of levels of education, innovation, and marketing capacity. A
summary of the research plan is as per Appendix K. The Malaysian firms interviewed
provided immediate access due to the importance and relevance of this study and the
value of the research findings towards improving and further enhancing procurement
and offsets policy and procedures. Issues of commercial sensitivity were raised by both
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local and international firms during the fieldwork process. However, due to the author’s
MOD background, both the Malaysian and international firms were receptive to the
research and agreed to cooperate in providing data for the study.88 There was an element
of good will throughout the research process between the author, Malaysian firms,
OEMs, and government agencies. The respondents appreciated the value and
importance of this study as being objective policy-based research. Respondents were
therefore content to discuss issues involved in the research. The respondents were
advised that they would be allowed access to the research findings.
1.11 Data Analysis
1.11.1 Quantitative Data
Quantitative data were analysed using the univariate method. Frequency tables were
used to calculate percentages belonging to each category of data as per the
questionnaire. Category data were classified into sets, according to the characteristics
ranked in order. Tables and charts were used to show the various types, categories, and
levels of impact. Responses were calculated, based on the numbers of respondents
against the total population. Table 1.3 provides a company distribution in terms of
workforce proportion by type of activity. The frequency of company response is
categorised according to the percentage bracket and type of activity. The total frequency
of each category is then counted, and changed into percentages or numbers, based on
the total number of responses, i.e 16.
As respondents numbered only 16, no software packages, such as SPSS, were used to
analyse the data. Excel was used to obtain pie, bar and gantt charts which could then be
used to interpret results. In relation to the semi-structured interview questionnaire
responses from the suppliers, the answers were clustered according to the questions.
These answers were individually analysed to identify similar themes and issues. For
example, question 3.4 and question 3.5 asked the percentage of offsets cost that would
be factored into the main procurement contract and the factors that could increase or
reduce offsets costs.
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20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Total
respondents
Management 11 5 - - - 16
Operation 1 4 2 8 1 16
Maintenance 3 8 4 1 - 16
R&D 14 2 - - 16
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms (July 2005)
1.11.2 Qualitative Research Analysis
Certain software packages such as (CAQDAS) computer aided qualitative data analysis
software, Nvivo, ATLAS, ti, N6 and HyperRESEARCH are available in the market for
qualitative data analysis. However, these software packages are not so widely practised
and the researcher decided not to use any of these software packages for qualitative data
analysis as they were unavailable at the university. Qualitative data were collected and
analysed simultaneously. Each interview was immediately typed into the word
processed file separately according to the relevant categories. The interviews were
grouped into systematic themes based on the guidance of the theoretical framework and
questionnaires. Interviews were not recorded due to the sensitive nature of the subject
matter. Almost all interview notes were hand-written as the interviewees were not
comfortable at being recorded. Issues were raised based on pre-conceived concepts or
themes that had already been identified. Interview notes were immediately transcribed
and keyed into the computer under separate headings in different folders. The folders
were divided according to several categories as per Table 1.4, such as offsets recipient
folders, OEM folders and government folders. Issues raised during the interviews by
these various players were then further broken-down and clustered into broad themes as
shown in table 1.5 such as policy, implementation, impact, benefits and costs. The main
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themes were then further broken-down into sub-themes as per Table 1.6. These themes
were then separated and linked to consistent patterns and recurring issues.
Table 1.4: Categorisation of Folders







































Table 1.5: Categorisation According to Research Themes












Table 1.6: Examples of Sub-Categorisation of Themes
1. Policy









































Source: Author, October 2006
The researcher found the thematic approach to be less complex and cost saving. It was
also very reliable as the researcher has first-hand experience of offsets policy
formulation, and its process and implementation by the Malaysian MOD. Although the
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qualitative method is time-consuming, the researcher had the advantage of substantial
background knowledge to the subject and recognised target groups to be interviewed.
1.11.3 Research Reliability and Validity
The researcher was conscious of the need to ensure credibility of the research findings.
To reduce the possibility of getting a wrong answer, two important elements were
particularly emphasised - data reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the extent to
which data collection techniques and analysis will yield consistent findings.89 The
triangulation method was used to increase reliability, as different sources were used to
reinforce research results. Robson identifys four threats to reliability - subject or
participant error, subject or participant bias, observer error, and observer bias.90 In
conducting this study, to avoid participant error, the respondents were interviewed
during their less busy times by pre-booking the appointments with their secretaries. This
flexibility provided respondents with the chance to be in a relaxed atmosphere and to
chat more freely without any interruption. In terms of subject or participant bias, in
most cases, the CEO was met in the same organisation and interviewed separately to
counter-check the accuracy and reliability of the data or information provided.
However, in some of the companies, the CEOs were not available for meetings.
Observer error was minimised as the author was the only person engaged in the
conducting the whole fieldwork study, including distribution of questionnaires, and
interviews. Observer bias was a crucial factor due to the author’s background of having
worked in the offsets environment and having dealt with many of these firms. Another
important element in relation to reliability was the element of generalisability. This
refers to whether the research findings may be equally applicable to other research
settings. In this case, as offsets are country-specific, the research findings are unique to
Malaysia and the theory cannot easily be generalised.
There are several types of validity such as face validity, concurrent validity, predictive
validity, construct validity and convergent validity.91 This research utilised the multi-
method through comparing the same concept developed through data analysis with
other methods to obtain validity. In terms of the validity of data, the research ensured
that the findings were really what they appeared to be. Measurement was cross-checked
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by asking experts in the field, particularly the practitioners of offsets, both government
and industry. There were potential problems in relation to the data as some of the
answers obtained through interviewees were influenced by the researcher’s previous
position within the government. This problem was solved by cross-checking the results
of interviews with questionnaire replies and archival sources. For example, some
companies claim to have R&D facilities in the questionnaire but during interviews and
participatory observation, it was clear that such facilities did not exist.
1.11.4 Research Values
Values in research relate to the researcher’s personal beliefs or feelings. Values have
regard to the choice of the research area, formulation of research question, choice of
method, formulation of research design, data collection techniques, data analysis, and
data interpretation to be held through-out the research process. The researcher had to
monitor and control the extent of bias in the research process due to the researcher
serving at the Ministry of Defence, Malaysia. The element of bias was controlled by
ensuring that the data gathered from the various sources were triangulated. There was a
tendency to exhibit sympathy towards local companies due to the closeness of long-
term relationships that had been established between the researcher and the research
subjects. The representatives interviewed view the researcher as a government
‘missionary’ and a target to vent their dissatisfaction. The researcher had to
continuously emphasise to the research subjects, the purpose of the research and
researcher’s role.92 This is where the triangulation method of data cross-checking
between the various sources was extremely useful in validating data reliability.
1.11.5 Research Ethics
Ethics, in the context of research, refers to the appropriateness of behaviour in relation
to the rights of those who become the subject of your work, or are affected by it.93 A
code of ethics provides a statement of principles and procedures for the conduct of the
research. Research ethics must be adhered across all the four stages of research. At the
first stage, the author ensured that the privacy of respondents is protected; that the time
frame for the research was determined; and that interviews were conducted according to
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pre-arranged appointments. The author also avoided questions creating stress or
discomfort, though there were data that could not be revealed by the respondents due to
commercial sensitivity. The author also agreed that anonymity and confidentiality were
strictly observed. During the second stage of design and initial access to data, the author
maintained the position that no pressure would be directed towards the respondents
enabling data access, and all information was to be provided voluntarily. At the third
stage of data collection, the author strictly focused on the research project’s aim.
Finally, at the analysis and reporting stage, the author ensured that the data were not
misrepresented, not selective, and did not report or misrepresent the statistical accuracy
of the data collected.94
Research findings as well as policy recommendations are to be presented to the relevant
stakeholders, primarily the Offsets Committee chaired by the Secretary General,
Ministry of Defence, Malaysia. Copies of the dissertation will also be sent to the Prime
Minister’s Department, the Ministry of Finance, and the Economic Planning Unit for
further action and implementation. The implementation schedule of overall research is
shown at Appendix-L. The schedule over-ran by six months for two principal reasons:
the fieldwork research took longer than expected and the researcher was also involved
in various conference presentations in the second and third year of PhD programme.
1.12 Research Limitations
Several limitations of the research process revealed themselves. These limitations
include:
i. Obtaining up-to-date information and data on offset programmes due to
several movements of records: in the past, all records were kept by the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry. This task was then handed
over to the Ministry of Finance and currently all records are under the
supervision of the Ministry of Defence.
ii. Delays in returning questionnaires within the stipulated timeframe by
research subjects, leading to slippage of the research schedule.
iii. Unavailability of target groups (offsets managers) for interview. This
was because most of them were actively involved in the day-to-day
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operations of their company. Appointments had to be altered or the
researcher had to wait for a long time before the appointment.
iv. Frequent cancellation of appointments as the target group is at the upper
management level and they lack the time.
v. Refusal by interviewees to commit to certain questions due to the
sensitivity of the subject matter.
vi. Unavailability of systematic and structured data on offsets projects
before 2001. The MIGHT report was used to capture data on offsets
projects before 2001.
1.13 Study Road Map
After this chapter’s scene-setting, Chapter 2 scrutinises the literature on economic
development, particularly with regard to technological and industrial development. The
chapter focuses on the differing theories and perspectives of economic development. It
argues that technology and industrialisation have provided the combined impetus
towards economic development in both developed and developing countries. The
chapter also provides an insight into why nations choose to venture into defence
industrialisation with its potential of contributing to overall technology development.
Chapter two addresses the important definitional and scoping issues relating to
technology transfer. Chapter three’s discussion progresses by providing an in-depth
evaluation of offsets and their role in defence industrialisation. This includes issues such
as definitions, frameworks, mechanisms, tools and various models of offsets across the
world. It then discusses the development of offsets in Malaysia. Chapter three also
discusses strategic partnerships formed between the government, sellers, local firms and
third parties in the offsets implementation process. Chapter 4 focuses on Malaysia’s
national economic policies and objectives. It then evaluates the Malaysian government’s
role towards promoting industrial and technological development. Chapter 4 includes a
discussion on how the government views offsets as a mechanism for technology
transfer. Chapter 5 offers an analysis of Malaysia’s offsets policy, including issues
related to the offsets strategy, process and implementation. This chapter uses the results
of the empirical data analysis to evaluate the impact of offsets on technology
development capability within the Malaysian defence industry. Further, the Malaysian
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defence industrial strategy, human resource development and R&D capability is also
evaluated. The chapter discusses the benefits of offsets to Malaysia including job-
creation, skills enhancement, dual-use technology, product/process innovation, inter-
industry linkages, technology clusters, research and development and indigenisation.
Finally, this chapter analyses the offsets cost as well as the challenges in realising a
sustainable defence industry leading to Malaysianisation. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes
that offsets have enjoyed mixed results in enhancing Malaysia’s defence industrial and
technological development, and offers policy recommendations geared toward crafting a
more effective offset model for Malaysia.
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Chapter 2
2. INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2.1 Introduction
Technology is a gift of God. After the gift of life it is perhaps the greatest of God’s gifts. It is the mother of
civilizations, of arts and of sciences.
Freeman Dyson1
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical review of the literature analysing the
key theories concerning industrial and technological development. The literature review
seeks to demonstrate three factors. Firstly, the availability of resources in fields related
to research on development, industrialisation, technology and offsets. Second, this
research tends to establish the limitations of literature on the subjects being analysed.
Finally, this study seeks to demonstrate how offsets fits into the wider context.2 Besides
these three main factors, this literature review also provides the author with the
opportunity to further refine the research questions and objectives, discover explicit
recommendations from other literature, avoid work duplication, obtain up-to-date
information about the subject studies, and finally, to discover research approaches,
strategies and techniques useful to develop research questions and objectives.3
Technological and industrial development has become inseparable themes in the pursuit
of economic progress in developed and emerging economies. Rapid industrialisation,
sophisticated technological development and high levels of productivity are seen to be
the source of both rapidly rising living standards and national prestige in the developed
countries of Europe, the United States of America, and Japan.4 The rapid phase of
modernisation in the first world countries have inspired the developing world to join the
‘industrial wagon’,5 seeking economic diversification to industrialise and catch up with
industrialised nations. 6
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Table 2.1 shows the ratio of real incomes per head between the developed and the
developing countries.7 These figures portray the increasing gap between the two worlds.
In an era of globalisation of technology8 developing countries have two main reasons to
worry: first, how to ‘catch up’ with the developed countries, which are aggressively
exploiting and increasing their technological capability, and, second, how to ensure a
sustainable and fair distribution of industrial and technological development.
Table 2.1: Ratio of Real Income per Head between Developed and Developing Countries










Source: Worldbank, Country Report, [online], (Worldbank, Washington, 2005), (Accessed: 11 January
2005), Avialable via: www.worldbank.org.
The importance of economic development to developing countries has led to a wealth of
literature on industrialisation and technology transfer. The essence of much of the
literature on technology transfer in the early stages drew empirically and theoretically
from the many ways in which the market for foreign technology functioned, and these
were normally not in the interest of developing countries. Problems included differences
in technological innovation and diffusion, dependence, unequal sharing of the
investment benefits, inappropriate foreign technology, absence of an autonomous and
indigenous science system due to the absence of genuine transfer of technology; this
latter factor was often because it was not in the interests of the technology supplier to
lose an important source of monopolistic control. The literature also raises issues
relating to the industrial and technological gap between the have and the have-nots, the
lack of competitiveness and the struggle to maintain industrial sustainability. 9
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Much of development economic literature stresses the role of the state in assisting
industrialisation and technological transfer. Government assists the transfer of
technology via multiple modes, including foreign-direct investment, technical
arrangement, bilateral cooperation and offsets. Offsets, mainly tied to arms
procurement, have become a preferred mode of technology transfer for governments in
developing countries. This is due to the leverage that purchasing countries possess in
demanding technology and other economic compensation packages. Governments of
developing countries heavily utilise offsets to enhance their defence industrial bases and
improve military capability as well as promoting spill over-effects into the civil sector.
The literature in the offsets field is wide. The sources used and the framework presented
in this chapter reflects the thrust and particular concerns underpinning the research. The
chapter will initially define development and the need for industrialisation, with a
particular focus on developing countries. It will then discuss the various
industrialisation models and strategies. The task is to define technology, analyse the
multiple issues related to technology and development, and evaluating the mechanisms
for transferring technology. Finally, the chapter will evaluate the relevance of offsets as
a mechanism for indigenisation, industrial competitiveness and sustainability in
developing countries, with particular emphasis on Malaysia’s defence industry.
2.2 Nuts and Bolts of Development
2.2.1 Development or Growth?
The study of development is multidimensional and multidisciplinary, ranging from the
economic, political, societal and cultural. There has been a huge volume of literature
written on development economics.10 This field remains an interesting component for
researchers due to the various political issues surrounding developing countries. This
research will focus on the development and defence economics and the role of
technology and industrialisation in the context of developing countries.
There is often confusion in distinguishing development and growth. The terms are often
used interchangeably. Throughout this thesis, the term economic development is
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preferred to economic growth. Economic growth has a connotation of quantitative
expansions in economic variables, especially aggregate and per capita national incomes
as measured by such statistics as GNP. Therefore, economic growth is concerned with
measuring growth in economic variables and identifying their relationships such as
between national income growth and the speed of capital formation.
Economic development, on the other hand, is usually conceived as a process involving
not only quantitative expansion but also changes in non-quantitative factors, such as
institutions, organisations and culture under which economies operate.11 Development
economics is, to a greater extent than traditional economics or even political economy
concerned with the political processes necessary for effecting rapid structural and
institutional transformation of entire societies in a manner that will most efficiently
bring the fruits of economic progress to the broadest segments of their populations.12
The role of government in coordinating economic planning as well as broad based
domestic and international economic policies is usually viewed as an essential
component of development economics. Development economics seeks to address the
needs of developing countries on issues such as poverty, famine, environment,
technology gaps, education and health.13
Economic development aims to raise the overall development of a society. An adequate
definition of economic development is not easy to construct. Todaro defined
development economics as a more comprehensive discipline compared to economics
and political economy.14 He regards development economics as being concerned with
the efficient allocation of existing scarce production resources, with sustained growth
over time. Development economics must also deal with economic, social, political and
institutional mechanisms, both public and private, necessary to bring about rapid and
large scale impact on the levels of living for peoples in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and
the former socialist countries.15
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2.2.2 Nature of Developing Countries
Development terminology has become slippery over the past few years. Developing
countries can no longer be categorised as a homogenous group of countries with
relatively low levels of income per capita, with a strong specialisation in the production
and exports of primary products. Various international organisations, such as the
OECD, United Nation and the World Bank have their own classifications for
developing countries.
Wide differences are taking place between groups of developing countries, as reflected
in their levels of industrialisation,16 the degree of export orientation of the
manufacturing sector, and the contribution of manufacturing to total exports. This is due
to differences in the availability of natural, human and capital resources and physical
infrastructure facilities. The World Bank distinguishes developing countries based on
their Gross National Product (GNP) per capita.17 Based on this indicator, countries are
divided into low, middle and upper-middle income groups. The middle-income
countries are further divided into lower-middle and upper-middle income groups. The
upper middle income group is further distinguished as the Newly Industrialised
Countries (NICs) based on their levels of industrial and technological development.
Malaysia, based on this classification falls under the special category of NICs amongst
the upper-middle income country together with countries such as South Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan.
2.3 Road to Industrialisation
2.3.1 Defining Industrialisation
The term ‘industrialisation’ is widely misunderstood. It does not simply refer to
economic development,18 but an outcome and indicator of economic development. The
process of industrialisation forms the core of economic development for many
developing countries. Various attempts have been made to define industrialisation. Tom
Hewitt defines industrialisation as the production of all material goods not grown
directly on the land.19
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In simple terms, industrialisation is a process whereby economic development moves
from an agricultural basis to industrial dominance and finally to a service industry
focus. During the early stages of economic development, developing countries remain
predominantly agricultural. In the post colonisation era, specialisation in agriculture and
raw materials is identified with backwardness and industrialisation with increased
economic activity, productivity and increased standards of living. As industrial
development further matures, the production structure gradually progresses.20
According to Sutcliffe, based on the International Standard Industrial Classification
(ISIC), revised in 1968, and shown in Table 2.2 below, he indicated that industrialised
nations should have 60% of their industrial output in the manufacturing sector21 and
10% of their populations employed in the industrial sector.22 In the early 1970s, only
Japan fulfilled these criteria in Asia. 23
Table 2.2: ISIC Classification of Industrialisation
Division Activity
Division 1 Mining and Quarrying
Division 2 &3 Manufacturing
Division 4 Construction
Division 5 Electricity, Gas and Sanitary
Source: R B Sutcliffe, Industry and Underdevelopment, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Oxford,
1971, pp.23-25.
There are differing opinions on how industrialisation should progress in developing
countries. The opponents of industrialisation, such as Myrdal and Elliott, argue against
achieving development through industrialisation.24 These observers view
industrialisation as a new form of imperialism, neglecting the agricultural sector.
Industrialisation is claimed to be overly dependent on foreign technology resulting in
various drawbacks to developing countries. These include unemployment due to
implementation of the wrong choice of technology, capital intensive industry in a labour
intensive environment, environmental degradation, pollution and exploitation of rich
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against poor nations.25 However, despite these arguments, industrialisation has
continued to be dominant and has remained an important strategy for the economic
development of underdeveloped countries.
Academics, such as Feber, Just and Zilberman, posit the view that underdeveloped
countries must develop their agricultural sector first.26 Development of the agricultural
sector ensures stability of prices as well as social and economic stability. The
superstructure of modern economic development, which involves the setting up of a
wide range of industries, must be based on the firm foundation of agriculture. For this
purpose, it would be appropriate for developing countries to concentrate resources
initially on the development of the agricultural sector and other simple industrial
activities, which do not absorb much capital. But once a reasonable supply of food and
other wage goods is assured, countries can then allocate resources for the development
of the modern industrial sector, ensuring self-sustained economic growth.27
However, this view was dismissed by some development economists, such as Sutcliffe,
arguing that developing countries should focus on the manufacturing sector28 due to its
productivity growth and technological development.29 The manufacturing and service
industries have become key components of industrialisation in some developing
countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, countries in Asia, such as Taiwan, South Korea and
Singapore, and in Latin America, such as Brazil, have greatly accelerated the growth of
manufacturing outputs and as a consequence have rapidly industrialised.30 Despite
arguments that this model of development is defective due to high dependency on
export markets, reliance on MNCs for capital-intensive foreign technologies, creating
little value-added employment, the track record of economic growth in these countries
has proven to the contrary. Besides China, GDP growth of the NICs has been one of the
highest and fastest in the world. Several pull factors, such as independence from
colonial power, unemployment due to the stagnation of the agricultural sector,
investments from MNCs subject to state control and imported technology, have helped
these countries ‘leap frog’ industrial stages, enhancing technological development.31
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Industrialisation can occur at three different levels: the country, industry and firm level.
Figure 2.1 shows that at the country level, the industrial shift is from agriculture to
industry, with respect to output and labour. At the industry level, the shift is from less
sophisticated technology to more sophisticated technology of product, process, know-
how and management. Finally, at the firm level, the shift is from low level labour
intensive work to high level capital intensive and high technology related work. This
shift in the industrialisation process may increase productivity, income per capita,
employment and growth in other sectors of the economy through backward and forward
linkages.
Figure 2.1: Three levels of Industrialisation
Source: Ashish Kumar, The Impact of Policy on Firms’ Performance: The Case of CNC machine Tool
Industry in India, PhD Thesis, Van Wageningen Universiteit, the Netherlands, 2003.
The present study focuses on the shift of industrialisation process at all three levels
being country, industry and firm level. At the initial stages of industrialisation, there
will be an increase in manufacturing in terms of total output and share of employment in
manufacturing within total employment. As manufacturing activity progresses further,
there will be higher value added activities with an increase in the technology absorption
level, including investment, infrastructure development, skills enhancement and
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starts with the processing of raw materials and commodities requiring only low-tech,
labour intensive inputs. The comparative advantage at this stage is based on natural
resources and low costs of labour. When a country starts producing intermediate
products, more labour intensive and capital intensive activities are undertaken. There is
a gradual reallocation of labour from primary products to intermediate types of
products. Division of labour at this point results in increased specialisation and
production and higher use of intermediate products. During this stage, comparative
advantage depends on sustained investments, adaptation and assimilation of technology
such as the ability to learn. At the advanced stages of industrialisation, such as in the
defence and aerospace industry, where technology intensive and knowledge intensive
activities are undertaken, the need is for high levels of investment, technology,
management skills, technical skills and know-how. Comparative advantage at this level
depends on a firm’s ability to absorb, adapt, improve and innovate.32









There are generally three different models of industrialisation. First is the capitalist
model, adopted by a majority of countries in the world. Firms rather than governments
do the planning. Countries such as Britain, Japan and the United States, with open
economies, follow this model. Second is the socialist model. Eastern European
countries, such as Russia, Poland and Ukraine pursued industrialisation under the
socialist system. With a closed economy, the industrialisation process was hampered by
their involvement in the closed economic system. The industrial planning of these
economies was solely done by government.33 The third model is the ‘late’
industrialising model, which can be further divided into two tiers. The first tier consists
of countries like Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. These ‘newly
industrialising countries’ have promoted strong ‘export-push strategies’ by utilising
existing technologies with labour intensive products and then progressing quickly to
more complex products that were capital and technology intensive.34 These countries
realise that rapid industrialisation was crucial for raising the standards of living. Hong
Kong,35 South Korea and Taiwan had strong support from their governments to build up
the international competitiveness of domestic industry, eventually raising living
standards.
The second tier consists of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. These countries have
been reliant on selective government intervention to promote industrialisation.
However, these second tier countries faced (and, indeed, face) constraints in their
industrialisation strategy, including the small initial size of the domestic market,
weaknesses of the national industrial entrepreneurial community, the lack of managerial
expertise, limited technological capacity and international marketing networks.
2.4 Why Do Developing Countries Need to Industrialise?
The question as to why countries need to industrialise has been debated at length at
many international forums. Adam Smith through his 1776 treatise ‘An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’, viewed industrialisation and trade
liberalisation as the driving force for economic growth. Since then, different schools of
thought have expressed views on the need to industrialise. Post-World War II literature
on economic development has been dominated by four competing strands of thought
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establishing the need for industrialisation and technological development, namely: the
‘linear stages of growth’ model; theories and patterns of structural change; the
international dependency revolution; and neo-classical/neo-liberal theory.36 These
theoretical frameworks offer an understanding of the stages of economic growth that led
to industrialisation, the role of the state in promoting structural growth and industrial
development, and the politico-economic need for developing countries to be self-reliant.
2.4.1 Linear Stages of Growth Model (LSG)
Advocates of the LSG model, in the 1950s and 1960s, viewed development as a series
of sequential stages of economic growth that all countries must pass through. W.W
Rostow identified the five stages as per Figure 2.3, as the traditional society; pre-take-
off; take–off; drive to maturity, and the age of mass consumption.37






Rostow’s Five Stages Model
Source: W Rostow W.W, The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non Communist Manifesto,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960.
Rostow explained that at the traditional society stage, production techniques are largely
primitive, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology attitudes towards the
physical world, with most people engaged in agricultural and related work with power
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vested in landownership.38 Next, the pre-take-off stage is associated with the ideas and
processes initiated for changes from the old culture to a modern alternative. Rostow
quoted the example of Western Europe in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth
centuries, where medieval societies disintegrated, modern society grew, and trade
developed. This was also the era when the possibilities for production were opened-up
through modern science. The third stage, the ‘take off’, is viewed as the most important
period amongst all the stages, when all the ‘old blocks and resistances to steady growth
are finally overcome’ and when ‘compound interest becomes built, as it were, into
[society’s] habits and institutional structure’.39 During this stage, there is a rapid
increase of economic activity fuelled by equally sudden spurts of savings, investments
and radical technological change. A new entrepreneurial class emerges, agricultural
productivity improves and resources, including population, begin to move into
industrial activities located in towns.40 At the fourth stage, industries become mature.
Rostow claims that during this period, nations will invest 10-20% of their national
income towards new production capacity. Industries will forge ahead, mature and level-
off whilst new industries will arrive on the scene. This era witnesses a mature economy
and society, resting on the absorption of home-generated technologies.41 Finally, in the
age of mass consumption, nations reach a level where their economic system is able to
produce a surplus.42 At this juncture, leading sectors of a nation shift from heavy
industries towards consumer durables and services. 43
Developing countries are said to take on similar stages of economic growth. These
countries are primarily agricultural-based and backward in terms of culture, political
systems, social institutions and economic resources.44 The possible solution is to
borrow, buy or copy those capitalist features of the rich countries felt to be instrumental
in bringing about economic growth. They need to undertake a transition to become
developed. The right quantity and mixture of savings, investments and foreign aid are
all necessary to enable developing nations to proceed along an economic growth path
that had historically been followed by the more developed western countries (e.g.
Britain and the United States).45 It is felt that developing countries have the advantage
of being late-comers and so avoiding the mistakes made by the now developed
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countries. However, a total application of the LSG model to developing countries by
Rostow was refuted by some scholars such as Myrdal, Myint and John.
Other schools of development heavily criticized the stage model. For instance, there can
be no one path to industrialisation for all countries as development is influenced by
various factors such as historical background, economic resources, political climate,
government policies and infrastructure.46 LSG was said to be unrealistic and
Eurocentric.47 There was also an absence of discussion on issues such as the type of
institutional and policy changes necessary in developing countries. Additionally, there
are likely to be traits that should not be emulated by the developing countries.48
Contemporary economists such as Nash,49 Roxborough50 and Apter51 have attempted to
reconstruct the linear stage model. Apter, for instance, argued that modernisation
approaches could produce a coherent result for developing countries.52 The
unpopularity of the LSG model in developing countries gave rise to the structuralist
model.
2.4.2 The Structuralist Model
The structuralist model was developed by a range of writers from Latin America,
amongt them being Raul Prebisch.53 Before this model flourished, Latin America, in the
years before the great depression of the 1930s pursued policies of primary-product
exporting. International trade at that time was based on the Ricardian Theory of
comparative advantage,54 structuralist felt to be ineffective for developing countries.55
This is because products exported by poor countries, mainly food and raw materials,
face greater falls in prices during periods of economic instability thereby benefiting
consumers mainly located in rich countries.56 The Ricardian theory, however,
guaranteed industrial prowess for the Western economy and relegated the rest of the
world to the status of raw material suppliers. The demand for raw materials fell
drastically during the great depression as did the income for Latin America. This was
the era when changes were initiated by governments of Latin America to adapt to these
adverse circumstances.
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Prebish disputed the Ricardian economic theory that international specialisation
conferred benefits upon all nations. He instead advocated the centre-periphery idea,
where developing economies are categorised as the periphery with a secondary and
declining position as primary product producers, while developed countries enjoying
rapid industrialisation are located at the centre. Structuralists argue that the terms of
international trade benefitted the rich at the expense of the poorer nations.57 Prebish’s
initial argument was based on the fact that most of the developing countries exported
primary commodities to the rich countries, which in turn sold manufactured products
made out of the same commodities back to the developing nations. He argues that the
‘value added’ from manufactured products will definitely be higher than that for raw
commodities, thus creating less earnings for the developing countries.58 The different
roles assigned to primary exports and industrial exports by the international division of
labour, results in an unequal distribution of technical progress. The core economies tend
to achieve an even greater technological lead, thus securing dominance.
The structuralist school attempted to use modern economic theory to reflect the internal
process of structural change that a ’typical’ developing country must undergo if it is to
succeed in sustaining a process of rapid economic growth. A stucturalist economic
theory was formulated to model local economies so that governments could effectively
plan for national development. Accordingly, Prebish called for the pursuance of national
programmes of industrialisation behind tariff barriers.59 He suggested that developing
countries must undergo structural change to generate and sustain economic growth.60
Raul Prebisch later suggested that developing countries should embark on ISI strategies
to overcome economic underperformance.
However, this policy backfired when the dependency group later focused on the failure
of import substitution strategy (ISI) to create an independent national economy,
allowing transnational corporations to take over most of the dynamic sectors of the
economy. The developing world was seen as a source of cheap labour and the location
of capital-intensive assembly plants, without first-world research and development
activities in place. The high rates of growth in East Asia based on the exports of
manufactured goods to the first world were dismissed as in no way significantly
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different from the old raw materials export-led growth model, which caused third world
underdevelopment in the first place.61
Structuralists have also been concerned with technological dependence arising out of
excessive reliance on imported technology. Firms in developed countries were felt to be
providing inappropriate third-generation technology at excessively high prices. The
technologies developed in Western countries may be inappropriate for conditions in
developing countries, in that they may be too capital-intensive for the labour market or
too large scale for the small markets of many developing countries, creating unused
capacity. There is also a lack of local technological capability within the developing
world.62 This weakens the bargaining power of firms in negotiating to acquire imported
technology, limiting their ability to adapt the imported technology to local conditions.
When countries import a technology package through a TNC, where all the principal
elements are provided from abroad, there are no opportunities for local learning.
Nevertheless, due to the lack of alternative sources and in order to gain competitive
advantage locally, Third world buyers choose to pay extra for these technologies. These
factors create a strong urge for the industrialisation of developing countries to be self-
reliant, building their own technological capability at an early stage of development.63
Many of the countries adopting this model have pursued an import substitution
industrialisation (ISI) strategy in line with the Keynesian economic model, structuralists
believe that government should play an important role towards industrialisation in
developing countries.64 Government should, through the ‘infant industry’ protectionist
model, protect local industries through trade barriers, tariffs and other protection
mechanisms.65 However, structuralism fell out of favour as the drive to enhance
industrialisation faltered. Political interference, lack of infrastructural support, large
investments, the inability to cope with increasingly complex technology, made many
countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Indonesia abandon this model and look
towards an outward industrialisation model.
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2.4.3 Dependency Theory
Contrary to neoclassical theory, which had assumed that economic growth was
beneficial to all and has been distributed along the value-chain (pareto optimal), the
dependencia group were not convinced that economic development in the developed
countries has necessarily trickled down to the developing world. The dependency theory
deals directly and explicitly with the issue of underdevelopment, and developing
countries pursuing the ambition of attaining self-reliance. Dependency theory argues
that poverty and underdevelopment are caused by the negative influences of advanced
countries.66 Underdevelopment is blamed on imperialism, colonialism and western
capitalism. Imperialism has drained the colonies of resources that could have been used
for investment and killed off local capitalism through competition.67
Surpluses produced at the periphery were extracted and expropriated by the centre.68
There is continuous reference in the literature to this scenario where the developed
countries tend to impoverish the developing countries through ‘backwash effects’, ‘low
level equilibrium traps’, backward sloping supply curves, ‘critical minimum efforts’, all
of which tend to impact negatively on the future possibilities for developing countries.69
Early versions of the dependency theory were inclined to claim that Third world
countries would remain locked into ‘classical dependence’, producing primary goods
and importing finished goods. These versions did not see the change in production
structure called for by the structuralists, namely industrial development.
Industrialisation in the developing countries was claimed not to be genuine and highly
dependent on the advanced capitalist world.70 Developing countries were claimed to be
looped in a ‘vicious cycle’ of dependence on foreign sources of technology for
industrial development.
Preston identified three core features of dependency: (a) the importance of considering
both the historical experience of peripheral countries and the phases of involvement
with wider encompassing systems; (b) the necessity of identifying the specific
economic, political and cultural linkages of centres and peripheries; and (c) the
requirement for active state involvement in the pursuit of development. Unlike
modernisation theory that describes the smooth transition of the underdeveloped
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countries from traditional to modern phases; the dependencia model offers a story of
how the peripheral countries fitted into the expanding sphere of the capitalistic core
creating a series of asymmetrical relationships between the periphery and core. The
dependencia theory called for attention on a wider political-economy, within which
particular nation states operated. The experiences of the peripheral countries were to be
found in a pattern of economic, social and cultural linkages with the more powerful core
countries. As opposed to the modernisation theory that emphasised the market place, the
dependency group wanted an independent pattern of development. The state was to
become a key vehicle in the development project. Furtado also mentioned the key role
of the state in political reform strategy. 71
Nevertheless, dependency theory has been criticized for being vague.72 For example,
Lall argues that countries like Canada and Belgium are more dependent on foreign
investment than India or Pakistan, but they are not underdeveloped. 73 The dependency
theory stressed the notion of self-reliance and how states should free themselves from
being dependent on foreign sources for technology.
2.4.4 The Post Washington Consensus (PWC)
The 1980s and 1990s brought a new dimension to developmental economics in the form
of ‘new development economics’. The Washington Consensus emphasises the
stabilisation of the economy through control of the money supply and enhancement of
growth through supply-side measures aimed at boosting private sector activity, such as
privatisation.74 However this group emphasised the benefits and role of free market
enterprise, open-economics and the privatisation of inefficient public enterprises and
export-oriented industrialisation.75 This group claims that industrial growth failure is not
due to exploitative external and internal forces but rather due to too much government
intervention and regulation. Neo-liberal academia argued that the market left to its own
devices is a far more efficient arbiter of economic development.76
According to the Washington model, competitiveness is eroded due to too much
government intervention and poor resource allocation, such as incorrect pricing policies,
high tariff rates, trade barriers and too much local industry protection. Neo-liberals
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prefer to rely on the market to choose the technology most appropriate for a given
industry in a given country as they view technology as a ‘black box.’77 Neo-liberalists
argue that technology is an important variable in the cost calculation, recommending
that developing countries should use tried and tested technologies to keep the initial
investment cost low.78
The Washington Consensus group believed that technology development and
industrialisation are best nurtured by creating a correct set of incentives by ‘getting
prices right’. They provided little room for intervention policy. The reforms argue for
removal of state-induced policies such as privatisation, price controls, discretionary
taxes and subsidies. Any market-based resource allocation policy was seen as
distortionary. It was assumed that laissez-faire industrial policy would result in optimal
allocation of resources for technology development. Any reference to tacit knowledge
asymmetry as being disadvantageous to technological development, were completely
ignored. The group mainly viewed the positive effects, dismissing the constraints due to
limitations on the supply side. However, the Washington consensus was undermined by
the failure of the free market system in many of the developing countries. Many of these
developing countries did not have the structural adjustment capability or the potential
for additional investments and high quality bureaucrats.
A Report by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) to understand the
economic miracle of East Asian countries mentioned that for East Asian developing
countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, the dominant approach was to
emphasise market forces and the need to take advantage of international market
opportunities.79 However, the government’s role was seen as providing a suitable
environment within which private initiative can flourish. The Report highlighted that in
these countries; the government intervened to foster development and in some cases the
development of specific industries. The Report also showed that in the NIC countries,
government intervention actually increased growth which otherwise would not have
occurred. Based on these arguments, the Post Washington Consensus (PWC) group
called for government intervention.80 However, government intervention in this case
does not imply the old style of intervention. The PWC consensus discusses
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transformation of society including issues of sustainability, equity and democracy. It
talks about how the public-private partnership, arm’s length government approach and
smart partnership’ with industry was promoted to assure competitive and sustainable
industry. 81
PWC argues that the market mechanism alone cannot create technology development.82
The market is influenced by other features, such as the tacit and imperfect nature of
technological knowledge and informational asymmetries. PWC group argue for
selective government intervention through industrial policy, strategic interventions in
trade and the creation of dynamic national innovation systems. Selective industrial
policies are required to identify and promote specific sectors as well as to increase
investment in technology generation.83
2.5 Industrialisation Strategies of Developing Countries
The role of government is necessary to make strategic choices with respect to
industrialisation in developing countries. Even countries such as the UK and US, which
are today champions of free trade and free market policies, were strongly dependent on
government support in their early stages of industrialisation.84 In developing countries,
government often intervenes in areas such as the investment of scarce resources and the
types and scale of technology to encourage industrialisation. Governments may carry
out their strategies through Industrial Master Plans. The following section will discuss
some of the industrial stratgies of developing countries.
Developing countries evolve from a purely agricultural base in the early stages towards
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) and some of them opt for an export-oriented
industrialisation (EOI) strategy. Many of these countries themselves go on to employ
both the ISI and EOI strategies for the best industrial outcome. For example, Chenery,
as per Table 2.3, classified development strategies into four categories, namely, primary
specialisation, mainly concentrated on agriculture with minimal industrialisation;
exclusively import substitution industrialisation; EOI and ISIs as well as Exclusive
Production Zones; with EOI and ISI, with a more dominating EOI.85 However, this
classification proved not to be stationary, changing over time. For instance, Malaysia,
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which was classified as having primary specialisation in the 1960s and 1970s, is today a
country specialising in industrial production.



















EOI and ISI with a
more dominating
EOI
Source: Chenery H B and Syrquin M, Patterns of Development, 1950-1970, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1975.
2.5.1 Import Substitution Industrialisation
ISI was introduced in the 1930s into Latin America, in the 1940s into late-
industrialising countries, and in the 1950s into other parts of the developing world,
particularly into the NIC countries, such as South Korea and Singapore. ISI was
employed by the developing countries to replace selected exports with local
production.86
The literature on ISI argues that it was introduced in the developing countries for
various reasons, including self-reliance, building indigenous technological capability
and diversification to capture export markets. The State was identified as a major player
in the ISI stage. Governments provided the impetus for industrial development through
incentives, such as developing infrastructure, offering tax holidays, protecting domestic
industry through infant industry protection policies and imposing indirect mechanisms
such as State subsidies.87 In some countries, OEMs played an important role by
assisting through partnership or joint venture.
The ISI industries, focusing largely on assembly processes, relied heavily on imported
materials and components, these having to be purchased from industrialised countries.
This created a heavy reliance on imported inputs and foreign managers. Most
importantly, the domestic industries lost competitiveness and innovativeness due to
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limited technological capability as a result of government protectionism and a less
experienced management and workforce.88 Firms were less motivated to seek newer
and more efficient technology or adapt it to local needs. Lack of competition created
inefficient firms in terms of production quality, productivity and price. Capital-intensive
modern technology failed to create the appropriate jobs for locals, limiting the growth
of the domestic market. It was also felt that ISI strategy undermined agricultural
development.89 Meanwhile, extensive government intervention led to corruption and
‘rent-seeking’ on a significant scale.90 Countries like Chile, Pakistan and Ghana failed
miserably in the 1960s due to the implementation of the ISI policy.91
According to Chenery:
Over time these policies led to ……… relatively low levels of exports, diversion of resources from
agriculture, and ultimately a slowdown in the growth of industry and Gross National Product (GNP) as
the possibilities for import substitution were progressively exhausted. Because of this market limit, the
strategy of inward-looking development usually succeeds in eliminating the specialization in primary
production but not achieving manufactured exports.92
Neo-liberals viewed the ISI strategy as economically inefficient due to the promotion of
inefficient and high cost industries. Most of these industries based on heavy goods
production take a long lead-time for tangible returns on investments.93 In the early
1960s, several developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Columbia and Mexico
began to abandon the idea of import substitution at all cost.94 A new approach called
export-oriented industrialisation became the way forward for these countries.95
2.5.2 Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI)
Multinationals have mainly been responsible for the promotion of EOI into developing
countries. Locational factors, disciplined unskilled labour at low wages, adequate
infrastructure, and stimulative government policies with tax incentives as well as EPZs
offer a favourable investment climate attracting MNCs into the manufacturing sectors.
EOI have become popular amongst the East and the South East Asian members. These
countries were attracted to the EOI strategy due to the unavailability of economies of
scale, encouraging foreign investment to spur the economy. Competitiveness is crucial;
otherwise EOI countries will suffer negative consequences.96 Some of the most
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successful developing countries, including Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore have
achieved extraordinary industrial growth by using an outward-oriented model driven by
market incentives and a strong private sector. For example, Table 2.4 illustrates GDP
growth of selected countries engaging in an EOI strategy.
However, the literature criticises an EOI strategy for its limited contribution to both the
creation of a skilled labour force and technological development.97 Production in
developing countries is mainly a simple assembly activity that is process-specific and
routine-like by nature. Possibilities for upgrading and shifting comparative advantage
towards more skilled and semi-skilled sectors are considered to be limited. The pattern
of specialisation that results from an EOI strategy is claimed to be at the lower end of
the technology spectrum.98 Countries with EOI strategies have a weak domestic
economic and technological base and a high degree of dependence on external factors.99
Table 2.4: GDP Growth for Countries implementing EOI strategy (Fourth Quarter of
2004)










Source: ‘Emerging Market Indicators’, Economist, 15-21 January 2005, p.102
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2.6 Industrial Clusters
A cluster is defined as a ‘geographic concentration of competing and cooperating
companies, suppliers, services and associated institutions.100 Industry tends to cluster
geographically due to the need to exchange information, transmission of tacit
knowledge about business formation and product development, localised concentration
of skilled labour, lifestyle amenities, and research facilities associated with research
universities, large corporations and research labs.101 Industrial clustering has been
identified as an effective way to nurture small and medium size enterprises in
developing and developed countries so that they survive and stay competitive on a
regional, international and global level.102 Clusters can increase the quality of local
suppliers, focusing on specialised local research and training providers. Clusters have
been found to increase the productivity of firms through specialised access to suppliers,
stimulating new business formations that support innovation.
MNCs relocate their value chains in to specific clustered areas to leverage the potential
and capabilities that clusters can offer.103 There is evidence that firms locate to one
geographic area to improve their comparative and competitive advantages.104
Localisation of firms in the same area affords firm geographic proximity, thus
encouraging the development of highly skilled workers for the specific needs of a
particular industry. Firms in need of this skill will have easy access to it. These firms
can experience economies of scale in developing and using common technologies,
tending to promote a maximum flow of information and ideas. Products, markets and
technological knowledge can be easily shared and effectively turned into valuable
innovations. These factors, together, contribute towards industrial competitiveness.
Information technology clusters, such as in Bangalore and Singapore, have been
extremely successful in producing globally competitive IT firms. Countries such as
Malaysia and Thailand have followed similar routes to developing industrial clusters to
prop-up their SMEs. Despite the success and unique competitive advantages that
industrial clusters possess, it is important for firms seeking global competitiveness to
identify the critical factors that make clusters successful.105
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2.7 Technology and Development
Technology, an integral ingredient of industrialisation, is a crucial factor in propelling
economic development. Rapid technical transformation accelerated by globalisation
requires technology to be the central focus for competitive and sustainable
industrialisation in developing countries. The nature, magnitude and mode of
technology transfer into developing countries have been influenced by various factors
such as geopolitical conditions, culture, economic conditions, ideology, production
possibilities, research and development policies and profitability. These factors are also
highly influential in determining the effectiveness of the transfer process. The following
section will provide an overview of the definition, transfer process, technology
paradigm and the various mechanisms for the transfer of technology.
2.7.1 Defining Technology
Having established the importance of technology transfer for industrialisation and
economic development, it is vital to define the term technology. Defining technology is
not a straightforward exercise. Definitions of technology can be drawn from multiple
disciplines, each with its own idiosyncrasies to suit the characteristics of that particular
discipline. Various definitions of technology are shown in Table 2.5. Although the
definitions appear to be distinct, there are similar features between the separate
definitions.106 This study, attempts to define technology from a management of
technology transfer perspective. Technology from a management perspective considers
technology as a complete package, including both soft and hard technology involving
the production, processing, and finally commercialisation of the product.








vii. Industry structure (suppliers, users, promoters).
viii. Commercialisation.
McIntyer focuses on soft technology, which he defines as a process in which knowledge
is used to reduce uncertainty and achieve the desired end.107 It is a process for creating
solutions to problems. Meier supports this view whereby he defines technology as
‘technical knowledge’ reflecting on the intellectual conception of the possibilities to
combine factor inputs such as labour, raw materials, machinery, and others, to achieve
an output of products, defined in terms of quality and quantity.108 Technical knowledge
includes not only the engineering aspects of production, but also the economic and
organisational aspects of firm operations, including management and marketing
activities, and the full combination of skills and knowledge. The technological
infrastructure necessary to support the recipient country includes the required hardware,
the level of technological education, the technical level of process technologies in the
receiving firms, the capability to perform R&D work and the ability
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Table 2.5: Definitions of Technology
General: Dictionary definitions:
Webster’s Dictionary (2001 )
1. The science or study of the practical industrial arts
2. The terms used in a science, technical terminology
3. Applied science. In simple terms, the definitions stress on the study and application of
science.109
Collins Dictionary (1991)
1. The application of practical or mechanical sciences to industry or commerce
2. The methods, theory and practice governing such application
3. The total knowledge and skills available to any human society110
Oxford Dictionary (2000)
Science or industrial art; literally, the science of technique is systematic knowledge of technique.
Technique: the interaction of people/tools with machine/objects which defines ‘a way of doing’ a
particular task 111
Management of technology transfer:
Abetti:
Technology as a body of knowledge, tools and techniques, derived from science and practical
experiences that is used in the development, design, production and application of innovations as
well as new processes or methods by which outputs are generated.112
Baranson:
Gives a similar definition of technology as consisting of product designs, production techniques
and managerial systems to organise and carry out production plans.113
Goulet:
Specifies the results of the application as asserting control over nature and over human processes
of all kinds.114
Meissner:
Goes one step further by defining technology as the configuration of processes, plans, techniques,
knowledge and skills and that the configuration of this structure is to effectively produce, process
and market a product or service. 115
Djeflat:
Technology marketed as a complete entity: all technological components tied together and
transferred as a whole: capital goods/ materials/know-how/qualified and specialised manpower116
97
to maintain the given technology. Technology is meaningless without ‘know-how’ and
the local ability to repair, design and produce technology.
Know-how often cannot be captured in words.117 Sahar supports this view where he
claims that simply focusing on the product is not sufficient to studying the transfer and
diffusion of technology. According to Sahar, it is not merely the product that is being
transferred but also the knowledge of its use and application.118 The United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) attempted to provide a
comprehensive definition of technology comprising both hard and soft technology,
whereby technology is said to be:
….. an essential input to production, is bought and sold as capital goods, human labour and information
of a technical and commercial character. The elements of technology include feasibility studies, market
surveys and other pre-investment services; determination of the range of technologies and choice of
technology; industrial processes; engineering designs and detailed engineering; plant construction and
installation; training of technical and managerial personnel; management and operation of production
facilities; marketing information and improvements to processes and product designs.119
Molas Gallart also takes a comprehensive view of technology, defining it as capital
equipment, software, scientific and technical knowledge, skills, research and production
processes, designs, blueprints, management techniques and principles, and the resulting
products developed to solve technical problems.120 Based on these definitions, the
present study considers both the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ technology component as vital in the
transfer process. Hard technology is confined to the material aspects of the technology
such as jigs, tools, machines and equipments that are used in the production process.
Soft technology includes knowledge, manuals, management, work organisation and
marketing.
2.7.2 Innovation versus Invention
It is important to distinguish between innovation and invention when defining
technology. Most literature has focused on differentiating these two terminologies.
Freeman mentions invention as an idea, sketch or a model for a new improved device,
product, process or system.121 Inventions are economically irrelevant if they are not
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carried into practice. Innovation, on the other hand involves new product, process,
system or device. Innovation is the whole process from idea to finished product, while
technology transfer is one of the means of achieving innovation. Technology transfer
can be said to be a subset of the process of innovation.122 Innovations can be subject to
continuous adaptations and improvements, which can later be an important source of
productivity growth compared to the original innovation itself.123
Two types of innovation have been identified, namely: product and process innovation.
Product innovations are often associated with discoveries of new technologies due to
new demands. In contrast, process innovations often take place under conditions of
economic stress where the action is to cut production costs of a given product to cope
with the market demand.124 Developing countries are said to indulge in process
innovation rather than product innovation due to the lack of capital and human
resources. The present study addresses the transfer of technology, in both hard and soft
technology, focusing on product and process innovation. Having defined technology
and noted the difference between innovation and invention, it is also vital to define
several specific types of technology, dual-use technology and high technology.
2.7.3 Dual-Use Technology
Dual-use refers to products and technologies that have both civil and military purposes,
such as computers, chemicals and advanced telecommunications, encryption, radar and
laser technologies. Dual-use items which are used in one area of activity can be adapted
and used in others. Dual-use technology has today become a strategic technology
development choice amongst some developing countries. Dual-use products can be
applicable to defence and civil uses without any modifications.125 For example, the
origins of commercial technologies today could be traced to defence-funded sectors,
such as civil aerospace. The strong commercial market has been utilised to sustain R&D
investments as compared to the complex military procurement procedures.126 The
influence of commercial activities could also include procurement reform, conversion
and diversification strategies.127
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Dual-use activities can be output or input oriented. Output relates to output of the
research or production activities. In this study, output, relates to the type of technology
transferred through offsets. This output can produce dual-use products applicable to
defence and civil use without modifications, such as general purpose computers,
electronics or dual-use products that need adaptation, such as radar, numeric control
machines, transport containers and microwave ovens. Many military systems are not
dual-use as they cannot be adapted to carry-out a task other than the specific job for
which they have been designed.128 However, the sub-systems and components are
generic components and could be dual-use. Other types of dual-use output identified
include codified knowledge, such as licenses and management principles. In terms of
dual-use inputs, these are most likely to represent capital and labour. Capital can be in
the form of equipment, machinery, tools, plants and other production facilities. Skills
refer to know-how embodied in the technology from researchers, managers and
employees.
2.7.4 High Technology
The Oxford English Dictionary defines high technology as advanced technology. High
technology is also popularly called the ‘Third Wave”, ‘new industrial’ and
‘entrepreneurial’ initiatives.129 High tech industry can be defined as:
…. the design, development and introduction of new products and innovative, manufacturing processes,
or both, through the systematic application of scientific and technical knowledge. 130
Malaysia’s MITI, for example, defines ‘high technology’ as companies committed to
projects requiring R&D expenditure equalling 1% of sales within 3 years of start-up and
having 7% of the workforce comprising employees holding post-secondary certificates
or diplomas in technical subjects.131 MITI’s list of specific activities to be promoted
under the high technology designation includes computers and computer peripherals,
liquid crystal displays (LCDs), medical equipment, biotechnology, automation
equipment, advanced materials, opto-electronics, software, alternative energy and
aerospace.
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The high technology sector has been largely supported by direct state intervention in the
creation of new enterprises, products, markets and technologies.132 Government support
is vital to push forward risky but potentially productive projects that would not
otherwise materialise. Governments assist in identifying market opportunities, fostering
local innovation capacities, and making public investments in new technology and
private enterprises. 133 High tech companies offer cutting-edge products, advanced state-
of-the-art techniques, they also raise expenditure on research and development and hire
a higher percentage of workers from technical and engineering fields.Some analysts
argue that high tech development is a path-dependent process that cannot be influenced
by public policies.134
Observers also argue that location factors, such as labour, the cost of living, low taxes,
infrastructure and markets are less relevant for the growth of high technology.135
However, several other studies support the importance of location in that it facilitates
high tech development.136 Further studies dismiss the location factor and argue that high
tech industries may achieve development through building business partnerships and
extensive interpersonal networks among distinct firms to exchange technical and market
information.137 The most crucial factor in high technology development is scientific
intelligence harnessed to technical problem-solving. A group of analysts argue that the
success of high tech industry is not based on location and traditional competitiveness,
but rather on factors such as the low cost of labour and low cost of commodities.138
Industrial clustering is discussed earlier in this chapter. A prominent feature of high
technology industry is the associated geographical cluster effect. Industrial clustering
has been identified as an effective way of nurturing high technology industries to stay
competitive.139
2.8 Determinants of Innovation
Discussions on the origins of technology mostly revolve around two interpretations-
science push and market pull. Science-push relates to technology development resulting
from the injection of new science and the adding of knowledge or the offering of new
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methods. On the other hand, market-pull means that the market solution drives
technology. In other words, profit and markets determines the direction of technological
development. Most literature claims that technologies are stimulated by market need.140
However, technology development requires science-push and market-pull to work hand-
in-hand. It is claimed that although science push is initially important for knowledge
accumulation, market-pull will soon take over in the later stages of the technology’s life
cycle.141
2.9 Technology Transfer Process
There are two types of technology transfer: vertical and horizontal transfer.142 Vertical
transfers are the transfers from general to specialised levels and from the scientific level
to the final product form. It can also be referred to as a flow of knowledge between pure
and applied research and product development. Horizontal technology transfer is the
transference from one country to another, or from one application to another. Examples
of horizontal technology transfer include licensing, know-how agreements, technical
cooperation agreements, training of personnel, conferences, attachments of consultants,
and the importation of machinery, equipment and raw materials. Vertical technology
transfer is more common in developing countries.
Various literature search on technology transfer process shows that technology transfer
involves five main steps as shown in Figure 2.4 below.
Figure 2.4: Technology Transfer Stages
Source: Author
The acquisition stage involves identification, assessment, acquisition and the mastering
of new knowledge and technology. At the development stage, further technology
transfer contributes to the innovative use of knowledge and skills. At the application
stage, technology is used to address the needs of government, industry and the
Acquisition Development Application Diffusion Management
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community. Diffusion involves the dissemination of new knowledge and technology
through learning and other programmes and the use of technology in solving problems.
Finally at the technology management stage, the effectiveness and efficiency of
technology usage will be gauged.
Effective technology transfer involves detailed and thorough planning. Prior to the
transfer process, critical issues must be addressed, such as the need for the particular
technology, technology absorption capacity, resource availability, proper social,
economic and technical environment for the technology, and appropriate factor prices
for the effective use of technology.
Generally, the process is divided into four main steps: the need for identification;
technology assessment; planning; and implementation. Details involved in each step are
outlined in Figure 2.5. The technology transfer process into developing countries is
often complex, and subject to many problems. These include the lack of an
understanding of the extent of technological change, overestimation of absorption
capacity, the setting of unrealistic or inapplicable objectives or standards. Further, there
is lack of cooperation between donors and recipients, the lack of follow-up and
continuity, insufficient resources, excessive delays in the technology transfer process,
lack of adequate maintenance, inadequate training, and incompetent management and
the inappropriate use of technology.143
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Figure 2.5: Technology Transfer Process
Source: Ernst G Frankel, Management of Technological Change, Kluwer Academic Publisher,
Netherlands, 1990, pp.88-89.
2.10 Technology Development Paradigm
There are numerous technology paradigms, namely the western model, soviet model,
Far East model and the African model. Their industrial and technology development
strategies incorporating considerations, such as government policy, choice of
technology, innovativeness and resource allocation are shown in Table 2.6. Based on
these paradigms, Malaysia has emulated the East Asian model. It has a very high
export-driven industry, but at the same time, government has promoted indigenous high
technology manufacturing capabilities through an ISI policy. The Malaysian
government practices selective intervention by providing incentives and infrastructure
to promote industrialisation. The development of indigenous technological capabilities
is at the forefront of attaining competitiveness. However, the country has yet to achieve
the desired results due to the lack of highly skilled human resources, government
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policies to protect Malay-owned industries under the Bumiputera special rights,
competition from low cost, high productivity neighbours and the lack of research and
development budgets for technological development.144
Table 2.6: Technology Development Paradigms
MODEL PARADIGM









Soviet  central planning
 labour intensive




East Asian  ‘hybrid’ model
 strong government support
 market-driven
 export-oriented
 reverse engineering leading to
innovation
 high quality , low cost
 from assembly-type
manufacturing to high technology
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2.11 Objectives of Technology Transfer
The objectives of technology transfer have been discussed at length in the literature on
technology. Generally, there are two dimensions to analysing the objectives of
technology transfer, those of the seller and the buyer. Buyers normally transfer
technology for several reasons. First and most importantly, technology is transferred for
commercialisation or profit making. The first sale is often seen as an effort towards
establishing a good reputation in the local market. This will create a positive feedback
which paves the way for future sales. However, the supplier will attempt to retain
control over the use of the technology transferred even after the expiration of the
contract period. This will form part of the negotiations, as the recipient country will
otherwise employ the technology as part of its modernisation strategy.145 Suppliers are
seldom worried about competition on international markets from their developing
country customers because in line with the product life cycle theory, most of the
technology transferred is obsolete and has been replaced by newer generations of
technologies.
Second, technology transfer is a method of cost-sharing as technology production is
very expensive. Developed countries have to obtain a sales return on investments in
order to venture into newer technologies.146 Third, technology transfer is also
undertaken in certain industries, especially defence, as a means of providing allies with
superior technologies. The US, for example, during the Cold War transferred
technology to other NATO countries and its developing country allies to defend
themselves against the Communist threat. Suppliers also transfer certain technologies,
such as those linked to health and education, to enhance the social-economic
development of developing countries.
By contrast, buyers require technology transfer to build indigenous technology
capability. It is too costly and time consuming for them to develop independently the
same technology. Buyer countries therefore, will try and obtain technology which they
can use to operate, establish new production units and expand existing ones, develop
new techniques, and innovate. However, using new technologies is not an automatic or
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simple process. New technology can be very complicated, involving complex processes
and continuous learning cycles. Therefore developing countries need to invest into
technology capacity-building to develop indigenous expertise.
2.12 Theoretical Approaches to Technology Development
2.12.1 Early Theories on Technology Development
Early theories on technology development were mainly focused on the demand side.
Most literature in the early 1900s talked about technology usage in the form of a
‘blueprint’.147 A technology blueprint contains complete information relating to the
efficient use of technology. This approach presumes that technologies will diffuse from
advanced countries to developing countries easily, similar to how technology diffuses in
their own country of origin. In this case, developing countries, largely importers of
technology, are assumed to have absorbed technology relatively easily, with limited
assistance, limited costs and low-risk. This assumption neglects issues such as the
availability of skills, capabilities, institutions and infrastructure in developing
countries.148 The dual economy model in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, emphasised
structural change and technique choice, but paid very little attention to ‘black box’
matters.149 The infant industry argument focuses on the protection of local industries by
encouraging trade protection mechanisms to nurture growth and competitiveness of
infant industries. However, this theory failed to discuss issues such as additional
investments by firms in technology, learning and infrastructural development.
2.12.2 Neo-Classical Growth Theory
The neo-classical growth theory assumes that technology is a public good, available
equally to all. Technical knowledge cannot be monopolised. Firms regardless of their
nationality should have equal opportunities to exploit the fruits of scientific and
technical advance around the world. Thus, when a firm makes an investment decision,
the neo-classical growth theory believes that it can incorporate ‘state-of-the-art’
technology into its new plant and thereby be competitive in world markets.150
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2.12.3 Technology Gap Theory
By contrast, technology–gap theory emphasises technological backwardness and the
need for catching up with technology leaders. The underlying mechanism of knowledge
diffusion in this stream of thought is a mastery of a developed country’s technology by
developing countries. This theory clearly recognised the need for building sufficient
domestic capabilities for imitation of technological knowledge but recognised the huge
costs involved.151 Without a sufficient level of domestic capability, requiring massive
investment, a country is unlikely to benefit from the technological knowledge of
developed countries and thus faces the risk of continuously lagging behind advanced
countries.152
2.12.4 Macroeconomic Theories of Market ‘Imperfections and Informational
Economics’
These theories argue that information is always imperfect and markets are always
incomplete.153 There is a question regarding the market mechanism for allocating
technology resources. Information asymmetry and missing markets are seen as creating
underinvestment in technology development, thus providing the rationale for
government intervention to promote technological development. 154
2.12.5 Evolutionary Theory of Technology and Growth
This theory argues that the origins of technology development occur at the micro level
and that ‘tacit’ knowledge is a crucial element of technology and technology
development. Technology cannot be easily transmitted or communicated. Nelson and
Winter claim that economic change takes place in an ‘evolutionary’ fashion, where
firms are constantly in competition with each other in an unstable environment. In this
instance, firms are behaving like organisms constantly under threat and using the
resources available to maintain their existence. The innovational actions of economic
agents are seen as being highly dependent on in-house expertise, technical skills,
patents, reputation, links to specialist suppliers and the skills necessary to absorb
technological knowledge. This also reflects that a given technology will diffuse among
potential users in a varied manner, depending on each individual’s technological
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absorptive capacity.155 Therefore, successful transfer of technology is highly dependent
on the capabilities and skills necessary to absorb technological knowledge. In this case,
the recipients are seen to act with ‘bounded rationality’.156
The evolutionary theory group has developed the idea of a ‘National Innovation
System’ (NIS). NIS is defined as a network of public and private sector institutions
which act to initiate, modify and diffuse new technologies. The functions of NIS include
the creation of new knowledge and guiding the search for existing knowledge and
supplying resources such as capital and skills. NIS consists of the government,
scientific and research institutions, universities, training centres and private firms.157
2.12.6 Endogenous or New Growth Theory
Endogenous growth theory or new growth theory argues that technology is appropriated
and monopolised by its innovators. Once technology has been mastered, it is difficult
for others to catch-up due to the difficulty of increasing returns to scale of physical and
human resources, and geographical localisation of technology.158 Today, technological
leaders attempt to restrict transmission of their most advanced technologies to foreign
competitors and protect their intellectual property rights, especially from the
encroachment of developing countries. Recipient governments and firms, however,
attempt to obtain control of these advanced technologies, as these have become factors
in economic growth and international competitiveness. This theory stresses the roles of
innovative investments, human capital accumulation and externalities as the dominant
factors that determine long-term economic growth. Although the endogenous theory of
growth identified knowledge spill-over as potential sources of growth, empirical support
for such externalities is not yet conclusive.
2.13 Issues in Technology Development
2.13.1 Technology Learning and Capability Building (TCB)
Technological learning is not straightforward. It is often tacit, complex,159 costly, time-
consuming, involving huge investment, with the results uncertain.160 In the learning
process, most developing countries start with labour intensive technologies where skills
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are low, learning is short and less risky, and with minimal inter-firm or inter-industry
coordination. Once these countries have mastered a technology, there is a process of
upgrading and deepening. After this is achieved, developing countries then progress into
more advanced technologies and functions to remain competitive.161 Certain
technologies take a longer learning process than others because they are more difficult
to master, involve greater effort but have stronger potential for competitiveness.162
Learning achievements are said to be the underlying features of Asian societies.163
Technology capability building (TCB) involves a comprehensive learning process.164
However, this cannot occur automatically and requires large resources and commitment
from the participating firms.165 People and skills are very important for TCB to be
successful. In countries such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, acquisition of
human capital has been included in their education policy objectives.166 In recent years,
much has been written about the importance of TCB in developing countries. TCB
involves a mixture of information, skills, interactions and routines that firms need in
order to develop technology.167 Routine capability development involves the capability
to use the technology as much as resources to produce goods and services at a given
level of efficiency, using a combination of factors such as abilities, equipment, products
and production specifications, organisational systems and methods. On the other hand,
innovative capabilities include the capability to carry out technological change to
encourage the use of distinctive resources to generate and manage technological
activities. 168
TCB can be divided into four levels. At the first level, is the operational function
involving basic manufacturing, demanding troubleshooting, quality control,
maintenance and procurement skills. The second level involves duplicative skills
investment capabilities to expand capacity and purchase and integrate foreign
technologies. At the third level are the adaptive skills involving importing technologies,
adapting and improving them, and design skills for more complex engineering. Finally,
the fourth level involves innovative skills, including R&D to keep pace with moving
technological frontiers and to generate new technologies. For most developing
countries, TCB is at the first or second level with a few at the third level. The Far East
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area, and some Latin American countries and South Africa are at the third level, and
they are making strong efforts to move into the fourth level. Countries like Malaysia are
basically in transition from second to the third level.169
Sanjaya Lall identifies six components for developing country technological capability
as shown in Figure 2.7. These six components are namely: the search and selection of
appropriate technology; basic research; technology adaptation to suit specific
production conditions; development of institutionally organised research and
development facilities; selective use of technology to produce goods and services; and
the further development of technology as a result of minor innovation. 170
TCB is a contentious topic. For instance, there are arguments that foreign suppliers are
not making sufficient efforts to transfer actual knowledge and develop the learning
curve.171 Developing countries are encouraged to break loose from this chain and reduce
their total reliance on foreign technology, increasing the flow of technical know-how to
individuals and firms within developing countries.
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Source: Sanjaya Lall, Technology Policy and Challenges, In: 1960 Conference on Globalisation and
Development: Lessons for the Malaysian Economy, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, August,
1960, (Faculty of Economics and Administration, Malaysia, 1960).
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Some commentators argue that State intervention has been instrumental in producing
successful TCB in developing countries.172 They claim that TCB cannot be achieved
especially in circumstances where developing country market systems are known to be
inefficient. 173Therefore, governments should play an active role through the provision
of appropriate policies. Technology policy is crucial to provide the institutional and
organisational framework that would allow interested stakeholders in the development
process to interact via a supply-demand relationship on a sustainable basis. This has
been proven to work not only in East Asia but also in the major industrialised countries
during their early days of industrial growth.174
However, most progressive developing countries do not follow the TCB path, due to the
lack of investment and resources.
2.13.2 The ‘Visible Hand’ Approach to Technology Development
One group of academics advocate that market forces alone cannot produce the
maximum allocation of resources for technological development.175 Problems which
arise from market failures such as the asymmetrical nature of technological knowledge
and the under-returns from technology investments require strong government
intervention in developing countries.
The East Asian countries (NICs), for example, are known for their policies of departing
from laissez faire practices. This group of countries focus on selectively intervening by
targeting particular activities (‘picking winners’) as opposed to functional intervention
which is aimed at improving markets, without favouring particular activities. However,
in some instances, this intervention policy is viewed as a ‘hybrid’ which lies between
‘functional’ and ‘selective’ intervention called ‘horizontal’ intervention.176 Horizontal
intervention refers to policies that go beyond promoting selected activities across
sectors, providing specific economic benefits. Most importantly, horizontal policies
address activities for which markets are missing or particularly difficult to create in
developing countries such as R&D types of activities.177 Sanjaya Lall argues that
technology development involves a mixture of all three types of intervention-selective,
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functional and horizontal technology development approaches, the exact mix varying
within the country context and capabilities of its policy makers. Government
intervention is acknowledged as a key ingredient to guide resource allocation in
developing countries.178
However, government initiatives to formulate technology policy depend on the
technical changes that take place at the industry level. Sanjaya Lall, again, explained the
extent of government intervention required within the neoclassical and evolutionary
types of technological change. According to him, the neoclassical approach relates to
technology development taking place in small, homogenous firms operating in a
perfectly competitive market, where technology options are known, and choices are
made costlessly to optimise allocation on the basis of capital and labour costs; the
technology being absorbed and used without further effort or cost.179 In such instances,
where firms need not learn to use the existing technology, and operate in isolation
without interlinkages and spill-over, government intervention is limited. On the other
hand, the evolutionary theory of technology change (propagated by Nelson and Winter),
argues that firms do not work with full information of technical alternatives.180 They
operate in imperfection, with asymmetrical knowledge of the technology they are using.
The companies need time and effort to learn the technology efficiently and to conduct
technological effort.181 In this case, government intervention through the formulation of
science and technology policies is vital for promoting and extending technology
learning.
A science and technology policy is viewed as an important strategy for developing
countries to develop technology.182 Formulation of a sound and comprehensive
technology policy with components such as a technologies wish-list, technology
directions, technology development strategies and technology operational issues are
vital for assisting structured and systematic technological development. The absence of
such a policy could result in the acquisition of expensive and unsuitable data. In many
countries, a sound science and technology policy has helped governments save cost and
time looking for the right technology.183
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The Washington Consensus (WC), however, took a neo-liberal approach where well-
functioning markets can achieve efficient and optimal resource allocation in all sectors.
The WC paid less emphasis on government intervention and called for developing
countries to create a correct set of incentives, ‘getting the prices’ right. It was argued
that industrial policy reform should focus on removing ‘policy induced’ distortions
arising from State interventions, privatisations and restrictions on private enterprise. In
contrast to the WC approach, the post-consensus group argue for a greater government
role for technology development in developing countries; this is to be done through: i)
selective intervention through industrial policy, ii) strategic intervention in trade policy,
and iii) the creation of a national innovation system.184
2.13.3 Costs of Technology
Technology does not come free. Technology owners, mainly from the developed
countries, who have invested large amounts of money into developing new
technologies, will only agree to transfer the required technology for a fee to developing
countries. Such direct costs are normally spelled out in written agreements between the
sellers and the buyers. The costs are for the granting of licenses, transferring know-how,
training courses and technical assistance. Nevertheless, in developing countries buyers
have to take into consideration indirect costs, including the cost of choosing an
inappropriate technology or supplier, selecting an obsolete technology or a technology
that is in competition with many other emerging technologies, or the inability to fully
utilise the technology due to the lack of information, knowledge, infrastructure or
skilled labour.185 In some instances, the supplier will impose a higher cost on a
technology that is being transferred to recipient country if it is aware that the particular
technology has less potential to be commercialised.
2.13.4 Competitiveness and Technology Development
Sustaining a competitive industry seems to be the biggest challenge facing developing
countries in the 21st century.186 Scholarly work highlights the challenges faced by
developing countries to industrialise.187 The reasons include the existence of
competition from industrialised countries with a wider market share, the changing
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structure of world trade and finance and the availability of more advanced technology to
developed countries. Further, in many of the developing countries, the global value
chains and integrated production systems are unlikely to be spread evenly due to
inherent technological developmental problems.188 These countries realise that
maintaining competitiveness is vital to attaining sustainable industrial development189.
Competitiveness means different things to different segments of society. Firms say that
competitiveness is the ability to compete in world markets with a global strategy. For
government, competitiveness means a positive balance of trade. Economists argue that
competitiveness is all about achieving low-unit costs of labour adjusted for exchange
rates. Measurements of competitiveness include sponsorship of R&D, profit levels,
management practices, labour unions, balance of trade, labour productivity rates and
export market penetration.190 Drivers for competitiveness include foreign direct
investment, skills, domestic R&D, licensing, economic strength, government, exchange
rates, finance, infrastructure and management. 191
Competitiveness can be viewed from both the macro and micro levels. The macro level
of competitiveness is focused on macroeconomic issues such as monetary and fiscal
policies, a trusted and efficient legal system, a stable set of democratic institutions and
progress in social conditions. Micro level competitiveness, on the other hand, depends
on the sophistication with which foreign sub-operators or domestic companies in the
local country operate, and the quality of the microeconomic business environment in
which firms operate. 192
Nevertheless, in an era of globalisation, technology has been identified as a sine-qua-
non for maintaining national competitiveness.193 Technology is seen as the key factor
for competitiveness. Technological progress is crucial for the growth process and
fundamental for achieving rising per capita income as it determines the rate at which
natural resources can be exploited and capital stock be expanded to enhance
productivity and maximise output and income.194 It is for this reason that economically
developed countries tend to be those that are also industrially and technologically
advanced.
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Porter’s195 famous national competitive advantage model is an important framework for
evaluating industrial competitiveness.196 His theory begins with individual industries
and competitors and builds up to the economy as a whole. Nations should decide the
success factors to achieve competitiveness and the ability to sustain it. Porter’s diamond
model illustrates the key issues for achieving competitive advantage of nations and is
shown in Figure 2.8: demand conditions; factor conditions; related and supporting
industries; and firm strategy, structure and rivalry. Porter lists ‘government’ and
‘chance’ as additional factors.
Porter’s model influences the role of technology in achieving competitive and
sustainable industrialisation. Factors of production such as a strong technological base,
indigenous capability and knowledgeable human resources are required to attain
competitiveness. Sophisticated and demanding customers will create the challenges to
improve product quality. Reliable and strong supplier bases will also help to reduce
costs, create clusters, innovative inputs and good inter-and intra-industrial linkages.
Finally, a firm’s strategy in terms of investment in research and development, science
and technology policy and human resource development will be fundamental to
maintaining industrial competitiveness. While chance can never be controlled, the
impact of government policies can be instrumental in increasing industry performance.
Smart partnerships between the government and industry have been identified as the
way forward for achieving sustainable industrial development. Governments have
developed strategies, identified skills, market requirements, ‘strategic’ industries and
critical technologies to achieve competitiveness. Many of the countries in the
developing world adopt a selective interventionist role to prop up infant industry and at
the same time prepare them to face a more challenging international environment.
Jin Zhouying argues that competitiveness derives from innovation that is transformed
into industrial technologies (or military applications) through commercialisation.197 Jin
explains that market application of hard technology occurs by means of soft technology
and therefore soft technology is the key to technology and economic competitiveness.
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Jin further explains that the economic success of contemporary developed countries can
be attributed to factors relating to the emergence of new business technologies, venture
capital and the development of financial instruments like derivatives. Developing
countries on the other hand, are characterised by the absence of soft technology and
limited abilities to make effective and efficient use of the technology they obtain
through a variety of transfer mechanisms to innovate and compete in the global market.
Figure 2.7: Porter’s Diamond Model
Porter’s Diamond Model for Competitive Advantage









Source: Michael Porter, Competitive Advantage of Nations, Simon &Schuster Inc, New York, 1990.
Developing countries, according to Jin, rarely benefit from technology transfer because
of the low efficiency they exhibit in absorbing the technology acquired. The problem of
low efficiency in technology absorption results mainly from the incompleteness of the
soft technology environment. Jin argues that soft technology is often neglected in
developing countries.198 Jin highlights the macro environment consisting of hard
environment issues such as such as infrastructure, the industrial base, economic strength
and the capacity to provide capital investment. He also emphasises the soft environment
issues, such as policies, laws, rules and regulations, the international environment and
market conditions as being crucial for increasing and sustaining development.199
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In recent years, a new phenomenon in the form of globalisation has had a profound
impact on industrialisation and technological competitiveness in the developing world.
Despite the huge benefits accrued, globalisation is claimed to have produced uneven
progress between the developing countries in industrialisation and technological
development.200 Sanjaya Lall, in his contribution to the Industrial Development Report
(2002/2003) for the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO),
outlined several issues that that have shaped developing country technological and
industrial competitiveness, due to the effects of globalisation.201
These include:
i. Economic distance being shortened due to the rapid growth of technical
efficiency in areas such as information processing, transport, clearly
reducing natural protection enjoyed by countries. Subsequently, this event
has increased international competition far more quickly and intensely.
ii. Adoption of new technologies, covering not just products and processes but
also new methods of organising firms, managing international relations and
supply chains, linked to innovation.
iii. Constant technological effort whereby developing countries have to invest in
absorbing and adapting technology, most importantly allowing these
countries to specialise in particular processes and functions within the global
production chain.
iv. The gain for high technology sectors due to enormous structural changes
with innovation-based manufacturing activities.
v. Changed patterns of competitive advantage as exports grow in response to
innovation and relocation.
vi. More coordinated industrial value chains within firms and externally where
functions and processes are subdivided and located across the globe to take
advantage of fine differences in costs, logistics, markets and innovations.
Countries that have been able to penetrate and become part of the dynamic
value chain have seen significant increases in employment.
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Sanjaya Lall, however, highlighted the fact that developing countries are constantly
increasing their overall competitiveness and moving into dynamic technology-based
exports, concentrated both by region and by country. He claimed that the local depth
and ‘rooting’ of high technology may vary greatly among successful exporters, and
those with shallow roots may find it more difficult to sustain their recent growth of
competitive production.
Based on the above assessment, technology will continue to feature as the cornerstone
of industrial competitiveness despite the challenges. Most importantly, firms must
process both hard and soft technologies in the form of equipment, patents, designs and
know-how. Firm competitiveness will be obtained through ‘learning by doing’ where
firms will be exposed to a multifaceted technological learning curve, including problem-
solving, managing technology processes, inter-and intra-firm interaction and the ability
to market and export their products. Continuing access to new technologies including
new products, new processes, management techniques, forms of linkages between
buyers and suppliers and tighter relations between technology and science, are essential
for sustaining competitiveness.202 Such access could be obtained through various
agents such as MNCs, consultants, research institutions, international organisations and
governments. These agents use various modes of transfer, namely, foreign direct
investment, joint ventures, turnkey projects, licensing, technical arrangements,
subcontracting and offsets, to transfer technology.
2.14 Technology Acquisition Modes
There are various types of technology acquisition modes, such as off-the-shelf purchase,
sub-contracting, joint-ventures, licensing, co-production, collaboration and research
development. This section discusses the various modes of technology transfer; the
advantages as well as the disadvantages of utilising each method to acquire technology.
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2.14.1 Off-the-Shelf Purchase
Off-the-shelf purchase is the straightforward purchase of technology. Here, the
transferor takes full responsibility to design, supply, install and operate the product or
system. The buyer will only select the consultative direction and assume responsibility
for the supply and installation of machines, equipments and systems. Normally, the
seller will provide consultation facilities for a period of time. There is often a complete
lack of local consultancy advice to follow up or support the equipment or system after
the warranty period. This attitude forces the buyer to be continuously dependent on the
seller for through-life support of the equipment or system purchased. Off-the-shelf
purchase makes very minimal technology transfer contributions.
2.14.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
FDI is claimed by some authors to be the most successful mode of technology transfer
into developing countries.203 FDI is a medium for acquiring skills, technology,
organisational and managerial practices and access to markets. It has also been used to
insert countries into global value chains and to build competitiveness in the changing
new economic order. Multinationals (MNC)204 bring in investment, new technology,
new varieties of products and new organisational forms into host countries.205 A greater
MNC presence tends to lead to a more rapid ‘catching up’ by the host country with
respect to the advanced countries.206 FDI in developing countries is increasing rapidly,
from an average $29 billion in 1986-1991 to $ 208 billion in 1999.207 FDI dependent
countries are reported to be climbing the technological ladder. 208
Why do MNCs transfer technology? Vernon argues that MNCs transfer technology by
reference to the international product life cycle theory.209 Vernon, employing the
example of US manufacturing industry, mentions that at the early stages of the product
life cycle, US controlled enterprises generate new product and processes in response to
the high per-capita incomes and relative availability of productive factors in the US.210
At an early stage, there is massive R&D leading to innovation and development. The
industry is dependent on know-how and provides specialised services. There is an
element of monopolistic pricing and large profits.211 At stage two, being the growth
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stage, there is a gradual introduction of mass-production methods and variations in
production techniques. At this stage, there is an entry of many aggressive investors
attracted by large profits. There is also a natural tendency towards price elasticity
leading to intra-industry competition and subsequently price reductions.212 Finally,
Vernon mentions that in stage three, the product becomes fully mature, and production
technology is fully understood and standardised. Possibilities for further innovation are
rare, monopolies are eroded, output falls off and price falls to a minimum ‘competitive’
level. At this stage, the underdeveloped countries have a comparative advantage in
production since unskilled labour has become the major inputs, and these are, of course,
cheaper in developing countries.
Nevertheless, Vernon’s model has been heavily criticised by academicians and
practitioners.213 To start with, the international product life cycle theory itself is
condemned as it has set the destiny of developing countries to be forever technological
‘followers’, constantly picking up the scraps of technology, which have become
obsolete in the rich countries.214 The extent of the linkages developed through FDI is
also highly questionable. Linkages with local companies are rare as a MNC produces
and imports the required inputs, rather than obtaining them from domestic suppliers.
Linkages normally depend upon the stage of development of indigenous industry, the
availability of local skills and technology, institutions and government policies, changes
in demand and technology in world markets and their political attractiveness to
MNCs.215 It is argued, however that, FDI has not been successful in developing such
strategies.216
MNCs are criticised for transferring intermediate products (knowledge) across
international boundaries while still retaining control of them.217 This is to maintain a
specific advantage and to retain their monopolistic status to overcome fear or lack of
knowledge of foreign markets. These specific advantages rely on entry barriers for
protection and sustenance. Market imperfections enable MNCs to utilise their
oligopolistic power, including the specific advantage of close market proximity and
superior rents on activities.218 By possessing advantages such as scale economies,
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knowledge advantage, distribution networks, product diversification, and credit
advantages to enhance asset power, the MNCs dominate markets.
FDI is also criticised by development economists because of its negative impact via
pricing,219 minimal value-added activities and arguably inappropriate capital intensive
investments in labour abundant economies.220 MNCs exploit their monopoly positions
in domestic economies, creating beneficial competition, efficiency and jobs; but tending
also to be highly exploitative.221 MNCs are also accused of being ‘footloose’, thus
relocating to wherever they have a production advantage.222 Home and host country
policies usually influence FDI movements. However, unstable political and economic
conditions in host countries may reduce the attractiveness of FDI.
FDI has become increasingly popular especially in EOI countries. It is claimed that FDI
increases foreign currency earnings, human resources, employment and linkages into
the economy, such as the development of local suppliers and sales to intermediate goods
industries.223 FDI has been important in manufacturing sectors, such as the electronics
industry in Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand. Countries, such as Singapore, have been
more prudent in ensuring that FDI is channelled into high-tech industries to maximise
technology competitiveness. By contrast, other countries, such as Malaysia, Thailand,
Philippines and Mexico have ended up with assembly line production industries, lower
skills and technological capability. FDI can promote indigenisation and local
technological capability building, but has proved otherwise for some countries. They
now seek more genuine modes of technology transfer to develop inhouse technology
capabilities.
2.14.3 Turnkey Operations
Turnkey projects are also called BOT (build, operate and transfer). They involve the
total construction of a project: product- and project-design, plant-engineering,
procurement and manufacture of equipment, construction management, commissioning
and training and trouble-shooting. At some future time, the project is handed over to the
customer. The prime contractor will normally take responsibility in setting up a
complete industrial plant. The project is packaged with the provision of various skills,
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services and finance to provide a functioning plant to the client. Demand for turnkey
projects among developing countries is on the rise. However, there is a question
regarding the viability of setting up a complete plant in smaller developing countries,
consisting of a smaller domestic-goods manufacturing base.
2.14.4 Licensing
Licensing is defined as the transfer of patents, brand names (including technical
assistance), sales of know-how and assembly under contract. Most of the time, licensing
takes place across national boundaries rather than between firms in the same country.
Licensing of technology involves explicit outlays of proprietary information freely
purchased by firms owned by nationals of one country from firms in another, as well as
payments made by subsidiaries of the MNC for the use of parent company knowledge.
Costs, besides royalty payments, include the loss of profits from restrictions on exports
to third countries and inputs that must be purchased from the purveyor of the
technology. Knowledge that is purchased falls into several categories, including pre-
investment feasibility studies, detailed studies, basic engineering, detailed engineering,
procurement, training, construction and assembly, startup or commissioning, technical
assistance agreements, trademarks, copyright licenses and troubleshooting. A licensing
agreement typically has patents, technical know-how, trademarks, marketing know-
how, managerial know-how and design incorporated into the agreement.224
Licensing is preferred in technologies that are not complex, with strong, well-enforced
and relatively mature patent, not relying on ‘user-active’ innovation requiring strong
links between marketing and product development. Licensing has been an important
alternative form of technology access in sectors such as pharmaceuticals. Licensing and
collaboration often complement one another in the microelectronics, robotics and
biotechnology industries.
Licensing imposes various challenges to licensor and licensees. Licensors are normally
worried about losing their technological niche if licensees do not honour the
agreements. In countries such as China and Taiwan, licensees have failed to adhere to
licensing contracts thus creating duplication of products available at cheaper prices. The
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absence of copyright and patent enforcements has made developed country contractors
lose their cutting edge technology. These and other issues have caused licensors to
impose various restrictions on the usage of technology, including where the output
should be marketed and what type of purchases must be made from the licensor to make
the transfer technically effective. This is to assure that the licensors enjoy an
advantageous position in the licensing agreement. Licensors will jealously guard their
technology, as any duplication of competition will drive returns down. Companies will
normally license peripheral rather than core technologies to maintain their competitive
advantage.
On the other hand, licensees perceive foreign technology licensing payments to be
unreasonably expensive. The licensee should be cautious in acquiring licenses so as not
to indulge in costly and unfamiliar activities.225 However there is an alternative view
that developing countries pay only a fraction of the initial R&D cost, with the developed
countries having to bear the cost of larger research facilities and skilled researchers.226
Royalty payments through licensing are justified as an attempt to obtain some
contribution towards development costs as well as compensation for exports income
forgone. Further, in many licensing deals, there is an absence of well-educated
individuals with adequate technical backgrounds to scrutinise the technology cost.
Licensing agreements can also either be obsolete or too advanced.227 Despite the
problems, licensing has been widely used by developing countries as a mode of inward
technology transfer. Licensing will be successful if there is a commitment from the
licensor to transfer genuine technology to the licensee and for the licensee to honour the
contract by protecting the transferred technology.
2.14.5 Sub-Contracting
Subcontracting involves a contract with one or a number of firms to assemble or
manufacture parts. It is defined as an interrelationship between enterprises to provide
not only an outlet for production by suppliers, but also the establishment of a
relationship between linked enterprises whereby long-term contracts are entered into,
product information exchanged, prices negotiated, technology shared and other forms of
assistance made possible.228
124
Sub-contracting involves linkages to the established local suppliers to obtain
intermediary inputs. In some countries, foreign companies are required to sub-contract
their activities to local firms as a means of protecting small and medium size industries.
The more important backward linkages can be categorised into three types of decision
making; namely, the decision as to whether: 229
i. To make or buy.
ii. Procure locally, giving rise to the possibility of local linkages or through
imports, the creation of national or international linkages.
iii. Linkages can be technical, financial, procurement, locational, managerial,
and pricing.
Supply chain networks have become a prominent component of subcontracting activity.
In the East Asian economies, sub-contracting processes have created global supply
chains. There are many definitions of a supply chain. One used by the Cranfield
University is:
The network of organisations involved, through upstream and downstream linkages in the different
processes and activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the
ultimate customer230
This international complex system of networks includes a variety of ties with sales,
manufacturing and engineering support affiliates of foreign firms; they also include
different forms and trajectories of integration into global production networks of MNC
firms. Taiwanese firms typically have relied on concurrent knowledge outsourcing; they
have pursued different applications in parallel, rather than concentrate exclusively on
one particular linkage.231 Supply chains act as cost-reducing, value-adding mechanisms
towards supporting a long-term commercial competitive advantage, besides linking
industries and economies.
In both developed and developing countries, sub-contracting is viewed both as a vital
mode of technology transfer and as an enhancement of linkages.
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2.14.6 Joint Ventures (JV)
JVs have become a popular medium of technology transfer, as they offer greater
opportunities for the effective transfer of technology.232 JVs are a business association
between foreign investors and local enterprises. JVs are categorised into three main
types: dominant parent ventures; shared management; and independent ventures.
Dominant parent ventures are managed by a dominant parent, as if they were wholly-
owned subsidiaries. Shared management is where both parents play a meaningful
management role, with functional managers drawn from both parents. Independent
ventures are where both firms in the joint ventures operate their own strategies.233
Companies have opted for JVs for various reasons. Overseas companies normally view
JVs as a platform for new markets and an access to raw materials. Local companies
engage in JVs due to governmental obligations, and when certain projects are too costly,
involving huge investments, which the local firm is not able to solely undertake. At
times, JVs are required because the host industry does not have the skills, technical
expertise and ability to capture the local product market.
The major difference between licensing and JVs is that in licensing there is no sharing
of equity between the firms involved. The licensee makes all the capital investment and
the licensor simply agrees to provide the technology or a fee as a percentage of the
sales. Current technology agreements gives the licensee access to the technology at the
time the license agreement is signed, and current and future technology agreements
specify the new development work as well as work done by the licensor on a specified
product during the agreement.
There have been cases of troubled JVs due to the lack of understanding between the
overseas and local partners, unequal sharing of responsibilities, monopoly by one
dominant party and government policy restrictions on, for instance, equity holdings. At
times, overseas companies refuse to share niche technology, worried that the technology
might fall into a competitor’s hands. Trust and equal sharing of responsibilities are
crucial in determining the success of JVs.
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2.14.7 Collaborative Technology Programmes
Technological collaboration has become another important source of technology
transfer. It is defined as any activity where two or more partners contribute differential
resources and technological know-how to achieve agreed complementary aims.234 This
mode of transfer includes collaboration in product development, manufacture and
marketing that spans across national boundaries, is not based on arms-length
transactions and includes substantial and continual contributions of capital, technology,
and other assets.
There are four types of technology-focused collaborative ventures:
i. Research collaboration amongst firms.
ii. Exchange of proven technologies within a single product line or across
multiple products, such as microelectronics and robotics.
iii. Joint development of one or more products, these ventures typifying
international collaboration in commercial aircraft, engines and segments of
telecommunications equipment, microelectronics and biotechnology
industries.
iv. Collaboration across different functions, with one firm providing a new
product or process for marketing, manufacture or application in a foreign
market.
In contrast to early Japanese development, US and EC collaborations focused on
activities further upstream, with recent international technology collaboration centered
on product development, manufacture and marketing.235
Technological collaboration has become more popular than other modes of technology
transfer due to its emphasis on long-term partnerships as well as the sharing of
management responsibilities amongst partners. It is both broader and more in-depth
than joint ventures, requiring strategic alliances and cooperation from every angle,
including sometimes the involvement of governments of both transferor and transferee
countrys. Such relationships may vary in terms of the legal contracting and equity
funding provided by the partners. Most importantly, there must be commitment and
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trust of the two or more companies to cooperatively develop technology, helping them
to keep pace with technological advancements in the marketplace.236 Many developing
countries view collaboration as a transparent and promising way to obtain technology.
Nevertheless, the absence of a legally binding agreement sometimes creates problems of
enforcement in the event that collaboration fails.
2.15 Research and Development
The technology management literature highlights the importance of R&D as a crucial
factor in developing technologies that can eventually be commercialised. R&D enables
firms to create new technologies and build on existing technologies obtained through
technology transfer. In most cases, the creation of core or strategic technologies calls
for the provision of human and financial capital. Countries without a strong industrial
base cannot afford the R&D for the development of strategic industries. An excellent
science and technology base for economic development has to be supported by high
quality human resources and environment and culture that are capable of facilitating
innovation. Developing countries have invested in R&D centres and promoted
collaboration between universities and industries.237 However, there is often a lack of
proper mechanisms for linking the research institutes, universities and industry. Further,
there is also often a lack of trust and esprit de’ corp between the different players in the
fields of research, technology and industry. In many instances, the universities and
industry are working in isolation. Universities do not understand the needs of industry
and thus rarely satisfy industry requirements. Equally, industries are often not willing to
invest in R&D activities, being more focused on short tem profits.
2.16 Offsets as a Tool for Technology Transfer
A detailed definition of offsets was provided in Chapter 1(see p.22). Although offsets
became popular in developed countries in the 1940s and 50s, and spread into Eastern
Europe in the 1960s, they gained footage in developing countries only in the 1980s.
Offsets have gained increased prominence over recent years, now being widely used in
defence markets.
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There is a substantial literature on why developing countries pursue technology transfer
through offsets.238 For sellers, offsets are viewed as a marketing tool. Many
international OEMs claim not be able to compete in the defence market without
packaging offsets as part of their defence sales.239 Offsets do escalate price, as there are
transaction costs involved, but offsets help companies to stay competitive in a tight
international defence market. Indeed, offsets have become a key factor in defence
procurement decision-making in numerous countries.240
For buyers, offsets have become a politico–economic tool. In the political sense, offsets
are seen as a means of building a self-reliant defence industry. Self-sufficiency in arms
procurement is a crucial strategic goal. Past experiences of embargoes, sanctions and
other potential threats, have reinforced the need to establish an indigenous defence
industry in many developing countries. A further reason has regard to a country’s
political aspiration to become a regional power through technological prowess.
In an economic sense, offsets have become an important aspect of development
strategy. Offsets are seen as an effective delivery mechanism within the defence
procurement process to achieve industry development objectives.241 Since offsets are
tied to defence purchases, governments acquire leverage to secure new technologies and
capabilities. Offsets also create spin-offs into civil sectors and dual-use application,
paving the way for strong backward and forward linkages into other industrial sectors
such as steel, machine tools, aerospace and shipbuilding. Offsets are also used to build-
up know-how and skills, gaining access to new markets, generating export earnings,
creating value-added employment as well as establishing strategic partnerships with
international companies.242
Papers have been written analysing whether offsets have contributed towards
industrialisation and technology development. Stefan Markowski and Peter Hall have
looked at the effectiveness of offsets within the Industry Involvement Programme in
Australia and New Zealand.243 They have concluded that offsets have not produced the
intended outcomes in these countries. Wally Struys discussed how Belgium used offsets
to maintain its defence industrial base, arguing that offsets need to integrate into
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industrial development policy and focus on sustainable long-term goals rather than
immediate short term objectives if they are to be successful.244 Other writers, such as
Stephen Martin and Keith Hartley, question the cost effectiveness of offsets as a means
towards promoting defence industrialisation.245 Michael Chinworth has further argued
that although Korea and Taiwan have received advanced assistance through offsets
deals, these countries still remain dependent on foreign technology inputs in their
respective defence industries.246 In other parts of the world, such as South Africa and
Brazil, empirical evidence has shown that offsets have had a smaller impact than
expected. 247
Other observers argue that developing nations do not possess the requisite capital,
neither to engage in arms production nor arms co-production.248 These capabilities
apparently cannot be imported; they need to be grown indigenously. There are claims
that developing countries do not have the capacity to produce sophisticated weapons
systems due to the lack of scientists, engineers and craftsmen.249 Countries may lack the
absorptive capacity, which cannot be acquired immediately but takes time and resources
to develop.250 Technology advances so quickly that the recipient country will always
confront a technology-lag and therefore remain uncompetitive with developed country
producers actively involved in technological development.251
On the positive side, offsets are claimed to have promoted local subcontracting
activity.252 Sub-contracting via offsets includes maintenance, production of parts and
components and local assembly. For example, Australia has benefited from the F/A 18
project.253 Other countries benefiting from offsets in this regard include Belgium, Spain,
Greece and Turkey.254 South Korea and Taiwan have embarked on offsets to cover part
of the cost of defence equipment purchases and increase the levels of industrial
sophistication through technology transfer.255 South Korea managed to leverage a 30%
license agreement for in-country production of components and sub-assemblies to
compensate for the purchase of 120 F-16 fighters from the US.256 In South Africa,
nearly 132,000 workers are employed in the manufacturing sector due to offsets.257 The
US Presidential Commission on Offsets in International Trade found that the US loses
$2.3 billion of work, or 25,300 work-years or the equivalent of 4,200 full time jobs per
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year due to offsets obligations by its defence contractors.258 It is also claimed that much
defence related subcontracting work goes into developed countries via offsets.259
In Malaysia, subcontracting work was provided by BAE Systems in 1992 to SME
Aerospace related to the sale of Hawk aircraft. This was followed by further
subcontracting work through the purchases of other defence equipment due to the
government’s local content policy. However, the number of jobs offsets have generated
is negligible, and no follow-up has been done to evaluate whether sufficient amounts of
quality work have been brought in, or whether the OEMs have been able to create
forward and backward linkages through offsets in Malaysia.
Developing countries, with a desire to pursue industrial policies, often find military
spending on dual use technology attractive. Indeed, some countries have used offsets
arrangements to enhance the capability of their non-defence sectors.260 Dual use strategy
can either be spin-off, from defence to civil, or spin-on, from civil to defence. The basic
idea behind the spin–off concept refers to the transfer of specific technical innovations
from the military to civilian sphere, which are subsequently exploited by the
commercial market.261 South Korea, for instance, uses military spending to obtain
defence technology which is later utilised by its civil industries.262 By contrast, spin-on
emphasises the movement of civilian technology into the defence sector. Academic and
policy discussion also focuses on the negative aspects of spin-offs. Military R&D is said
to crowd-out civilian technological innovation and investment,263 and arguably military
technology is too complex and performance too high for civilian applications.264
Military technology may not be compatible with the economic and technological
environment of the weapons purchasing country, particularly if it is a developing
country. It is claimed to be more cost effective to move from civil to military
technology.265
Employment generation has also been highlighted as one of the benefits of offsets.
Developing countries view offsets as an avenue for employment creation. However, the
figures substantiating employment creation have been more convincing in the West
such as in Spain, Belgium and Britain than in poorer regions.266 Britain’s Westland
Company, for example, claims that the Apache programme has created 3,000 British
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jobs.267 Spain‘s 1980 licensed production of the US F /A 18 aircraft was claimed to
have generated employment in the defence sector from an offset worth $1540 million.268
However, figures for developing countries are not available.
Data on skills transfer through offsets are also minimal. Questions have been raised as
to the extent that skills acquired through military production are applicable to civil
industries.269 Military technologies are complex; they need reshaping and modification
before transfer to other sectors is possible. However, do developing countries possess
the financial and human resources to carry out technology conversion? No research has
been done to indicate whether skill-development encompasses new target groups or the
retraining of workers from existing defence industries.
Countries have pursued different offsets strategies to maximise benefits. Ron
Matthews270 has explained the different strategies using a four quadrant model. He
identified four types of strategies, namely, defence-defence, defence-civil, civil-defence
and civil-civil. For instance, Korea, India, Russia, the UK and the US fall into quadrant
one, which is the traditional model of defence-defence strategy, whereby these countries
have mainly utilised defence offsets to prop up their defence industries.
Others, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and Malaysia fall under quadrant two,
defence-civil, whereby offsets are used for civil projects. These countries realise that
defence industrialisation involves high R&D costs, local economies of scale and a
highly skilled workforce. The fact that the Saudi Al Yamamah offsets arrangement was
instrumental in the establishment of the Tate and Lyle sugar processing complex, the
Glaxo pharmaceutical plant and computer training facilities is proof of such efforts.
Oman and Kuwait have used their offsets credits for networks of small businesses. In
Malaysia, defence offsets have been utilised to leverage technology collaboration with
local universities and through the setting up of a ‘smart’ school.271
Quadrant three involves civil-civil strategy. This involves commercial contracts,
involving aerospace, transport, telecommunications and energy. The fourth quadrant,
involves civil-defence offsets. Japan, for example, through dual use industrialisation has
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been successful in transferring technology and skills obtained from civil projects into
the defence sector, thus enhancing defence industrial capability through successful
utilisation of civil offsets for defence activities. The question, though, is whether these
strategies are static or changeable according to the industrial and technological
development of each nation. For example, in recent years, more and more developing
countries have been directing offsets credits towards the defence sector with the hope of
enhancing and developing a self-reliant and capable defence industry. Malaysia has
used much of its offsets credits to enhance defence capability in recent years. The
challenge remains of determining the optimal strategy for a country’s economic
development.
Due to a lack of information, a knowledge gap exists pertaining to issues related to
offsets. It is therefore crucial to undertake empirical research into this area. This thesis
will attempt to do so by using the example of a developing country, Malaysia.
Malaysia has slowly evolved from being a traditional agricultural economy, pre-
Independence 1957. The country progressed into pre take-off in the 1950s and 1960s
mainly through import substitution activities in primary manufacturing. Malaysia then
embarked on export-oriented manufacturing in the 1970s and 1980s. It entered into the
take-off stage during the late 1980s, venturing into high technology sectors such as
defence and aerospace in its approach towards technological and industrial
development.
This process has been expedited by the dynamic global changes in technology
development through globalisation and liberalisation. However, such changes are
supported by government intervention to put in place policies focused on infrastructure
and the training of workers to ensure that industries are able to take-off into the high
technology sectors, being able absorb and apply their capabilities efficiently across a
wide range of sectors. Pursuit of indigenisation is in line with a nation’s aspiration to
attain self-reliance in technological and industrial development. In this context, and in
accordance with the endogenous or new growth theory, Malaysia has tried to leverage
through defence offsets, high technology, skilled manpower, innovative investments
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and enhanced research and development activities. However, the government sees the
need to protect its strategic industries, including defence industry. This is based on the
need to extend assistance to indigenous industries, based on security rather than
economic reasons.
2.17 Summary
This chapter has attempted to put forward various perspectives on issues relating to
industrialisation and technological development, seeking to establish that technology is
the ‘answer’ to achieving the economic development of underdeveloped countries.
Initially, technology was acquired by these countries to achieve self-reliance and
technological independence from the advanced Western countries. Today, the debate
centres on how economic take-off can be achieved and competitive edge be sustained.
Developing countries have employed various industrial strategies, such as ISI and EOI,
to build technological capability. The role of government has been significant in
enhancing industrialisation and technological development in these countries. In the
more successful developing countries, government have taken an active role in
promoting indigenous technological innovation. Government has selectively intervened
by providing a suitable political and economic environment for foreign investment,
fostering the process of structural development, such as tax-free incentives to foreign
investors, and the promotion of infrastructure and transportation structures.
This chapter also highlights the broader definitions of technology, to include hard and
soft technology. Science-push and market-pull contributes to technology development.
Evaluation of the literature in this chapter also highlights the fact that a well planned
technology transfer process is important to ensure smooth and effective technology
development. Several technology development paradigms have been put forward,
namely the Western, Socialist, Late-Industrialising and African models to indicate the
different policies, strategies and mechanisms involved. The chapter looks at the
objectives of technology transfer from two perspectives, the seller and the buyer,
arguing that both objectives must be met in order to obtain a successful transfer of
technology. The various modes of technology transfer, namely, off-the-shelf-purchase,
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FDI, licensing, sub-contracting, joint venture, collaboration and offsets have been
discussed. Issues such as definitions, mechanisms, benefits and disadvantages of
employing these modes were analysed by drawing examples from various countries.
Finally, an in-depth discussion was provided, focusing on the importance of offsets as a
tool for enhancing industrialisation and promoting technological capability in
developing countries. Differing perspectives were provided as to whether offsets have
worked by drawing examples from various developed and developing countries seeking
to achieve economic development through offsets. There is a widespread view that
offsets can act as a catalyst for defence industrialisation, technology indigenisation,
skills development, employment, licensing, creating sub-contractors, joint ventures, and
long-term industrial collaboration. However, the majority of studies to date have
provided empirical evidence in relation to the development experiences of only
developed countries. Moreover, the empirical evidence is both anecdotal and vague.
This study attempts to close this gap by analysing the effectiveness of offsets in a
developing country, namely, Malaysia. The study analyses the innovations, sub-
contracting work, joint-ventures, licensing, skill development and dual-use technology
through offsets in Malaysia.
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Chapter 3
3. OFFSETS AND DEFENCE INDUSTRIALISATION
3.1 Scene Setting
Offsets thrive in contradiction: at one end of the spectrum, offsets are recognised as a
tool for economic development contributing to technological and industrial growth. On
the other hand, offsets are held to be in opposition to a free market approach,
encouraging corrupt practices, market distortion and cost inefficiency.1 The truth,
however, lies somewhere between the two extremes. Offsets, fifty years ago were a
complex blend of national pride, budget concerns, domestic politics and Cold War
industrial policy. Offsets, at that time, were perceived as a tool to relieve economic
deprivation.
At the end of the Second World War nation states were confronted with varieties of
problems including domestic economic disarray and international trade crises. During
this period, the US became concerned about the Soviet Union’s military capabilities and
decided to offer offsets to its allies as a means of increasing their allies’ industrial
capability and modernise as well as standardising military equipment between the allied
forces. Offsets practices, which began in the late 1950s, especially amongst NATO
members, were clearly aimed at promoting US weapons systems and fostering the
reconstruction efforts of US allies.
This strategy changed in the 1960s and 1970s when a large number of industrialised
Western European countries, recognising the increasing costs of advanced technology,
began to demand offsets to maintain their defence effectiveness. Governments of these
countries wanted to justify the huge outflows of foreign currency through military
purchases by returns in the form of economic development. Eastern European and other
developing countries slowly emulated Western offsets practices aimed at raising their
defence and economic capabilities. On the civil side, commercial offsets development
can be traced back to the 1970s with the changing face of global industrial
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competitiveness. Today, offsets have gained prominence not only among developed
countries but increasingly among developing ones. There are a number of reasons for
the increased importance of offsets. 2
The end of the Cold War has left a security vacuum. There was a global reduction in
defence spending, causing a massive dent in the growth and progress of defence
industry. Developing countries re-prioritised their national budgets by reducing defence
spending and reallocating spending into other sectors of development. Much defence
spending was now focused on defence modernisation programmes to upgrade and equip
Armed Forces with the latest state-of-the-art-technology.
On the whole, it became a buyers’ market. The shrinking defence market, rising
equipment costs, increasing demand on ‘value for money’ and the uncertainties of
future defence procurement forced multinationals to pursue market consolidation to
become internationally competitive. Against this background, defence contractors had
to offer additional incentives, such as offsets, to stay competitive within the defence
market. In the 21st century, offsets transactions have continued to grow, featuring as a
key ingredient in the arms trade.3
Given the fact that offsets are normally tied to arms sales, they are surrounded by
complex processes, clouded by secrecy and non-transparent data, and are highly
sensitive. Offsets are complex and do not have common international practices
applicable across the board. Offsets practices around the world vary in terms of
objectives, requirements, strategies and processes. It is also strange that certain
countries appear to be more successful than others in their offsets strategies. For the
purchasing countries, offsets are often seen as a perfect solution for penetrating the
defence sector which is still highly protected by market barriers, patents, intellectual
property rights, controlled technology transfers and oligopolistic market structures.
Against this backdrop, the primary objective of this chapter is to critically discuss the
theory and practice of offsets. This chapter also focuses on the role and impact of offsets
towards defence industrialisation with references to both developed and developing
countries.
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Section 3.2 discusses the components of countertrade. Offsets, a sub-category of
countertrade have been characterised as comprising a pool of contradicting definitions.
Section 3.3 discusses the reasons for offsets, both from the buyer and seller
perspectives. This section provides examples of why offsets were undertaken by certain
nations. Section 3.4 examines the policy, process and implementation of offsets. The
entire offsets management process, including the role of offsets as part of procurement
processes, is explored. This provides an understanding of how offsets fit into the wider
function of procurement. Section 3.5 of this chapter examines the challenges faced in
the implementation of offsets. This section mainly traces and analyses the undercurrents
and complexities that often arise in offsets practices. Section 3.6 explores offsets
success factors. The success of offsets depends on a purchasing government’s offsets
strategy, policy and implementation approach; the defence suppliers’ commitment,
indigenous corporate strategy and human resource development, and finally the
technological absorption capability of the local sub-contracting base. Section 3.7
critically examines the role of offsets and its impact on defence industrialisation by
reference to countries which have used offsets to develop their defence industrial base.
Section 3.8 closes the chapter.
3.2 Components Countertrade
Academicians and practitioners often find it difficult to define offsets. Offsets are
complex, muddled with terminologies, complicated tools, formulas and contradictory
practices, but offsets are also unique as they create strategic and economic
opportunities. Offsets fall under the umbrella term of countertrade. Figure 3.1, below,
explains in detail the various components of countertrade. Generally, countertrade is
divided into three broad categories of barter, counterpurchase and offsets; barter




Barter can be divided into simple barter, clearing arrangements and switch-trade. The
earliest countertrade activity was mainly in the form of simple barter. This practice
existed for a long time and flourished during the great depressions of the 1930s, an era
when governments and industry faced difficulties in paying for their imports and
financing their exports due to exchange restrictions, large debts and low foreign
exchange currency reserves. Simple barter is a simultaneous exchange of one item for
another. The essence of this transaction is the exchange of goods without the use of
currency. This primitive mode of business transaction under imperialistic policies
fostered a tight system of colonial dependency on protected markets and captive sources
of raw materials. Simple barter was popular until end of the Second World War when a
‘truly moneterised world economy’ was established5. Barter amongst all forms of
countertrade was the most popular mode of transaction until the end of the Second
World War.6

















Source: Johan van Dyk, Denel Pty Ltd, Introduction to Offsets, In: 2001 Offsets
Workshop, Civil Service Golf Club, Kuala Lumpur, July 2001, (Ministry of Defence,
Malaysia, 2001), (with permission).7
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When a number of barter transactions are grouped together under a single contract,
whereby each party agrees to purchase a specified (usually equal value) amount of
goods and services, the arrangement is known as a ‘Clearing Arrangement’. Most of
such transactions are accomplished on a government-to-government basis, in which
each country sets up an account that is debited whenever one country imports from the
other. This form of transaction is very popular amongst Third World countries which
lack foreign currency or face difficulties with cash transactions. The account is cleared
on an annual basis to remove imbalances.8 The third type of barter is switch trade.
Switch trade is more flexible as it allows a country to exchange with a third party (hard
currency or another product) credits accrued under a clearing arrangement.9
3.2.2 Counterpurchase
The second mode of countertrade transaction is counterpurchase. Counterpurchase is an
agreement whereby the initial exporter buys or undertakes to find a buyer for a specified
amount or value of unrelated goods from a set list determined by the buyer, during a
specified time period and to the value of the initial export. The value of the counter-
purchase goods is an agreed percentage of the price of the goods originally exported.
This type of transaction is the most widely used of all countertrade options. Counter-
purchase usually occurs between an advanced country and a developing country and is
found particularly in key industrial sectors. Defence companies tend to avoid counter-
purchase agreements because they inevitably incur extra transaction costs.10 In addition,
many counterpurchase agreements impose quite rigid specifications relating to the time
for completion of the counter purchase and penalties for non-performance.11
3.2.3 Offsets
Offsets, the third mode of countertrade, have become increasingly popular, especially in
the international defence trade in recent years. Offsets have been subject to various
definitions, meaning different things to different people. Below are a few examples of
offsets definitions:
158
i. ‘….an offset is a contract imposing performance conditions on the seller of a
good or service so that the purchasing government can recoup, or offset,
some of its investment. In some way, reciprocity beyond that associated with
market exchange of goods and services is involved.’12
ii. ‘… an offset occurs when the supplier places work of an agreed value with
firms in the buying country, over and above what it would have bought in
the absence of the offsets.’13
iii. ‘Offsets are simply goods and services which form elements of complex
voluntary transactions negotiated between governments as purchasers and
foreign suppliers….. They are those goods and services on which a
government chooses to place the label offsets.’ 14
iv. ‘Offsets, co-production, barter and countertrade are compensatory trade
agreements that incorporate some method of reducing the amount of foreign
exchange needed to buy a military item/some means of creating revenue to
help pay for it.’15
v. Offsets are ‘compensatory procurement arrangements designed to offset the
cost of purchasing defence equipment from overseas by means of a
reciprocal (countertrade) commitment by suppliers in support of a
purchaser’s domestic economy.’16
vi. Offsets often appear under the guise of compensation packages, industrial
benefits programmes, cooperative arrangements and countertrade policy.17
These various definitions appear to offer a common understanding that offsets are a
form of compensatory or reciprocal trade agreement between private companies of
seller countries and governments of buyer countries in the arms trade. The term
‘reciprocity’ stresses the mutual agreement between sellers and buyers to enter into
offsets transactions. Some countries view offsets as implying partnership and
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cooperation. However, implicitly there is a more cynical view of schemes that see
offsets as intending to force relocation of activity from the supplier country to the
purchasing nation.18 Offsets are even seen as a form of coercion.19
Offsets relate to any normal ‘reciprocity transactions’ and are not limited to defence or
government imports. Offsets have become a widespread practice both in the civilian
aircraft industry as well as in the aerospace/defence sector. Offsets recipients look for
additionality20 and causality21 in offsets arrangements. Causality relates to establishing
the fact that projects would not otherwise materialise without offsets. Additionality
refers to projects that are new to the buyer country and must create new opportunities
such as of employment, technology and skills development.
Countries often differ in their interpretation of offsets. Some countries tend to use
offsets as a subset of countertrade and vice-versa. The US, for example, does not favour
the term offsets as it is said to be a politically incorrect word, implying barriers to free
market enterprise and liberalisation. The US prefers to use the term Industrial
Participation rather than offsets. The US defines offsets as a condition that a foreign
government often negotiates with a US company seeking to export a major defence or
commercial system to its country, under which the country’s firms: i) participate in the
production of the system and/or its subsystems, or ii.) obtain other technological or
economic benefits from the US exporter.22 Often direct offsets are mandatory and US
companies should be given the opportunity to be directly involved in the technology
development and production of the equipment or sub-systems purchased. To define
offsets, a detailed classification of offsets types is offered by the United States Bureau
of Export Administration (BEA) is shown in Table 3.1, below.
The UK also uses Industrial Participation as the term to describe its offsets activities,
being purely based on work generated within the UK by offshore vendors. South Africa
uses the term National Industrial Policy (NIP) to relate to non-defence related offsets
and Defence Industrial Participation (DIP) to relate to defence offsets. Malaysia uses
countertrade as the umbrella term for a spectrum of activities including offsets and
counterpurchase. Other terms used to define offsets include Industrial Enhancement,
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Industrial and Regional Benefits Policy and Industrial Cooperation.23 Variation in the
usage of offsets amongst countries may be interpreted as implying differing strategies. It
is almost impossible to have one universal definition for offsets as the subject is ‘not a
one size fits all’. Offsets can be further divided into direct and indirect offsets.24
3.2.4 Direct Offsets
Direct offsets are contractual agreements that involve defence products and services
referenced in the sales agreement for military exports. These transactions are directly
related to the defence items or services exported by the defence firm and are usually in
the form of co-production, subcontracting, technology transfer, buy-back, joint-
ventures, marketing assistance, training, production, licensed production or financial
assistance. Countries like the UK, the US, Singapore and South Korea adopt this
interpretation. Others, such as Malaysia, South Africa and Portugal, include all defence-
related activities as direct offsets. Each activity is explained in detail below.
Co-production permits a foreign government or producer to acquire the technical
information to manufacture all or part of a defence item domestically. Co-production
can be either government-to-government agreements or between a government and a
private manufacturer. Co-production includes government-to-government licensed
production, but excludes licensed production based upon direct commercial
arrangements by prime manufacturers. On the other hand, licensed production, a
commercial arrangement, involves the manufacture of a whole system or just
components of the system using the supplier’s technology in the buyer’s country. This
must, however, be done with the permission of the supplier government. The quantity of
the items to be manufactured can be a proportion of all its orders, including exports.
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Table 3.1: Types of Offsets according to United States Bureau of Export Administration
Offset term Definition
Direct offsets Contractual arrangements that involve defence articles and
services referenced in the sales agreement for military exports.
Indirect
Offsets
Contractual arrangements that involve goods and services
unrelated to the export referenced in the sales agreement.
Co-production Overseas production based upon government to government
agreement that permits a foreign government(s) or producer(s) to
acquire the technical information to manufacture all or part of a
US origin defence article. It includes licensed production based
upon direct commercial arrangements by US manufacturers.
Licensed
production
Overseas production of US-origin defence article based upon
transfer of technical information under direct commercial




Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offset
agreement and that may take the form of research and
development conducted abroad; technical assistance provided to
the subsidiary or joint venture of overseas investment; or other
activities under direct commercial arrangement between the US
manufacturer and a foreign entity.
Overseas
Investment
Investment arising from an offset agreement, often taking the
form of capital dedicated to establish or expand a subsidiary or
joint venture in the foreign country.
Credit Value
of an Offset
The offset transaction value applied against the offset agreement,
which may be greater that the actual value of the offset. Extra
credit (that is, through multipliers) is sometimes earned as an
incentive to perform some specific offset, such as investment or
technology transfer of particular interest to the foreign
government.
Source: The United States Department of Commerce, Ninth Offsets Report, [online],
(Bureau of Industry and Security, Washington, 2006), (Accessed: 7 June 2004), Avialable at:
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenceindustrialbaseprograms/index.htm, p.11
The technology transfer contemplated can include both product and process technology,
with the presumption that the buyer’s defence industrial capacity is fairly well
developed to be reasonably able to absorb the transfer. Both, co-production and licensed
production, however, takes into consideration issues such as unit costs, lead times and
equipment costs.
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Subcontractor production is a straightforward overseas production of parts or sub-
systems of a wider defence system. It does not necessarily involve licensing of technical
information and is usually a direct commercial arrangement between the defence prime
contractor and a foreign producer. This is one of the less desirable forms of offsets for a
country to negotiate, as it comprises little transfer of technical knowledge. Buy-back
arrangements can be more costly as it involves the exporter agreeing to purchase
products from the importer. In this case, the seller transfers technology (embodied in
plant and equipment) and agrees to buy a proportion of the output over a specified
period of time. The buyer will borrow money and pay the seller for the plant. Buyers
will then use the proceeds of the sales to repay the hard currency which was borrowed
to purchase the equipment. Buy-back involves precise particulars of the products to be
bought, the amount, type and delivery periods.
Technology transfer is highly prized and considered to be one of the most valuable
benefits of offsets.25 Technology transfer can be in the form of research and
development, technical assistance and training, or patent agreements between
manufacturers. For many developing countries, technology transfer forms an essential
part of their offsets arrangement. The US Department of Commerce in its 9th BIS
Report defined technology transfer as including research and development conducted
abroad, exchange programs for personnel, data exchanges, integration of machinery and
equipment into a recipient’s production facility, technical assistance, education and
training, manufacturing know-how, licensing and patent sharing.26




The technology transfer process shown in Figure 3.2 involves three stages: acquisition,
absorption, and diffusion. The local commercial and defence industry learn and
assimilate technologies that are transferred through offset arrangements and fully
capitalise on such technologies by, first, replication, and then introduction of upgrades
and finally independent innovation as a foundation for global competitiveness.
Investments of this form usually involve a joint venture arrangement, though output
from an independent manufacturer may be used in lieu of cash dividends in computing
compensation. It is a way for the buyer to increase investment, create jobs, and
stimulate the domestic economy, contributing towards domestic economic development.
3.2.5 Indirect Offsets
In contrast to direct offsets, indirect offsets are contractual arrangements that involve
defence or civil goods and services unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales
agreement. These transactions are not directly related to the defence items or services
exported by the defence firm. The kinds of offsets that are considered ‘indirect’ include
purchases, investment, training, financing activities, marketing/exporting assistance and
technology transfer. The varying definitions used by nations to define offsets activities
determine a particular country’s offsets strategy.
For the purpose of this study, offsets are defined from a developing country’s
perspective. In this case, offsets are defined as an economic compensation package
whereby the buyer gets a return for the equipment purchased. Direct offsets relate to
defence and indirect offsets relate to non-defence.
3.3 Why Pursue Offsets?
The reasons for pursuing offsets can be looked at from two different angles - from the
buyer’s perspective and the seller’s perspective. For buyers, offsets act as a mechanism
to leverage economic development from contractors. As the purchase of military
equipment involves huge expenses which are not normally directly reflected as
beneficial to the society (as opposed to health or education) purchasing countries thus
view offsets as an excellent tool to justify military expenditure. They normally highlight
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the beneficiaries’ economic returns in terms of jobs, investments, enhanced
industrialisation and foreign exchange savings. On the other hand, suppliers view
offsets as a marketing tool that can give them the edge to compete for business within a
competitive defence market. The following section examines in detail why buyers and
sellers pursue offsets.
3.3.1 Defence Industrial Base
Most buyer nations see offsets primarily as a mechanism for both enhancing their
defence industrial base, pursuing other economic goals. Governments of buyer nations
exercise a certain degree of leverage over the defence contractors to obtain various
macro economic benefits, such as employment and the economic growth of domestic
defence and non-defence industries. Offsets are also said to provide access to new
commercial opportunities through international marketing expertise provided by offsets
providers to buyer nation industries.27 Buyer nations realise the need to maintain a DIB
to provide employment and to utilise the skills of retired Armed Forces personnel. In
such instances, offsets are also used as political cover to provide hidden subsidies to
indigenous military firms that governments wish to artificially sustain, i.e. the
promotion of total or partial self-reliance.28
Total self-reliance, however, can be a costly affair for smaller countries which have
resource constraints on the availability of well-trained production personnel, scientists
and engineers, domestic capabilities, financial resources for huge investments into
structural development, as well as economies of scale for in-country consumption.29 In
such circumstances, these countries will aim for self-reliance to an extent where they are
able to undertake through-life-support in terms of enhanced logistic support capability
and depot-level maintenance of the equipment purchased. This is seen as a way to break
away from monopoly prices of spares and support by buyers.
Some countries with additional know-how and capability will go a step further by
becoming manufacturers of parts and components for foreign producers of platforms,
weapons or weapon systems. In the F-16 programme involving Belgium, Denmark,
Netherlands and Norway, for example, the consortium decided to participate in the
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production of the F-16. Some 40 firms participated in the production of parts and
components for the aircraft but these companies were small; their industrial structure
was below ‘critical mass’ and the required capital investment exceeded their financial
capabilities. 30
Nations are at crossroads between specialising in platform manufacturing or the
weapons and associated control-units and subsystems. For example, nations with
capabilities in electronics may want to specialise in the production of subsystems,
leaving platform manufacturing to bigger industry players. Developing countries,
especially the Newly Industrialised Countries, with low capabilities in platform
manufacturing, do have high capabilities in electronic modules related to control-units
and subsystems. These countries may thus specialise in sub-system manufacturing.
Therefore, it is important that offsets recipients identify their capabilities and strengths
and use offsets to further develop their strengths to achieve competitiveness.31
Another strategy might be to request offsets for integration and though-life support of
the equipment purchased. Yet another is to be self sufficient to the extent of maintaining
the equipment purchased, required to avoid unnecessary delays in the case of
emergency or breakdowns of equipments, where buyers are continuously dependant on
OEMs for spare parts and the maintenance of equipments purchased. In such instances,
buyers normally require offsets to support the equipment, thus building capabilities to
become providers for regional markets. Countries, such as the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, South Korea and India, follow this strategy.
A popular case study of how offsets were used to promote the defence sector is that of
South Korea (ROK). The security threat to ROK has prompted greater emphasis on
indigenous capability. ROK’s objective, as far as possible, has been to use offsets to
build a domestic production capability in all systems areas, with sufficient capability to
manufacture and export items to other countries.32 The T-50 jet trainer is most often
quoted as an example of the strengthening of ROK’s defence industrial base. Under this
contract, Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) was the prime contractor while Lockheed
Martin (LM) acted as the main subcontractor. 33 KAI was responsible for the avionics
and flight control development, wing production and other technical assistance. LM
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handled marketing presentations. The initial order of 100 aircraft was made by the
Korean Air Force with potential global sales of 600 aircraft. 34 The Korean government
funded 70% of the programme costs, KAI provided 17% and LM covered the remaining
13%. 35 The main features of this programme included:36
i. ROK’s ability to maintain a financial/ budgetary lead with the US suppliers.
ii. Significant technology transfers in all areas of the system from foreign
suppliers to domestic Korean manufacturers.
iii. Significant offsets content.
Other Korean offsets projects include UK’s Westland Helicopter’s technology transfer,
the supply of technical assistance, training, tooling provision and supply of raw
materials for the manufacturing of Lynx landing gears, nose landing gears and the main
landing gears to KIA Machine Tool Co.Ltd. Westland continues to place orders for the
manufacture of nose/landing gears and parts from KIA for helicopters for its other
customers. Daewoo produces 8 P-3C wings for Lockheed Martin, technology obtained
through the ROK navy’s P-3C anti-submarine airplane acquisition.37
The United Kingdom is another country that utilises offsets solely for the development
of its DIB. On the one hand, the UK strongly promotes the virtues of market
liberalisation, commercialisation and increasingly ‘open trade.’ UK defence acquisition
policy is based on the notion of best value for money. Nevertheless, the risk of
neglecting its home-grown defence industry which might in the long run erode its
manufacturing base and strategic capabilities has forced it to develop a rigorous offsets
policy called Industrial Participation Policy (IPP) to compensate UK businesses by
providing work packages. The ‘participatory’ element of IPP takes the form of
compensatory investment into the UK DIB by overseas vendors officially. The UK
government is not seeking to protect its domestic defence industry, per se, but to enable
local defence companies to bid under open competition for overseas defence contracts.
It is envisaged that the winning of such contracts will stimulate higher order, defence-
related development and production activities in the UK.38
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The IPP is based on best endeavours and requires 100% IP value with no multipliers.
The IP work, both direct and indirect, requires defence-related work carried out in the
UK. Commercial or civil equipmend in a defence application qualifies, so does dual
use, namely civil application of defence technologies. DESO monitors the
implementation of IPP while the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) oversees all
policy matter pertaining to IPP. The value creation of IPP linked to the UK’s DIB has
been debated as not bringing in ‘high-quality’ or innovative work to UK firms.39 It tends
to be merely the assembly of foreign made components within the UK, under license,
generating short-term income and not directly advancing manufacturing capabilities.40
In the case of Singapore, a small but geo-politically, powerful country, defence offsets
were used to develop its DIB primarily for strategic reasons. Singapore’s threat
perception of its neighbouring countries has made it focus on meeting its Armed Forces’
immediate needs. In terms of indigenous arms production and defence industrialisation,
Singapore regards potential economic benefits as secondary to the task of bolstering the
country’s defence capabilities.41 South Africa has also utilised its offsets credits towards
the development of the country’s defence industrial base based on the Defence
Industrial Participation (DIP) scheme under the Armaments Corporation of South
Africa (ARMSCOR), with the aim of creating defence-related business in SA. Other
countries, such as Brazil,42 Argentina, Turkey, and Indonesia have all used offsets to
develop their defence industrial base over the years. Indonesia’s IPTN undertook
licensed production of foreign-designed aircraft including the NC 212 light transport
plane from CASA Spain, the NB-105 utility-lift helicopters from Germany’s MBB, the
NAS-332 Super Puma helicopter from France’s Aerospatiale, the Bell 412 helicopter
from the US and the co-development of CN-235 transport aircraft with CASA of
Spain.43
Defence industrialisation involves huge investments that take a long time to obtain
returns. These investments include sensitive technologies which are not easily
obtainable and are subject to various export regulations and embargoes. Therefore, most
countries are not able to pursue a totally self-reliant defence industrialisation strategy.
Some smaller countries, such as Portugal, Malaysia and the Czech Republic, adopt a
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more pragmatic approach when entering into collaborative or joint ventures to develop
part of the equipment or components that are vital to the main platform. Offsets in this
case are linked to in-country work related to the main equipment purchased or other
defence work.
3.3.2 Leveraging for High-Technology
Buyer countries often utilise offsets to leverage the transfer of technology into high
technology sectors, such as aerospace and defence, as compared to off-the-shelf
purchase.44 For developing countries, heavily engaged in industrialisation, offsets also
fill the gap as a vehicle to obtain technology, thereby avoiding the high cost of
‘reinventing the wheel’ and as a partnering mechanism for engaging in collaborative
development of frontier technological systems.45 The US Presidential Commission
reports that 29% of technologies transferred through offsets have resulted in recipient
firms being able to compete in world markets.46
3.3.3 Jobs
Offsets are also viewed as a vehicle to bring in employment into buyer countries.
Employment here refers not only to work in the high technology sector, but also to
simple manufacturing and assembly work. For example, Britain’s Westland Company
claims that the Apache programme has created up to 3,000 British jobs.47 In the case of
Malaysia, CTRM a composite manufacturing plant in Malacca has secured work for
around 1,000 workers through an offsets deal from BAE Systems for manufacturing
composite parts for the Airbus series of aircraft as well as for the A400M military
transport carrier. 48
3.3.4 Human Resouce Development
Indirectly, the work provided through offsets may enhance local workforce skills and
capabilities. Offsets may increase worker skills due to the exposure to new product
requirements. New work orders can create opportunities for locals to acquire skills in
new industrial areas while repetitive orders for similar jobs in the long-run could
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develop and further enhance their skills. In high technology sectors, such as aerospace
and defence, offsets may benefit recipient firms in terms of training local manpower in
areas of documentation, systematic industrial procedures and facilities management
which are crucial in the defence or aerospace sectors. Furthermore, international
compliance and certification have won overseas orders for many local companies.49
3.3.5 Hard Currency Savings
Offsets provide hard currency savings for buyer countries, especially when the deal
involves barter or counterpurchase. Sellers will be forced to either receive goods or
services in return for cash. Offsets also bring inflows of capital investment which are
crucial for developing countries that are shortened capital. However, the issue here is to
ensure that such capital is sourced externally from overseas and not within the buyer’s
country. If the capital for investment is from the buyer country, this will cause a strain
on the existing domestic entrepreneurs who are fighting to obtain capital from the pool
of scarce capital resources. Yet, operationally, it is difficult to ensure that capital flows
are from external sources.
3.3.6 Marketing
For sellers of defence equipment, offsets are seen as a marketing tool, sustaining
competitiveness in the saturated defence market, enabling the sale of defence platforms,
weapons and subsystems overseas. Offsets can become an essential element of
marketing when dealing with trading partners with a strong preference for countertrade.
Offsets may be preferred as it demonstrates long-term interest in the customer and may
give an edge when core submissions are equal.50 Past evidence has shown that offsets
can be the deciding factor to win a contract if two companies with equally competitive
price and quality of equipment compete on the same international bid.51 Even in the US,
where offsets are not a recognised mode of trade transaction, US defence contractors
offer offsets to their customers, afraid of losing business to other suppliers who are
heavily engaged in the offsets business.
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Large defence multinationals have set up extensive offsets operations, manned by
individuals whose work is essentially that of a trading company. These MNCs are
engaged in evaluating offsets demands, marketing offsets products, building plants,
working with potential foreign suppliers, searching for saleable technologies, training
foreign firms, managers and engineers, identifying sources of credit, bargaining with
buyers over commitments and performance, as well as trading offsets credits and debits.
Companies such as BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, EADS, MBDA, Northrop Grumman
and Boeing, have their own in-house offsets specialists who work on offsets deals.
Normally, the offsets set-up is part of the marketing division within a business
development department. Staffs are trained in-house on the workings of offsets and are
prepared using their customer’s politico-economic objectives and national development
plans.52 Other smaller companies hire independent consultants or offsets advisors to
negotiate on their behalf.
3.3.7 Political Mileage
For sellers, offsets are further viewed as an effective tool earning political mileage for
defence contractors by demonstrating that they do not seek short-term benefits through
the selling of defence equipment, but intend to establish long term partnerships with
buyer countries and their industries. This further assists in cementing a bilateral
relationship, on a country-to-country level, creating the potential for future business.
Contractors create the trust and commitment in wanting to develop long-term
sustainable projects that will assist the economic development of buyer countries. The
seller company’s track record of long-term commitment is reflected positively in the
buyer’s order book. The successful offsets projects are seen as establishing a good
relationship between sellers and buyers beyond normal business deals. Once the buyer
and seller establish their reasons for wanting offsets, both parties will then indulge in
initiating offsets into their deals. Buyers will ask to incorporate offsets in the
procurement deal whilst sellers will formulate the best possible offsets deal to win the
contract. This overall process requires an understanding of offsets policy, process and
implementation.
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3.4 Overview of Offsets Policy and Management Process
In reality, the ‘no one size fits all’ condition makes offsets a complex tool to be applied
in business practices. There are more than 78 countries around the world with some
form of offsets policy.53 Offsets policy normally outlines the buyer country’s offsets
objectives and strategy, the various conditions imposed on suppliers, the details of the
offsets process, the authority in charge, the implementation procedures and penalties
applied. The offsets policies, however, vary in terms of focus and objectives for each
country depending on the nation’s socio-economic objectives. Many nations have
formalised their offsets policy through the publication of guidelines. A dedicated
service provider called EPICOS has captured most of these written policies on its
website to assist defence contractors and buyer nations in understanding the offsets
policies of different countries. However, some countries resort to unpublished
guidelines to provide maximum flexibility for negotiations. The overall offsets
management process requires producing an offsets policy that includes strategy, process
and implementation. The following section provides a general overview in relation to
these aspects.
3.4.1 Offsets Strategy
Countries may employ different offsets strategies. The strategy selected will largely
depend on the offsets objectives of each nation. Ron Matthews clustered country
practices into three different offsets strategies, as shown in Figure 3.3.54 According to
Matthews, the first approach is to use offsets on a case-by-case basis. Japan and
Singapore, for example, are more comfortable with this approach, seeking to maximise
their benefits though negotiations and compromise.55
The second approach is based on ‘best endeavours’ where offshore vendors are
encouraged to offer offsets in return for the sale of goods and services. The UK
government takes this approach. The UK MOD believes that the key ingredients for
success are partnership, trust and vendor commitment. No penalties are imposed if the
vendor fails to achieve the required 100 percent offsets target across the stipulated
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delivery period. However, non-fulfilment will seriously jeopardise a contractor’s
chances of winning future bids. It is reported by DESO, the UK offsets authority, that
offshore vendors, to date, have kept to their obligations. DESO keeps track of offshore
vendor performance which carries weight for future sales.
Figure 3.3: Spectrum of Offsets Policy Possibilities
Source: Ron Matthews, Defence Offsets: Policy versus Pragmatism, In: J Brauer and J P Dunne, Eds,
Arms Trade and Economic Development Theory, Policy and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets, Routledge,
London, 2004, p.92.
A third and more rigid approach is where offsets are obligatory and penalties will be
imposed on sellers for non-achievement of offset obligations. Normally, a set amount is
determined at the outset of the agreement to be mutually agreed between both buyers
and sellers. The average penalty is between 5-9% of the contract, and is imposed in the
form of a bank guarantee. Penalties have become an increasingly popular approach
amongst developing countries. This approach is taken by countries, such as South
Africa, Turkey, Poland, the Nordic countries and Malaysia.






















3.4.2 Offsets Management Process
There are several stages to an offsets management process. Figure 3.4 provides an
overview of how offsets fit into the overall procurement process. The level and depth of
how offsets interface with procurement process may vary for each nation.
For a buyer, once a decision has been made on buying defence equipment, sub-systems
or solutions, the Ministry of Defence will then prepare allocations and specifications. In
countries where procurement practices are based on free market and competitive
tendering, such as in most of the Western European countries, North America and
Canada, procurement decisions are based on best value for money. In such instances,
offsets recipients are not pre-determined and governments take a hands-off approach
towards offsets. Defence contractors are given the option of choosing and working with
companies of their choice.
This same system does not apply in many of the developing countries. In such
developing countries, procurement decisions are made by the Treasury which will
decide whether it should be an open-tender, limited tender or direct negotiation. In most
instances, direct negotiations are made on a government-to-government deal, mainly
based on political decisions. Once these decisions have been made, the tender document
will then be prepared and advertised. The tender document will have requirements on
proposal submission, based on several criteria such as a competitive price, superior
technical components and attractive offsets packages. Buyer nations have more leverage
on demanding quality offsets in an open-based tender as compared to restricted or direct
negotiation. This is because suppliers will try their best to put together an attractive
offsets package in order to win the contract. The proposal which includes offsets will
then be submitted to the MOD procurement division for tender evaluation.
The Tender Board will evaluate various proposals and select the winning defence
supplier. The defence procurement team will evaluate and negotiate the equipment price
and technical aspects of the equipment while the offsets team will evaluate the merits of
the offsets proposal. Once the supplier has been identified, the government and defence
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contractor will negotiate the details of the contract. A separate negotiation will take
place to determine the details of the offsets programme, recipients, implementation
schedule and the penalty for non-compliance. During the offsets negotiation process,
various offsets attributes such as multilpiers, threshold values, penalties, etc are used to
conclude the offsets programmes. These attributes are vital to determine that the buyer
country has obtained sufficient offsets, valued at mutually agreeable terms between the
seller and buyer. In some instances, when there are disagreements as to the details of the
offsets contracts, negotiations can take months to conclude.
Figure 3.4: Offsets Process
Foreign contractor bid Tender announcement
Tender evaluation









As the offsets proposal is an important component of the overall procurement bid, the
seller has to be well-versed in the preparation of a comprehensive and competitive
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offsets proposal. There are four phases in the preparation of the offsets proposal by the
supplier. In the first phase, the supplier company’s marketing unit will form a team to
study the buyer country’s geo-politics and economic background. These include
understanding the buyer nation’s policy requirements, the people, their history and
traditions, their government and its bureaucracies, as well as the planning cycles and
development priorities. Further, a survey, including a risk analysis, will be conducted to
evaluate the country’s economic conditions, industry growth and capabilities. The seller
must also be familiar with the buyer nation’s defence equipment procedures and offsets
rules when preparing a sale.
The second stage will involve a massive sales campaign to promote the defence
equipment and the offsets programme proposal to the relevant authorities in the buyer
country. This stage will include understanding the offsets guidelines, regulations and
objectives, establishing timing and pre-contract needs, developing a strategic plan
within the campaign framework, determining tactical pre-offset needs, direct and
unrelated, as well as managing and controlling risk, costs and expectations.
The third stage will only occur if the supplier’s bid is successful, whereby the supplier
company’s offsets team will then have to sit down with the buyer nation’s government
offsets authority to discuss the finer details of the offsets package. This stage will
include documentation, finalisation of costs, identification of risk and performance
bonds, penalties and liquidated damages.
The fourth and final stage requires that, upon signing of the primary defence contract, as
well as the offsets contract, the supplier will need to embark on implementation of the
offsets project. The implementation stage will take into consideration the performance
and reporting procedures, targets and milestones, identification of projects and
opportunities, market and supply constraints, loss of work and intellectual property
implications, management of internal and external resources and the possibility of
fostering sub-contractor and partnership support. Figure 3.5 below summarises a
supplier’s four-stage approach to offsets management, as explained above.
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Figure 3.5: Four-Phase Approach in the Formulation of an Offsets Proposal
Source: Clive Simeons, Senior Consultant to British Aerospace Plc, Implementation of Offsets, In: 1999
SMI Offsets Conference, Washington, 21 January 1999, (SMI Conference, US, 1999).
3.4.3 Offsets Implementation
At the implementation stage, it is vital to understand the various attributes which are
included in the offsets policy to ensure smooth implementation. These attributes and
how they work need to be understood thoroughly by the negotiating parties of both
suppliers and recipients of offsets.
The first of such attributes is offsets value. Most countries like to set a minimum offsets
value. Offsets value refers to the percentage of offsets required by a buyer government,
valued against the total value of the equipment and services purchased. The minimum
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further divided into direct offsets, indirect offsets, counterpurchase, and so on. The
quantum or allocation to each sector depends on the buyer country’s objectives. For
instance, Poland normally asks for a very high offsets value, up to 200%, which are
mainly focused towards enhancing its defence industrial base. Saudi Arabia, on the
other hand, often asks for offsets to be used to develop commercial ventures. The UK
requires a 100% offsets value channelled wholly into its defence sector.
Multipliers are crucial for countries aiming to attract a certain type of offsets.
Multipliers are defined as incentives used by buyer countries to stimulate particular
types of offsets activities. Defence contractors will receive additional credits towards
their offsets obligations above the actual offsets value by introducing multipliers. In
2005, BIS reported that 83 percent of transactions in Europe did not involve multipliers,
85.5 percent of transactions in North and South America did not use multipliers, and
76.6 percent of transactions in Asia and 87.9 percent in the Middle East and Africa did
not use multipliers.56 This indicates that a large number of countries around the world
still do not use multipliers as this practice can distort the actual value of a particular
offsets transaction.57
Offsets multipliers normally vary from one country to another. Multipliers are given by
buyer countries to the offshore vendor depending on the importance of the project
concerned. For example, a seller may argue that a project valued at x, be given a
multiplier of 4 as the project will bring economic returns four times greater than the
initial investment to a buyer country’s economy. Offsets multipliers are usually used to
attract defence contractors to offer high value added projects that suit buyer country
objectives, identifying high priority sectors for offsets work. The BIS Report 2005
states that multipliers were most widely used in overseas investments, training
transactions, followed by subcontracting.58 Most countries tend to award high
multipliers for technology transfers into high-tech areas, being investments that can
create long-term sustainability and employment. High multipliers are also given to
government focused projects. The UK does not employ multipliers, thus all work
brought into the country is counted on a dollar-to-dollar basis. Poland, however, has a
complex system of awarding multipliers, but is reviewing this practice.
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Purchasing countries require that suppliers offer offsets at the determined minimum
threshold value. The offsets threshold refers to a minimum procurement amount set by
buyer governments for sellers to include an offsets package in their sale of goods and
services. For example, Malaysia imposes offsets on all purchases above 50,000 Euros,
whilst South Africa imposes offsets on all purchases of goods and services above
10,000 USD.
An Implementation schedule is often included as part of the offsets agreement. This is to
ensure that the seller and buyer mutually agree to a timeframe in which the offsets
obligations are to be completed. Normally, offsets obligations are to be completed by
the end of the warranty period of the equipment purchased. Sometimes, offsets
obligations can be longer than the warranty period. The implementation schedule is
crucial to ensure on-time delivery of obligations and the constant reporting of
programme progress to the relevant government authority. Projects that do not keep
track with implementation schedules, without valid reasons are normally subject to
penalties.
Another method used to attract offshore vendor investment is to allow the banking of
credits. This is where sellers are allowed to ‘bank’ credits earned through projects done
in advance or in anticipation of a sale. Some buyer countries provide such options to
sellers. Sellers have two ways of accumulating credits. The first is when they have
fulfilled their obligations over and above what has been promised in the contract. The
second is when sellers provide offsets projects even before the main contract agreement
or before a sale is finalised. However, there is usually a time-frame for the utilisation of
these credits, normally within three to five years from the offsets credit accumulation
date. The benefit of banking offsets credits is that it enables sellers to run programmes
in advance, in anticipation of future sales, and be able to claim for this against existing
project. This scheme helps sellers achieve their offsets targets much quicker than
waiting for the actual programme to commence.
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However, sellers must be careful to clarify with buyer governments projects that can be
considered for credits. As for buyers, the banking of credits enables sellers to implement
projects even before actual sale. It also allows them to be selective in awarding the
credits based on the credibility and long-term sustainability of the programme to buyer
countries. Banking of credits is still new to many countries due to their lack of
understanding with respect to implementing and monitoring this mechanism. As soon as
these offsets conditions have been agreed, both sellers and buyers will agree to either
sign a separate offsets contract or to insert offsets as part of the main contract. The
contract may be signed before, or after, the signing of the main procurement contract.
Sometimes, individual offsets recipients will sign a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the seller, spelling out details of their offsets obligations and workings.
As soon as the agreement has been signed, the offsets contract is constantly monitored
by an offsets authority. Most countries have an Offsets Management Office within their
Ministry of Defence, while some country’s offsets are managed by their Department of
Trade and Industry or Commerce. A few such as the UAE, Kuwait and Spain have set
up ‘independent’ Offsets Groups to handle offsets management. The role of an Offsets
Department is crucial to ensure proper management, including the monitoring of the
offsets implementation process. Therefore, issues such as organisational structure,
staffing, processes and procedures, as well as implementation mechanisms must be
considered by such organisations in order to maintain effectiveness and efficiency of the
offsets programme. Sellers, for their part, will have to send in periodical reports to the
offsets monitoring bodies on the progress of their projects. Offsets beneficiaries will
also be required to constantly provide feedback to the government on progress, raising
issues and challenges faced in the implementation phase.
The offsets process and implementation procedures are not straight forward. Different
groups involved in the exercise make offsets practice complicated. Besides
understanding the attributes of offsets, it is also vital to appreciate the offsets
management process and how it operates within the procurement process of each buyer
nation requiring offsets. The process is triggered by the announcement of defence
procurement, normally undergoing several stages involving various stakeholders, such
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as the supplier company, buyer nation and its industry, and the Armed Forces in the
case of a defence purchase. Given that the details of the process may vary from one
country to another, the next section discusses the challenges faced in the offsets
implementation process.
3.5 Challenges to Offsets Policy, Process and Implementation
The practice of offsets is bounded by complexities, arising from the lack of
understanding on the usage and interpretation of offsets attributes as well as the
differing approach to the offsets procedures, structure and implementation process.
Further, the offsets policy and guidelines are fluid, constantly changing to accommodate
the buyer country’s political-economic objectives. It is therefore vital to address some
of these complex challenges, analysing why they occur and how best to manage them.
The various problems related to offsets are discussed below.
3.5.1 Non-Harmonisation of Offsets Practices
Various terminology and technical jargon are used in the practice of offsets. Each nation
has a different interpretation of these terminologies, including the offsets criteria,
selection process, threshold value, multipliers, penalty and monitoring processes. For
instance, the application of multipliers can be confusing as buyers and sellers have
different methods for evaluating and applying multipliers against projects. If buyer
countries are not stringent with the awarding of multipliers, they may obtain too little of
a programme for too much money. Multipliers cannot be fixed for all countries as each
nation has its national development objectives to be achieved through offsets. Some
countries, however, do have written fixed multipliers that can be used by sellers to draw
up their offsets projects. These formulas are nevertheless detailed and complicated,
often causing disputes between buyers and sellers.59 Sellers try to achieve high
multipliers in order to fulfil their offsets obligations. Due to the various complexities
arising from the usage of multipliers, many offsets practicing countries either choose
not to incorporate multipliers or to take a flexible approach of only applying them on a
case-by-case basis.
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3.5.2 Imposition of Penalties
Another challenge is related to the imposition of penalties for non-fulfilment of offsets
obligations. Penalties may be a good option for pinning down defaulting contractors,
but they may not be the best solution for completing offsets obligations successfully.
Many nations resort to the usage of penalties for non-fulfilment of offsets obligations.
Each nation has a different percentage of penalties and imposes different conditions for
non-fulfilment. Defence contractors normally react negatively to this practice, claiming
that penalties negate the spirit of partnership and goodwill in offsets dealings. Most
contractors claim that they would normally try their best to fulfil offsets obligations,
forecasting future business rather than forfeiting it.60 Defence contractors also highlight
the fact that penalties unnecessarily incur additional costs to buyers, as the bank
guarantee for the amount specified will be factored into the overall equipment price.
However, certain countries still continue to impose penalties quoting bad experiences of
offsets obligors failing to fulfil their obligations. 61
3.5.3 Codified versus Un-Codified Offsets Policy/Guideline
Besides the complexity arising from offsets attributes and processes, one of the most
controversial issues is whether offsets policies and guidelines should be codified or
otherwise. In recent years, most offsets practising countries have taken steps to
formalise their policy/guidelines through publications/bills or Parliamentary Acts. Can a
codified policy create greater clarity and transparency for both offsets providers and
recipients?62 From a seller’s point of view, codified offsets policy allows a systematic
and coordinated approach, whereby the offsets provider based on the codified policy
will be able to plan, strategise and provide the best offsets deals suited to a recipient
country’s politico-economic needs and objectives. The need is to understand the internal
offsets mechanisms of the recipient’s offsets office and most importantly appreciate the
greater transparency within the purchasing country’s processes and procedures.
Buyers consider a codified offsets policy vital for ensuring continuity, especially if there
is rapid movement of desk officers handling offsets within the offsets management
office. A codified offsets policy can be reviewed from time to time to incorporate the
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recipient countries changing needs. Do offsets work better with or without a codified
policy? The answer is again not straightforward. Countries like the UK, Sweden,
Norway, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Greece, Poland and South Korea have codified
offsets policies. Countries, such as Singapore, Japan, Malaysia and India do not have
codified offsets policies but have had very successful offsets programmes in the past.63
For these countries, a non-codified offsets policy provides greater flexibility and
provision for continuous improvement on on going offset projects. Generally, a codified
offsets policy may work better for countries where offsets desk officers lack in-depth
knowledge of offsets with frequent changes of officers or attrition rates within the
offsets set-up. Therefore, it is difficult to pinpoint whether offsets work better when
they are codified, or otherwise, as the issue is again, country specific. However, recent
trends clearly indicate that more and more countries are moving towards drawing-up
codified offsets policy and guidelines.64
3.5.4 Issues of Causality and Additionality
A further contentious issue is that of causality and additionality. Causality and
additionality play important roles in offsets implementation as most countries demand
during the offsets negotiations that sellers prove that the offsets programme introduced
into the buyer country has both these characteristics. In reality, can the impact of
causality and additionality be measured? It is almost impossible to prove that the
‘demand’ was solely due to the offsets initiative and that it has created new business.
A famous example quoted by many authors with regard to additionality is the case
where the UK government agreed in the 1990s to buy seven airborne warning and
control (AWAC) aircraft from Boeing.65 The deal committed Boeing to offering 130%
offsets. Over 50% of the offset obligation was to be met by purchases of civilian
aerospace products, including Rolls Royce engines to be used in civilian airliners. Since
the civilian division of Boeing normally bought a substantial amount of aerospace
products from UK suppliers anyway, there was considerable controversy as to whether
the orders that Boeing wanted to count as an offsets obligation actually represented new
business, or just a ‘creative classification’ that had nothing to do with the AWACs
deal.66 Another example is where the Malaysian government bought two Scorpene class
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submarines from DCN International (Armaris) (France) and Izar (Navantia) of Spain.
One of the offsets deals was for the Spanish company (Izar) Navantia through a third
party to award a contract to a Malaysian company, XY Base Sdn Bhd, for an IT project
to upgrade the systems at the Barjeras airport. It was claimed that the contract would
have been given to this company anyway due to its competitive pricing and work
quality. In fact, reportedly, the project was already under discussion before the offsets
programme was negotiated.67
The negative implications of offsets practices vary from one purchasing country to
another. Buyer countries engaged in counterpurchase transactions may not be able to
identify the additionality aspect or actualise new markets created by offsets providers. It
may be impossible to discover whether the counterpurchase deal is new or just a
diversion from one country to another. Often, commodity dealers complain that the
counterpurchase arrangements distort the existing market, creating problems for
commodity traders. 68 It is likely that offsets providers will view such arrangements as
short-term and discontinue their purchase as soon as the obligations are over.69 What
happens to the supply of commodities to supplier countries or third party countries once
the offsets deals are over? In Malaysia, for example, 50% of the countertrade deal for
the purchase of the submarine from France and 50% for the Main Battle Tanks from
Poland are to be offset by counterpurchase of commodities comprising palm oil, rubber,
cocoa and other products. However, how does the offsets office at the Defence Industry
Division, MOD, Malaysia, distinguish between a new sale and the continuoation of
existing market relationship? As commodity trading is not the core business of defence
suppliers, they will normally hire a commodity-trading company to undertake this work.
The problem for the buyer country again is how to keep track and ensure that the trading
house is not buying and selling to the existing market instead of new markets. For
countries that do not have sufficient monitoring mechanisms, tracking such activities
can be difficult, thus defeating the purpose of creating additional sales through
counterpurchase deals.
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3.5.5 Is Offsets Practice Transparent?
Offsets are also claimed to be non-transparent. They are said to be corrupt practices or a
legal form of bribe.70 Often, the complex and non-transparent way in which decisions
are made to select and award offsets projects are questioned. Offsets are also said to
inflate the price of the main defence equipment as most of the additional costs are
factored into the offsets programme. The absence of a transparent process is also
claimed to create loop-holes for corrupt practices in the offsets industry.71
There are initiatives to overcome the unnecessary complication and avoid the non-
harmonised offsets practices amongst nations. The EU countries, for example, have
sought to explore the possibility of harmonising offsets policy.72 The European Defence
Agency (EDA), an agency also responsible for offsets-related matters, has recently
called upon the EU countries to harmonise offsets policy.73 This initiative according to
the EDA is to harmonise five practices: threshold value, selection, composition of
direct-indirect offsets value, multipliers and terms. The harmonised policy will reflect
the key features of the monitoring process. However, this initiative has received mixed
signals from EU countries, as not all of them want to adopt a unified offsets policy due
to then uneven level of defence industry development. 74 Similarly, in the US there are
efforts to standardise offsets practice to eliminate corrupt and and inconsitent processes
thereby enforcing maximum local production and employment creation within the US
defence industries.
3.5.6 Increase in Price?
Do offsets costs money? There is arguably a certain amount of costs built into offsets.
Offsets are certainly not a free lunch and someone has to pay for the tab. Who bears the
costs of offsets? In this study’s 2005 fieldwork involving twelve Malaysian offsets
providers, all companies admitted that offsets cost money.75 Such offsets costs are
normally factored into the primary contract’s equipment price. In most cases, the costs
vary depending on the type of offsets programmes and the commercial viability of the
offsets programme to the seller. For ventures that benefit suppliers, such as sub-
contracting work involving minimal technology learning benefits, the offsets costs
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might be minimal. However, offsets involving human resource development, training
and consultancy work will incur higher offsets costs. Similarly, for subcontractor
production where the identified subcontractor does not have enough skills to produce
quality products, the offsets costs will likely increase. The increased costs are then
added to those of the primary contract, to be absorbed by the buyer country as an
opportunity cost of maintaining domestic production.76
The setting-up of offsets operations within the seller’s firm may incur additional
operational costs, eventually increasing the costs of equipment. Offsets create an
additional workload and thus costs for sellers. For example, many multinationals invest
heavily into the offsets team, who need to be involved in extensive research to study
economic development needs. Companies have to create extra positions and incur
additional administrative costs to sustain offsets operations within their organisation. In
the case of BAE Systems, which has a huge offsets set-up, it must absorb overall offset
costs to maintain its offsets division. For some vendors, offsets can be a totally new
experience and they will have to train staff. The issue becomes more complicated if the
offsets requirements are not part of seller’s core business, such as biotechnology,
fisheries, agriculture and information technology. In such instances, the seller will have
to hire independent third party advisors or agents to undertake the work. This again will
incur additional costs to the sellers which are eventually likely to be transferred to the
purchasing countries. Defence contractors would normally like to focus on their core
business, finding indirect offsets obligations too demanding in terms of costs and
financial resources.
A survey conducted in the UK suggests that offsets do cost more than off-the-shelf
purchases, and, not surprisingly, vendors seek to include most of this premium in the
selling price.77 Wally Struys argues that Belgium has had to pay an estimated 20-30% in
‘over-costs’ in conjunction with offsets tied to military procurement.78 Ann Markusen
indicates that offsets cost between 7-10% of the value of arms sales,79 whilst Finland
estimates a 10-15% cost increase per offset agreement.80
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A Dutch audit on offsets costs, prepared by Price Waterhouse Consulting (PWC) for the
Netherlands’ Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Defence, found that the
costs of imposing offsets averages 2.9% of the value of the acquisition.81 The findings
also mention the factors influencing offset costs are the value and type (direct or
indirect) of offsets obligation, the location of the foreign obligor and any possible
cooperation with a foreign Ministry of Defence. Other factors, such as competitive
tendering and the existence of a penalty clause, have no effect on offset costs. However,
the Report qualified that this scenario only applies to Western European countries and
may differ for other nations with different considerations.82 A recent survey in Malaysia
indicates that offshore vendors do build-in costs which may vary between 5-8%.83
Although offsets are not free, it is difficult due to corporate sensitivity to obtain the
exact amount of any offsets cost premium. There is no fixed percentage of offsets costs
as this can vary depending on many external and internal factors relating to the offsets
provider and recipient contractual arrangements.
Realising the multiple challenges faced in the practice of offsets, can offsets be
successful? What are the factors that contribute to the successful practice of offsets?
Several factors have been identified as contributing to the success of offsets. These
factors are clustered into four areas and are discussed in the next section.
3.6 Offsets Success Factors: Key Discriminators
What determines offsets success? Various factors were identified as contributing to
offsets success. Based on the literature review, four principal factors were identified as
vital towards ensuring the success of offsets as a tool for industrial and technological
development:
 Whether the buyer country has an offsets strategy, policy and implementation
mechanisms in place to ensure positive offsets growth.
 The commitment of defence contractors and their governments towards ensuring
the successful completion of the promised offsets programmes.
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 The offsets recipient’s capability and readiness to learn, absorb and effectively
translate offsets programmes into successful projects as well as the ability to
strengthen sub-contracting base.
 The offsets recipient companies’ strategy and human resource development
plans.
The interaction between these four elements, as shown in Figure 3.6 below, is
fundamental to ensure a successful offsets programme.





Industry Strategy & HRD
Technology Development
& Sub-Contracting Offsets Success
Source: Author
3.6.1 Recipient Government’s Offsets Strategy, Policy and Implementation
Process
In any examination of offsets success, the role of the purchasing country must be
considered. Key factors include whether the purchasing country’s government has in
place clear offsets objectives and comprehensive strategies to meet those objectives and
also whether offsets strategy and policy are in tandem with their national economic
development plans, industrial policies and science and technology policies. National
offsets objectives can vary according to geo-politics and the level of socio-economic
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development. Each country has its own rules on accepting offsets. Some countries limit
offsets entirely to the defence industry and some direct their obligors to local companies
they should work with.
Ron Matthews introduced an offsets matrix illustrating the mix of processes and
objectives linked to the principal forms of offset strategy, as shown in Figure 3.7 below.
Matthews’ model has provided a neat demarcation of offsets strategy that has been
practiced by various countries. The matrix is divided into four quadrants.






Source: Ron Matthews, Defence Offsets: Policy
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i. Quadrant 1 shows a traditional offsets model, where a major weapon
systems purchase from an offshore vendor is tied to a defence-related offset
programme. Countries such as South Korea, the UK, India and the US are
said to fall under Q1 where offsets are mainly tied to license agreements for














ii. Quadrant II talks about the high costs of defence R&D and how
constrained production scales limit the economic benefits of defence offsets.
The policy direction may shift from defence to civil offset requirement, and
this is illustrated by countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and
Malaysia falling into QII.
iii. Quadrant III illustrates civil-civil primary contracts for commercial items
such as aerospace, power generation and telecommunications. Examples
here include Indonesia’s purchase of aircraft for Garuda airlines using
leverage from purchasing airliners from Boeing and Airbus to obtain offsets
fabrication work on the subassemblies of the aircraft purchased.
iv. Quadrant IV relates to dual-use industrialisation. Civil to defence offsets
strategy emphasises the role of technology spin-on. Local defence
industrialisation is underpinned by foreign technology transfer via licensed
production of technologies in a recipient country’s civil economy. Labour
skills and manufacturing outputs, in turn, are transferred domestically from
the civil to defence sector to foster development of sovereign defence
industrial capacity. Japan is quoted as falling into this category.
These quadrants reflect the different offsets strategies pursued by each country towards
achieving its offsets objectives.
India, for example, has been using offsets for decades through the defence equipment
purchases to attain self-reliance based on political and economic factors. Politically,
India’s move towards self-reliance and indigenisation was based on its high-level
security threat from its neighbours as well as being hurt by arms embargoes imposed by
the US and the UK several times in the past. Economically, India wants to develop its
own indigenous DIB and provide opportunities to its SMEs in terms of employment,
training and technology transfer. Some nation’s offsets objectives are focused on non-
defence sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, petro-chemical and electronics. Countries
in the Middle East have largely taken this approach. Defence Offsets has been a
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mechanism for reciprocal investment in the Gulf region since the mid-1980s. Offsets
have been viewed as a ‘third wave’ to economic development, stimulating viable local
manufacturing capabilities.84
For example, Kuwait, having established its offsets policy in 1992, has most of its
offsets projects focused on manufacturing, with most of its regional inward investments
geared towards ‘soft’ technology transfer through the provision of training packages,
particularly the upgrading of local staff for equipment maintenance and servicing. Other
projects include medical–human patient simulators, home health services, educational
projects, eg.the IPETQ training institute as well as educational and scholarship funds.
Also in the Middle-East, the UAE since 1995 has launched 21 joint ventures through
various offsets programmes.85 Projects include shipbuilding, aircraft and ship-leasing,
central cooling systems, fish farming real estate, property management, commercial
aviation maintenance, financial services, agriculture, green housing, medical waste
management and medical insurance.
Finally, in the case of Saudi Arabia, there have been three major offsets projects:
i. US Peace Shield programme (worth 35% of the primary defence contract)
ii. Al Yamamah 1 and II.
iii. French Al Sawari (35% of the primary defence contract).
Al Yamamah and Al Sawari were heavily focused on the civil sectors. In the case of Al-
Sawari, the French invested into the oil sectors, specialising in recycling of catalyst
equipment, and a gold refinery, geared towards the processing of gold scrap. The Al
Yamamah project’s objective was to develop commercially viable and profitable
projects, facilitate investments and joint ventures by diversifying Saudi’s national
income into non-petroleum activities. However, critics argue that contrary to the claims
of economic diversification, most of the Saudi offsets projects have been concentrated
in the petrochemical, oil and gas sectors, hardly advancing diversification.86
The buyer government needs to consider whether offsets are in line with the country’s
national development objectives and whether offsets feature in all these documents.
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Also, do offsets feature in purchasing countries short-and long-term procurement plans?
Finally, has the purchasing government enforced local content input in defence
procurement?
Other issues for consideration include competence in offsets negotiations, internal
offsets processes, procedures, implementation mechanisms and auditing that could
increase the efficiency and effectiveness of overall offsets performance. In developing
countries, the extent of a purchasing government’s selective intervention in assisting the
success of offsets programmes should also be considered. Many countries have in place
systems to closely monitor the progress of offsets projects. Periodic reports are to be
submitted by OEMs to the offsets authorities. OEMs are also required to adhere to
implementation schedules.
Certain countries have realistic and practical modes to calculate offsets output which
can be used to measure offsets performance. In the case of the Czech Republic, for
example, offsets are calculated based on the value generated by the investment or its
export contracts for Czech companies and also technology transfers that generate Czech
revenues.87 Offset transaction values are confirmed annually, and are either the net
export value generated in connection with new export contracts or net sales of goods or
services based on that investment. Similarly, UK offsets performance is based on the
commercial value or export value of the product produced through the industrial
participation initiative. 88 Other crucial factors to be considered by developing countries
include the ability of offsets authorities to plan, coordinate and negotiate offsets.
Purchasing governments should have policies that can support the growth of supporting
industries.
3.6.2 OEMs’ Commitment to Offsets Obligations and Technology Recipients
With respect to the offshore vendor, several issues may be considered to ensure the
success of the offsets programme. These include the sellers’ willingness to transfer
technology, the level and type of technology to be transferred, whether the technology is
commercially viable, the cost of technology, intellectual property rights and patenting
issues, the willingness to give away licenses, the ability to find suitable partners to
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collaborate on specific projects and the issues of cost-sharing. Also, there must be a
commitment from vendors when offering the offsets package. Vendors should also
undertake risk analysis of the purchasing country’s political-economic conditions to be
able to offer deals that are suitable to the recipient country’s development requirements.
Sellers should ensure that the projects they propose are not ‘one-off’ deals. Defence
contractors should be transparent in their dealings with local subcontractors, working
towards not only ensuring successful completion of projects but helping prepare local
partners secure sustainable business. Sellers need to be open for discussions on issues
such as offset costs, project viability and the commercial potential of projects. The
question is will the OEMs meet their offsets commitments once weapons and money
have exchanged hands. Normally implementation of offsets may take a long time, often
up to ten years. Thus, the political economic climate of the weapon supplying countries
may change, impacting on relationships which may indirectly interfere with the
completion of offsets deals as originally agreed. Defence suppliers should view offsets
as long term partnerships and be willing to work with local firms without looking at
short-term economic returns.
An interesting example of a supplier’s commitment has regard to the 2004 BAE-SAAB
Gripen programme in the Czech Republic. The offsets programme which runs from
June 2004 to December 2014, is worth 25.5 billion CZK which represents 130% of the
value of the lease payments for Grippen aircraft.89 At December 2004, the project had
officially accumulated an offsets value exceeding 4.2 billion CZK, which represents
16.5% of the total offset obligation.90 BAES and SAAB have been jointly committed to
attracting offsets projects, mainly indirect work, related to autocomponent
manufacturing, electric tools, export-based investments, such as the production of
power generation equipment, the supply of medical components, the export of spark
plugs, nitro-cellulose and investment into producing a brake disc foundry and forging
equipment for Saudi Arabia. These initiatives have largely benefitted the Czech
manufacturing industry.91 In the Gulf States, however, contractors claim that they are
unable to deliver offsets projects effectively due to complicated and underdeveloped
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commercial laws, government bureaucracy, underdeveloped investment infrastructure,
as well as cultural issues.92
3.6.3 Local Industrial Strategy and Human Resource Development
Another vital factor for offsets success is the recipient company’s strategy in terms of
employment, training, skills development and positioning in the global market. The
issues to be considered include whether the local companies selected to participate in
the offsets programme are willing to invest in infrastructure, human resource
development, training and research and development. These companies should have a
development strategy to enhance their competitive-edge in order to penetrate the global
market. There should also have export and marketing strategies in-house. The most
crucial factor is for the local suppliers to be able to participate in the offsets programme,
and be able to compete internationally on the basis of price, quality and product
characteristics. The recipient company should be prepared to invest into training
towards human resource development to ensure that adequate workers with the
sufficient level of capabilities are available to absorb the technology being transferred
into the company. These workers should be prepared to undertake work in the relevant
areas and maintain their competitiveness.
3.6.4 Technology Development and the Strengthening of the Subcontractor Base
A further success factor has regard to the offsets recipients’ capacity to absorb
technology, strengthening the subcontracting base within the country. The issue is
whether offsets beneficiaries have the resources, i.e-capital, manpower, skills and raw
materials, required to absorb the transferred technology and undertake work. Issues in
this respect include the learning curve to be able to perform fully on identified projects
and whether the offsets work is being awarded to beneficiaries with the right capability
and resources. To ensure success, the offsets providers require the opportunity to audit
the beneficiaries before the allocation of offsets. This practice may reduce programme
failure as sometimes offsets projects are awarded to beneficiaries without the right
capabilities or resources.
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Supporting industries, mainly in the aerospace sectors, are vital to ensure high
specialisation. This, for instance includes work such as painting, drilling, welding and
wiring. Purchasing countries need to know whether they have a sufficiently strong base
of supporting industries to assist the main contractors in offsets work. Main contractors
should provide opportunities for supplier industries to grow. In the case of South
Korean offsets, for example, the uneven growth of the country’s DIB was linked to the
monopoly dominance of a small number of large conglomerates –the chaebol, providing
little diffusion of production work to small and medium-sized industries. At the end of
1995, 82 Korean defence contractors produced 308 types of defence equipment but the
top ten chaebol accounted for 75% of production.93 It is argued that the chaebol’s
dominance of the Korean industry minimised the multiplier effect from technology
transfers and necessitated continued dependence on foreign firms through the
procurement of spares and maintenance.94
Based on the above critical success factors, have offsets really worked? The next section
examines whether offsets have contributed towards defence industrialisation in
countries that have heavily engaged in offsets mainly for purposes of developing their
defence industrial base.
3.7 Offsets as a Tool for Defence Industrial Development: Myth or Reality?
Offsets are viewed as a tool for achieving a self-reliant and resilient defence industry.
Offsets are claimed to have had various impacts on the development of a nation’s
defence industry. These include technology development, employment, skills-
enhancement, supply-chain development, and subcontractorisation and marketing. As
discussed earlier, nations around the world view offsets as a tool to acquire capabilities
to build their defence industries. Past examples have indicated that some nations have
used offsets to develop capabilities to design, develop, manufacture, integrate and
maintain the equipment. This can only be done if nations have the capital, human
resources and sufficient material to undertake production in-country. This also depends
on other factors such as a sufficient market for products competitiveness in terms of
price, products and quality, as well as adequate infrastructural support, such as
transportation, a safe political environment and attractive economic incentives.
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However, the question is whether all countries should follow a similar path by utilising
offsets credits to build their indigenous defence industry since the benefits of defence
industrialisation especially for Third World countries, are often intangible. Ron
Matthews, for example, argued that:
For third world nations, it can be argued that military-led industrialisation has contributed less to
employment, due to its capital intensity, than many other industrial sectors, has encouraged the growth of
research, design and development in a direction incompatible with the needs of society in the third world,
has drained the civil economy of skilled labour, and has inflated the import-bill, at least in the short to
medium term. Furthermore, in terms of export earnings potential, it is unclear how many Brazils the
international market for arms could support over the longer term.95
3.7.1 Technology Development
In relation to technological development of indigenous defence industry, offsets may
not have resulted in producing the best possible outcomes. Numerous offsets activities
have resulted in technology transfer. For instance, in the Spanish CF-18 deal, offsets
helped CASA develop its skills in the manufacturing of composite structural
components for aircraft. The electronics firm, CESELSA (now under INDRA)
established an important presence in the field of simulators and automated test beds96
Also, India, has increased the technological capability of its defence industries, such as
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), Bharat Electronic (BEL) and Mazagon Docks Ltd.97
However, in most cases the outcome of technology development through offsets has
been minimal. Most technologies transferred are basic and often on the declining end of
the supplier’s product life cycle. Suppliers are said to be not willing to transfer ‘know-
how’ for various reasons including their country’s technology export control
restrictions. In the case of Canada, for example, in the CF18 deal, it was claimed that
the technology transfer programmes were mainly focused on build-to-print short term
work which translated into little technology transfer on long-term benefits.98 In the
Spanish case, again, it was claimed that technology transfers through offsets were
extremely concentrated, with minimal diffusion of defence technology.
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First world defence suppliers invest huge amounts in R&D to invent and innovate the
latest state-of-the-art technology; they then want a return from such investments. These
technologies are transferred through licensed production or co-production, and buyer
countries are charged a royalty for the technology. The Korean defence sector,
comprising three big Korean companies and 20 smaller sub-contractors, have not been
able to leap-frog stages of development enabling them to compete directly with major
western producers.99 Offsets have only helped South Korea build a modest domestic
defence industry.100
In the Spanish case, the 84 F-18S fighters purchased from the US Mc Donnell Douglas
Corporation (MDS) had an offsets value of US$1.8 billion, (later proportionally reduced
to US$1.54 as the aircraft numbers were reduced to 72) but defence offsets only
amounted to 28% and the final configuration was biased towards indirect offsets. This
relatively low percentage was explained by Molas-Galart as due to limited capacity of
the Spanish military-related industry to absorb a high volume of direct offsets.101 When
India bought MIG-21 aircraft from the Soviet Union in the 1960s under an offsets deal,
the Soviets imposed restrictions on licensed production prohibiting India from exporting
certain products to other countries. The Soviet Union was reluctant to provide complete
technical information, withheld core technology and refused buy-back arrangements to
India.102 Another important example of technology development through offsets in the
defence sector is South Africa, which has built production capabilities in landing gear
fuselage sections for Gripen jet fighters and rudders and ailerons for other BAE Systems
aeroplanes.103
In the past, developing countries have had a bad track record in terms of protecting
intellectual property rights and patenting. Taiwan and South Korea, for example, have
had IPR problems. Many multinationals have complained that their technologies have
been pirated by small and medium scale industries in these countries, especially in the
electrical and electronic sectors. Some of these problems have hindered the smooth
transfer of technology from seller to buyer countries. Nevertheless, purchasing countries
continue to demand technology through offsets. The learning curve in defence
production can be steep, proving impossible for some countries, especially developing
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ones, to climb the technological ladder. Offsets can provide the opportunity to ‘catch-
up’ in a market place that would otherwise be impossible.
The success of technology transfer depends on the physical, social, economic and
technological environment in which the technology must operate. Developed country
technologies require reasonably high quality utilities such as clean water, reliable
electronic power supply, waste treatment facilities, interaction with other technology,
high skilled maintenance personnel-equipped with state of the art tools to keep high
technology equipment in good operating order.104 Despite the higher costs and risks of
failure, countries still engage in spin-off activities as they find it vital to invest in such
technologies for national pride and self-sufficiency.
On the other hand, sellers are cautious of technology transferred though offsets as
beneficiaries can in the long run acquire the capability to become possible competitors.
This may create over-capacity in a particular niche area. Japan indigenised technology
obtained through the US and was eventually able to demonstrate its technological
prowess and compete with the US in the international commercial market. Seller
country governments often view transfer of technology through offsets as creating
possibilities for leakage of leading-edge weapons products and processes, undermining
national and world security. There is increasing concern about the diversion of
technology to unauthorised users and the need to prohibit third parties from obtaining
sensitive military technologies and know-how. For example, Israel has reportedly
transferred US-licensed missile and radar technology to China in the 1980s and 1990s,
and has been charged with illegally incorporating US technology into weapons exported
to South Africa, Chile, Ethiopia, and other countries that the US refuses to sell arms for
human rights or foreign policy reasons.105 Brazil transferred to Iraq technology obtained
from a US offsets deal to improve Iraqi scud missile targeting capabilities. 106
3.7.2 Employment
Despite the view that offsets increase the level of employment within the defence sector,
evidence suggests that offsets have not brought in the promised amount of work. In a
major South African arms acquisition deal valued at $3.9 billion dollars, the sellers
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promised to generate employment totalling 67,000 but eventually only a negligible
amount of work was generated.107 Saudi Arabia’s multiple offsets programmes were
said to have only created a few hundred local jobs, mostly unskilled.108 The Spanish
1980’s licensed production of the US F/A-18 aircraft was claimed to have generated
substantial amount of work to the local industries but only at a considerable cost to the
Spanish public funds used to subsidise the Spanish firms.109 In the 1980s, there was a
dispute between the UK MOD and the Defence Committee over work placed by Boeing
under the AWACs project. A study on the AWACs offsets Agreement by the UK
Parliamentary Defence Committee, states that 38% of the respondents claimed that were
no impact on employment creation.110 The net number of jobs sustained was 1279 and
the net number of jobs created was only 1392.111 In the Canadian F18 purchase, the
1984 auditor general’s Report and the 1985 Nielson Task Force Report both argued that
of the C$ 2.45 billion offsets package, 57% consisted of work that could have been done
in Canada regardless of the contract and no subcontractor work was created by the
offsets contract. Britain’s Westland Helicopters (now Agusta Westland) claims that the
Apache programme has created up to 3,000 British jobs, but in the longer-term, the net
impact of offsets in the UK as a whole may lead to a loss of jobs. 112
Offsets may be damaging for the seller country’s economy as offsets transfer jobs out of
seller’s country. The US claims to have lost many jobs due to offsets. The National
Defence Industrial Association (NDIA) has clamoured for the elimination of offsets to
save the American industry.113 The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) also
lobbies hard on the subject of offsets, claiming that offsets have caused a threat to US
jobs. A sample survey of 64 transactions by eight of the largest US aerospace
companies over 1993-1998 found that direct offsets completed during this period
supplanted $2.3 billion of US work or 25,000 work-years equivalent to 4,200 full-time
jobs per year.114 The US Bureau of Industry Offsets Report by the Department of Trade
also projects a massive loss of jobs within the small and medium scale industries in the
US due to US offsets obligations overseas.115
In the UK, the DTI claims that a substantial number of SMEs have in the past few years
lost jobs to other countries where UK defence contractors have offsets obligations. The
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European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) has voiced similar concerns on
employment loss and has published a policy paper on offsets that outlines accrued
benefits by redirecting revenue back to the domestic economy, maintaining market
potential of these industries and increasing employment skills.116 What these Reports
fail to highlight is that the sale of the main equipment may actually sustain many more
high-end research and development and high technology jobs within the seller’s
country, with only the low-end labour intensive jobs transferred through offsets related
work.
3.7.3 Skills Enhancement
Offsets are claimed to enhance the skills of local workers, if they are able to learn, adapt
and enhance technology for local production. Nevertheless, offsets are said to contribute
towards raising the buyer countries’ worker skills only if the standards of low-skilled
labour are raised through offsets programme. Otherwise offsets are merely diverting
skilled labour from one sector to another in the purchasing country.
Military oriented activities have little real economic value if the skills acquired through
military-oriented production are not easily and cost effectively transferable to the
commercial sector. Some skills may be transferable only after considerable reshaping of
a potentially expensive process. Even for the kinds of skills that can be relatively easily
transferred, there is the question of whether a military–oriented environment is the most
cost-effective way of acquiring those skills.117 Further, questions are raised as to
whether the level of skilled workers employed through offsets training is simply from
an existing pool of limited skilled workers available within the host country.
3.7.4 The Supply-Chain
Offsets are utilised by major defence suppliers to source efficient and effective
subcontractors located overseas. Sellers are then able to improve their comparative
advantage by moving parts of the production process to more cost effective locations
abroad, where labour and raw material costs are significantly lower thus reducing
equipment production costs. There is evidence that countries have benefitted from
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vertical disintegration, work-sharing arrangements, and subcontracting activities
through offsets. 118
An example of work specialisation through subcontracting is the F16 co-production
arrangement with General Dynamics, in which a Dutch firm, DAF, became a
subcontractor for landing gear equipment, supplying not only General Dynamics but all
other manufacturers.119 A similar case is that of Westland Helicopters which transferred
technology to KIA, South Korea, to manufacture landing gears for Westland
helicopters.120 Today, KIA is not only able to produce landing gears for all Westland
helicopters but has also captured the Korean civil market through the manufacture of
landing gears for commercial aircraft, thus becoming a specialist in the manufacture of
landing gears. 121 In the UK, for example, the willingness of US firms to transfer
contracts, through offsets has led to work for small UK defence companies, such as
Avimo (UK) Ltd and its work on the Apache AH-64-D project, and Hyde Engineering
(UK) and its work on the C 130-J. This has resulted in the transfer of supply chain
activity from the US to the UK.122
Offsets may benefit only the bigger and more powerful defence companies in certain
countries. In Spain, for example, it is reported that 10 firms received the largest share of
offsets activities.123 Two of them, CASA (aerospace) and INDRA (electronics) account
for 30% of all offsets obligations within the country.124 This concentration exists despite
the large number of firms that have participated in one or more offsets agreements.125
The uneven growth in the ROK’s defence industrial base was linked to the monopoly of
the industry by a small number of large conglomerates, the chaebol, which facilitated
little diffusion of production to small and medium–sized industry. South Africa also has
similar problems in strengthening its backward linkages.126
3.7.5 Competition within Supplier Countries
The growth of offsets and the increasing outsourcing activities by large offshore prime
contractors endangers the local small and medium sized defence contractors in the
advanced countries. Offsets agreements that include subcontracting or licensed activities
can displace local sub-suppliers, transferring jobs from these companies to low cost
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centres abroad. Offsets activities may enhance future competition from foreign
competitors.127
To counter these negative effects, governments of large prime contractors implement
measures to counter threats. The US government, for example, pays special attention to
lower-tier subcontractors and the effects of offsets agreements. As a result, various bills
such as the Buy America Act128, Defence Production Act 1950, Arms Export Control
Act 1968, National Authorization Act 1989, The Presidential Policy 1990 and the
Feingold Amendment 1954 were all aimed at protecting the American defence
industrial base.
In the UK, the risk of neglecting the home-grown defence industry might in the long run
erode manufacturing capabilities. This has obliged the government to develop the
Industrial Participation Policy. IPP aims to compensate UK businesses by providing
work packages. The ‘participatory’ element of IPP takes the form of compensatory
investment into the UK DIB by overseas vendors. The UK government is not seeking to
protect its domestic defence industry, per se, but to enable local defence companies to
bid under open competition for overseas defence contracts. It is envisaged that the
winning of such contracts will stimulate higher-order, defence-related development and
production activities in the UK.129
3.7.6 Sustainability
Offsets receiving countries may negotiate projects obligating exporting countries to
buy-back products produced with the transferred technology. In most cases, contracts do
not compel the principal contractor to maintain ties with sub-contractors. An offsets
deal with a buy-back arrangement can only work if the buyer country has the capacity
and competitiveness to sustain the business momentum once the offsets programme
ends. Otherwise the buy-back process will fail.130 Short-term solutions have proven to
be worthless, as once foreign suppliers have completed their offsets obligations,
operations will cease to exist. In the UK, IP work is measured in terms of volume of
work but there are no explicit mechanisms to ensure that this volume is converted into
long-term growth potential.131 In South Africa there was a debate about defence offsets
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being leveraged into sectors with the capacity to maintain sustainability of employment
and ‘basic needs’ public-utility sectors, such as housing, transport, energy and
communication.132
Indonesian defence industries, heavily subsidised by the government, could not sustain
their activities during the Asian Financial Crisis. IPTN had to downsize due to
outstanding debts of $570 million, eliminating 5,000 jobs, and holding back projects
including the CN-235 and N-2130.133 In the case of the Philippines, the 1992 GKN
Sankey Limited (UK) 150 wheeled personnel vehicles (Samba) contract (Value: $56,
272) involved the assembly in-country of 142 vehicles.134 Although there was limited
technology transfer and employment created, the plant had to shut-down with worker
retrenchment as there was no succession plan for exports or marketing in the contract.135
3.8 Summary
Offsets are complex, employing complicated terminologies and processes. Nevertheless,
offsets remain a popular mode of trade transaction, especially amongst the defence
industry community. The objective of this chapter has been to encapsulate the various
issues revolving around offsets, evaluating whether offsets work. This chapter has
discussed offsets definitional tools, processes and workings; the complex issues
surrounding offsets practices and success factors. There is no straightforward answer to
whether offsets can or cannot work. Offsets success is ‘country-specific’ and depends
largely on each nation’s offsets strategy, policy and processes. Based on general
analysis in this chapter, the next two chapters analyses whether offsets work in
Malaysia, with particular reference to the Malaysian defence industry. To begin, the
next chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of Malaysia’s defence industrial context
and the role that offsets have played in the development of its defence industry base.
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Chapter 4
4. DEFENCE INDUSTRIALISATION IN MALAYSIA:
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES AND THE ROLE OF OFFSETS
4.1 Developing Nations: The ‘Need’ for Defence Industrialisation
The first duty of the sovereign is that of protecting society from the violence and invasion
of other independent societies, can be performed only by means of military force. But the
expense both of preparing this military force in time of peace, and employing it in times of
war, is very different in the different states of society, in the different periods of
improvements.
Adam Smith
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations (1776)
Contrary to Adam’s Smith’s quote on the socio-economic costs of maintaining
military prowess, arms deals continue to feature as an important component in a
nation’s defence economy. The range and diversity of arms producing countries
can be clustered into three different categories - first tier, second tier and third tier.
First-tier arms producers are the US, the UK, France, Germany and Italy,
collectively accounting for 75% of global arms production and dominating defence
R&D.1 Second tier arms producers would be those on the spectrum between the
most and the least advanced countries. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil,
Singapore, South Africa and South Korea fall into this category.2 Third tier
countries are defined as those possessing low-technology production capabilities.
Developing countries fall into this category.
Developing countries pursue the long-term goal of establishing indigenous arms
production even though they have not been able to eliminate or reduce dependence
on imports. These countries are still dependent on foreign inputs in critical sectors,
such as design, systems engineering, high-tech components and sub-systems. In
214
fact, few of them have been able to successfully absorb technological know-how
due to the stringent export controls imposed by foreign suppliers. 3
In recent years, the technological gap between the developed and developing
countries has further widened due to various factors including the lack of qualified
human resources within host economies to absorb technology and also often the
reluctance of OEMs to transfer critical technologies for fear of potential
competitors eating into their market share.4 Observers have also argued that
indigenous production can be a costly affair for developing countries, with barriers
to technology transfer from military to civilian applications, the secrecy with
which the military handles most of its R&D projects and manufacturing processes,
the importance paid to performance of equipment rather than cost, the complexity
of programmes and the lack of economies of scale.5 Why do small developing
nations still then persist in pursuing defence industrialisation?
Developing nations with limited resources for socio-economic development spend
large proportions of their budgets on defence, pursuing arms production for non-
economic and economic reasons. Arms production is of recent origin to these
countries.6 In relation to the non-economic aspect, developing nations pursue arms
production for strategic reasons including the need to overcome weapon
embargoes.7 Political motives include considerations of foreign policy and the
leveraging of military production for regional power recognition.8 Developing
nations have recognised the benefits of building a defence industrial base that is
capable of supporting self-reliant Armed Forces, further adding to their defence
capability.
In an economic sense, a developing country’s defence industrial structure doubles
up to meet the country’s scientific, technological and strategic needs. In line with
the pursuance of defence industrialisation, the defence industry is viewed as a
catalyst for capacity-building, creating high-value added products, promoting
backward linkages to support industries, as well as dual-use technology,
employment, export promotion, absorption of high-technology and spin-offs that
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boost the civilian economy.9 Latecomers to defence industrialisation include
Argentina, India, Turkey and South Africa, all of whom have pursued aggressive
defence industrialisation strategies with the aim of achieving technological and
industrial development. Small emerging economies, such as Malaysia, aspire to go
down a similar route in the search for indigenous defence industrialisation.
Malaysia decided to undertake defence industrialisation for both economic and
military reasons. Defence industry development was mainly aimed at self-reliance
in spares and logistic support, modification, upgrades, retrofits, maintenance,
repair and overhauls without foreign assistance.10 Technically, a domestic defence
industry is essential in the long-run to ensure the continuous supply of weapons,
ammunitions and spares in times of crisis, thus saving cost and at the same time
upgrading the performance of weapons procured. A defence industrial base is also
needed to create high technology employment, value-added work, and also
backward linkages in support of small and medium scale industries, especially
heavy manufacturing industries and dual-use technology. Strategically, Malaysia
also pursues defence industrialisation to obtain high-end sensitive military
technology and know-how.
The State continues to play a vital role in nurturing Malaysia’s defence industry
through mechanisms such as defence procurement and offsets. The government
invests a great deal of financial and human resources in the development of
Malaysia’s defence industry. The question, however, is whether after more then 30
years of investment, the defence industry has attained the capability and
performance expected? Has there been sufficient attention and resources allocated
to the growth of this sector? What have been the challenges faced by the industry
during its development path? Has the defence industry been treated as a strategic
industry for political reasons, rather than as a vehicle for industrial and
technological development of the country? Finally, has Malaysia’s defence
industry policy focussed sufficiently on the development of strategic sectors,
identified the challenges, and considered the strategies that can move the
Malaysian defence industry forward?
216
The objective of this chapter is thus to discuss Malaysia’s defence industrial push,
its strategy, development, performance as well as the role of offsets in the sector’s
development. Section 4.1 provides a general definition of the defence industrial
and technological stages in the defence industrialisation process, prior to focusing
on the Malaysian industrial base. Section 4.2 provides a broad overview of
Malaysia’s defence industrial push. It discusses the development of Malaysia’s
defence industrialisation in the national industrial strategy and the influence of
defence and procurement policy in defence industrialisation. Section 4.3 discusses
Malaysia’s defence industrial policy and how this policy fits into the nation’s
development strategies. Section 4.4 discusses the role of the state in Malaysian
defence industrial development. The section explains the role of various
governmental and non-governmental agencies in supporting Malaysia’s defence
industry. Section 4.5 explains the origins of the defence industry in Malaysia and
the various stages involved in securing technological maturity. Section 4.6
critically analyses Malaysia’s defence industry structure and its capabilities to
undertake defence industry work. Section 4.7 examines Malaysia’s defence
industrial development based on six sectors - aerospace, weapons, automotive,
maritime, ICT and common-users.11 Section 4.8 analyses the development of
Malaysia’s subcontracting base through defence industrialisation, evaluating
government initiatives and performance. Finally, Section 4.9 briefly introduces the
subject of offsets as a catalyst towards the development of Malaysia’s defence
industrial development. The final section paves the way for detailed analysis in the
next chapter on the effectiveness of offsets in the Malaysian defence context.
4.2 Defining Defence Industrialisation (DIB)
Defining a DIB is not a trivial exercise. The DIB is used interchangeably with arms
production and military production. A DIB is defined by some observers as being
confined to companies that provide defence and defence-related equipment and
services to the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces.12 Gavin Kennedy uses
the word defence market 13 to identify defence industry.14 He provides a narrow
definition and a broader definition of the defence market: the narrow definition
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being current15 and capital purchase16 of goods and services, including manpower,
by the defence agencies for national security; the broader definition being any
services that contributed to national security. Other definitions take a broader
approach, with the DIB embracing industrial sectors that manufacture military
goods as well as civil goods.17 Molas-Gallart distinguishes three different
discriminating factors to define military production, namely, the client, product
specificity, and the final use of the product.18 The client base in the case of military
production comprises the defence agencies and specifically the Armed Forces; the
second indicator is product specificity, being outputs produced by the military
industry, either pure military goods or non-specialised products; the third indicator
reflects the final use of the product, i.e. those products used in combat for war
fighting or immobilising enemy forces being classified as military production.19 In
general, most sources agree that the defence industry designation depends upon the
nature of the industry’s output, and that its end-use is for defence purposes. The
absence of an industrial classification under ISIC solely dedicated to the defence
industry makes the analysis of defence industry activities difficult.
The Malaysian DIB is defined as comprising activities that are related to defence
production, encompassing production of capital equipment, components and spares
as well as maintenance and repair services to meet the in-country military and
security needs of the country.20 Malaysia also classifies its DIB as a ‘strategic
industry’ with the bulk of its production destined for defence markets, including
the Malaysian Ministry of Defence. A strategic industry in this case is defined as
an industry that provides key elements of military power and national security,
demanding special consideration by government.21 Based on the various
definitions above, this study embraces the Malaysian definition of defence
industrialisation.
In general terms, each nation goes through a series of arms production stages
before qualifying as an independent platform manufacturer possessing fully-
fledged research and development capabilities. Keith Krause22 provides an
elaborate explanation of defence industrialisation by identifying eleven stages of
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activities. This is shown in Table 4.1, constituting a DIB ranging from simple
maintenance tasks on imported arms to the possession of an independent R&D
production capability.
Table 4.1: Path Towards Indigenisation of Arms Production
Number Activity
1 Capability of performing simple maintenance
2 Overhaul, refurbishment and rudimentary modification capabilities
3 Assembly of imported components and simple licensed production
4 Local production of components or raw materials
5 Final assembly of less sophisticated weapons; some local component
production
6 Co-production or complete licensed production of less sophisticated
weapons
7 Limited R&D improvements to local license-production of arms
8 Limited independent production of less sophisticated weapons; limited
production of more advanced weapons
9 Independent R&D and production of less sophisticated weapons
10 Independent R&D and production of advanced arms with foreign
components
11 Completely independent R&D and production
Source: Krause, Keith, Arms Imports, Arms Production, and the Quest for Security in the Third
World, In: I Brian Job, Ed, The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, Lynne
Rienner Publication, Boulder CO, 1992, pp.121-142.
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Herbert Wulf, when examining developing countries, condenses this process into
just five major stages.23 As shown in Figure 4.1, the process proceeds from off-the-
shelf purchase to co-production, licensed production and finally indigenisation.
Based on these two writers’ models, the Malaysian DIB has gradually progressed
from stage 1, off-the-shelf purchase for all major capital items, to stages 2 and 3,
with the assembly of armoured vehicles and local production of certain automotive
and aerospace components. However the country’s defence industrial capability is
minimal in stage 4, licensed production, and almost non-existent in stage 5,
complete indigenous design and production of weapons.
A different and thought-provoking attempt to define defence industrial capacity is
undertaken in the book entitled Defence Economics by the defence economist, Gavin
Kennedy.24 His methodology involves calculating what he called the Potential
Defence Capacity (PDC), based on the percentage of GDP of seven selected
manufacturing sectors. Kennedy argues that arms production requires manufacturing
skills and some minimum threshold of capacity, even for the simplest of weapons.
The International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) 2004 classifies
manufacturing industry into 99 sub-categories. However, most of these categories
are not linked to arms production.
Kennedy lists seven categories under the ISIC classification, being iron and steel,
non-ferrous metals, metal products, non-machinery, machinery, non-electrical and
electrical machinery, shipbuilding and repairing, and motor vehicles; these he views
as essential to the development of a defence industrial base. According to Kennedy,
armaments, naval craft and aircraft are all heavily dependent on metal trades, metal
processing, metal fabrication and metal machining. Manufacturing output from these
categories can then be taken as a percentage of the country’s total manufacturing
capacity to establish its contribution in a country’s defence output. The PDC share in
total manufacturing capacity can be measured in several ways, including the fixed
wage bill for each sub-category, the proportion of value–added, the numbers
employed, and the value of output produced.
220
Figure 4.1: Herbert Wulf’s Five Stages of Defence Industrialisation
Source: Herbert Wulf, Arms Production in the Third World, In: SIPRI Yearbook, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 1985, p.330.
Based on Kennedy’s model, Matthews calculated India’s PDC for 1974 and
compared it to that for 1984, as per Table 4.2.25 The analysis indicated that India’s
major capital goods industries made a substantial contribution to manufacturing
activity as far back as 1974. All indicators registered an increase, with value-added
surging to a remarkable 40 percent, reflecting the growing maturity of India’s civil
Assembly of imported arms, components, subsystems and
unassembled kits of particular weapon systems are purchased
abroad and assembled domestically
Local production of simple components under license,
though sophisticated and more expensive parts continue to
be delivered from abroad. License-produced and imported
components are then assembled domestically
License-production of near complete weapon systems.
While the number of imported parts is reduced so that the
weapon is produced domestically many sophisticated
components still have to be imported.
Indigenous design and production of weapon systems.
This stage can be initiated, at least for technologically
advanced weapon systems, on the basis of many years of
production experience and when sophisticated and
diversified R&D facilities are set up. Design and production
are often still dependent on know-how and technology input
from producers in the industrialised countries
Import of equipment for repair, maintenance and overhaul
of imported weapon systems. Foreign suppliers export
technological skills by training personnel.
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engineering sector. India’s PDC was ranked highly compared to other newly
industrialising countries engaged in defence industrialisation.
Based on Gavin Kennedy’s PDC model, small developing states like Malaysia need
to analyse whether they have a viable capital goods and increasingly today, dual-use
industries to develop and sustain a defence industrial base.









1974 1984 1974 1984 1974 1984
33-Basic metals 421.7 669.4 2636 12854.5 643.4 1862.11
34-Metal products 172.2 196.5 683.5 2170.5 170.9 490.6
35-Nonelectrical
machinery
335.5 429.6 1485.6 5941.9 427.4 1608.9
36-Electrical machinery 254.4 353.2 1384.4 5562.0 387.9 1710.8
37-Transport equipment 395.2 521.4 1360.7 5831.8 398.3 1535.6
Total PDC 1579 2170.1 7550.2 32360.7 2027.9 7208
Total manufacturing 5408 6759 24447.2 95989.0 6201.0 17839
Total PDC as % of total
manufacturing
29.2 32.1 30.9 33.7 32.7 40.4
Source: Matthews, Ron, Matthews, ‘The Development of India’s Defence Industrial Base’, The
Journal of Strategic Studies, 4(12), 1989, pp.405-454, In:Annual Survey of Industries, 1974-75 and
1984-85, Summary Reports, C.S.O, Government of India. Industrial Statistics Yearbook 1985, UN,
New York 1987.
4.3 Contextualising Malaysia’s Defence Industrial Push
Malaysia’s defence policy, its Armed Forces structure and also procurement
decisions, are strongly influenced by the political vision of the country’s leaders.
When Malaysia attained independence in 1957, there was no definitive role for the
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military apart from assisting the police in the maintenance of law and order, given
the absence of external threats and the significant presence of Commonwealth
forces.26 However this scenario changed during the 1963 Malaysia–Indonesia
confrontation. That year, the Yang Di- Pertuan Agung at the 1975 Parliamentary
session declared:
Formerly, the primary role of the armed forces was to assist the police on preserving peace in the
country. Today, their primary role is to defend the country against external threat and
aggression……..27
Britain’s decision to accelerate military withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore,
the escalation of Communist activity, post 13 May, 1969, and the Sabah
‘Annexation’ Act by the Philippines Congress, forced the Malaysian government
to take a more serious approach to defence. In 1969, the late Tun Abdul Razak
(then Deputy Prime Minister as well as Minister of Defence) emphasised the need
‘….. to review the whole defence structure…… to formulate new defence
arrangements…… in the light of the likely threat, both internal and external, to the
security and stability of this region to be more self-reliant as a nation………(and)
to meet new additional responsibilities.’28 This set the tone for Malaysia’s defence
policy with greater emphasis on ‘self-reliance’ in defence as well as sustaining a
more objective external defence force. Regional instability and uncertainty,
following the withdrawal of American forces from South East Asia after the fall of
South Vietnam in the 1970s, further increased Malaysia’s need to strengthen
national security.29
In the 1980s, during the tenure of the late Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn,
defence was allocated one of the largest budgets ever, some RM 7.19 billion or
18.3 percent of overall government budget to modernise and upgrade Armed
Forces capability under a special programme called PERISTA (Perkembangan
Istimewa Angkatan Tentera).30 The changing role of the Malaysian Armed Forces
from a counter-insurgency force towards acquiring capabilities in conventional
warfare to counter external threats required massive modernisation of the Armed
Forces.31 However, the modernisation effort that was put on hold in the mid-1980s,
due to economic recession, and was reinstated in the early 1990s by the Malaysian
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Armed Forces under the leadership of Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohammad (the fourth
Prime Minister of Malaysia). Defence was once again allocated a huge budget
under the 8th Malaysia plan, amounting to RM 17,298 million or 10.2% of
Malaysia’s national budget. This high level of defence expenditure was due to the
demands of the MAF in preparing to face the new security challenges and modern
warfare of the 21st century, in terms of the nature of operations, equipment and
technology requirements.32
According to Dato’ Najib Tun Razak (Deputy Prime Minister cum Minister of
Defence) ….. ‘there is no definitive clear cut military threat facing the nation
today, but the Armed Forces still function at the frontier to tackle the country’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity.’33 The Armed Forces are needed to address the
security challenges of asymmetric warfare, including terrorism and cyber warfare.
Nevertheless, many security analysts claim that Malaysia’s immediate security
concerns today include territorial claims over the Spratly islands, also claimed by
China, Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei. Other major
flash points include piracy in the Straits of Malacca, illegal immigrants,
kidnapping, terrorism and drug trafficking.34
Malaysia’s evolving defence policy is thus said to be dictated by its foreign policy
but to a large extent foreign policy decisions are idiosyncratic, mostly made by the
prime minister in power.35 The defence policy provides the strategic guidance
determining capability requirements, to be later translated into arms procurement
planning. Malaysia’s defence policy is politically-driven and the country, to date,
does not have a defence White Paper defining Malaysia’s security concerns.36 A
1997 MOD document outlined Malaysia’s defence policy, based on three basic
fundamental principles: national strategic interest; principles of defence; and the
concept of total defence.
Based on Malaysia’s strategic interest, self-reliance of the Armed Forces became
an underpinning requirement for internal and external security of the nation. The
nation’s strategic interests lies at three different levels: the immediate vicinity,
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including land territories, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, the Straits
of Malacca and the Straits of Singapore; regional interests including South east
Asia, the Andaman Islands and the South China Sea; and Malaysia’s growing
interest beyond the region due to its growing trade links and increasing foreign
direct investment.
Considering Malaysia’s strategic interests, its defence centres on the principles of
self-reliance, regional cooperation and external assistance. At the core is the
principle of self-reliance, emphasising the Armed Forces’ capability to act
independently without foreign assistance in matters concerning internal security
and protecting the territorial integrity and security interests within the immediate
vicinity from low to medium threat level. At the same time, Malaysia‘s closeness
to the other ASEAN countries has encouraged bilateral defence cooperation and
confidence-building measures through the ASEAN Regional Forum. Despite the
country’s allegiance to ZOPFAN, Malaysia does seek external assistance outside
the region.37 The one and only formal external multilateral agreement is the Five
Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA).38 The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) has
translated its defence policy into concepts of defensive defence, comprising
deterrence, forward defence and total defence.39
4.3.1 Armed Forces Structure, Budgetary Processes and Defence Inventory
The three services of the MAF comprise 110,000 military personnel. The Army
has the largest force with 80,000 personnel whilst the Navy and Air Force have
15,000 each.40 The MOD imposes a five-year planning structure, establishing its
manpower levels, equipment requirements and financial ceilings to guide the
formulation of annual budgets. The annual budget is divided into a development
budget and an operating budget.41 The government has consistently increased its
defence spending to equip the Armed Forces with newer and more modern
equipment.42 Table 4.3 shows the rising trend of Malaysia’s defence spending over
the past 10 years.
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1995 1961 6121 2.8
1996 1886 6091 2.4
1997 1772 5877 2.1
1998 1302 4547 1.6
1999 1762 6321 2.1
2000 1600 5826 1.7
2001 1991 7351 2.2
2002 2263 8504 2.4
2003 2882 10950 2.8
2004 2073 10419 2.3
2005 2363 9039 NA
2006 3008 11070 NA
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Year Book, p.339, 2006.
The MAF’s inventory comprises armoured personnel carriers, trucks, missiles,
torpedoes, war ships, fighter aircraft, trainer and transport carriers. Appendix M
provides a full list of Malaysia’s defence inventory. Recent purchases under the 8th
Malaysia plan43, as shown in Table 4.4, are mainly part of the on-going
modernisation plan with a particular focus on strengthening sea and air power to
face the newer global security threats confronting Malaysia as well as the region.44
The government, however, aims to reduce the size of MAF personnel in the long
run and increase the fire power capabilities of the Armed Forces by equipping the
MAF with more digitised battlefield equipment.45
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Table 4.4: Main Projects under the 8th Malaysia Plan (1999-2005)
Service Equipment
Land MBT PT91

















Air A400M Transport carrier
CN 235VVIP aircraft
SU-30MKM
High Performance Human Centrifuge
Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, 2005
4.3.2 Defence Procurement Planning and Procurement Processes
Malaysia’s defence purchases are highly political with defence equipment
continuing to be bought from many different countries.46 Table 4.5 shows
Malaysia’s major conventional weapons purchases from its 10 largest suppliers
(2000-2004).47 The MOD has short-and long-term defence procurement plans,
requiring the respective armed services to prepare their capability requirements and
submit them to the Armed Forces Headquarters (AFH). AFH after a series of
internal scrutinies by the Development Division of the MOD, send a document to
the Economic Planning Unit (EPU)48 at the Prime Minister’s Department for a
feasibility study and associated budget consideration. The paper after several
reiterations is then sent by EPU to the National Development Council (NDC).49
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Source: Extracted from Appendix 10B, Register of transfer of Major Conventional Weapons,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Year Book, Stockholm, 2006.
The NDC presents the plans for Cabinet approval, which is finally presented for
Parliamentary approval.50 The Cabinet will then let the Ministry of Defence decide
on the procurement processes. Appendix N shows the seven stages of procurement
and explains how defence procurement decisions are made. Almost all of
Malaysia’s major platforms and sub-systems are purchased off-the shelf, but the
government has a keen interest in the development of its local defence industries
and emphasises the inclusion of local content and industrial participation in
defence equipment purchases from abroad. However, in reality, there is a constant
conflict between the need for local content as opposed to the government’s
emphasis on value for money and the Armed Forces’ priority for efficiency and
effectiveness of the equipment purchased. Further, as the defence policy is not
publicly accessible, it is difficult to evaluate arms procurement decisions, or to
know whether defence policy fits into the political leadership’s perception of
strategic planning in a comprehensive and systematic fashion.51
4.4 Malaysia’s Defence Industrial Policy: Congruence or Contradiction?
The defence industry forms an integral part of the defence capability of any
country. In the case of Malaysia, the defence industry is categorised as a ‘strategic
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industry’, and therefore its prime purpose is to support the Armed Forces to attain
self-reliance. The growth and development of this industry is planned and
monitored by the Ministry of Defence rather than the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI). The country does not have a published defence
industry policy or defence industry blue-print because a defence policy White
Paper has still not been formulated.52 Malaysia has not possessed a formal
approach to arms production since 1957. Defence production was solely in the
hands of the government on the pretext of national security. Over the years, the
Armed Forces’ needs were satisfied through in-house facilities on an ad-hoc basis,
geared towards the individual needs of each branch of the Armed Forces. There
was minimal defence industrialisation due to the absence of policy catering to
defence industrial development. In the initial era, industrial participation was
completely neglected in both defence procurement and national industrial
development plans.
The Malaysian Armed Forces, however, realised that it is crucial to have a capable
defence industry during war time. The Malaysian government also recognised that
defence industrial capability is crucial in supporting the development of a credible
and effective fighting force. A main objective was thus to create a defence
industrial base that is credible to provide first-line support to its Armed Forces
mainly in through-life support and spares. Malaysia’s policy of DIB modernisation
is, therefore, gradual, cautious, non-ambitious and pragmatic. The government
realised that no country outside the US can afford to have a ‘cradle to grave’
defence industry in every sector. 53 Therefore Malaysia has consistently reinforced
its position by maintaining a defence industrial base that can efficiently and
effectively sustain the equipment purchased. The nation’s capacity-building
focused on through-life support and developing the skills of Armed Forces
personnel and defence industry members.54 The defence industry is also viewed as
a source of employment for retired Armed Forces personnel who have been
commercially trained whilst in service.
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In 1982, the government initiated a formal approach to defence production policy
by introducing the National Defence Production Policy (NDPP), the first written
framework for the development of the Malaysian defence industries. Under this
policy, defence items were classified into three categories, namely, ‘strategic’,
‘essential’ and ‘non-strategic.’55 This policy recognised the need for self-reliance
in some areas, with government undertaking the production of strategic items
while semi-government and the private sector ventured into the non-strategic and
essential items. A national Defence Production Committee (NDPC) headed by the
Deputy Minister of Defence was set up to oversee the implementation of the
NDPP. However, the Committee’s efforts to implement the NDPP were disrupted
due to the economic recession in the mid-1980s, having a drastic impact on
military expenditure. Plans for weapons acquisition and all other defence-related
activities had to be put on hold and this also had a direct effect on the
implementation of the NDPP. With no new equipment forthcoming, defence
industry expenditure was channelled towards extending the shelf-life of existing
equipment through upgrades and overhauls. Sadly, the NDPP was completely
abandoned in the later days.
The government has taken a strong position on defence industrialisation and views
its progress as a public-private partnership. Efforts have been made to increase
local defence industry capabilities through government initiatives at various levels,
including local content requirements and industrial participation through defence
procurement and offsets, promotion of defence industrial collaboration through
bilateral defence industry and defence science and technology cooperation and the
award of long term contracts to deserving local industries.56 Table 4.6 lists the
Memorandum of Understandings signed between Malaysia and other countries
reflecting active bilateral defence industry working groups. Many of these working
groups have been used as platforms to discuss potential international defence
industry collaboration and technology transfer issues.
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Table 4.6: Memorandum of Understanding - Defence Industry Cooperation
Number Country Working Group
1 Australia Defence Science, Technology & Industry
Cooperation
2 India Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
3 Pakistan Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
4 Singapore Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
5 United Kingdom Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
6 France Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
7 Italy Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
8 Sweden Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
9 Brunei Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
10 South Africa Defence Industry Bilateral Working Group
Source: Defence Industry Division, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, 2006.
There are also continuous efforts to encourage dual-use technology for industrial
growth as the country’s defence industrial base is small. A dual-use strategy is
employed to assist these industries to adapt to changes in supply and demand and
keep production lines active. The government’s aim is to maintain a diversified
industrial base as a priority policy option.57 As most of the country’s major defence
platforms are bought from overseas, the government requires local defence
industry participation during the initial planning stages, though there is always a
battle between quality and performance of the equipment and national economic
development aspirations. The government has been leveraging defence purchases
to develop in country human skills of both the Armed Forces and the defence
industry, particularly in first- to third-line maintenance, repair and overhaul
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(MRO), upgrades, retrofits, basic assembly, systems integration and logistics
systems.
In recent years, Malaysia has also viewed the defence sector as a vehicle to acquire
high-end defence and aerospace-related technology that could alleviate the
country’s low technological level. This could then indirectly create spin-offs, such
as high value-added employment, indigenous technological and industrial
development, skills development and penetration into the global supply chain. The
government’s initiative to incorporate the need for high technology and value-
added activities, as well as highly skilled manpower, was reflected in its national
development goals, including the New Economic Policy, the Industrial Master
Plan, privatisation, contractorisation and Vision 2020. Interestingly, despite the
absence of a written defence industrial policy, the government aims to create a
developed nation by the year 2020, with fully developed technological and
industrial capabilities and highly trained human resources.
4.5 Tracing Malaysia’s Defence Industry Origins
Malaysia’s defence industrial base started to develop much later than many of its
neighbouring countries, such as Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and
Thailand. The country’s defence industrial base has advanced in the past twenty
years due to the government’s strong drive to promote a home grown defence
industry capable of supporting the nation’s tri-services.58 Although Malaysia’s
defence industry is viewed as a strategic sector and forms part of the country’s
defence policy, the reality is that the industry’s origins and growth are closely
linked to the country’s overall Industrial Master Plan59 and import substitution
strategies.
Malaysia hardly had any active industrial development programme before
Independence in 1957. There existed only pockets of small enterprises generally
owned by Chinese, with larger enterprises dominated by foreigners, mostly
British.60 This situation changed after Independence when the government started
encouraging industrial development to promote greater diversification and growth
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in national output.61 In the 1960s and early 1970s, there was a political will to
drive Malaysia down the import substitution strategy route,62 trying to create the
demand for domestic production with the intention of reducing exports due to the
steady worsening of the country’s terms of trade.63 Yet this ISI strategy was not
applicable to the defence industry sector per se.
During the initial development stages, Malaysia viewed ISI in the defence sector as
providing the educational effects of learning by doing.64 Malaysia’s defence
industry was very much a government-led initiative, with most of the defence
production facilities operating within the Armed Forces domain. Until the late
1980s, defence industrialisation had been minimal, and there were no significantly
important production plants.65 The government’s focus centred on three main
sectors, aerospace, maritime and ordnance.
In the mid-1980s, Malaysia decided to embark more aggressively on an ISI policy
focusing on heavy industrialisation in line with the government’s launch of the
Industrial Master Plan66. The Mid-term review of the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-
1985) stated that:
The government has been promoting the development of heavy industries in order
to strengthen the foundation of the manufacturing sector. Heavy industries are
needed to create new engines of growth and to provide strong forward and
backward linkages for the development of industries. Heavy industries can also
have substantial effects on the growth of small-scale industries if efforts are made
to establish linkages and integrate small scale industries development with heavy
industries.67
The general concentration on heavy industries, mainly the basic metals industry,
including iron and steel and non-ferrous metals, machinery and equipment, general
engineering, transport equipment and petro-chemicals, had a profound impact on
defence industrialisation. The need for force modernisation under PERISTA 2 and
also the government’s strategy to privatise and corporatise many of its defence
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facilities gave birth to several defence prime contractors. Despite this industrial
push, much of the defence industrial capability remained shallow and heavily
engaged in maintenance, repairs and overhaul (MRO) type of work, with minimal
in country assembly, co-production and licensed production work.
A further phase of defence industrialisation started between the late 1980s and
mid-1990s, with Malaysia commencing another set of Armed Forces
modernisation programmes. In the early 1990s, Malaysia’s need for defence
industrialisation grew stronger for several reasons. The country realised that other
developing countries were heavily engaged in defence industrialisation and were
far ahead by this time. Brazil, Turkey and India, for instance, were able to
manufacture their own platforms. Nearer to home, Indonesia and South Korea were
also heavily engaged in arms production. Singapore grew strong in MRO
capabilities and was able to become the regional aerospace service centre.
Malaysia viewed this progress closely and did not want to be left behind in terms
of defence industrialisation. Politically, Malaysia was trying to position itself as a
strong and economically progressive country in South East Asia and wanted to
acquire defence production capability to demonstrate self-reliance by its Armed
Forces. At the same time, Malaysia also realised that the defence industry was a
crucial means of acquiring high technology, and a strong and capable industrial
base is a prerequisite for absorbing imported technology. Investing in the
development of defence technology is costly and involves research and
development as well as highly skilled human resources. Arguably, the best way to
acquire these technologies is through a defence industrial strategy.
This was also an era when Malaysia was enjoying rapid civil industrialisation. This
strength was used as an advantage to attract some of the civil-related companies to
venture into the defence sector. Many of these companies, like DRB-HiCOM and
Sapura Telecommunications, had strategically formed a defence focus within their
organisations. Malaysia viewed the dual-use technology path as a more viable
option for local defence industrialisation. This was mainly because the
requirements of its Armed Forces were generally too small for viably setting up of
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facilities solely dedicated to defence production. Therefore, many of Malaysia’s
defence companies have taken the safe approach by catering to both defence and
civil markets at the same time. This worked well during the economic downturn
and associated defence budget cuts, allowing these industries to immediately re-
strategise and concentrate on civil markets. Today, the government focuses on the
defence and aerospace sectors as a source of high technology. 68
Malaysia applies a strong interventionist policy towards the development of its
defence industry. The government has adopted a policy of nurturing and
supporting the industry up to the point of which local companies are able to
support themselves. According to the Minister of Defence, Malaysia, Dato’ Seri
Najib Tun Razak:
To realise the goal of self-reliance in defence production and product support for
the Malaysian Armed Forces, there is a need to develop our local defence industry
in an orderly and systematic manner. There is a strategic consideration to be taken
into account and there is also an economic factor that we cannot ignore.
Therefore, there is a need to have close interplay between the Malaysian Armed
Forces, i.e. the user, the local defence industry, the supplier, and the government
agencies, which will facilitate in the areas of government funding, transfer of
technology, tax incentives etc. 69
4.6 Defence Industrialisation and the Role of the State
The State has been influential in promoting Malaysia’s defence industrial base
despite internal struggles: fulfilling the objectives of the Armed Forces in terms of
quality and operability of equipment and at the same time adhering to the
Treasury’s requirement of keeping the costs of equipment low. The government
realises that the DIB sometimes overshadows factors of economic efficiency and
effectiveness within the overall economy, a cost to tax payers.70
There are several government agencies and defence organisations responsible for
the development of Malaysia’s defence industry. The Defence Industry Division
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(DID), formed in 1972, is the key Agency overseeing Malaysia’s defence industrial
progress. This Division situated within the Ministry of Defence, is headed by an
Under-Secretary, and has four main units: Defence Industry Development; Offsets;
Defence Industry Bilateral; and Defence Exhibitions and Privatisation.71 The main
aim of the DID is to oversee Malaysia’s defence industry development through
active participation and promotion of the defence sector locally and abroad through
bilateral platforms and defence air shows, as well as assisting and preparing the
industry to face current and future challenges.72 The Department tries to promote
and assist joint ventures and export markets through bilateral defence industry
cooperation and defence exhibitions worldwide.
The DID’s efforts are supported by the Defence Industry Council (MDIC),73 a
private sector initiative, begun in 199074 to promote defence industrialisation in
Malaysia. The MDIC is chaired by the Minister of Defence, with representations
from various government and semi-government agencies, as well as defence
companies. It is focused on steering orderly development of the defence industry,
taking into consideration the objectives of the government, as well as that of the
nation as a whole. The MDIC consists of six sectors; namely; aerospace, maritime,
automotive, weapons, ICT, and common-users. Each sector is headed by an
industry member, hand-picked and nominated by the Minister of Defence. The key
objective of this council is to meet at least twice a year and to use this platform to
discuss various issues that could assist in defence industrial development. This
forum has been instrumental in formulating various policies that assist Malaysian
defence company progress. The MDIC council has also acted as the platform for
open discussions on defence industry-related issues. The council’s support has
been the backbone to DID’s efforts in promoting the Malaysian defence industry
sector.75 The Council has been responsible for formulating several important
policies in support of local defence industries, including long-term contracts,
offsets policy and the defence industry blue-print. However, some observers see
the Council as nothing more than a ‘talking shop.’76
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As defence technology and R&D are important elements in the development of the
defence industry, the government set up in 1968 a Defence Research Organisation
called the Defence Science Technology Centre (DSTC) within the Ministry of
Defence. DSTC has grown from an organisation of 182 people, to one with a total
staff of 520.77 This organisation was renamed as STRIDE78 or Science,
Technology and Research Institute for Defence in 2002. STRIDE’s task is to
supply scientific and technical expertise to the MAF. The Agency has collaborated
with several defence companies and universities on defence R&D projects.
STRIDE’s concern has always been the lack of government funding for defence-
based R&D.79 In 2002, a joint research fund was set up between STRIDE and the
Malaysian Defence Industry Council members under the mandate of the MDIC to
collaborate on defence R&D projects. Further, a body called the Intensification of
Research in Priority Areas (IRPA),80 the national R&D organisation, within the
Ministry of Science and Technology, also provides support to defence R&D but
sets a low level of priority to defence-related R& D research projects due to their
lack of both commercial value and dual-use application.
The government has also sought to develop the civil aerospace sector, providing
the vehicle for defence-related aerospace industry to spread its base. A special
aerospace related agency called the Malaysian Industry Government Group for
High Technology (MIGHT) 81 was set-up to plan and monitor the progress of the
aerospace industry. The organisation was initially part of the Prime Minister’s
Department but is now currently part of the Ministry of Science and Technology.
MIGHT updates on the progress of the aerospace defence industry in Malaysia.
Since April 2004, MIGHT has also been appointed by the Ministry of Finance as
the Technology Depository Agency (TDA). TDA’s primary role is to ensure that
technology acquisition meets the country’s development objectives. TDA,
therefore, compiles the country’s technology wish-list and links these needs to
government acquisitions. 82
Additionally, the Malaysian Aerospace Council was formed to oversee the
development of the aerospace industry, including defence aerospace. The objective
237
of this council is to monitor the overall development plan of the national aerospace
industry, providing guidelines and identifying priority areas.83 Linked to the
Development Plan, is the 1996 Aerospace Blueprint.84 The blueprint sets the vision
and development strategy for the Malaysian aerospace sector. This blueprint takes
into consideration the development of indigenous companies catering for both the
defence and civil sectors.
Other government agencies, such as the Economic Planning Unit, the Treasury and
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), as well as the Malaysian
Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), closely monitor and facilitate progress
of the Malaysian defence industry.85 The Treasury imposes local content on
purchases of big ticket investments. This is to ensure that local manufacturers, with
the capabilities and infrastructure, are given opportunities to obtain work from
overseas suppliers, wherever possible.86
The most recent development has been the proposal to form the Defence Industry
Blueprint under the MDIC. The objective of the blue-print is to put in place a
systematic plan for defence industrial development, as opposed to an ad-hoc
policy, with a lack of planning on the promotion and development of strategic
industries. The proposed blueprint has recommended five thrusts, namely, human
resource and competency development, technology development, industry
development, domestic defence procurement and international marketing, with 23
key initiatives.87 This blueprint, when published, will be the first strategic guidance
towards the development of a structured defence industry base in Malaysia.
Despite the presence of various governmental and semi-governmental agencies in
support of Malaysia’s defence industry development, most of these agencies
operate in isolation without any strategic or coherent plan under one umbrella
organisation, overseeing and monitoring defence industry development. In the past,
this has created complications in terms of work duplication, creating differing
objectives and strategies. The Ministry of Defence, however, tries to guard
jealously defence industry activities, claiming they are an important task of the
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Ministry. Further, there are lingering issues pertaining to the follow-up of the
policies by the relevant organisations involved.
4.7 Malaysia’s Defence Industry: Structure and Capabilities
After more than thirty years of defence industrial ventures, the number of
Malaysian defence companies has quadrupled. Table 4.7 below shows the growth
in the numbers of defence companies in Malaysia. The defence industry started off
as a pure government-based initiative with the formation of a few companies,
mainly in aerospace and weapon production in the 1970s. These companies were
mainly government-owned with facilities in the military environment. This pattern
changed in the early 1980s when several of the government-owned companies
were corporatised or privatised in-line with national privatisation policy initiatives.
Since the early 1990s, most of the firms have become fully private firms. Further,
there is an increase in the number of ICT and aerospace-related defence
companies. This is due to Malaysia’s focus on the aerospace sector, as a stepping-
stone into high technology and civil manufacturing industry, particularly, the
electronic and electrical sectors.
Whilst there has been an increase in the number of defence companies in Malaysia,
the question remains as to the depth and capability of the defence industry to
undertake work beyond maintenance, repair, overhaul and low-end manufacturing
of parts and components.88 Although Malaysia has been developing its defence
industry across 30 years, the government and industry feel strongly about the lack
of capabilities in major areas.89
As shown in Table 4.8, below, the Malaysian defence industry seems to have
performed better in manufacturing and MRO activities; some of the defence
companies even managing to penetrate the global supply chain in a more
challenging environment, where prime contractors have the potential to exploit
their vertically integrated positions to win an increasing share of business.
However, most of these companies possess only medium-level expertise in
assembly work. The overall industry has only attained low levels of capability in
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research, development and design work.90 Only a handful of these companies have
been able to enhance their capabilities to become international players.
Table 4.7: Expansion of Malaysia’s Defence Industry (1970-2000)
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Source: Malaysian Defence Industry Council (MDIC), registered members, 15 May 2006;
www.mod.gov.my
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Many defence companies maintain close ties with the government and are highly
dependent on the Malaysian Armed Forces for continuous business. The MOD is
thus the largest customer of these local companies for which the total contract value
in 2005 from MOD for through-life support of equipment for the three services was
RM 646.15 million.91 Of late, due to increasing international economic pressure,
many local companies have opted to diversify their markets towards a dual-use
strategy, instead of solely depending on defence. Many companies have set up
defence-based subsidiary companies within their overarching commercial
businesses.
Table 4.8: Malaysia’s Current Defence Industry Capability, 2006
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Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, 2006. 92
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4.8 Malaysia’s Defence Industry Development
According to a report by the MDIC,93 28 out of 52 members are representatives
from Malaysia’s defence industry, comprising the six sectors of aerospace,
maritime, weapons, automotive, information, communication and common-users.
However, not all members of the MDIC are established defence companies,
possessing research and development facilities, infrastructure and human
resources. Some are merely trading companies or agents, mainly involved in spares
or management consultancy.94 Appendix O presents a comprehensive list of
Malaysian MDIC members and core businesses. Figure 4.2 below, shows the six
sectors that will be examined in detail in this section. The discussion further
explores the sub-sectors within each main sector, according to the type of activity.
4.8.1 Aerospace Sector
Within the defence industry, the aerospace sector is arguably the most successful
with ‘spin-offs and spin-ons'.95 The Malaysian government believes that the
aircraft industry could move Malaysia’s technological and industrial capability
forward. There are a handful of Malaysian aerospace companies that specialise in
design, manufacturing and maintenance of aircraft.
4.8.1.1 Design
In terms of aerospace design capability, the nation is still inexperienced, and only a
small number of Malaysian companies are specialised in this area. One of them,
Excelnet, a design house, started operations in 1998. 96 Excelnet is equipped with
engineers specialising in computer Aided Design/ Computer Aided Manufacturing
(CAD/CAM) and Stress Analysis Software, undertaking design work for the
BAES Nimrod MRA4. Some of this company’s projects include managing the
wing spar modification of the Scottish Aviation Bulldog wing life extension.
Excelnet also claims that through aircraft design work, the company has been able




In terms of manufacturing capability, a few Malaysian-based defence companies
have been successful in securing international contracts for the manufacturing of
aircraft parts and components. A pioneer manufacturing facility is the Armed
Forces Manufacturing Workshop. This was set up in 1978 with the aid of Australia
to produce a variety of aerospace components. The Armed Forces Manufacturing
Workshop is capable of manufacturing parts for various equipments used by the
Armed Forces and producing a wide variety of machined components. It also
undertakes fabrication-welding, plastic moulding and auto-reclamation. Today,
other Malaysian companies have qualified to become 3rd tier suppliers of aircraft
parts, components and specialised services.97
Figure 4.2: Six Sectors of the Malaysian Defence Industry Council
Source: Author
SME Aerospace (SMEA) is a Malaysian company that started life in 1992 solely as
a defence business. The company, formed through an offsets initiative,









venture was the manufacture of Hawk pylons for BAE Systems. SMEA, over the
years, has built-up its capability in the manufacturing of aircraft parts and
components to become part of BAES’ global supply chain. SMEA, with a
workforce of 448, based in Sungai Buloh, claims to have capabilities to
manufacture Airbus fixed leading-edge metallic parts and components, Airbus sub-
spar assemblies, RJ wing leading-edges, Airbus aft pylon fairings, sono-buoy racks
and stairs, crew and troop seats and helicopter vertical and horizontal fins. The
company also claims to be competent and internationally competitive in securing
work packages based on the price and quality of work.98 SMEA started off as a
defence manufacturing company, but today has managed to diversify its business
and move into the commercial aerospace sector. The company’s CEO, Colonel
(Rtd) Chee Ng Boon, mentioned that SMEA will in future emphasise a more
practical dual-use strategy, which in the long-run will help the industry sustain its
business and increase its competitiveness.99
UPECA Engineering Sdn Bhd (UPECA’s) defence and aerospace business is a
spin-off from SMEA. This company was formed in 1990, and is civil-oriented,
primarily in the oil and gas sectors. SMEA has sub-contracted some of its work,
mainly in the production of high precision parts, tools and dies, jigs and fixtures,
aircraft parts and automation systems to UPECA. The company, through its civil
aerospace experience, has moved into the defence sector by securing work to
produce high-precision parts for the A400M. Although metal-based parts and
components manufacturing in Malaysia has not involved primary aircraft
structures, SMEA and UPECA claim to have the capability to fabricate relatively
complex aero-structural parts requiring up to five axis CNC machining.
Composite Technology Research Malaysia (CTRM) has, since its inception in
1991, been mainly involved in civil aerospace, such as the production of the Eagle
and the UAV performance Lancair Columbia 300. CTRM’s subsidiary company,
Asian Composite Manufacturing (ACT) was formed in 2001 and ventured into
composite manufacturing. ACT designs and manufactures various components for
the Airbus 320 and 380, worth more than RM 1.4 billion. 100 ACM is also the sole
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supplier of fixed trailing edge panels for the B747, 757 aircargo, 767 and 777
aircraft.101 CTRM recently moved into the defence sector when the company was
awarded the contract from BAES to design and manufacture airframe parts worth
RM 907 million for the A400M.102 CTRM also pursues a dual-use strategy and has
been successful in undertaking both defence and aerospace work using composite
manufacturing technology.
SME Aviation, a subsidiary of the NADI group, was initially set up with the sole
purpose of building the MD3 aircraft; the first Malaysian made commercial
aircraft. The project was a joint-venture between SMEAv and BAES under an
offsets programme linked to the purchase of the Hawk aircraft. However, since the
ending of the MD3 project, SMEAv has restructured its strategy to become a MRO
centre for both commercial and military aircraft. 103
4.8.1.3 Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO)
MRO capability is the oldest and most established activity within the defence
aerospace sector in Malaysia. This is because most of the companies were initially
set-up to provide immediate first- and second-line service to the RMAF before the
OEMs arrived. Eventually, some of these companies upgraded their capacity to
become regional service centres for defence and non-defence based aircraft. The
earliest defence-related aerospace company, specialising in MRO activity, was the
Aircraft Repair and Overhaul Depot (AIROD), being set up in 1976 to cater for the
RMAF’s needs. Prior to privatisation, AIROD had serviced some of the main
RMAF aircraft, such as the C-130, F-5, A-4 Skyhawk, PC-7, Caribour aircraft, S-
61 and Aloutte helicopters. AIROD also undertook repair and overhaul work on the
T-58, J-85 and Astoute engines. Under- utilisation of AIROD facilities prompted
the government to privatise this facility in 1985 as a joint-venture between
Aerospace Industries Malaysia Sdn Bhd and Lockheed Aircraft Services
International.
AIROD’s capability was initially limited to the servicing of aircraft engines,
accessories and avionics for both military and civil aircraft. AIROD was the
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pioneer in providing maintenance facilities to support the Royal Malaysian Air
Force in areas such as engines, aero-components and avionics. In 1984, AIROD
was incorporated as a private limited company, jointly owned by Aerospace
Industries Malaysia (AIM), otherwise known as the National Aerospace and
Defence Industries (NADI), and Lockheed Aircraft Systems, US. However, by
1995, AIROD had become a fully Malaysian-owned company, with 90% of its
ownership controlled by NADI and the other 10% by the Malaysian government.104
Of late, AIROD has become a wholly-owned subsidiary of NADI.
AIROD specialises in maintenance, repair and overhaul of air components, and also
engages in aircraft upgrades and refurbishment. AIROD has grown from a
workforce of 152 and 10 managers to employing over 1,200 workers, mainly
highly qualified and experienced aviation engineers. A large number of AIROD’s
workforce includes retired RMAF personnel. The company’s facilities105 located in
Subang have expanded with the capacity to undertake both military and
commercial maintenance work, diversifying its business to sustain continuous
workflow for its workers.106 In the military sector, the company currently services
the RMAF and a few other military aircraft in the region, such as the Indonesian
Airforce, Royal Jordanian Airforce and the United States Air Force (PACAF).
AIROD has also ventured into the manufacturing of wire-looms and assemblies.
Another company involved in services work is Aerospace Technology Systems
Corp Sdn Bhd (ATSC).107 ATSC with its partners, Rosoronboronexport and RAC
‘MIG’, have facilities in Pekan, Pahang. The company was formed mainly to
support and enhance MIG-29 aircraft in repair and overhaul, technical services,
upgrading and modification as well as through the distribution of spares and
materials. ATSC’s workforce is largely ex-RMAF personnel, with experience in
aircraft maintenance and engineering support. ATSC has been actively engaged
with other countries, such as Germany and India, which have also undertaken
MIG-29 maintenance work. Presently, ATSC is providing a defence maintenance
and repair service, particularly for the RMAF’s MIG-29 aircraft. With the ageing
MIG aircraft, coupled with newer aircraft, such as the SU-30 MKM, questions
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remain as to the viability and relevance of this service centre, without the servicing
of newer aircraft by ATSC to ensure sustainability.
Zetro Aerospace Corporation was formed in 1981 to deal primarily with the
supply of parts and components for the RMAF. However, its function changed
when Zetro Engineering was formed to provide services in the area of aircraft
avionics maintenance. Zetro has the capabilities to maintain, repair and overhaul
avionics components, to integrate avionics systems, maintain, repair and overhaul
ground electronic components and to test and commission radar systems. Zetro has
entered into various partnerships with foreign companies to upgrade its facilities
and be recognised as an established regional avionics centre. Zetro, with its
capabilities acquired through defence work, has moved into avionics maintenance
for civil aircraft. Zetro enjoys a partnership with Eurocopter Malaysia, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of EADS, in the servicing of aerospace electronics for
Eurocopter helicopters. 108
Other players in the aerospace sector include Caidmark, Aeronautical Technology
Sdn Bhd and Ikramatik. Caidmark, for example, has capabilities in reliability-
centred maintenance analysis and conditioned-based monitoring. The company has
been appointed by the RMAF as its authorised service provider for majority of
MAF aircraft.109
4.8.2 Weapons Sector
Although Malaysia’s weapons industry was one of the country’s earliest defence
sectors, the industry has not grown beyond catering for the basic needs of the local
Armed Forces. Syarikat Malaysia Explosives Sdn Bhd (SME) was set up in 1972 to
produce small arms ammunition, hand grenades and pyrotechnics. It started as a
joint-venture with the Government of Malaysia and two European defence
producers, Nobel of Sweden and Oerlikon Machine Tool Co of Switzerland. Some
of SME’s subsidiaries include Tenaga Kimia Sdn Bhd, SME Tools Sdn Bhd and
SME Trading Sdn Bhd. Tenaga Kimia was incorporated in 1976 as a joint venture
with Nitro Nobel of Sweden to produce emulsive explosives. SME Tools
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manufactures precision tools and parts, including plastic molds, engineered plastic
products and ground support tooling for both military and civilian consumption.
SME Trading (later known as SME Technologies) is the trading arm of the Group
that undertakes production of precision machines tools and plastic moulding. In
1989, SME signed an agreement with Steyr-Mannlicher of Austria to produce and
sell the Steyr-AUG assault gun for the Malaysian Armed Forces.110 SME
Technologies obtained the license from an Austrian-based company to produce the
Steyr for the Malaysian Armed Forces. The business did not flourish, however,
and was later dissolved, with production taken over by SME Aerospace. Recent
developments indicate that the entire production plant has shut down, and the Steyr
machine gun is no longer produced in Malaysia, following MAF’s decision to
change weapons requirements.
The Malaysian weapons industry faces difficulties due to the lack of export
markets as well as low demand domestically. The only thriving weapons producing
Malaysian company today is SME Ordnance, a subsidiary of the NADI group.
SME Ordnance Sdn Bhd (SMEO) was formerly known as Syarikat Malaysia
Explosive Sdn Bhd. Its present name came into effect on 5 March, 1993, to better
reflect its expanding business into the manufacturing of defence products. SMEO
is the only licensed manufacturer of ammunition in Malaysia and has been
identified by the government as the Agency responsible for the development of
defence products.
SMEO was incorporated in 1969 as a joint-venture company with equity
participation between the Government of Malaysia, Dynamit Nobel of Germany,
Oerlikon Machine Tools Co of Switzerland and two local Malaysian partners,
namely Syarikat Permodalan Kebangsaan and Syarikat Jaya Raya Sdn Bhd.
However, by 1974, the Government of Malaysia acquired all the shares and SMEO
and it became a wholly-owned Government company. SMEO initially began
operations as a manufacturer of small calibre ammunition and progressed to
develop a range of pyrotechnic, large calibre ammunition and engineering plastics
products. The company is also involved in refurbishing a wide range of
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ammunition and the provision of Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) services.
In 1993, SMEO was approved as a preferred supplier of Guns and Ammunition to
the Royal Ordnance Division, BAE Systems.111 SMEO is also involved in the
manufacture and assembly of various types of ammunition, such as small and
medium-calibre ammunition, pyrotechnics products, shotgun cartridges, large
calibre ammunition, and lead products. SMEO is today a wholly-owned private
company.
4.8.3 Land Systems
Malaysia’s rapid development of the civil automotive sector in the early 1980s did
not have a similar impact on the defence-related automotive industry.112 Malaysia’s
defence-related automotive industry is focused on three major players, DEFTECH,
MMC Defence and Pesaka Astana. At the initial stages of development, each
company was designed to specialise in a particular type of production so as not to
overlap in the small market. DEFTECH, a subsidiary of DRB-HICOM Bhd, was
established in 1996, specialising in the manufacture, supply and maintenance of
defence-related equipment, particularly soft skinned vehicles below three
tonnes.113 The first major in country project for DEFTECH was the joint
development and local assembly of 64 Turkish APC 300s. Through this project
DEFTECH was able to obtain technology know-how, including production and
process technologies and equipment such as jigs, tools and documentation of
processes. From this know-how, DEFTECH has been able to manufacture trucks
for export. Today, DEFTECH exports dual-use trucks to countries like Bangladesh
and Brunei.
MMC Defence is a subsidiary of the MMC Engineering Group and specialises in
the production of armoured vehicles.114 The company is a pioneer in the defence
automotive sector, being formed in 1986 and having a huge infrastructural facility
based in Nilai, Negeri Sembilan. MMC was mandated by the Malaysian Armed
Forces to carry out activities in armoured vehicle technology, including
maintenance, overhaul, upgrading, spare parts management and related research
and development. MMC has successfully carried out prototype development of the
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Commando V150 dieselisation project. This was followed by the modernisation of
first, the 100 petrol-driven Ferret Scout Cars, and secondly, the 110 MT
turbocharged diesel engine on a Chrysler A727, which is a fully automatic
transmission, replacing the old petrol engine and semi-automatic transmission.
In 1993, the Army awarded MMC a contract to overhaul 96 Thysen Henschell
Radpanzer Condor 4x4s involving total refurbishment, including overhaul of the
engine, axle, transmissions, hulls and turrets. The three-year contract was
completed in 1996. In 1997, the Army awarded the company another contract to
refurbish an additional 150 Condor 4x4s which was successfully completed in
2000. In 2003, MBDA selected MMC Defence as an industrial partner in South
East Asia after a thorough auditing process to design and manufacture the missile
rack for the Jernas SHORAD system. According to MMC Defence personnel, this
contract was a breakthrough for MMC Defence allowing it to embark on more
diversified defence industrial activities.115
MMC Defence went one step further in 1995 by undertaking R&D programmes for
life extension and upgrade of the Scorpion and Stormer Armoured Personal
Carriers, involving the general overhaul of the vehicles and upgrading of the
suspension and turret systems. The vehicles have successfully undergone stringent
trials and evaluation tests conducted by the Malaysian Army. In 2000, MMC
Defence successfully converted a Stormer APC into a Command Vehicle. The
Malaysian Government appointed MMC Defence to receive technology transfer
linked to the Korean Infantry Vehicle from its manufacturer. The technology
transfer package involves on-the-job training of the company's staff conducted in
Malaysia, Bosnia and Korea, covering fourth-line repair work on the vehicles.
MMC Defence was also nominated as the prime beneficiary and local partner for
various activities, including transfer of technology, local assembly, maintenance,
spare parts management, manufacturing and related activities as stated in the
contract for the purchase of Main Battle Tanks (MBT) from Poland. For this,
MMC Defence sent a team of selected staff to Poland to study the technicality and
engineering components of the MBT under a transfer of technology
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agreement. MMC Defence has also established technical collaboration with several
international suppliers such as ALVIS (UK), Thyssen Henschell (Germany),
Bumar Labedy (Poland), Daewoo (Korea) and Cadillac Gage (US). Currently,
MMC Defence is one of the few Malaysian companies focusing purely on defence
work.116
Another important player in the land systems area is Pesaka Astana. The company
produces specialised vehicles under the brand name AMDAC. The company has
manufacturing plants in Romania and Korea. Pesaka Astana caters to both the
defence and civil market. Currently its clients include the Ministry of Defence
Malaysia (MINDEF), the mining industry, fire and rescue departments, port and
airport authorities and municipals. Pesaka Astana has technical partners
worldwide, such as MAN, ALLISON, Detroit Diesel, Iveco-Magirus (Germany),
CNIM (France) and Chase Enterprise (Thailand). The products manufactured and
supplied include 4 x 4 to 8 x 8 vehicles, such as gun towers, troop carriers, missile
loaders, bulk refuellers, tactical floating bridges, DROPS vehicles, turntable
ladders (TTL), rapid fire rescue tenders (RFRT) and port terminal tractors.
Recently, Pesaka Astana formed Daesung Marine Technology Co, Ltd (DSMT) in
Korea to jointly develop the AMDAC Waterjet Propulsion System for the South
Korean Navy. Overall, the Malaysian defence land systems industry struggles to
maintain an attractive export market that is low cost and high quality. The land
systems companies would rather maintain a civil automotive business with some
defence work to sustain their businesses.117
4.8.4 Maritime Sector
In the maritime sector, one of the early developments was the 1953 formation of
the Malaysian Shipyard and Engineering Sdn Bhd (MSE) based at Pasir Gudang,
Johor. It began as a joint venture between the Malaysian government and a number
of foreign and local companies. The Korean-designed offshore patrol vessel (OPV)
of the RMN, the 300-tonne KD Marikh, was built by MSE in 1984. Four
dockyards also had significant roles in the development of the maritime industry.
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These dockyards are the Hong Leong-Lurrsen Yard, MARA Shipyard, Penang
Shipbuilding Company and the Lumut Dockyard.
The Lumut dockyard, built in 1984, became Malaysia’s principal dockyard, and
was later privatised so that its capability could be extended beyond the needs of the
Malaysian navy to provide for non-government and commercial entities. The
Lumut dockyard was valued at RM 650 million in 1992 is based in Lumut, later
known as the Naval Dockyard in 1995.118 The Naval Dockyard possessed the
capability to build and repair ships with particular expertise in the repair of
weapons, electronics and electrical systems as well as design. It was able to
undertake ship repair for vessels up to 6,000 dwt as well as onshore and offshore
engineering, such as fabrication of modules and living quarters, jackets, platforms,
pressure vessels and onshore projects, such as cement terminals, railway wagons
and coaches.
The Naval Dockyard was reinvented yet again in 1992, becoming a private entity,
PSCNDSB. The company has facilities at the Lumut Naval dockyard. PSC became
an immense power-house in Malaysia’s s maritime sector. In 1997, the government
awarded a procurement contract worth RM 24 million to PSC in partnership with a
German company, Thyssen Krupp, for an in country construction of up to 27 patrol
vessels over a 10 year period. This contract was in line with the concept of national
self reliance in partnership with local defence companies.119 However, the whole
project was derailed due to technical problems and delays causing PSCNDSB to
seek another RM 1.8 billion from the government to complete the vessels.120 In
2005, the Public Accounts Committee said that over RM 200 million ($52.6
million) was needed to meet unpaid bills and project costs incurred by PSCNDSB
and recommended that the government rescue the project.121 The company owed
contractors, vendors and suppliers RM 80 million and an additional RM 200
million for completion of the first two vessels.122 Several subcontractors and
OEMs blamed the failure of the project on the overall mismanagement and lack of
professionalism on the part of the PSCNDSB management team.123
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PSCNDSB was also given the ‘first right of refusal’ to undertake all scheduled
maintenance for RMN ships. This provided PSCNDSB control over servicing and
maintenance of all Malaysian Armed Forces’ ships. Other companies could only
participate upon PSCNDSB’s refusal to undertake the work. This government
policy hit the other naval companies hard, putting many of them out of business.
However, due to the failure of the PV project and other internal problems, PSC
was bailed out in September 2005 by a government-owned Malaysian property and
palm oil plantation firm, Boustead Holdings.124 Other naval companies recently
entering the defence sector include D’Aquarian Services, Sigma Xi and ME&O
Fleet Services. These companies mainly focus on systems integration for RMN
ships.
4.8.5 Information Communications and Technology Sector
Although a late starter, Malaysia’s ICT defence-related industry has caught up in
the past 10 years, becoming a leading player in the local DIB. Malaysia’s strong
base in electronics and electrical manufacturing has laid a strong foundation for
some of the ICT commercial companies to venture into defence. Some of the
defence companies include Sapura Defence, Systems Consultancy Services (SCS),
Ikramatik and Satang Jaya. Sapura Defence, for example, is a subsidiary of Sapura
holdings, specialising in products and systems design, development, integration
and manufacturing. It has built on its capabilities to design, develop, upgrade and
integrate flight, land and maritime-based simulators through offsets. Sapura has
also been successful through a joint-venture with Thales, UK, in producing
military tactical hand-held VHF radios (TRC 5100 series) and accessories. SCS
specialises in the C4I system and the battlefield management system. Satang Jaya,
a listed company, is involved in the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of
safety and survival, search and rescue equipment for the Malaysian Armed Forces,
Royal Malaysian Police, Fire Fighting and Rescue Department, Civil Defence
Department and Commercial Aviation and Maritime.
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4.8.6 Common-User Items Sector
The defence industry also comprises a pool of local companies that specialise in
producing various essential items for the Malaysian Armed Forces. Although not a
high tech industry, some of these companies have now gained business in the
region to supply items such as ration packs, military boots, uniforms and
parachutes. Total government expenditure on uniforms and accessories, medical
equipment, laundry, tailoring and footwear, as well as building maintenance,
covers 98 contracts worth RM89.66 million under the 8th Malaysia Plan.125
Some of these companies include Glowtrade, Nadicorp, Kulitkraf, Pakaian Saling
Erti and Puspamara. Glowtrade provides parachutes to the MAF and also for the
export market. Pakaian Saling Erti began operations in 1984, and with a current
workforce of 300 people is involved in providing uniforms and accessories to the
MAF. Puspmara Sdn Bhd, established in 1980, is another company involved in the
manufacture and supply of uniforms and commercial garments. Semenanjung
Selatan makes combat rigid hull inflatable boats. These small and medium scale
companies with low-end technology, catering to both civil and defence markets,
have managed to sustain and grow their businesses.
4.9 Malaysia’s Defence Industrial Subcontracting Base
Malaysia’s plan has been to deepen and strengthen its defence sub-contacting base
to support prime contractors.126 Subcontracting of work from prime defence
companies to small and medium scale industries has long been viewed as a way to
deepen the industrial structure and create backward linkages. SMIDEC, a special
semi-government agency, under the umbrella of MITI, was formed to promote the
development of the SMEs in the manufacturing sector. SMIDEC provides advisory
services, fiscal and financial assistance, infrastructural facilities, market access and
other support programmes. SMIDEC is also responsible for the development of
subcontractoring base in Malaysia through an industrial linkage programme
between prime contractors and SMEs.127 SMIDEC categorises SMEs or
subcontractors into nine sub-sectors128 For 2003 alone, SMEs contributed 26.1%
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(14.2 billion RM) of value-added and 32.5 per cent (375,840) employment as a
percentage of national GDP. 129 Some of the defence SMEs under the SMIDEC list
include electrical and electronics products, transport equipment, machinery and
equipment, metal and metal products and chemical and chemical products.
In the defence sector, the government has tried to build a subcontracting base
through vendor development programmes. The major capital purchases involving
such initiatives include the German Patrol Vessel project, Turkish APC 300 tanks,
South African G5-Guns, the Brazilian MLRS Astros II and the Polish MBT-PT91.
Eurocopter Malaysia, a subsidiary of EADS, has created work through its vendor
development programme for SMEs worth RM 17.5 million.130 Table 4.9 shows the
status and growth performance of selected SMEs in the Gavin Kennedy’s defence-
industry related activities for the year 2003 (% share of total SMEs).131 The
government has introduced various initiatives, such as the industrial linkage
programme, aimed at developing linkages between domestic SMEs, MNCs and the
prime contractors. There are also efforts to try and integrate SMEs into the supply
chain, thus creating local content as well as expanding international industrial
clusters. However, the development of defence SMEs through backward linkages
remains minimal. This topic will be examined further in Chapter 5.132
4.10 Role of Defence Offsets in Malaysia’s Defence Industrialisation
The State has consistently introduced measures to promote Malaysia’s defence
industrial base. One of the most important of such policies is offsets. Offsets were
introduced for the first time in 1990 by the UK when Malaysia bought the Hawk
aircraft from BAE Systems. The positive result from some of the offsets projects
culminating from this deal has encouraged the Malaysian government to
incorporate offsets into all major defence procurement deals as a means of
obtaining technology, work packages and skills enhancement through training and
on-the-job experience. Offsets are seen as a way forward for industrial and
technological development, particularly in the defence sector. The country’s offsets
initiative started around the same time as other developed and developing
countries, such as the UK and South Africa, began to introduce their policies.
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Malaysia has been involved in the offsets business since the early 1990s. The
country views offsets as an important tool to support its import substitution policy
in creating a sustainable and competitive industry. Offsets are demanded through
defence procurement for various reasons, including creating a defence industry
base, employment creation, dual use industrialisation, skill development and sub-
contracting work.
Table 4.9 : Status and Growth Performance of SMI in terms of Output, Value-added
and Employment in Malaysia’s Defence-related Industries, 2003
Sector Output

























Source: Malaysia. National Productivity Corporation (NPC), Extracted from National Productivity
Corporation Industry Report, (NPC, Kuala Lumpur, November 2005)
However, after more than 10 years of offsets implementation, questions have been
raised as to the effectiveness of offsets.133 Have offsets worked in Malaysia? It is
claimed, for instance, that arms manufacturing in Malaysia has been mainly low-
tech and small scale.134 The defence industry is still in the backwater and most of
the companies still require government support. The National Plan of Action
Report for the Coordination and Transfer of Industrial Technology to the Ministry
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of Science, prepared in 1990, was not required to incorporate offsets. Various
reasons have been highlighted for this ommision.135
OEMs argue that they are unable to transfer high tech work due to the lack of
investment and skilled workers from the local companies to undertake production.
The ratio of 7 research scientists per 10,000 of the labour force in Malaysia is
extremely low compared to that required for a technologically sophisticated
industrial programme.136 A counter-argument is that OEMs are not genuine about
releasing their technology via offsets. There is little local content in the defence
equipment purchased. In line with the international product life cycle theory, only
obsolete or third generation technology is passed on to the developing countries.137
It is argued that most of the patents taken out by investors from Malaysia are in
low-tech areas, such as assembly work, basic maintenance, rubber production,
general cleaning, upgrade, metal fusion bonding, dispensing and optics.138
Arguably, also the spill-over effects of offsets have not created sufficiently large
backward and forward linkages in Malaysia.139
Generally, there has not been enough empirical work done to provide substantial
evidence as to whether offsets have progressed technological and industrial
development, as compared to other modes of technology transfer such as foreign
direct investment. In Malaysia, there is currently little evidence to prove whether
offsets are working in the way intended. The present study attempts to close the
evidence gap by conducting empirical research on the effectiveness of offsets in
Malaysia, particularly in the defence industry. The following chapter analyses
empirical data to evaluate the effectiveness of offsets in sustaining Malaysia’s
defence industrial base.
4.11 Summary
This chapter has examined the reasons for defence industrialisation in developing
countries, focused on the Malaysian experience. It has reflected on Malaysia’s
defence policy and the need to maintain self-reliant Armed Forces. Defence
industrial progress is intertwined with the nation’s defence procurement and
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Armed Forces budgetary plans. Although the Malaysian defence industry is a late-
comer, its industrial and technological development has rapidly progressed in the
last 20 years. The State has been instrumental in closely monitoring and supporting
the progress of the Malaysian defence industry. Government incentives and
policies including the introduction of offsets have targeted the enhancement of the
defence industrial base in various sectors, including aerospace, land systems,
weapons and ICT. Capability development within these different sectors, however,
has been mixed. The aerospace, ICT and land systems have acquired higher levels
of technological capability as compared to the weapons and maritime sector. The
chapter has also analysed the role of the Malaysian prime defence contractors
towards creating industrial-linkages. There have been several initiatives from the
suppliers and the MOD, Malaysia, to assist in developing and enhancing the sub-
contracting base within the defence sector, contributing potentially towards
enhancing Malaysia’s defence industrial base. Finally, this chapter has provided an
introduction to offsets activities in Malaysia.
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Chapter 5
5. MALAYSIA: DO OFFSETS WORK?
5.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the growing importance of offsets within the defence market,
requiring buyers and sellers within the arms trade to include offsets in almost all major
capital sales. Contrary to its soaring popularity, and the frequent hype about offsets
success stories, questions still arise as to the impact and benefits of offsets as an
effective tool for technological and industrial development.
This study examines the effectiveness of offsets as a tool for technological and
industrial development, particularly for sustaining Malaysia’s defence industrial base.
Referring to the study framework in Chapter 1, within developing countries, offsets are
viewed as a catalyst for take-off through technology acquisition, creation of value-added
activities, skills enhancement and the promotion of supply chain networks and exports.
In the defence sector, offsets are employed particularly to acquire capabilities within the
defence industry to support self-reliant Armed Forces. Offsets in developing countries
involve selective government intervention to ensure structural changes in the identified
technological and industrial sectors. Intervention may be via the selection of
technology/projects, or skills to be acquired, or the choice of recipients. Therefore, the
offsets contribution towards creating a sustainable defence industrial base in developing
countries depends on the formulation, process and implementation of a pragmatic and
realistic offsets policy.
Malaysia’s offsets objective is two pronged: firstly, the development of high technology
sectors, mainly aerospace, and, secondly, the strengthening of the defence industrial
base. The government is largely instrumental in ensuring that offsets are geared towards
achieving these two objectives. This chapter evaluates whether offsets credits have been
effectively utilised in the development of Malaysia’s defence industrial base. There is
also a need to explore how Malaysia’s offsets objectives and strategy were formulated.
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What has been the role of the government towards building a sustainable defence
industrial base? What value has Malaysia obtained through offsets, such as those direct
and indirect, and via the type and category of technology? How have offsets impacted
on Malaysia’s defence industrial base? What have been the challenges faced in the
effective utilisation of offsets? The research data obtained through the study
questionnaire, semi-structured and open-ended interviews will be used to answer these
questions and, in particular, how offsets have been utilised for the development of a
sustainable Malaysian defence industry. The triangulation methodological method
approach adopted in this research helped verify data gathered via both quantitative and
qualitative techniques. Data collecting tools included survey such as questionnaire,
semi-structured interviews, open-ended interviews, archival sources such as government
reports, procurement contracts and company financial reports as well as participatory
observation. The evidences were analysed and the outcomes were verified through
cross- checking of information in order to to ensure validity and at the same time
eliminate biasness. Author’s previous position of being directly involved in offsets
management at the Defence Industry Division, MINDEF validated the participatory
observation research technique especially in discussing issues related to policy and
implementation of offsets in the Malaysian context.
Section two of this chapter evaluates the study findings on Malaysia’s offsets policy,
process and implementation. This offers a thorough discussion of the offsets objectives,
policy formulation and strategy within the overall defence procurement stage. The
section on implementation includes findings on the planning of offsets programmes, the
negotiation process and the contractual terms and monitoring mechanisms. There is
also an evaluation of Malaysia’s scope of offsets in relation to the total number of
projects, their value as well as the categories of offsets recipients. Section three
critically evaluates the role of government in sustaining Malaysia’s defence industrial
base. This section explores the initiatives undertaken by the government towards
promoting defence industrialisation as well as the challenges faced in trying to achieve
an effective offsets outcome.
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Section four focuses on offsets projects in Malaysia, undertaking analysis in terms of
the impact of technology transfer through offsets on the technological absorption
capability of local firms. This includes analysis of the selection and evaluation of
technology by recipient firms, firm strategy towards training and the process of
technology development leading to R&D and the commercialisation of technology
within the defence sector. The section also addresses technological collaboration and
technology sharing-problems with sellers and the government in the technology
absorption process. Section five measures the benefits of offsets in Malaysia. This
section evaluates the benefits of offsets in relation to employment creation’
enhancement of skills’ promotion of a competitive supply chain, technological spin-
offs, dual-use industrialisation, diversification and the fostering of exports and
marketing assistance. Section six analyses the transformational costs of offsets. Various
issues are explored, including whether offsets involve additional costs to the buyer
country and transparency within offsets practice. This section also discusses the
challenges faced by the Malaysian defence industry in attaining a sustainable and
competitive defence industry contributing towards indigenisation and self-reliance.
5.2 Malaysia’s Offsets Policy
5.2.1 Setting Malaysia’s Offsets Objectives
Chapter 2 concerned itself with examining the importance of industrialisation for
developing countries and how technology acquisition can alleviate a nation’s
backwardness. In this respect, Malaysia’s Vision 2020 policy has been aimed at re-
aligning its industrial focus from labour-intensive technology-based industries to capital
and knowledge based industries. Malaysia has positioned itself within South-East Asia
to develop high-technology sectors, particularly in defence and aerospace. Offsets have
mainly been used as a platform to attract high technology capital- and service-based
technology industries for achieving this purpose. The Fourth Prime Minister of
Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, during an opening speech at the sixth LIMA show
(1981-2004) in Langkawi stressed the importance of offsets when he mentioned:
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The supplier offering the most attractive offset programmes, in terms of value and depth of technology,
with sustainable business opportunities, will command substantial weightage. 1
Similar issues regarding offsets were mentioned by the Minister of Defence, Dato’
Najib Tun Razak, during various speeches on defence industrialisation and at the MDIC
platform, pleading for both OEMs and local companies to use offsets for sustainable
collaborative technology development.
Offsets in Malaysia are used to enhance the defence industrial base. The short-term
strategy aims at creating more self-sufficient Armed Forces in terms of through-life
support, including maintenance, repair and over-haul (MRO), logistic support and
spares management. The government seeks to ensure that its Armed Forces are in a
combat ready position in the short-term through in-country industry support instead of
having to rely on overseas suppliers. In the longer-term, however, the objective is to
equip the defence industry to undertake defence-related work in manufacturing,
assembly, maintenance, integration and support.
Offsets are also seen as a political tool to justify military purchases. There is generally a
lack of public awareness and scrutiny in relation to Malaysia’s defence budget and
spending. However, international development in matters of defence and security has
increased public awareness on issues related to defence spending in Malaysia. The
government has become more sensitive to the public voice and the need to justify
military purchases and defence spending in parliamentary debates. Therefore, when
offsets were first introduced to Malaysia, there was a general feeling that the spin-offs
from this tool in terms of employment, technology and exports could be used to justify
military purchases.
A further aim of the offsets policy is to complement national development policies, such
as the New Economic Policy, Industrial Master Plan, the Five-Year-Plan and Science
and Technology Policy. The government’s 1990’s approach was to encourage the
participation of Malay entrepreneurs in high technology sectors. Offsets were
capitalised to further enhance this objective by ensuring participation of local people in
high technology sectors, such as aerospace and defence; the aim being to create
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employment, skills enhancement and technology development capability within the
bumiputera firms. Offsets were seen as an effective means towards achieving this goal.
In relation to human resource development and skills enhancement, a key objective of
the nation’s offsets policy has been the training of labour in high technology sectors
related to defence and aerospace. Rapid changes due to globalisation have created the
demand for competitive skilled people.2 Malaysia’s Multimedia Super Corridor, for
example, is focused on the development of a knowledge economy with information
technology as its base. The Ministry of Human Resources, in particular, has placed
great emphasis on training and human resource development in Malaysia. This is
reflected in the fact that 20.6%, or RM22.66 billion, of the total development allocation
for the 8th Malaysia Plan period (2001-2005) has been set aside for education and
training programmes.3
5.3 Offsets Policy Formulation
Malaysia’s countertrade operations commenced during the economic recession of the
early 1980s. Countertrade, particularly, barter and counterpurchase, were seen as a
viable vehicle for entering into international trade.4 The Countertrade Department at that
time was under the supervision of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI). However, as economic conditions improved in the early 1990s, barter and
counterpurchase types of activities were substantially reduced and eventually the
countertrade policy was sidelined. Responsibilities for such activities were shifted to the
Ministry of Finance (MOF). Offsets only became popular in the 1990s when Malaysia
bought its first set of Hawk aircraft from BAE Systems.
Initially, offsets management was undertaken on an ad-hoc basis, with offsets projects
identified and determined by the government on a case-by-case basis. There were
minimal guidelines and directions for project choice that could prove ‘additionality’ or
‘causality’. The quality and content of the offsets projects depended mainly on the skills
and knowledge of individual project teams. MITI had issued a countertrade policy,
mainly consisting of the terms and conditions for counterpurchase deals. This
document, however, became less popular as the demand for counterpurchase and barter-
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type activities within the country diminished. No formal policy or guidelines on offsets
existed except for a brief document published in October 1999 by MOF (Appendix P).
This document provided details, such as minimum threshold and offsets objectives,
definitions and various types of offsets to be pursued. A committee existed within MOF
to manage offsets programmes.5 Yet, many of the activities leveraged had minimal
emphasis on treating offsets as a component of Malaysia’s technological and industrial
development.
Nevertheless, the huge defence capital purchases under the Eight Malaysia Plan (2001-
2005) forced the government to reconsider the offsets management process. Lack of
structured offsets guidelines and knowledge amongst MINDEF civil service personnel
on offset matters made negotiations and the finalisation of proposals difficult. 6 The
question of whether Malaysia was getting value for money and thus enhancing its
defence industrial base obliged the government to introduce several important measures,
as follows:
i. Appointment of MIGHT7 in the year 2000 to evaluate the effectiveness of
offsets.8 MIGHT was mandated with resources and provided access to
government documents and industry to obtain evidence to measure the
impact of offsets programmes in enhancing industrial competitiveness in
Malaysia’s defence sector and to propose recommendations on how to utilise
offsets effectively.9
ii. Exposure of Malaysian officers to offsets management training in South
Africa and the United Kingdom and via a series of in-country workshops
creating awareness and understanding of offsets within the Malaysian
defence community.10
iii. Invitation for consultants to study the Malaysian defence economy to
suggest improvements and recommendations for the formulation of an offset
policy.
A 2003 Cabinet decision that MITI should review Malaysia’s countertrade policy in
view of contract values being inflated by as much as 5% due to the inclusion of
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countertrade agreements in government procurement.11 MITI referred to MIGHT’s
study conclusion that offsets benefits are limited, due to the:
i. Absence of coordinated and comprehensive offsets planning prior to the
purchase of equipment.
ii. Weakness of management in terms of financial and manpower planning as
well as technology transfer.
iii. Lack of local absorptive capacity of foreign technologies and OEM support
in the export of goods by local companies.12
Based on MIGHT’s findings, MITI recommended that countertrade be de-emphasised
in government procurement. This was because countertrade arrangements inflate the
cost of purchase and arguably do little to raise local capability in technology
development. The government decided not to totally scrap offsets but to seriously
review the policy and process by adopting a more structured offsets practice with the
view to increasing the effectiveness of offsets. A committee chaired by the Economic
Planning Unit (EPU) was formed to review Malaysia’s offsets process and formulate a
written offsets policy. MINDEF, as the largest beneficiary of offsets, undertook the task
of formulating a draft offsets policy, tailored solely to defence procurement
requirements. This draft was then tabled at a high level meeting chaired by the EPU.13
The draft policy completed in 2003, after much deliberation, was finally approved by
MOF in 2005 for implementation by MINDEF.14 However, the new and current policy
was solely geared to defence offsets and did not apply across the board to all other
ministries.15 While offsets were widely practised by other ministries, there was less
initiative on their part to comply with formal guidelines. However, there were on-going
pressures to broaden the scope of the defence offsets policy in order to make it a
national offsets policy. 16
The 2005 emerging national offsets guidelines bear numerous similarities with the
earlier fragmented offsets guidelines. Besides an explicit call for strategic partnerships
and the focus on high-value added activities, the new policy offered little in the way of
additional initiatives. Nevertheless the defence offsets guidelines offer clarity of
purpose, specifying aims to enhance international competitiveness through enhancement
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of economic and technological capabilities. The explicit objectives of the policy
include: the fostering of strategic international partnerships, contributing to the
economic and industrial enhancement of local expertise, capacity and marketing
potential; maximum usage of local content; establishment of a sustainable defence
industrial base, including strong logistic support capabilities; promotion of inward
technology transfer; collaboration in research and development projects; and
cooperation in local human resource development initiatives, contributing to the
generation of a high-value Malaysian skill-base.
Malaysia’s offsets policy outlines reflect all the usual generic features of the offset
process, such as monitoring of credits, the timescales for completion, as well as
tendering requirements. However, more interestingly, Malaysia’s specific-guidelines
require that:
i. Additional weightage be given to direct offsets compared to indirect offset.
ii. Exceptionally, multipliers credits should apply, influenced by the extent to
which Malaysian companies, universities and R&D-based organisations are
able to exploit intellectual property rights derived from joint projects.
iii. A procurement threshold of Euro 10 million is required to activate offsets
requirements.
iv. A 100% countertrade target against total contract value be set, subject to a
minimum of 50% of contract value. This can be split between
counterpurchase and offsets with offsets forming at least 50% of
countertrade value and is subject to review on a case by case basis.
v. A compensation requirement of 5% of the contract value be paid to the
Malaysian government at contract start, representing liquidated damages for
any unfulfilled countertrade /offset obligations.17
The policy in general takes into consideration various uncoordinated national policies
incorporating and cross-linking their key elements into a coherent ‘holistic’ set of
guidelines. A MIGHT Report indicates that 51% of defence respondents surveyed
believe that the offsets programmes are in line with Malaysia’s macro-strategy.18
Malaysia’s new offsets policy model is integrated into Malaysia’s Vision 2020, the
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Five-Year Policy, Industrial Master Plan, National Development Policy (NDP) and the
Science and Technology Policy to ensure that defence industrialisation is calibrated into
the country’s overall industrial and technological strategy. The policy still lacks focus,
however, and has obvious faults due to the non-publication of critical documents, such
as those relating to defence policy, defence industry policy and strategy and defence
technology policy. Further, the lack of emphasis on the defence industry is reflected by
the fact that this sector does not feature as a separate category within the Industrial
Master Plan (IMP 3).19 There has also been a lack of consultation with local industry as
a principal stakeholder in the formulation of the policy.20 The offsets policy lacks clarity
in risk assessment and associated metrics determining project ‘sustainability’.
Moreover, there is an absence of multipliers and pre-offsets credits to attract foreign
investors to Malaysia, bringing high value-added projects without the additional costs
incurred by offsets. 21
5.4 Offsets Management Process
5.4.1 Planning
The relevance of introducing an all-embracing process involving adequate planning,
implementation and monitoring to ensure the effectiveness of offsets programmes was
examined in Chapter 3. In Malaysia, at the initial stages, offsets were an after-thought
and not included as part of the initial procurement tender requirement. In most
instances, suppliers were notified of such an intention ‘after’ the bid had been
submitted. However, this practice has created difficulties for both offshore suppliers and
the Malaysian defence industry. Suppliers, not being forewarned of offsets requirements
have failed to factor in the time and costs of offsets activities in procurement. Malaysian
companies, in turn, have not been awarded sufficient time to plan and cater for offsets
work. The offsets authority appointed to coordinate and negotiate these deals have
often been left with insufficient time to discuss and finalise a concrete offsets package.22
Moreover, offsets projects continue to be negotiated after the final contract has been
signed, losing the leverage to obtain the best possible offsets packages.
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When the offsets implementation function was transferred to MINDEF in 2001, there
was an initiative to seriously study the procurement process flow. The procurement
flow-charts as per Appendix N show that offsets have not featured in the initial stages
of procurement planning. Further, the absence of an offsets project team shows that
procurement decisions are mainly based on pricing and technical issues as opposed to
the quality of the offsets package.23 The chart contradicts the notion that offsets have
been influential in Malaysia’s procurement decisionmaking. Several documents
including the MIGHT Report pointed to the lack of planning in relation to offsets at the
procurement stage. This included last-minute inclusion of local content and industrial
participation into tender bids. As most of Malaysia’s procurement deals are on a
government-to-government basis, the offsets recipients often end-up with less if the
offsets deals are not concluded before the main contract is agreed. Last minute inclusion
of offsets leaves insufficient time for offsets authority, industry/recipients and suppliers
to plan and work-out effective offsets projects.24 This also amounts to a lack of planning
in the selection of technology and the inability of OEMs and the government to carry
out auditing of the identified technology recipient companies. Local companies request
that preliminary planning and discussions be held with end-users and OEMs before
procurement decisions are made. Local firms want to be involved along-side end-users
in determining industrial participation via local content.25
Table 5.1 shows the response to this study’s 2006 offsets survey in relation to offsets
recipients’ preparedness to participate in offsets programmes. The results show that
88% of the firms are not adequately prepared to undertake offsets projects due to
insufficient notification regarding potential projects. Also, 88% of the respondents
claim to be unprepared with respect to investment, infrastructure and human resources,
because their late inclusion as a technology partner.
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Table 5.1: Offsets Recipient Preparedness to Participate in Offsets Projects
Question 6.01 Yes (%) No (%)
Does your company have adequate resources
to undertake the offsets programme in terms of :
 infrastructure , plant and machinery
 financial resources
 skilled workers
 commitment( marketing, R&D, training)
12% 88%
Adequate Planning before embarking on projects 12% 88%
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms (July 2005)
In 2003, the MOD response to the MIGHT Report and consultant recommendations
was to restructure its procurement process and tender documents by including offsets as
part of the tender-bid. This was intended to provide sufficient notice to the suppliers of
the MOD’s requirements re offsets. The processes were altered to incorporate offsets
into MOD’s procurement process.
As shown in Figure 5.1, below, there are two types of offsets workflows. The
workflows differ between procurement on a government-to-government deal (direct
negotiation) and procurement via competitive tendering (open/restricted tender). For
direct negotiations, suppliers are identified before-hand, based on political
considerations. The offsets proposal is submitted together with a tender document. The
proposal will be evaluated and feedback provided by the DID to the supplier concerned,
after consultation with various users and local industries. The supplier may need to
revise the proposal, based on feedback until both the DID and supplier’s offsets teams
come to an agreement on the details of the offsets package. The final proposal, subject
to agreement from all relevant parties, will be forwarded to the CTC. Upon approval
from the CTC, the proposal will be forwarded to the Procurement Division26 to be
incorporated into the main defence contract. The Procurement Division, responsible for
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the parent contract, will forward the main contract together with the offsets clause to the
MOF for approval. Once the contract comes into effect after signature between the
buyer and seller, the DID will take over all offsets implementation activities.
In the case of a restricted or open tender, where there may be competitive tendering
based on more than one potential supplier, as shown in Figure 5.2, the initial processes
are similar except that there will be an invitation to tender. The various suppliers’
offsets proposals will be separately evaluated based on projects, value-added activities,
spin-offs to the buyer nations and any additional costs incurred due to offsets. The
different proposals are evaluated and discussed by the DID, with consultation from
relevant authorities. Subsequently, DID will recommend the best offsets package to the
Tender Board. The Board will eventually consider purchase, based on price, technicality
and offsets.
The current process provides suppliers with sufficient information ahead of time
regarding offsets requirements. It also provides the suppliers with opportunities to do
substantial groundwork in sourcing for good quality offsets projects and suitable local
industry partners.27 The offsets authority has additional time to plan and coordinate new
projects. Currently, 90% of procurement involving offsets are based on direct
negotiations.
The current process nevertheless lacks several crucial features including the:
i. Lack of information flows from the project team in terms of local content
requirements and the extent of local participation for technology absorption.
ii. Lack of coordination between the parties involved in the procurement process,
including the technical project team, pricing project team and the DID to
determine the scope of the offsets projects.28
iii. Lack of communication and fact-finding to gauge local industry capability to
undertake offsets projects.
iv. Absence of an offsets project team as part of the main procurement contract.
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v. Lack of clarity as to whether offsets plays a vital role in procurement decision
making and the weight given to offsets as compared to other components in
procurement decisionmaking.
vi. Absence of a countertrade committee to evaluate and approve offsets projects.29
Even though the offsets process is clearly laid out, in practice it is still very fluid.





















































The need for both suppliers and buyers to be adequately informed of the technicalities
of offsets was discussed in Chapter 3. The complex and diverse nature of offsets
requires a high level of efficiency and sufficient knowledge of the subject amongst
bureaucrats handling the subject. The learning curve is steep and any lack of
understanding on the subject will be detrimental towards the buyer country obtaining
the best deal from suppliers.
Within Malaysia’s MOD, offsets are handled by a special unit called the Offsets Unit of
the DID. The unit’s three man team, consisting of two military and one civilian officer,
are responsible for offsets management including evaluating proposals, negotiating,
coordinating and implementing offsets projects. The nature of the appointment of these
officers requires them to move every few years, leaving a high degree of attrition
amongst officers dealing with offsets management within the Department. Further,
officers handling offsets within the MOF and the MOD lack the exposure and
experience in the broad offsets field. The absence of continuous learning on offsets
management in-country and the high cost of training overseas has hindered MOD from
exposing its officers to recent developments in the offsets sphere.30 Successful
negotiations require officers to be skilful in understanding the tools and contractual
terminologies of offsets.
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Source: Defence industry Division, 25 June 2005, Ministry of Defence,
Malaysia
5.4.3 Offsets Contractual Terms
The effectiveness of offsets depends very much on the contents of the offsets contract,
such as provisions for the type of technology transfer, the cost of technology, remedies
for non-compliance and future business. In Malaysia, as the offsets contract is part of
the main contract, most offsets contracts are standardised as per offsets values,
proportion of direct and indirect offsets, objectives, details of the offsets projects,
nominated recipients, implementation schedules, monitoring mechanisms and penalty
clauses for non-compliance.
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Malaysian contracts are kept flexible and in most instances the final offset recipients are
not determined until after the contract has been signed. Contracts do not restrict the
inclusion of local or regional resources, such as machines and manpower. The contracts
also spell out details of the technology being transferred, such as design, R&D,
management and technical know-how; they also include provisions for educational
courses, training services, specialised technical services, transfer of technical
instructions and manuals. Objectively, these contracts do not restrict local or outside
sourcing of material, machines and equipment; the suppliers are flexible as to where and
how the contents are sourced. 31 Table 5.2 indicates that 100% of respondents agree that
offsets contracts provide flexibility, with local companies able to choose local or foreign
content, human resources and machines in the offsets projects.
Table 5.2: Flexibility in Resource Use
Question 6.03






Local material resources 0 100
Outside material resources 0 100
Local machines and equipments 0 100
Outside machines and equipments 0 100
Local manpower 0 100
Outside manpower 0 100
Source: Survey results, 30 April-31 July, 2005
Most of the agreements were focused on training, transfer of technical instructions,
manuals, transfer of technical services and consultancy. These were related to basic
technology transfer dealing directly with the maintenance of equipment purchased,
becoming part of the main procurement contract. Additionally, the agreements lacked
focus on more substantial transfers of technology, such as the transfer of
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hardware/machinery, components and parts, local participation in R&D, design and
construction as well as management.
Table 5.3 shows survey responses in terms of the types of offsets obligations included in
the contract. The findings show that the focus has been on basic technology transfer
activities, including educational courses, training, transfer of hard and soft technologies
and the provision of technical and consultancy services. In terms of prioritisation of
activities being included in the offsets contract document, 100% of the survey
respondents agreed that contract agreements include educational and training
components, followed by 80% agreeing that specialised technical services were also
included. Some, 70% of the respondents agreed that their agreements included transfer
of technical instruments and manuals. They claim that projects that dealt with
manufacturing, assembly and maintenance required manuals spelling out the details of
the step-by-step processes. Although 60% of the respondents agreed that agreements
included consultancy services, equal numbers also agreed that the contracts allowed for
local management participation in the offsets projects to learn side-by-side with
consultants, eventually preparing the locals to run the operations independently. Some
90% of the respondents claimed that offsets agreements failed to include transfer of
design, specialised research, local participation in R&D and local participation in design
and construction. This suggests that R&D did not feature strongly in Malaysia’s offsets
contract agreements.
It is vital for offsets contracts to capture future business in the agreement, ensuring the
continuity and sustainability of the projects. As per Table 5.4, of the total 16, 90% of
respondents believed that offset agreements did not include provisions for securing
future business, such as buy-back provisions. As the offsets generally did not comprise
commercial based projects, there were minimal provisions featuring future business
opportunities for the offsets recipient companies. This is a challenge to the local firm, if
it is unable to independently market its products overseas once the offsets obligation has
been completed. There is thus a real danger that the project may end up being high risk
and one-off. Besides planning, negotiation and getting contractual terms correct, it is
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vital to ensure the effectiveness of offsets implementation in realising successful offsets
programmes.
Table 5.3: Inclusion of Offsets Obligations in Contract Agreements
(Question 6.02)
In the offsets agreement, is there a provision, which





Educational Courses 100 0
Training Services 100 0
Components and parts 50 50
Specialised technical services 80 20
Transfer of technical instruments and manuals 70 30
Transfer of hardware/machinery 10 90
Transfer of design 10 90
Consultancy service 60 40
Specialised Research 10 90
Local participation in R and D 10 90
Local participation in design and construction 40 60
Local participation in management 60 40
Source: Survey Questionnaire, Malaysia 30 April-31 July, 2005
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Transfer of technology through offsets have
resulted in the following:
 turnkey projects
 buy-back arrangements







Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April- 31 July, 2005.
5.5 Implementation and Monitoring of Offsets
At the offsets implementation stage, the MOD is bound by several steps, including the
monitoring the success and failure of the project. Figure 5.3 below outlines the various
stages of implementation including: identification and determination of offsets
recipients; enforcement of systematic time schedules on the completion of projects;
structured reporting mechanisms from the offsets obligors and offsets recipients;
follow-up and follow-through of the projects; and penalty clauses for non-compliance.
Mr. Abdullah Badawi, Prime Minister of Malaysia (current since 2004) emphasised in
his forward note to the 9th Malaysia Plan (2005-2010) that:
Particular attention be given to implementation, coordination and monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms to ensure that programmes are effective in attaining the targets that have been set. 32
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Once a contract has been signed, the countertrade agreement is reviewed and the
recipient of each programme is determined. For Malaysia, recipients are decided by the
MOD, based on several considerations:
 The dominant recipient shall be a bumiputra company.
 The company selected must have the required infrastructure, investment capacity
and human resource capability.
 Willingness to invest, partner or collaborate with oversees suppliers.
 Suppliers are normally given a list of companies. These companies are mainly
members of the MDIC. Overseas suppliers are encouraged to audit and partner
with identified local companies. However, the MOD provides flexibility for
suppliers to explore and work with other companies upon consultation with
MOD.
At the monitoring stage, the offshore vendor and offsets recipients can independently
work on the details of the identified projects with frequent consultation with the DID,
providing periodical reports on progress achieved to the DID every six months. Some
90% of the procurement contracts analysed have detailed implementation schedules
clearly outlining the stages of fulfilment by obligors.33 Suppliers forward their claims
for credits to the DID every year. The DID, however, lacks a structured reporting
system to effectively monitor project progress.34 Due to the absence of a Countertrade
Committee, the reports are presently scrutinised by DID. If project progress is found to
be satisfactory, a certificate of discharge is given to the OEM recording satisfactory
completion of the programme. 35 A penalty is imposed for no-completed projects.
Malaysia decided to include penalties in its offsets policy for non-fulfilment of offsets
obligations as a means of ensuring that obligors adhered to the offsets obligations.
OEMs are required to deposit a bank guarantee for non-compliance. The government
has taken a flexible approach towards renegotiating project content if requirements
become outdated or non-viable.
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Source: Defence Industry Division, 25 June 2006, Ministry of Defence,
Malaysia
Survey results in Table 5.5 show that 90% of the respondents agree that OEMs have
strictly kept to their offsets obligations.36 None of the overseas companies has yet paid a
penalty due to non-compliance, not least because their ultimate aim is to secure
sustainable long-term partnerships with buyer countries. Obligors therefore seek to
ensure successful completion of the project without the penalty being imposed.
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Are the obligations in the offsets
agreement strictly followed by the
OEMs?
90 10 16
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July, 2005.
According to the DID offsets authority, MINDEF, there have been instances where
offsets could not be fulfilled as some of the projects were out-dated or overtaken by
events such as the declining need for the technology to be transferred or the OEM’s
unavailability to find a suitable technology partner. In such instances, the government,
together with the OEMs, reach an amicable solution to replace existing projects with
other suitable projects. For example, within the Westland Helicopter’s (now Agusta
Westland) offsets obligation, the transfer of composite technology to CTRM as initially
stated in the offsets contract, was found to be overtaken by events as CTRM had already
obtained similar technologies from other sources. Westland then took the initiative to
substitute this offsets obligation concerned by providing composite-related work to
CTRM, which was more commercially viable to both companies. This was agreed by
the government as the solution was found to benefit CTRM, the technology recipient. 37
Regular follow-ups have helped identify teething problems faced by technology
recipients. Such problems include applicability of the technology, process and levels of
technology absorption and other challenges that impact on the effective transfer of
technology to the recipient firm. Table 5.6 provides respondent feedback as to the
follow-up and follow-through from OEMs and the government. The results in Table 5.6
indicate that OEMs have been more diligent undertaking follow-ups. This relates to the
OEMs’ intention not to default on the contracts, thus paying a penalty, as well as the
need to sustain good relationships for future contracts. Most of the OEMs view
Malaysia as a long term customer and they do not want to jeopardise their relationship
due to the failure to perform offsets obligations.38
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Is there constant follow-up and follow-
through from the OEM?
90 10
Does the MOD constantly monitor your
company’s offsets strategy?
30 70
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July, July 2005.
On the other hand, the government tries to take a ‘hands-off’ approach to suppliers and
local companies collaborating independently on projects. By contrast, political
interference and local industries demand stronger government participation in offsets
project determination and monitoring. The government role is arguably to smooth the
process of local companies acquiring technology from overseas suppliers. Follow-ups
and follow-through from the offsets Agency is often irregular and mostly reactive and
not proactive.
5.6 Offsets Scope
5.6.1 Defence versus Non-Defence
To date, 431 offsets projects have been agreed with offshore vendors, of which 48%
have been completed, 32% are on-going and 20% are yet to begin.39 The majority of
offsets projects have been direct, defence-related. Data analysis shows that out of the
total 431 projects, 321 of them have been focused on direct defence-related work.40 Of
the 321 projects, 60% of them have been targeted on the Malaysian defence industry in
terms of training, employment, skills enhancement and innovation. Table 5.7 lists the
various offsets projects undertaken by Malaysia under the 7th (1995-2000) and 8th
(2001-2005) Malaysia Plans. Most of the projects have concentrated on technology
transfer in the form of training, know-how, joint-development, local production, and
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sub-assembly. The 2006 published offsets guidelines explicitly state that higher
weightage and multipliers be given to direct defence-related projects.
Table 5.7: List of Offsets projects under the 7th and 8th Malaysia Plans
Year Equipment Offsets Projects
2003 SU-30MKM (Russia)  Establishment of technical service
centre for maintaining and
repairing SU-30MKM aircraft.
 Development of the programme of
logistics support for the technical
service centre operation.
 Development of full mission
simulator for SU-30MKM aircraft.
 Training and launching of
Malaysian astronaut.
2003 GFE (THALES) SU-30MKM
(France)
 Participation in optronic, avionic,
communication ICD definition
phase.
 Participation to integrate optronic,
avionic, communication
equipment on aircraft.
 Advisory support of Thales
regarding the setting-up of
maintenance facilities.
 Maintenance license for optronics
to Malaysian industry.
 Repair accreditation for avionics.
2002 Scorpene Submarine (France)  Transfer of technology, namely
training in various submarine
handling and management.
2000 ACV 300 (Turkey)  Vendor development-supply and
manufacture of parts and
components of the vehicle.
 Production works (assembly) on
ACV300 vehicles in Malaysia.




Year Equipment Offsets Projects
 Transfer of technology in
developing track pads for vehicles.
2003 MBT PT91 (Poland)  Transfer of technology for final
assembly of MBT and its variants.
 Transfer of technology for
maintenance and repair of MBT
and its variants.
 Theoretical and practical transfer
operation and maintenance.
 Local production of parts and
components.
 Data transfer for spare parts
management and maintenance
planning system.
 Local production of MBT and its
variants.
 Documentation for MBT and its
variants.
 Simulator and CBT data for MBT
and its variants.
 Transfer of process engineering
for welding and machining of
special steel with practical
training.
 Transfer of technology for
production of rubber pads.
 Training/course in defence against
NBC weapons of mass
destruction.
 Training in Poland for horse
management.
 Transfer of technology for laser
technology application.
1999 Superlynx (UK)  Technology transfer to assist in the
establishment of maintenance
capabilities for support of the
RMN Super lynx helicopters.
 Certification of composite
facilities and provision of
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Year Equipment Offsets Projects
opportunities for manufacture of
aircraft composite components.
 Development of inventory control
and management system for Navy.
 Transfer of technology in areas of
advanced helicopter technologies
and associated subjects.
 Technology transfer to assist in
establishment of avionics systems
technologies and computer
maintenance capabilities.
 Manufacture of helicopter ground
support equipment and
opportunities for the manufacture
of other aircraft components.
2003 LOH 109  Development of maintenance
capabilities.
 Establishment of the helicopter
service centre.
 Establishment of the engine
service center.
 Support for the establishment of a
multipurpose test bench for
gearbox.
 Post design support and
documentation.
 On-the-job training concerning
calibration of test equipment.
 Flight training centre set-up.
 Study visit to Agusta facilities.
 Computer based training and
cockpit and mission training
know-how.
 Sub-contract to local industry for
helicopter sub-assemblies.
2002 JESNAS Short Range
Missile(UK)
 Establishment of tri-service
electronic warfare training center.
 Transfer of technology through
training.
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Year Equipment Offsets Projects
 Work experience secondment in
the development and management
of offsets strategy.
 Design, manufacture and support
of towing vehicle installation kits.
 Design, manufacture and support
of combat repair vehicle
installation kits (CRVIK).
 Manufacture of stowed
items/equipment.






2003 Exocet SM39 Block 2 Missiles
( France)
 Training course (basic,
intermediate and advance), know-
how related to guided missiles
technologies.
 Engineering session related to
guided missile technologies for
experienced scientist and
engineers.
 Transfer of know-how and
technology related to intermediate
level maintenance.
2002 Black Shark Torpedo 9Italy)  Support and test equipment
(S&TE) adaptation.
 Live torpedo runs tactical
evaluation.
 ILS management.
 Torpedo performance critical
topics.
 Configuration management.
 ORACOM 2000 system simulator.
 Warhead and explosive for
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Year Equipment Offsets Projects
underwater application.
 Propulsion batteries site design.
 Industrial and management
training.
2003 High Performance Human
Centrifuge (HPHC) -US
 Transfer of technology in
developing a national hyperbaric
medicine centre at the school of
Medical Sciences (USM).
 Training to RMAF Institute of
Aviation Medicine (IAM) on GAT
II Spatial Disorientation (SD).
 Establishment of a local
engineering office for the support
of the G-FET II and to assist in the
coordination of the local
manufacturing and product
support.
 Transfer of technology in local
manufacturing and procurement
for G-FET II TFS primary
components.
 Local technology development
partners.
2001 Fennec AS555 SN (France0  Developing cockpit trainer
cooperation.
 Manufacture of Ecureuil/Fennec
service station or O/I maintenance
level.
 Maintenance support for avionics
equipment.
 Maintenance support for radar and
communications equipment.
Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, June 2005
However, the exact value of the overall direct-indirect composition could not be
obtained as most of the offsets projects prior to 2000 did not have a value attached to
them. This was because the offsets threshold value and the composition of the different
types of offsets were not fixed prior to the written policy. There were also frequent
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changes in terms of minimum offsets threshold values and the composition of different
type of offsets.41 However, there have been frequent policy shifts between the defence
and non-defence offsets composition in Malaysia. The early 1990s, for example, saw an
increase in counterpurchase activities, reducing in the mid-to-late 1990s and then a
sudden increase again in the late 1990s. Malaysia’s demand for offsets is strongly
connected to the country’s economic climate, whereby during economic slowdowns, the
government tends to focus on commodity trading as opposed to enhancing the defence
industrial base. In 1997, after the Asian financial crisis, the government sought a quick
economic recovery through offset-induced production of commodity trading. This is
reflected in the 8th Malaysia Plan where counterpurchase was a prominent feature.
Table 5.8 shows the value of defence procurement and offsets under 7th and 8th
Malaysia Plans. The DID reported that from 1999-2003, the total counterpurchase value
was $381,382,206, which almost equalled the offsets value of $388,638,214.42 Offsets
deals under these plans also featured a high value of indirect offsets, mainly into foreign
direct investments and civil technology development, such as GPS and IT projects.43
Indirect offsets projects provided the milieu to develop the civil aerospace, bio-
technology, agricultural, IT and other high-technology sectors. There was a clear policy
shift to greater emphasis on indirect as opposed to direct offsets projects.
In the late 1990s, there were increasing concerns amongst policymakers about the
decreasing value of defence-related offsets in the development of a sustainable defence
industrial base. Issues were raised as to the verification of additionality through
counterpurchase and the distortions created within the existing commodity market in the
search of short-term gains.44 The DID itself faced difficulty in proving causality and
additionality in investment-related offsets. 45
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1 SU30MKM $900.7 Russia US540.4 (60%) 30% 30%
2 Scorpene EU920.4 France/
Spain
EU460.2 (50%) 15% 35%
3 GFE SU-
30MKM
EU118.5 France EU35.5 (30%) 30% -
4 MBT PT
91M
US370.6 Poland US222.4 (60%) 30% 30%
5 Exocet SM39
missile
EU131.7 France EU26.34 (20%) NA NA
6 Black Shark
Torpedo
EU 87.5 Italy EU43.8 (50%) 25% 25%
7 Super Lynx £113.3 UK N/A NA NA
8 LOH 109 $75,339 France N/A NA NA





$11,055 USA NA NA NA
11 FENNEC Euro 42,124 France NA NA NA
12 ACV 300 $278,700,500 Turkey NA NA NA





NA Brazil NA NA NA
15 CN235 US36,280 Indonesia US7256 NA NA
Source: Defence Industry Division, June 2005, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia
Amongst defence contractors, there were conflicts of interest in the transferring of
defence technology after the end of the Cold War period. The saturated defence market
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coupled with increasing competition to obtain sales had caused many of the prime
defence suppliers to either merge or consolidate their businesses. Many of them had
also lost huge amounts of work, laying-off high numbers of workers. These companies
struggled to keep defence work at home. The OEMs are not willing to part with
defence-related technology, which could potentially further erode their market potential.
Defence suppliers, were keener on promoting non-defence related offsets as compared
to defence.46
Defence OEMs agree that Malaysia needs to pursue defence industrialisation to support
its aim of maintaining self-reliant Armed Forces.47 Acquisition and absorption of
technology relating to the equipment purchased is vital to support the Armed Forces in
terms of supplying materials, such as spares and services as these play an important role
in directly reducing the through-life-support costs of maintaining the equipment
purchased. However, many of the vendors question the need for Malaysia to become a
defence platform or equipment manufacturer.48 The vendors are reluctant to provide
defence-related offsets, as opposed to indirect offsets, (mainly civil related-work and
investments). Some 80% of the vendors interviewed regard defence work undertaken by
‘small’ developing countries as economically inefficient, requiring large capital outlays,
incurring long lead-times for returns and carrying uncertainty in terms of recurrent
volume and export performance.49 Overseas defence suppliers see these potential new
entrants as further saturating an already over-crowded international supply base.50
Suppliers look at indirect offsets as a better option for smaller developing countries to
sustain their market position. Malaysia, for example, is identified as being able to
perform better by focusing on initiatives such as biotechnology, healthcare, and ICT,
arguably having a greater impact on national development. 51
5.6.2 Source of Offsets
The sources of innovation, in relation to country-origin, and degree of dependency (see
Chapters 2 and 3) affect local absorption of technology. For Malaysia, technology has
been sourced from many different countries. Weapons have been purchased from a wide
variety of countries, including the US, the UK, various EU countries (such as France,
Germany and Italy), Eastern Europe (Russia and Poland) and other developing countries
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(Brazil, South Africa and Turkey). These purchases have created a range of expertise
and logistical problems within the Armed Forces and defence industry. Diversified
technology capabilities, from West and East, with different technical standards and
specifications, have created complications in terms of integration of the various
equipments for interoperability and capability within the Malaysian Armed Forces. This
has challenged the learning process and technological capability with the industry as
well.52 The problem is that firms need to be familiar within different manuals, standards
of instructions, rules and guidelines for the defence technology transfer process.53
The overall experience of diversified procurement has also limited local technological
capability and caused increased development costs due to the frequent need to adapt to
differing countries technology processes. These include modification of infrastructure
and hardware (such as jigs and tools) to suit each supplier’s technology transfer
requirements. At the same time, some of the OEMs view this logistical complexity as
high risk, given that technology could leak to competitors via Malaysian companies.54
5.7 Role of the Malaysian Government in Sustaining a Defence Industrial Base
Government plays a vital role in the structural support of economic development (see
Chapter 2). Government is one of the principal actors ensuring the success of a nation’s
technological and industrial development. Government decides on policies aimed at
providing an appropriate climate for development. The role of government is thus
essential in identifying crucial developmental indicators for the creation of a
competitive and high-value added technological environment. For Malaysia, the
national goal has been to transform the economy from one based on agriculture to
instead a more diversified manufacturing economy. The government has played an
active participatory policy in promoting industrialisation through ISI and EOI strategies,
incorporating Western as well as East Asian economic models to enhance the industrial
base. Today, the government’s key agenda is to create diversification in various high-
technology sectors, including defence.
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5.7.1 Government Initiatives Aimed at Raising Offsets Effectiveness
The Malaysian government is committed to the development of its defence industrial
base. Offsets are used as the main instrument towards achieving this objective, with
policies concentrated on the formation of an offsets policy to capture high value-added
projects through joint-ventures, and co-production, leading to indigenisation and
exports. The task of offsets management, as discussed earlier, was transferred from
MITI (1983-1992) to the Ministry of Finance in 1992. This transition of function was in
parallel with the introduction of offsets in Malaysia through the purchase of Hawk
aircraft from BAE in the early 1990s. The special offsets unit at the MOF was tasked
from that time to coordinate, manage and implement offsets projects. The MOF invited
relevant stakeholders to participate in offsets negotiation before projects are finalised.
All offsets policy and implementation matters fell within the purview of MOF with a
minimal role for the ministries purchasing the capital items. The government’s first
initiative to increase offsets effectiveness was to decentralise offsets implementation
and monitoring to the relevant ministries in 2001. It was realised that it is vital for
implementing ministries to be directly involved in offsets decision-making and
negotiation processes to obtain the best possible project outcomes. This move was also
expected to give the respective ministries the opportunity to plan and coordinate their
offsets projects in parallel with procurement activities.55
The task of offsets management was delegated to six key ministries: the Ministry of
Defence (MOD); Ministry of Health (MOH); Ministry of Education (MOE); Ministry of
Transport (MOT); Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA); and the Ministry of Public Works
and Utility (MPWU). This decision was taken on the basis that the relevant ministries
would have the expertise and skills to better manage their respective offsets projects.56
The MOF, however, still retained responsibility for all offsets policy matters. The
transition of the offsets management responsibility is shown in Figure 5.4.
The government’s decision to decentralise offsets management was a step forward,
ensuring that stakeholder ministries were involved in securing relevant and high quality
offsets projects. For the MOD, with the largest amount of offsets obligations, this action
was viewed as a positive move towards ensuring that the defence sector, particularly the
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defence industry, benefitted from defence offsets. Further, the government’s initiative to
formalise offsets policy was seen as a step in the right direction in the provisioning of a
transparent and systematic methodology for the design and implementation of offset
programmes.57
Figure 5.4: Offsets Management Transformation (1983-current)
Source: Author
As Malaysia’s public sector, particularly the MOD, is directly involved in the
technology identification and selection process, the government wants to ensure that
there is an effective process for obtaining the right sort of technology based on national
need. The government has believed for some time that the ad hoc nature of compiling a
technology wish-list was not producing adequate technology development capability
within the defence industry.58 Thus, as a follow-up to the MIGHT Report, the MOF
decided in 2005 to form the Technology Depository Agency (TDA) under the
responsibility of MIGHT. MIGHT was thereon responsible as a ‘technology bank’ for










i. Identifying technological needs.
ii. Recommending on how best to, acquire, exploit, receive and house the
technology.
iii. Ensuring both (direct and indirect) offsets are effectively used to assist economic
growth.
iv. Ensuring technology is procured successfully and transferred to local recipients
monitoring offset implementation.59
Further, the MOD through the MDIC platform created a joint R&D fund to encourage
public-private defence R&D ventures. The fund was to operate via a joint-funding type
of collaboration.60 The Government took the initiative to formulate a defence industry
blue-print.61 This document was meant to be a guideline for the development of a local
defence industry, identifying and prioritising strategic technology with both a short- and
long-term vision of creating a sustainable Malaysian defence industrial base.62 The blue-
print, however, remains to be approved and formalised.
The government also took initiatives to create defence industry clusters through offsets.
In this respect, offsets were used to develop SMEs through the vendor development
programme. Under this initiative, an identified Malaysian prime contractor would be
awarded an offsets project. The government would then expect the Malaysian prime to
sub-contract work within the offsets project to Malaysian SMEs. The government’s
intention was, and is, to create defence industrial clusters and enhance backward
linkages. This policy was initially applied to the 1999 Patrol Vessel project, which was
undertaken by PSC Naval Dockyard (further details about this project are discussed in
Section 5.4.7).
The government is easily the largest procurement source for products and services from
the local defence industry. For 2005, the government procured RM 6.46 million in
terms of products and services from local defence industry.63 The scope of government
procurement varies from purchasing small essential items and services to obtaining
through-life support, including maintenance, up-grade, assembly, as well as the
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procurement of high-tech equipment, such as simulators, trucks, combat vehicles,
ordnance and weapons. The government, to support sustainable defence industries, has
implemented a long-term contract policy, providing continuous work to defence
companies for a period of 5-10 years, depending on their capability. This move will
encourage local companies to invest in infrastructure and manpower development.
5.7.2 Challenges Faced by Government and Offsets Implementation
The Malaysian government faces several challenges in its efforts to promote defence
industrialisation. The absence of a defence policy outlining the nation’s security
environment, threat perception, defence capability, and procurement strategy has direct
implications on the formulation of a defence industrial policy. There appears a lack of
direction amongst policymakers in developing strategies to enhance the Malaysian
defence industrial base, due to the absence of focussed policy guidelines.
Technology selection, coordination and prioritisation are still a problem despite the
presence of the TDA. There exists a huge gap between the MOD as the implementing
Ministry and MIGHT, due to the differences in focus within the high technology
sectors. MINDEF aims to use offsets to develop, particularly, the defence sector. By
contrast, MIGHT as the umbrella organisation for high technology, focuses on the civil
and aerospace high technology sectors. Further, there is clear lack of coordination
between MIGHT and STRIDE in relation to determining and prioritising the
technological needs within the defence sector. MIGHT, is at the early stages of policy
formulation, and therefore is still experimenting on the effective utilisation of TDA.
MIGHT also lacks human resources to evaluate technological needs.64 Currently, 100%
of staff in the TDA is seconded from the Armed Forces.65
In terms of export and marketing promotion, the government’s explicit intention is to
promote Malaysian defence exports, but this is not accurately reflected in its policy. As
a result, offsets agreements are devoid of any export or buy-back provisions; an issue
that will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
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5.8 Impact of Offsets
5.8.1 Technology Absorption and Capability Development
Technology capability resides at several levels (see Chapters 2 and 4). In the defence
sector, technology capability at the most basic level involves the capacity to undertake
activities such as production, operation, maintenance, repair, overhaul (MRO), up-
grade, assembly and resource allocation. At the higher stages, this capability moves on
to acquiring capability for joint-ventures, co-production and licensed production.
Finally, at the highest level, technology capability centres on innovation leading to
indigenisation.
In the past 15 years, Malaysia has used offsets to build its defence industrial base.
Technology absorption involves various levels of technology learning such as learning-
by-doing, adaptation, and basic R&D, leading to innovation. The purpose of this
section, then, is to analyse the impact of offsets on the development of technology
capability, leading ultimately to innovation of new technologies and R&D.
Offsets have successfully targeted bumiputera entrepreneurs and workers, developing
their capabilities in high-technology sectors, such as defence and aerospace. Malaysia’s
defence industries are almost 100% owned by the bumiputras, and the majority of the
workers are Malay.66 These companies are mainly small to medium size firms, 80%
privately owned, with 70% having businesses in both the civil and defence sectors.67
5.8.2 Technology Learning and Capability Building
The technology transfer process has already been discussed (Chapter 2 ) whereby the
firm selects the technology, acquires it, and then goes through the process of
development, application, diffusion and management of the technology. However, in
some instances within developing countries, offsets reciepients and projects are
identified and selected by the government. Once the type of technology and the
recipients have been identified, the technology transfer process, including technology
learning, adaptation and innovation at the industry level involves the following steps:
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i. Company informed that it has been selected as the technology recipient.
ii. Company invited during the negotiation stage to discuss technology issues,
including, transfer strategy, pricing, infrastructure and man-power capability.
iii. Supplier conducts audit on the recipient company to gauge its technology
absorption capability and suggest up-grades and possible infrastructure that need
to be in place to smooth the technology transfer process.
iv. Local firm identifies possible technology gaps and works with the identified
OEM and MINDEF to put in place the appropriate infrastructure before the
project is implemented.
v. Acquisition through offsets of hardware, such as jigs, tools and machinery if the
local firm is unable to acquire these items in a short period of time; or if
specified in the contract.
vi. OEMs transfers the necessary documents, provides training locally and overseas,
both in the form of theoretical classroom teaching and hands-on technical and
know-how training at the OEM’s facilities abroad.
vii. Local firm absorbs the technology at various levels, including the process
technology, management techniques, production know-how and product
technology.
viii. OEM and recipient firms seek to stay within the project implementation
schedule of the offsets contract; the OEM to commit to working towards
meeting this deadline in order to not be penalised.
ix. Periodical follow-up and follow-through from the OEM before reports are
submitted to MINDEF on project progress.68
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Malaysian inward technology transfer is divided into six categories, as shown in Table
5.9. The breakdown is categorised as transfer of technology (TOT), maintenance, repair
and overhaul (MRO), manufacturing, sub-assembly, integrated logistics systems (ILS)
and research and development.
Table 5.9: Types of Offsets Activity
Type of activity (%)
Transfer of Technology 58
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul(MRO) 18
Manufacturing 8
Sub-Assembly 10
Integrated Logistic Systems(ILS) 5
R&D 1
Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, June 2005.
As per Table 5.9, above, 58% of offsets are focused towards technology transfer. The
technology transfer component can be sub-divided into training, know-how, technical
assistance, consultancy and documentation as well as the transfer of hardware. The
results from the questionnaire and analysis of the offsets programmes revealed that 70%
of technology transfer is focused on training of the Armed Forces and industry
personnel selected to handle the main equipment and the sub-systems purchased.69
Training includes theory and on-the-job training, conducted both locally and abroad.
Technical assistance and documentation are also provided through offsets for the
equipment purchased. Consultancy services are provided by foreign suppliers for a short
duration or until the end of the warranty period.
The second largest type of offsets involves the MRO type of activities (18%), mainly
second and third level MRO.70 In such instances, local companies are selected by the
MOD to provide MRO services for the Armed Forces after the warranty period expires.
Normally, the selected company’s personnel will have to undergo training on how to
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service the equipment purchased and this is captured by offsets. A few military
personnel will also be selected to learn MRO at the second and third level in order to be
equipped in emergency situations. MRO activities are currently being undertaken in
Malaysia by companies like Zetro in avionics maintenance, Airod in engine
maintenance, Caidmark in Condition-Based Monitoring, and Sapura and SCS in
simulator maintenance.71
The third largest type of offsets activity involves sub-assembly (10%) where locally
identified defence company personnel will be selected to learn and assemble a certain
percentage of the defence equipment in-country. A Malaysian major sub-assembly
project, involving the ACV 300 (Adnan) was purchased from Turkey, and 64 out of the
204 vehicles were assembled locally by DEFTECH. DEFTECH a subsidiary of EON
Berhad was selected as the prime contractor for the offsets project. With regards to the
offsets deal, DEFTECH undertook to carry out in-country tank assembly. DEFTECH
claims that through this technology transfer process, DEFTECH workers were able to
obtain capability to design and produce simple tanks for the Malaysian Armed Forces.72
Another example of an offsets sub-contracting project is MMC Defence’s on-going
contract to assemble MBT-PT91 tanks from Bumar Labedi, Poland. According to MMC
personnel, several of the company’s workers, through this project, have been sent to
Poland for training on processes related to the tank.73
Manufacturing forms 8% of offsets74 and integrated logistic systems (ILS) forms 5% of
Malaysia’s offsets activity.75 This includes activities in logistics support, integration and
simulator development and other electronics and electrical-based types of activity.
Finally, design and development form only 1% of offsets activities. Several research
projects involving R&D were carried out via defence offsets, but these projects were
mainly diversified activities, mainly in the civil sector.
5.8.3 Technology Collaboration
In terms of technology collaboration, Table 5.10 shows that there have been joint-
ventures, co-production, sub-contracting, collaboration, buy-back arrangements and
BOT with overseas firms. Of the 16 companies that responded to the survey
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questionnaire, 50% claimed to have technology partnerships through sub-contracting
work, 44% through collaboration, 38% through joint-ventures, 31% through co-
production and licensing, and just 6% through buy-backs and BOT.
Table 5.10: Technology Collaboration
Question 4.06:Transfer of technology through









Build, Operate, Transfer(BOT) 6
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
Offsets projects have created partnerships across various companies and countries
across a broad range of technology transfer activities. However, these have been mainly
basic technology transfer types of activities where technology transfer involves the
transfer of hard and soft technologies, involving minimal innovation, mostly ‘build to
print’ requiring local firms to stick to product and process specifications identified and
set by the OEMs.
Table 5.11 below shows the break-down of technology-transfer according to the type of
activities from the USA, Britain, France, Italy, EU, Canada, South Korea, South Africa
and Germany. The partnerships are analysed in relation to joint-ventures, co-production,
sub-contracting and collaboration. Table 5.11 shows that Malaysian companies have
relatively more sub-contracting and collaboration types of technology transfer activities
with US (4 sub-contracting and 5 collaborative activities) and UK companies (5
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subcontracting and 4 collaborative activities). Overall, Table 5.11 illustrates that the
numbers across the board in terms of joint-ventures and co-production activities are
minimal indicating that offsets have not been able to create substantive technology
partnerships between overseas and Malaysian companies. Many of these companies
claim to have been provided with extensive training and consultancy services. Offsets
projects have been merely at the basic technology level, involving training, technical
assistance, manufacturing, sub-assemblies and simple MROs. There is a clear absence
of more sophisticated types of technology collaboration through offsets in the defence
sector.



















USA 3 - 4 5 Training
Britain 2 2 5 4
France 1 1 1 3 Consultancy




Canada 1 1 1 Training




South Africa 1 Training and
consultancy
Switzerland 1
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms (July 2005)
Offsets have been the main source of technology transfer for local companies, but they
have sourced technology through various other options besides offsets. Table 5.12
shows that of the 16 firms that responded, 25% of the respondents claim that they have
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have obtained technology through through bilateral arrangements, 38% claim to have
obtained technology through technical cooperation, 19% through joint-ventures and
13% turnkey projects. However, 56% of the respondents claim that their main mode of
technology transfer is through offsets. This indicates that offsets have been the main
source of technology for the majority of Malaysian defence industry.
Table 5.12: Modes of Technology Transfer
Question 4.03:
If an innovation has
come from another

















Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April- 31 July 2005.
Local firms have initiated innovation strategies through collaboration with local
universities, such as UTM, USM, UiTM, USM and research organisations, such as
STRIDE. CAIDMARK and STRIDE, for example, have collaborated in joint-research
in software modelling. These two organisations have also signed an MOU for R&D
collaboration in condition based-monitoring, inclusive of aircraft structural integrity
programmes.76 Astronautics Tech (M) collaborated with SIRIM on ISO, with USM on
an aerospace research programme and remote sensing with UPM on aerospace research
programmes and with UiTM on electronics/mechatronics RF and antenna system.77
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Chapter 4 discussed the need for local firms to become self-reliant, in terms of sources
of technology, raw materials and skilled workers. Table 5.13 shows that the 16
respondent local firms sourced technology, components, parts, machinery, specialised
research, training services, consultancy services, raw materials and skilled workers, both
abroad and locally. These resources were sourced from mainly the US, the EU and
Japan.
Table 5.13: Source of Technology
Question3.07:Does your









Technology 25 44 31 16
Components and parts 25 38 37 16
Machinery 19 38 43 16
Specialised research and training
services
25 38 37 16
Consultancy services 25 44 31 16
Raw materials 31 38 31 16
Skilled workers 38 25 37 16
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
Some 38% of respondents, as shown in Table 5.13, relied on foreign sources of
technology, components and parts, machinery, specialised research and training services
and consultancy services to enhance their technological and industrial capability. Some
31% of respondent firms claimed to have sourced a fairly low amount of raw materials
in-country and 38% of respondents claim to be highly dependent on imports of raw
materials and machinery. Raw materials are vital to enhance and sustain
competitiveness of the industrial base. Malaysian companies have had problems in
producing raw materials and machinery in-county and are still highly dependent on
imports such as steel, composites and 5 axis machines.78 Some 44% of respondent firms
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source technology and consultancy services from overseas for their industrial
development, indicating that there is significant amount of technology transfer from
overseas suppliers for hard and soft technology. The only area where local sources are
used is skilled workers. Some 38% of respondents claim that Malaysia is still
competitive in terms of the cost of high skilled workers. 79
Although Malaysia utilises offsets in developing its defence industrial base, success has
been achieved only to the extent of first and second level capability, with minimal third
level development processes and product innovation. Finally, there has been hardly any
success in terms of R&D from offsets activities.
5.8.4 R&D Strategy
R&D investment is critical for ensuring a successful technology absorption process,
leading to indigenisation and ultimately export. Creation of new technologies,
especially product technology, involves a huge investment in R&D. The commitment of
Malaysian companies towards R&D activities has been minimal. Some 70% of the
Malaysian companies interviewed (see Table 5.14) spend less than 10% of annual
revenue on developing new technologies. There have been minimal exports generated
through R&D activities. The few defence exports that have been achieved have been in
sub-contracting work, where there is no room for new research except to duplicate
existing processes for production.80
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Table 5.14: Company Annual Expenditure on R&D as a Percentage of Revenue
Question 3.02: Indicate your company’s annual
R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue:
Respondents Total no of
respondents





Greater than 51% - 16
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July, 2005.
Zetro Aerospace, for instance, invests in R&D to develop and integrate software.
Several smaller companies, such as Ikramatik and UPECA, dedicate a bigger share of
their revenue towards R&D. Ikramatik has been actively involved in R&D for simulator
development. These companies have on their own initiative invested in R&D, instead of
being dependent on government funds. The R&D component, however, comprises only
1% of Malaysia’s total offsets obligations.81 Public-led research institutions are less
commercially focused. The R&D fund set-up by STRIDE for public-private research
collaboration in defence technology is yet to take-off due to the lack of investment
initiatives from local firms.
Some 88% of Malaysian defence and aerospace firms do not have R&D facilities as
illustrated in Table 5.15. Zetro, for example, has a laboratory in KLIA to conduct
software development testing. Others such as Cairdmark, Sapura Defence and
Ikramatik, do have R&D facilities, but 60% of these firms have in-house R&D
laboratories that are ill-equipped.82 Thus, there is little real R&D activities in the
Malaysian defence industry.
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Does your company have R&D facilities? 12 88
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
Local firms blame the government for the lack of defence R&D funding. The survey
response (Table 5.16) indicates that 14 out of 16 respondents agree that there is
insufficient R&D support in terms of financial allocations and incentives to the local
defence companies to prop-up their technology innovation capabilities. All 16
repondents state that they do not receive any form of tax credits for R&D activities from
the government.
Table 5.16 : Government R&D Support
Questions 3.05 and 3.06: Yes No Total
respondents
Question 3.05: Does your company receive R&D
assistance from the government?
2 14 16
Question 3.06: Does your company receive
government R&D tax credits?
0 16 16
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms (July 2005)
Malaysia’s lack of R&D is due to several reasons. These include the lack of government
investment in defence R&D, the paucity of corporate investment into R&D as well as
the lack of R&D activities being leveraged through offsets in the Malaysian defence
sector. According to a MOD senior officer, R&D activities supported through offsets
have not only been minimal but also short term as most of the firms participating in the
programmes do not develop further research on these technologies for the purposes of
commercialisation. Zetro, for example, has entered into an R&D project with STRIDE
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and PUSPEKA, but is uncertain of the project’s commercial viability. Most of the
offsets projects are abandoned after in-depth and extensive training has been provided,
creating ‘one-off’ effects. R&D projects which are government-led also face challenges.
The Science University of Malaysia which was awarded the contract to upgrade the
HUGE air-defence radar in Western Hill, Butterworth, faced difficulties to proceed, and
finally had to seek Zetro’s assistance.83
Further, the government as well as technology recipients are not able to benefit from
technology transfer due to the absence of immediate returns and the high investment
risks involved.84 Within national R&D initiatives, organisations such as Intensification
of Research in Priority Areas (IRPA), do allocate financial resources to R&D. However,
only a small fraction of this is allocated towards defence, as this sector is not seen as a
profitable industry generating commercial returns to the nation. STRIDE, for example,
was only allocated RM 21 million out of the total RM 3,868 million of the national
R&D budget under the 9th Malaysia Plan.85 The defence sector is felt to be a strategic
industry contributing towards military self-reliance, but not as an income generating
industry by those outside the MOD. 86
The low status of defence R&D in Malaysia’s defence industry is shown in Table 5.17,
below. The Table shows that no patent registrations have been registered by any of the
companies surveyed. This is an indicator of how technology transfer had failed to create
sustainable long-term defence business, enhancing local firms to Malaysianise their
products for the export market.





Does your company have any patent registrations? 0 100
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
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5.8.5 Technology-Sharing Problems
Technology-sharing problems include the unwillingness of suppliers to share the
contents of ‘black-boxes’ with the recipients firms due to the threat of competition, the
lack of investment initiative from local firms, and the high cost of royalty payments for
the technology. Some 6 out of 16 respondents interviewed, claim that they have
experienced technology-sharing problems with their overseas partner. Zetro Aerospace
had problems in the technology transfer process in its efforts to develop a radar system,
due to the large royalty payments required by Alenia Marconi. This technology
partnership faced troubles and required government intervention.87 ATSB also had
problems in the technology transfer process when the facilities to assemble and test
components for a thermal vacuum chamber (TVC) were not available in Malaysia.
Suppliers involved in technology transfer face government restrictions and export
control regulations. Companies are prepared to transfer licensed-based technologies but
subject to national authorisation.88 Some 80% of OEMs claim to have invested in
critical operational areas, such as systems and technology components.89 There is a
need to achieve and preserve competitive edge in system/product performance,
technical strength, independence, innovation potential, and economic competitiveness.
‘Core technology’ to the OEMs reflects their intellectual property rights and these are
unlikely to be given away free.90 Suppliers are willing to partner with local firms
provided there is direct participation in the investment of the supplied system, including
sharing of development costs, risks, through-life support and upgrades.
The Malaysian government has been supportive of technology transfer to local firms.
Some 90% of respondents agree that they have not had any difficulty with the
government in technology acquisition. One particular company faced challenges when it
was denied access to the equipment or facilities, thus failing to appreciate the problems
with regards to technology acquisition.91 Sometimes, the local company has had to cater
to the design changes requested by users to meet operational requirements.92 A further
example regards a UK company, Elvis Bridging, which faced technology transfer
problems involving composite rails. These included the ability of CTRM workers to
consistently produce the required quality of rails in its factory, as compliant with
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specifications. Elvis personnel were placed on the shop floor at CTRM to provide
training to CTRM workers, ensuring that the manufacturing procedures and outputs
were compliant. 93
When sourcing technology from other developing countries, the issue becomes more
complicated. Defence suppliers almost never hold the IPR (or the ‘black-box’) and will
need to seek approval from the OEMs concerned. For example, when Malaysia bought
300 APC tanks from FNSS Savunma Systems, Turkey, there were complications over
technology transfer to DEFTECH, the nominated Malaysian company. This was mainly
because FNSS Savunnma had to refer constantly to its US technology partner regarding
US ITAR (United States International Traffic & Arms Regulations) before it could
transfer the technology work concerned to DEFTECH 94 This further escalates the costs
of technology as well as increasing the time-lines, as the process involves technology
export approvals from several countries.
Most governments adhere to the principle of free, open and competitive trade. However,
in the case of defence exports, technology supplier governments often impose various
restrictions on technology transfer. This is based on the background of the country,
political stability, operational issues, technical issues, and most importantly, high level
government-to-government collaboration, based on national interest and the protection
of ally States. Malaysia, based on its membership of various international organisations,
and its support for UN programmes, has gained recognition from governments as a
country with a sound politico-economic policy. The transfer process through offsets has
suffered minimal difficulties, though inward technology transfer policy has varied
where some of the exporting country policies have been more stringent than others due
to various security, political and economic reasons. However, Malaysia has not
penalised offshore defence contractors because of their government’s technology
restriction policies; the evidence shows that Malaysia has continued to buy weapons
even from countries with tough technology export policies.
Malaysia’s export policies are supportive not only of protecting its own defence
industrial base, but also overseas sales contracts. Technology exports from the Eastern
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bloc have proven to be more complicated due to red tape and stringent technology
export clearance controls imposed by their governments. For example, ATSC, a
Malaysian company based in Kuantan, Pahang, was nominated as the Service Centre for
the Russian MIG but it faced serious technology transfer problems and spare-parts
management from the Russian company, RAC MIG, (now called Rosoroboronexport).95
Although RAC tried to smooth the transfer process, the overseas company was still
bound by the Russian government’s technology export rules.96
5.8.4 Human Resource Development
Malaysia focuses on human resource development through offsets as a means to train
and enhance manpower. Workers hired by the local companies are mainly from local
institutions with various levels of educational background. Table 5.18, below, shows
that out of the 16 respondents of recipient companies interviewed, 15 of them had more
than 20% of their workers involved in operational work, followed by 13 with more than
20% in maintenance work. In fact, only five of the respondent companies have more
than 20% of their workforce in management work, and two with more than 20% in
R&D related work. The distribution of human resources reflects two issues. Firstly, at
the firm level, human resources are heavily concentrated on operational and
maintenance activities. Secondly, training through offsets projects has only been
undertaken at lower levels of activity, as opposed to R&D.
OEMs, however, are positive about the capability of the Malaysian workforce. Some
90% of the suppliers interviewed claimed that there is a cooperative spirit between the
Malaysian workforce and technology suppliers; the local workers are reliable and have a
positive attitude towards work.97 Table 5.19 shows the composition of workers
according to their educational background. The Table shows that 11 out of the 16
companies have more than 20% of their workers with vocational school qualifications
and 10 out of 16 have more than 20% with university degrees.
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20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-100% Total
respondents
Management 11 5 - - - 16
Operation 1 4 2 8 1 16
Maintenance 3 8 4 1 - 16
R&D 14 2 - - 16
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2007.
Table 5.19 shows that 100% of the companies have less than 20% of workers with only
primary school qualifications.98 This suggests that the majority of local firms employ
workers with good basic qualifications, either a university degree in a relevant field or a
diploma from a technical or vocational school. This also indicates that these workers
should be able to absorb the transferred know-how. One supplier mentioned that
Malaysians have a customer-oriented mind.99 Senior and middle level management
possess strong English skills and have no problems understanding the manuals and
documents provided by the suppliers.100
The issue is whether the skills of this local workforce are utilised effectively to
undertake high level technology development work appropriate to their educational
qualifications. There is a danger of creating a less technologically demanding
environment for human resource development in Malaysia’s defence industries. This
situation is exacerbated if the type of work transferred through offsets is mainly low-
level operational and maintenance activities.
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Table 5.19 : Distribution of Workers According to Educational Level












16 - - - - 16
Secondary
school
12 1 1 11 16
High school
completed








6 4 2 2 2 16
Source: Malaysian Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
Further, as illustrated in Table 5.20, there is a weak commitment from local companies
towards human resource development. Some 50% of local firms invest less than 10% of
total revenue in the training of human resources. Firms appear to use offsets largely to
support focused training activities. The offsets vehicle, contrary to the policy of
enhancing skills in high technology areas, has largely been geared towards basic
training of workers in the operational and maintenance spheres.
Several local firms still lack the human resources to undertake high-end jobs in certain
specialised fields. This has created the need for local firms to import skilled workers
from overseas, such as India and Indonesia, capable of working on CAD/CAM and
designing.101 Graduates from local universities, such as UTM, USM and technical and
vocational institutes, are claimed to have the theory but not the ‘hands-on’ technical
skills. To ensure production quality, many of these firms provide in-house training to
newly appointed workers despite the loss of time and additional costs incurred.102
Further, many of the local graduates have to be provided with translated documents in
the native Malays language, slowing the overall process of technology transfer.103
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Table 5.20 : Annual Corporate Expenditure on Training as a Percentage of Sales Revenue
Question 2.05: Your company’s annual expenditure on









Greater than 51% 6
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
Instances of English language deficiency amongst local workers raise the question as to
the quality of local educational instruction within the technical and vocational schools.
The question is whether these organisations survey the needs of local firms to ensure
that the curriculum incorporates industrial development methods and procedures
relevant to rapid technological change. Indigenous firms also face high attrition rates of
skilled workers. There is an imbedded culture of job-hopping in search of more
lucrative salaries within the local community due to the high demand and lack of supply
for human resources with specialised skills. 104
Several offsets recipient firms still rely on consultants for various high technology
works. The offsets policy emphasises co-development in the form of co-production and
licensed production to encourage on-the-job training amongst Malaysian firms. The
frustrations of some local firms arise due to the inconsistency in the selection of final
technology recipients. In some instances, the offset project is subsequently not awarded
to firms that had been encouraged to invest in worker training; these workers then not
being mobilised effectively, resulting in redundancy and inefficient usage of manpower
and capital resources. 105
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5.9 Industrial Transformation through Offsets
The aim of every nation is to maximise the benefits of offsets through economic
multipliers, such as employment, skills enhancement, innovation, technological spin-
offs, value-added supply chains, exports and marketing. In Malaysia, offsets have had
mixed outcomes, both positive and negative. In the context of developing a sustainable
defence industrial base, Malaysia has successfully used offsets to foster basic
technological development in the defence sector but has not yet been able to create
high-level innovation resulting in indigenisation and a sustainable defence industry.
Nevertheless, offsets have been able to create diversification in the civil sectors,
especially aerospace and electronics. This section further elaborates on these issues.
5.9.1 Technology Innovation and Competitiveness
Local firms have been able to utilise offsets to absorb and create technologies, as shown
in Table 5.21, below. There are four types of technology capability developed within the
recipient firms. These comprise process technology, production know-how,
management techniques and product technology.
Table 5.21 : Types of Technology Transferred
Question 4.07: In your company, do offsets







Process technology 94 6 100
Production know-how 88 12 100
Management techniques 81 19 100
Product technologies 75 25 100
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
The study found that 94% of recipient firms agree that offsets have been able to transfer
process technology, 88 % agree to the transfer of production know-how, 81% to the
transfer of management techniques and 75% to the transfer of product technology. In
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relation to process technology, managers and engineers handling offsets projects have
built on the existing processes and procedures to make the project more cost effective to
meet the high expectations for product quality and price. Several offsets recipient
companies have been awarded certification for their process innovation in terms of ISO
certification. Such certification has enabled firms to secure contracts via competitive
tendering at the international level. These include companies such as SME Aerospace,
UPECA Engineering, Airod and Zetro Aerospace.
Companies have also gained know-how to enhance product technologies. A successful
defence-related R&D investment has been the local development of simulation visual
systems and databases by Sapura Defence. Sapura was appointed as the recipient of
technology from TTSL, UK, for the 1992 Hawk simulators under the BAE Systems
Hawk offsets project. Based on technological collaboration, Sapura was then appointed
by the Malaysian government to maintain the Hawk simulators. In 1993, when Malaysia
bought the MIG-29N from Russia, Sapura was again selected to obtain training from
CAE, Canada, to jointly develop the simulator for the MIG29. In 1995, when the
government purchased the F18s, Sapura was once again nominated to supply training on
the F18 simulator offsets programme.106 Based on these experiences, Sapura was able to
absorb, learn, adapt and finally design its own simulator for the Indonesian CN235
aircraft and the Turkish ACV 300 tanks. Sapura was able to obtain further capabilities
in simulator development through offsets including the comprehensive maintenance of
simulators, upgrading of existing simulators, and, finally, indigenisation leading to
development of visual databases. With these capabilities, Sapura was able to provide
support to the MAF, develop sub-contractors and create off-shoots such as Ikramatik.107
According to Mr. Wan Shahruddin, the CEO of Sapura Defence:
The simulation offsets venture had several benefits to our company. We were able to
gain access to restricted technology, venture into new business and diversify into civil
sectors. These achievements were in-line with government aspirations and commitment
towards economic development and self-reliance. 108
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MMC Defence claims to have benefited from improved management techniques
through the technology transfer process.109 For example, the transfer of technology for
the design and manufacturing of the stowing kits for JERNAS short-range missiles
enhanced MMC management techniques across several areas, including documentation
and quality assurance procedures by the MMC Defence workers.110
As defence and aerospace processes involve high levels of security and safety, these
industries must develop stringent step-by-step documentation to ensure accuracy in final
production. Local managers and staff are trained by the OEMs to establish good quality
documentation with appropriate control mechanisms to ensure high quality production.
Local firms will not be able to participate in offsets production unless they have
complied with the OEMs’ stringent expectations regarding quality assurance processes.
Several Malaysian firms have successfully been accepted into the OEMs’ supply chain
to produce parts and components mainly for civil customers.
Table 5.22, below shows that, 12 of the 16 respondents claim to have established equal
capabilities with other regional countries in manufacturing processes, assembly and
MRO. These are mainly first-level manufacturing processes, safety and maintenance,
and through-life support activities. Some of these companies, such as Airod and Zetro,
have used their know-how to penetrate the regional market by servicing commercial and
military aircraft across the world. Malaysia’s aspiration of becoming a capable regional
service centre is threatened by the increasing cost of skilled labour, the high attrition
rate of skilled workers within the MRO sector and competition from other neighbouring
countries trying to penetrate into emerging markets, such as the Philippines and
Thailand. Malaysian defence firms are still highly dependent on the government for
marketing support, seeing offsets as a means of encouraging more offshore suppliers to
use local companies for in-country and regional activities. However, only one out of the
four companies that responded claim to have capabilities in product design and quality
to compete regionally or internationally. More than 50% of the respondents were unsure
of their company’s capability in terms of product design and quality and therefore did
not want to respond to the question.
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Overall, Table 5.22 indicates that Malaysian companies have limited capabilities to
compete internationally in product design, safety and management strategy pertaining to
defence technology. These companies, however, do have capabilities in manufacturing
processes, assembly, MRO processes and through-life support to compete regionally.
Table 5.23 shows that the strengths of Malaysian defence companies are based on
favourable costs of skilled workers (50%) and product and process technology (31%).
None of these companies have built their competitiveness on marketing strategy, to
independently innovate and push exports internationally. Globalisation pressures have
forced the government to encourage partnership in the form of regional service centres,
such as the case of Eurocopter Malaysia in Subang and also the formation of the
Agusta-Westland Service Centre. The formation of in-country service centres have
existed from the 2001 FENNEC offsets programme, with the 2003 LOH offsets
programme also aimed at promoting local partnerships.111 partnership basis, where
genuine transfer of technology must happen instead of the ‘fly by night’ MNC model of
continuously looking for the cheapest cost centre. 112
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Table 5.22 : Benchmarking Local Defence Technology Capabilities
Question 2.06: For



























- 4 1 1 6
Manufacturing process - 3 12 1 16
Assembly - 2 12 2 16
MRO process - 3 12 1 16
Through-life support 2 7 7 - 16
Systems integration - 5 8 3 16
Safety - 7 7 2 16
Management strategy - 7 9 - 16
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
Based on local firm capability, these facilities will eventually become fully-owned
Malaysian companies. This initiative is also seen as an effective option by the
government to assist the local defence industry in attaining competitiveness without
huge capital investment in the short-run. However, this arrangement is expected to be
on a win-win long-term.
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Table 5.23 : Malaysian Industry Competitiveness
Question 2.07:Your Company’s Competitive Strategy in its
Principal Business is based on:
Total
(%)
Natural resources availability 6
Favourable costs of skilled workers 50
Product or process technology 31
Marketing strategy -
Infrastructure support 13
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 March-31 July 2005.
5.5.2 Dual-Use Technology
Table 5.24 indicates that 69% of respondents claim that they were not able to utilise the
technology transferred through offsets for civil-related projects.





Ability to use the technology gained for dual-use application,
mainly civil related projects
31 69
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 March-31 July 2007.
As discussed in Chapter 4, most of the defence firms in Malaysia are dual-use, or civil
companies with a defence arm, carrying-out defence-based work. Some 70% of these
companies are able to switch their operations easily from defence to civil work.113 In
such instances, the most viable option will be for these companies to venture into
technology fields which are of a dual-use nature. However, the survey results show that
69% of respondents felt that offsets-related technologies were not dual-use. The few
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areas where dual-use technologies have proved applicable include inventory
management, software (especially asset management), parts issuance or orders, imaging
technology, where technology captured images have improved drastically and the
management of natural resources, such as raw materials and urban development.
Respondents claim that workers in their companies are able to apply to civil work the
‘know-how’ in relation to documentation and management procedures gained through
the military technology process. For example, UPECA was able to enhance its
manufacturing processes in the usage of CNC machines. Sapura Defence improved its
visual system for marine, automotive and aerospace application. DEFTECH enhanced
its automotive design and assembly capabilities for application in civil work. Table 5.25
reinforces this point, with 69% of the respondents agreeing that technology obtained
through offsets has narrow applicability solely to the defence systems produced by the
companies.





Does the technology have narrow applicability to defence
systems produced by the company?
69 31
Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
SMET’s premises, for example, were not utilised when the production of the Styer rifles
was stopped. This is because the machines and equipment in the premises were not
dual-use. SMEA took over the operations and tried to utilise the machines but later
gave-up the idea, realising the cost was too high to maintain the equipment, and the
machines could not be used for any other type of production aside from weapons.
Similarly, DEFTECH abandoned the jigs and tools that were made during the 2000
ACV project, as these tools could not be used for civil projects. On the whole, the dual-
use technology transfer has been more applicable towards enhancing know-how or tacit
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knowledge amongst managers and workers as opposed to supplying dual-use facilities,
tools and machinery.
5.9.3 Diversification
Technology obtained through offsets has been utilised by recipient companies to
diversify into other projects. For example, the 1992 Hawk offsets project was used to
develop the MD3, a two-seater light-weight trainer aircraft. This was a partnership
between BAE Systems, SMEA and SME Aviation. Another example is the Unmanned
Aerial Reconnaissance (UAV) commercial aircraft development programme between
BAE Systems, CTRM, SCS, Excelnet and Ikramatik. Three aircraft have so far been
produced and sold to the Malaysian Armed Forces. Technology obtained by these
companies involved in the two projects has been used in design and development of
other defence and civil aircraft. SMEA and CTRM, for example, have utilised the
technologies to manufacture parts and components for the Airbus aircraft series.
Excelnet has also been able to utilise the expertise obtained from the design to venture
into other projects.114 In the case of CTRM, offsets were used to diversify into civil
projects. The composite technology obtained through the Eagle Aircraft project was
used to develop skilled engineers, management capabilities and design and
manufacturing capabilities. This advantage was used by CTRM to diversify into civil
aerospace composite manufacturing projects, such as the A320 (design approval),
NIMROD, A380 and most recently the A400M series. The company has gone a step
further by investing in R&D for composite manufacturing.115
5.9.4 Market Penetration
Technological learning is at the highest stage when a firm is able to design a new
product or process and penetrate a foreign market. For Malaysia, offsets have not been
successful in assisting Malaysian companies to penetrate into new markets, as shown in
Table 5.26.
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Indicate the benefits of offsets with respect to market
penetration
25 75
Source: Malaysian Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms, 30 April-31 July 2005.
Table 5.26 shows that 75% of recipient companies indicate that offsets have not
equipped them with the capabilities to produce for the export market.116 Some
collaborative projects have been able to explore products overseas, including those
between IKramatik, CTRM and Excelnet to develop and market the commercial
UAV.117 UPECA Engineering has also been able to use its aerospace manufacturing
accreditation certification, gained from a BAE systems offsets project, to penetrate the
US and UK markets (Honeywell and Weston Aerospace) respectively.118 Many of the
Malaysian companies rely heavily on the MOD for business and marketing. The
government, for example, was heavily involved in trying to market the UAV aircraft
through the defence industry Bilateral Agenda to countries and regions such as
Vietnam, Brunei and the Middle East. One offshore supplier highlighted the reluctance
of Malaysian firms to invest into marketing. OEMs view offsets as a gate-opener to
promote technology partnerships with local companies but access does not come free.
Local companies are expected to also invest in the marketing of their products.119
5.9.5 Defence Exports
Offsets have had minimal impact on Malaysian defence exports. Referring to the offsets
objectives in Chapter 4, whilst Malaysia emphasised skill-generation, the policy did not
focus on the ability of Malaysian companies to export the process, product or services.
Commercialisation of technology has been completely neglected, but there is now a
drive by the local defence firms to build export capabilities. However, many of these
companies still depend on government assistance both due to the lack of resources and
the huge investments involved in defence R&D. As previously stated, 90% of survey
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respondents indicated that offsets have not created export opportunities for their
companies.120 There was only one project that incorporated BOT in Malaysia’s offsets
projects which tied the defence contractor conmcerned to secure export for the local
supplier. Supplier companies interviewed agreed to such ventures, depending on the
attractiveness of the offsets policy, including higher multipliers. One supplier
mentioned that:
Why should we have BOT or buy back arrangements when we can have similar
arrangements with many other countries around the world. What is that Malaysia can
do to lure us? We need good incentives, like high multipliers to be able to do work with
your companies.121
By contrast, civil work obtained through offsets has created more exports for Malaysia.
SMEA, for example, a defence and aerospace company has enjoyed growth in export
sales from 3% in 2000 to 30% in 2004.122 This sudden increase in business is primarily
due to defence offsets being used for civil aerospace projects, involving the manufacture
of metal parts and components. SMEA’s CEO, Rtd Colonel Chee Ng Boon stated that :
Our company uses offsets as a gate-opener to get new business. We now do not have to
rely on offsets, as the company has built its technological and industrial capability to be
equally competitive in the market. Now, all our contracts are based on competitive
tendering, taking into account price, quality and on-time-delivery. 123
This confirms the research finding that defence offsets used for civil projects are more
successful in equipping Malaysian firms with the ‘technology’ for both indigenisation
and export.
5.9.6 Job Creation
Despite the hype about offsets-induced job creation, the actual number of new
Malaysian jobs created has been minimal. In total, between the years 2000-2004, the 16
recipient companies state that only 95 additional jobs in total were created from offsets
projects.124 Most of these jobs were low-end, not high-end, technology work. This is
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evidenced by the linked research findings that the offsets programmes had concentrated
on basic training and maintenance for through-life support of the defence equipment
purchased.
A small number of jobs were created in software development, hardware networking,
CAD usage, CNC machining and welding. However, the CAD jobs were undertaken by
foreign workers, mainly from India and Indonesia, with few locals being trained.125
Some of the local companies also face problems in terms of sourcing of workers in the
usage of CNC 5 axis machines. A few technical schools in Malaysia do provide
education in these areas but not hands-on training in the usage of such machines. These
employees have to be trained in-house by the local firms upon recruitment. 126
Eurocopter Malaysia, a wholly owned subsidiary of EADS, was spawned from the
FENNEC offsets project.127 The company, realising the need for local expertise in
aircraft maintenance, conducted several programmes to train locals. The partnership
programme with the Malaysian Institute of Aviation Technology (MIAT), for example,
is committed towards training 100 apprentices over a 5 year period.128 The nature of
such programmes is to train locals to undertake more substantial high-end work,
eventually replacing overseas experts within the industry.129
Overall, it has been difficult for local firms to sustain defence sector jobs as most of the
offsets projects have unavoidably proven to be ‘one-offs’. Several firms had to abandon
their defence facilities and convert them to civil-use after completion of the offsets
projects. This raises the policy question as to whether Malaysia should focus on high-
technology jobs involving less workers, like the RM 5million tantalum project in Kulim
Technology Park employing 50 workers, or should offsets policy focus on areas such as
fishing, and agriculture, potentially creating more sustainable long-term jobs. 130
5.9.7 Skills Enhancement
In terms of skills enhancement, offsets have proved successful in the operational and
maintenance field. Whilst progress has been made, offsets policy needs to evolve to
calibrate with Malaysia’s industrial shift from labour-intensive to capital-based
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industry. Offsets have successfully enhanced local defence manpower skills especially
in areas that require documentation, quality assurance and systematic work processes,
complying with international standards and requirements. Some 85% of the
questionnaire respondents state that offsets have been successful in improving worker
skills.131 For example, rigorous quality and process control requirements involved in the
aerospace industry have been beneficial for Malaysian workers, enforcing high quality
international level competitiveness.
5.5.8 Sub-Contracting and the Promotion of Industrial Clusters
Some 63% of respondents agree that offsets have strengthened the local sub-contractor
base. In the Hawk aircraft offsets deal, for example, BAE Systems placed sub-
contracting work worth £92,000,000 in areas such as pylon manufacture, ground-
support equipment (GSE) manufacturing, replacement of tyres and the manufacturing of
wire looms.132 In the 2002 JERNAS offsets contract, MBDA sub-contracted several
work packages for vehicle installation kits and stowed-equipment to SMEA and MMC
Defence. This included portabar assembly and the spreader sling multiple leg, skid, hub-
assembly, jockey wheel and parts of the heavy lift trolley.
Major sub-contracting work was allocated to PSCNDSB under the Patrol Vessel (PV)
project. Yet, despite the government’s aspiration that several hundred sub-contractors
would materialise, this has not happened. A special PV offsets committee was set-up by
the MOF to monitor the progress of this project. The overall project was deemed a
failure, and PSCNDSB had to finally hand-back operational control to the government.
There were several reasons for project failure. Firstly, PSCNDSB was not efficient in
farming-out the contracts to deserving sub-contractors. Several sources also claimed
that smaller companies were charged to participate as sub-contractors and this
complicated matters.133 Other reasons included inefficient project management by PSC.
Overall, the government was disappointed with the outcome of this offsets project,
supposedly the pioneer project to operationalise aspirations to strengthen backward
linkages in the defence sector. It was a bitter experience for the Armed Forces, keen to
ensure delivery of timely top-quality equipment to budget.
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Defence offsets have proved more successful in fostering sub-contractorisation and
backward linkages in the civil sector, as opposed to the defence sector. In particular,
foreign prime contractors have used offsets to integrate Malaysian companies into their
global supply chain. It should be recognised that companies, such as SMEA, have been
successful in obtaining significant subcontract work through offsets. SMEA has
developed capabilities to manufacture weapon pylons for Hawk aircraft and ground
support equipment. Capability obtained through technology transfer later provided
SMEA with business opportunities to become a third tier sub-system (equipment)
supplier within the OEM’s global supply chain. SMEA has currently positioned itself as
a sub-contractor for the Airbus series and A400M, supplying metal parts and
components within EADS’s international supply chain. According to SMEA’s CEO,
offsets are no longer required to secure work as the company has acquired capabilities
to compete internationally on a level playing field.134
BAE Systems provides an even better example of subcontract success though offsets.
Over the last 15 years, BAE Systems has placed work with at least four Malaysian
defence prime contractor companies worth RM 608,300,000.135 The subcontracts
covered several areas, including, manufacturing of metal and composite parts and
components, pylon loom manufacturing, as well as design work. As shown in Table
5.27, much of the work was placed with Malaysian aerospace companies, such as
CTRM, SMEA, ACT (subsidiary of CTRM) and Excelnet.
This sub-contractoring work has been successful in creating backward linkages. The
local prime contractors subcontract some of the OEMs’ work to other smaller
companies; the latter are normally located in the same industrial area, creating clusters
of industries. Significantly, this subcontract work is not defence-specific and therefore
existing civil companies can undertake the jobs. SMEA, for instance, sub-contracted
work to UPECA Engineering, acting as a fourth-tier manufacturer of machined
mechanical components.136 As a consequence, UPECA, based in Puchong, Selangor,
has increased its turnover from RM16million in 1992 to RM 22 million in 2004.137 The
company produces parts and components for SMEA.
336
Through this work, UPECA has also enjoyed improvements in process control, internal
quality processes and manpower skills in CNC machining.138 UPECA is presently
upgrading its product line through the know-how gained from offset-derived
subcontracts. This is allowing the company to bid for high-end customers through
quality awards and certification gained from companies, such as BAE, Airbus and
Honeywell. UPECA has also managed to use these benefits to create spin-offs in safety
and quality measures for the oil and gas industry sector.139 Finally, UPECA has fostered
local sub-contractors in secondary processing, such as surface treatment.140 Such
modest beginnings nevertheless create industrial foundations for technological progress.
Table 5.27: Malaysian Prime Contractors Offsets Projects Sourced from BAE Systems,
UK (1992- 2005)
Company Work Placed
SME Aerospace Airbus(single aisle) machined details
Avro RJ leading edges
Avro RJ leading edge and carriage assemblies
A380 manufacture of components
RAF Hawk tank floor, ceiling and frame 13
Airbus A320 (single aisle) machined assemblies
Airbus A320D Nose sub-assemblies
RAF Nimrod Sonobuoy rack assemblies
RMAF/South Africa /Australian pylon manufacture
Bulldog modification kits
Jernas detail machining
ACT Airbus A300 fixed trailing edges
Airbus A320 (single aisle) leading edge and trailing edge panels
Airbus A320 (single aisle) aileron mod package
Airod Mk 67 centreline pylon looms
RMAF pylon loom manufacture
Excelnet Nimrod Sonobuoy design package
Nimrod airstairs design work
CTRM A380 manufacture of components
Source: BAE Systems, August 2005.
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SMEA, as a prime contractor company in Malaysia, has contributed to the strengthening
of backward linkages. SMEA’s work is distributed to 12 subcontractors located in
Selangor. These companies are civil companies located within the same industrial area
as SMEA, and supporting SMEA’s work in the manufacturing of tools, drill jigs, mix
fixtures and sub-assembly jigs. Additionally, Ikramatik, an ICT company, reported that
it had created sub-contracting work in areas such as wiring, lighting-generators,
painting, mechanical and electronic parts, and computer projects in 2004, worth RM
1.2.million.141 Zetro Aerospace subcontracted work worth RM 18 million to 27
Malaysian companies in areas such as UPS and lighting protecting systems.142
Importantly, Eurocopter Malaysia has created 20 subcontractors, providing work worth
RM17.5 million between years 2002-2004.143 The above examples indicate that the
bulk of these sub-subcontracting projects have been in the civil aerospace and
electronics sectors, as opposed to defence. Except for some design-related work, many
of the subcontracts have initially at least been at a low-level, mainly metal-bashing and
‘build-to-print’ subcontracting work.
5.10 Offsets and Transformational Costs
Technology transformational costs might arise due to the lack of policy transparency,
unrealistic demands from the host country and a lack of recipient capability. The
government’s role is vital to ensure that these factors are addressed, bringing down the
cost.
This study’s fieldwork found that offsets do cost money. The finding indicates that a
cost premium averages between 4-15%.144 This premium includes the:
i. Direct cost of operations, without margins, plus the value of the technology (if
any).
ii. Direct costs of manufacturing, purchase, training and non-recurring costs (such
as capital investments, surveys, qualifications, quality assurance, technical
assistance), administrative costs, technical supervision, quality process, capital
investment, technical assistance and progress monitoring.
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iii. Indirect costs, such as licenses, loss of income, royalties, intellectual property
rights and risk.145
Offshore vendors impose a higher price tag on technologies transferred through offsets
as these technologies are not supposed to be available off-the-shelf. However, in the
case of Malaysia, Table 5.28 shows that 80% of respondents confirm that technology
obtained through offsets is readily available from several other sources in the world and
are not particularly sophisticated or highly sensitive. The issue is whether Malaysia
needs to pay a higher price through offsets to obtain technology that could have been
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Source: Malaysia Survey of Offsets Recipient Firms (July 2005)
Greater transparency of offsets requirements such as process, implementation and
monitoring could reduce offsets costs. If offsets requirements are raised late in the
contract negotiations, then this forces suppliers to raise premiums due to unforeseen
circumstances leading to non-fulfilment of obligations. Direct offsets projects,
moreover, cost more as there is a higher risk of non-recurring ‘one-offs’, a higher outlay
of capital investment, with longer ROI, and a greater risk of non-sustainable projects.
On the other hand, indirect offsets projects, especially those incorporating dual-use
technologies, incur less offsets-related costs as suppliers view these projects as
sustainable, with long-term impacts on technology, human resource development and
civil-military integration. Short-term projects involving basic training and technical
know-how with minimal commercial value, increases the costs of offsets. This is
because suppliers view training as ‘one-off’ activities not necessarily guaranteeing
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commercial viability. Potential multiplier effects from offsets projects are viewed with
even greater suspicion by suppliers. Further, if the technology transfer requested
involves high levels of export control clearance in the supplier country, then this will
also increase the costs of offsets. 146
Offsets costs could be reduced if the offsets management policy and processes are more
transparent, if offsets projects are not short-term but rather are driven by long-term
‘commercial’ partnerships, and, finally, if the choice of offsets projects are realistic and
pragmatic.
5.11 Challenges to Sustainable Partnerships
Defence industrial sustainability demands repeat orders. Malaysia has experience of
offsets projects failing because of lack of repetitive orders. The first example has regard
to the 2002 purchase of modular suspension bridges for the Malaysian Army from BAE
Land (Vickers-Bridging at the time). The offsets requirement was for technology
transfer to CTRM enabling it to supply carbon composite launch rails for the modular
suspension composite bridges. CTRM already possessed skilled composite technology
workers and secured the offsets contract (worth 12% of the primary defence contract
value or $2, 936,316) to build the composite rails for BAE Land.147 Technology transfer
involved the training of local workers, as the rails were build-to-print. Polymeric Ltd,
the Vickers UK subcontractor of launch rails was invited to Malaysia to provide the
training of local workers. The cost of this training was claimed to be £50,000, and a
further £750,000 was spent on the jigs and fixtures required for the CTRM site.148
However, after having developed the infrastructure and the training of workers, CTRM
failed to secure any fresh orders. BAE was willing to provide CTRM with work if it
managed to secure new contracts from South Korea or if the Malaysian government
were to buy more of this system, but further contracts failed to materialise. The problem
for CTRM was that it lost its capabilities as no further orders arose.149 CTRM has
recently shut down its composite rail manufacturing facilities, transferring all workers
to another site. 150
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A second example relates to the Malaysian defence automotive company, DEFTECH,
which secured an offsets project from Malaysia’s ACV 300 armoured personnel
carriers. DEFTECH secured work to manufacture parts and components for the
vehicles, installation of vehicle sub-systems, as well as assembly and maintenance.
According to the agreement, 146 vehicles were completed in Turkey, with a further 65
built in Malaysia.151 This involved complete-knock-down (CKD) versions of the
vehicles which were assembled at the DEFTECH plant in Pekan, Pahang. However,
upon project completion, the plant in Pekan was abandoned. The question is whether the
RM 50 million investment for infrastructure and equipment, as well as the RM 12
million for the test track, was cost-effective, given that no new work was available.152
DEFTECH later diversified into manufacturing multi-purpose vehicles. The plant in
Pekan was utilised to manufacture multi-purpose vehicles, such as buses, fire-engines
and other vehicles. DEFTECH has been successful in exporting these vehicles to
Bangladesh, Brunei and Timor Leste.153 The company realised that diversification into
civil work was a more viable option than attempting to sustain its defence business in
the long-run. However, most of the jigs and tools that were used in ACV production
were left unused.
A third example of offsets business vulnerability is Sapura Defence. Although Sapura
has been successful in the indigenisation of technology through simulator development,
the company continues to face several critical challenges which could lead to the loss.
The loss of in-house expertise if there is no new business. The challenge of maintaining
innovation in this area is great, requiring R&D investment but facing the reluctance of
OEMs to share state-of-the-art technology. The company is only able to continue with
defence activities if it obtains further business either from the government or through
exports. Currently, Sapura does not receive any form of government R&D support
grants to retain or enhance its capability in this field.
These examples demonstrate that three major Malaysian defence companies have not
been able to sustain defence work due to lack of market demand, either locally or
foreign. Offsets, for these companies, have been more a ‘one-off’ phenomenon.
Interestingly, all three companies have relied on civil projects to sustain their business.
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5.12 Summary
This chapter has analysed the policy formulation, strategy and implementation of
defence offsets in Malaysia. The Malaysian government has been instrumental in
operationalising defence offsets policy as well as ensuring the effectiveness of this tool.
In Malaysia, offsets have had both positive and negative impacts on the development of
its defence industrial base. Considering the internal and external factors that have
influenced Malaysia’s defence industries, offsets have managed to create innovation,
skills, jobs and also subcontracting and diversification into civil projects. However, the
extent of the impact on these activities has been limited.
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Chapter 6
6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
6.0 Introduction
This final chapter seeks to offer conclusions and policy recommendations from the
research results. It also considers the extent to which these findings may be specific
to Malaysian industry, particularly to the defence industry. It further examines how
relevant these findings are to the main policy issues and concerns of the Malaysian
government. Finally it reflects on the study, suggesting some implications and
opportunities for further research.
This chapter is arranged into four sections. Section 6.1 provides a summary,
addressing the fundamental theoretical issues emerging from the literature review. It
focuses on the issues of development, industrialisation, technology development, and
the technology transfer process, including the need to achieve competitive advantage
and technology development capability within developing countries. This section
also elaborates on the role of offsets as a means to industrial and technological
development and the specific role of offsets in developing Malaysia’s defence
industrial and technological base. Section 6.2 provides the conclusions derived from
the Chapter 5 empirical analysis. This section highlights the success, or otherwise, of
offsets in Malaysia, including the reasons for the success and failure. Section 6.3
proposes policy recommendations for the Malaysian government to initiate steps to
increase effective utilisation of offsets, enhancing Malaysia’s industrial and
technological base. The final section 6.4 proposes areas for further research.
6.1 Summary
6.1.1 Industrial and Technological Development
Chapter two defines economic development as constituting the political and
economic processes necessary for effecting rapid structural and institutional
transformation of countries. Based on this definition, it is argued that developing
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countries decide to embark on industrialisation and technological development as a
means to complement and accelerate national economic development.
Industrialisation is also viewed as a lever to realise economic prowess and national
prestige. Further, there is a strong desire amongst peripheral nations to draw level
with core industrialised nations, and in the process attain self-reliance in the long-
run. However, unlike the market-led liberalised industrial policies of the West, most
developing countries have opted for selective government intervention to facilitate
structural change and the smooth flow of inward technology transfer. The State takes
a pivotal role in steering and realising national industrial and technological
development. Chapter two discusses how the NICs, in particular, implemented a
liberal market-driven EOI policy to drive inward investments, opting also for
selective interventions with respect to an ISI policy, ensuring substantial domestic
industrial and technological development leading to innovation and indigenisation.
Chapter two additionally discusses the importance of technology transfer.
Technology transfer is promoted for various reasons, including commercialisation,
profit- making, the formation of strategic alliances, cost-sharing, venturing and the
development of cutting-edge innovative technologies. There is a compulsion amongst
developing nations to acquire leading technologies to assuage the risk of lagging
behind if they don’t ‘catch-up’ with the developed world. At the macro-level, a
public-private partnership in research between government agencies, universities and
industries is crucial to ensure that effective technology transfer and absorption
occurs. Meanwhile, at the micro-level, corporate commitment towards infrastructural
investments, human resources and R&D is crucial for effective technology
absorption and capability development. Technology, in this regard, is obtained
through various modes, including foreign direct investment, turnkey projects,
licensing, sub-contracting, joint-ventures, collaboration as well as R&D. Overall,
technology development involves technology acquisition, adaptation and
modification, creating the conditions for indigenisation of competitive industries.
Finally, the chapter examines how defence offsets have been employed by many
nations to develop their industrial and technological bases.
353
6.1.2 Defence Offsets and Defence Industrialisation
Defence offsets are used for various reasons including the acquisition of technology,
the development and strengthening of the local defence industrial base, employment
creation, human resource development, and value-adding industrial development. As
discussed in Chapter 3, there is absolutely ‘no one size fits all’ offsets policy or
strategy. Each country develops its own policy and strategy according to national,
political, security and economic considerations. Offsets practices are complicated
and differ according to each country’s procurement planning and operational
processes. Further, offsets are clouded by technical jargon, requiring an in-depth
understanding of the subject. This study has looked at the various challenges of
offsets practices, culminating from the lack of non-uniformity of offsets practices,
technology transfer and pricing issues. An important dimension highlighted in this
study is the identification of offsets success factors. Chapter 3 discusses the key
determinants to offsets success, including buyer government policy, strategy, OEM
commitment, local technological absorption capability, the assistance and technical
quality of contracting networks, industrial strategy and human resource development
capability. Chapter 3 offers various examples of how offsets have worked in both
developed and developing countries. These examples have been drawn from several
country case studies of offsets experiences.
6.1.3 Malaysia’s Defence Industrial Base and the Role of Defence Offsets
Malaysia embarked on defence industrialisation at the start of the 1980s, in line with
the country’s national goal to venture into heavy industry as part of its import
substitution policy. Defence industry since then, has developed gradually from being
a totally State-owned enterprise operation into one more akin to private enterprise.
The government’s adherence to the principle of public-private partnerships has
encouraged the MOD to adapt the ‘Malaysia Incorporated’ policy towards
developing Malaysia’s defence industry for economic, strategic, and security reasons.
The Malaysian government’s initiative in developing its defence industrial base has
been multi-faceted. Defence procurement and offsets have been utilised to transfer
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technologies, creating partnerships and collaborative ventures between local and
overseas firms in defence projects. Offsets are viewed as a catalyst to enhance and
strengthen the defence industrial base, creating in the process, employment, skilled
human resources, and technology development capability.
Chapter 4 discusses the development of the six leading sectors of the Malaysian
defence industry as per the MDIC categorisation (see Section 4.8). The different
levels of development within each sector are strongly linked to Malaysia’s national
industrial strategy. The aerospace and ICT sectors, have taken the lead in the defence
sector by acquiring higher-end technology development capability as compared to
other sectors, such as land, air and maritime activities. This study found that the
uneven development is linked to Malaysia’s strength in the civil aerospace and
electronics sectors. Overall, after almost 30 years of defence industrialisation effort,
Malaysia is still lagging behind some of its neighbouring countries in relation to
defence technology and human resource capabilities.
Offsets programmes, introduced into Malaysia’s defence sector since the early 1990s,
have largely concentrated on acquiring basic training and human resource
development for the Malaysian Armed Forces personnel and defence industry
members. Although the offsets policy objectives are explicit about the need for more
collaborative R&D projects, leading to commercialisation, some 60% of the offsets
projects were for training and through-life support of the equipment and systems
purchased. The Malaysian government has from time to time reviewed the offsets
policy, incorporating incentives to lure more substantial long-term projects into the
industry. However, this is not well reflected by the nature of the final projects.
Chapter 5, critically analyses the success and failure of offsets in Malaysia, directed
at pertinent issues such as offsets policy, implementation process, strategy as well as
the impact of offsets on Malaysia’s defence industrial and technological base.
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6.2 Conclusions
Employing the Chapter 1’s conceptual framework, Chapter 5 analyses the major
issues associated with measuring the effectiveness of defence offsets and how they
have been employed to progress industrial and technological development of
Malaysia’s defence industrial base.
6.2.1 Key Conclusions from Chapter 5 Analysis
Malaysia’s defence offsets policy has been pragmatic, providing flexibility for
technology transfer. For greater efficiency in offsets implementation, offsets
planning and implementation processes must be systematic. This is highly dependent
on how the offsets policy is formulated, requiring a well-planned selection of
technology; as well as sound implementation and coordination of projects. The
Malaysian offsets process and implementation, nevertheless, lacks compliance with
the offsets policy objectives. There is still a lack of clarity in the offsets
implementation, process, and this has led to the lack of a systematic procedure to
identify, select, acquire and develop technology. The risk of unsuccessful transfer
may exist when there is a lack of planning on technology selection and ad-hoc
selection of recipients, without a preliminary audit.
Malaysian defence offsets have been used to absorb technology in both the defence
and non-defence sectors. Offsets have been instrumental in transferring know-how
through hands-on training, provided locally and abroad by suppliers. The transfer of
skills and knowledge has been through on-the-job training, transfer of manuals,
documents and drawings into hardware, including the production of jigs and tools. In
the case of defence production, these transfers have assisted many Malaysian
companies to obtain quality assurance certification. Offsets have assisted in
infrastructural development, systematic documentation, technological learning and
development. Technology development has been largely successful to the extent of
supporting MOD Malaysia contracts. Offsets have also been utilised to enhance the
human resource base, in line with the Vision 2020 goal of creating a knowledge-
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based society. Offsets have been mainly used to train MAF and industry personnel to
undertake defence-related work.
However, technology transfer and adaptation by itself will not be sufficient if the
industries cannot sustain their businesses or are unable to utilise the skills acquired
for further development. What is required is that offsets projects are well-planned
and not ‘one-off’ activities and that they are able to secure work from the foreign
vendors’ value chains, through buy-backs, joint-ventures and co-production.
6.2.2 Successful Outcomes through Offsets
This study indicates (Chapter 5, Section 5.4) that defence offsets in the Malaysian
defence industry context, have been successful in the following areas:
 Technology Capability Development (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.1)
Offsets have been used to acquire technology from various sources linked to
defence capital goods purchases. These sources include the US, the UK,
Europe, Russia, Poland and South Korea. Offsets have been successful in
creating basic technology development capabilities leading to process and
product development, enhancement of management techniques and know-
how. However, as most of the technology transfer activities have been in the
form of basic training, MRO, build-to-print types of manufacturing, as well
as final assembly, this has not added to innovational capability. Substantive
technological capabilities have been developed within the Malaysian Armed
Forces and Malaysian defence industry to undertake work in support of
maintaining a self-reliant MAF. Maintenance, repair, over-haul and up-grade
work, especially in the aerospace and automotive sectors, is now able to be
undertaken locally (refer to Chapter 5, Section 5.3). Table 5.9 5 illustrates the
types of offsets activity in Malaysia. The Table clearly indicates that 58% of
all technology was transferred for training followed by 18% for MRO work.
This ‘measured’ success is attributable to the government’s fundamental
objective of creating a defence industrial base supportive of a self-reliant
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MAF. The offsets objectives have, to this effect, been largely focused on
obtaining capabilities to enhance the MAF and the defence industry in
through-lifeequipment support.
 Skills Enhancement (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.7)
Defence offsets have been successful in developing skills amongst the MAF
and Malaysian defence industry personnel. The government’s focus since the
initial stages has been focused on using offsets to develop various training
programmes. This has directly fostered the development of local skills in
focused technologies, particularly defence and aerospace related
technologies. Skills enhancement has been mainly in the areas related to
MROs, up-grades, sub-assemblies, basic or ‘build-to-print’ components
manufacturing, logistics support, spares management, documentation
processes, as well as improvements in general management techniques and
procedures. However, human resources expertise is not maximised due to
limited capacity utilisation.
 Diversification (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.8)
Defence Offsets have been successful in creating diversification into the civil
arena. Companies which started with small defence offsets projects,
especially in the manufacturing of aerospace parts and components, have
developed their capabilities in related technologies. Such newly acquired
expertise has helped such companies to venture into civil projects at the
global level, creating higher value-added components. These new
opportunities have allowed Malaysian companies to engage in competitive
tendering and if successful, qualify as part of an international supply chain.
Two successful examples of civil diversification quoted in Chapter 5
(Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.8) are SME Aerospace and CTRM. SME began life
by manufacturing Hawk pylons for BAE Systems as part of the Hawk offsets
project and is today a leading manufacturer of metal-based tools, as well as
parts and components for the Airbus and Boeing aircraft series. Similarly,
CTRM acquired composite technology through the Hawk offsets programme,
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and has today built on those capabilities to become an international partner of
EADS and Boeing in producing composite parts for their aircraft.
Diversification though offsets appears to work better in Malaysia for the following
reasons:
 possession of a strong civil-based industry, especially in electronics and
aerospace (Chapter 4,Section 4.7). This is supported by the business
structure of Malaysia’s defence companies, being civil-defence based
(Chapter 4, Section 4.3).
 OEMs are more receptive towards transferring non-defence technologies
and collaborating on civil projects (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).
 Offsets have been successful in enhancing and strengthening existing
strong backward linkages within the civil sectors, mainly again in
electronics and aerospace (Chapter 4, Section 4.9). Local companies find
it easier to source from companies with generic expertise, such as in
wiring, painting, machining and cabling.
6.2.3 Malaysia’s Offsets Success Factors
Generally, Malaysia’s defence offsets success in enhancing the country’s industrial
and technological base can be attributed to the following factors:
 An offsets policy that provides flexibility, both for the offsets obligor and the
recipients, to discuss and produce offsets projects that fulfil national
objectives (Chapter 5, Section 5.1).
 Pressure to ensure that the Offsets Policy operates in tandem with National
Development and Technology Policies (Chapter 5, Section 5.1).
 Government initiatives to continuously review and enhance offsets policy and
implementation in order to achieve better results (Chapter 5, Sections 5.2.2
and 5.2.3).
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 Government’s strong public-private partnership with Malaysian companies to
ensure successful transfer, adaptation and indigenisation of technology
(Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1).
 Strong Government collaboration with foreign governments and OEMs
through various bilateral platforms, providing incentives to promote defence
industry and technology cooperation (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.3).
 Willingness of Malaysian labour to learn and absorb ‘soft’ technology
(Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1).
 Willingness and commitment of OEMs to ensure that offsets projects are
delivered according to contract, fulfilling obligations (Chapter 5, Section 5.5).
6.2.4 Less Successful Outcomes from Offsets
The research findings indicate (Section 5.4) that Malaysian defence offsets have been
less successful in the following areas:
 R&D Leading to Indigenisation (Chapter 5, Sections 5.4.1 and 5.3.3)
There is a significant lack of R&D type initiatives within defence offsets projects
(Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2).
The lack of R&D activities and associated promotion of innovation in the defence
sector are due to the following reasons:
● Lack of government support and investment in defence R&D (Chapter 5,
Table 5.16)
● Minimal R&D-type projects obtained through offsets (Chapter 5, Table 5.9)
● Absence of specific requests within the offsets terms and conditions for R&D
type projects ( Chapter 5, Table 5.3)
● Limited explicit interest within the offsets policy for incentivising R&D- type
projects (Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1)
● Restricted local company commitment and investment into R&D (Chapter 5,
Table 5.14)
● R&D facilities in Malaysia’s defence companies (Chapter 5, Section 5)
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● Limited coordination of R&D activities between STRIDE and other defence-
related research organisations, universities and defence industry (Chapter 5,
Table 5.15).
As R&D lies at the core of technology development, contributing significantly to
knowledge development, efforts should be taken to enhance the importance of this
activity, investing in core competencies. STRIDE, together with other defence
related agencies, universities and defence companies should:
● Facilitate technology transfer through defence procurement/offsets
● Identify key defence technology requirements for defence industry
● Chart Malaysia’s defence technology requirements and capability
development plans
● Generate defence-related projects
● Invest in defence R&D projects
● Initiate commercialisation of defence-related R&D projects
● Enhance closer cooperation between local companies, OEMs, foreign
governments, and other research agencies, through formal and informal
platforms (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2).
● Dual-use Technology (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.2)
This study found that offsets have not been maximised by MOD to leverage dual-use
technologies. There are opportunities to acquire specific technologies such as GPS,
and computer-related technologies that are applicable to both the defence and civil
sectors. Unfortunately, technologies obtained through offsets have mainly been
focused on defence, particularly technologies that are not convertible, such as in the
defence-related fields of MRO, assembly and manufacturing.
Policy initiatives should be aimed at:
 Leveraging more dual-use technologies; this is particularly appropriate given
that Malaysian defence companies are civil-defence based.
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● Ensuring that dual-use technologies are more marketable and cost-efficient
● Achieving a wider choice in terms of application, requiring dual-use
technology to be less complicated, less sensitive and more easily adaptable
for export to overseas commercial markets.
 Sub-Contracting Base (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.3)
In respect of sub-contractorisation and the creation of backward linkages, defence
offsets have failed to develop a substantive supplier network within the
Malaysian defence industrial base. As discussed in Chapter 5, sections 5.4.3 and
5.6, the Malaysian prime contractors, vertically integrated business operations
have not been supportive of vendor development. Many of the smaller companies
have not been given equal opportunity to participate in projects. Thus, these
companies have been denied opportunities to enhance their capabilities and
compete internationally. Further, there is lack of confidence amongst the OEMs
and the MAF (users) to allow participation by the Malaysian sub-contractors in
developing or contributing towards local content within the equipment and sub-
systems purchased. These constraints are based on the perceived lack of security
and quality assurance in the Malaysian production processes and procedures.
There is also the view that insufficient work is generated through offsets to
justify local subcontract engagement.
Notwithstanding the above reservations, the government should enforce a
stronger sub-contracting programme within the defence sector. This should be
followed by constant monitoring of the work-flow to negate monopoly practices
by the prime contractors. At the same time, offsets should be used to bring in
more work packages that create work and enhance backward linkages. Higher
incentives should be awarded to OEMs such as BAE, Boeing and Eurocopter
Malaysia to bring work packages into the country.
 Market Penetration (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.4)
Offsets have failed to create marketing opportunities for Malaysian defence
companies. Findings in Table 5.26 show that only 25% of respondents agreed
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that their companies had benefited from marketing activities through offsets. This
is because the government and local companies do not have a structured
marketing strategy to develop and promote products overseas. Most marketing
initiatives are done on an ad-hoc basis.
● Defence Exports (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.5)
Similarly, minimal defence exports have been generated through offsets
activities. Section 5.4.5 shows that only 10% of respondents confirm that exports
have emerged from offsets activities. The nature of Malaysian offsets projects are
largely focused on training, reducing the capability of local companies to embark
on technology development that could lead to innovation and exports. Further,
the offsets negotiated lack provisions for buy-backs, joint-production or licensed
production in the defence industry sector. Of greater concern, is that there are no
explicit policy intentions to promote such ventures.
● Job Creation (Chapter 5, Section 5.4.6)
Section 5.4.6 indicates that there have been minimal jobs created due to offsets
activity in Malaysia. This is again linked to the argument that the country’s
offsets projects have largely been concentrated on training and not on
commercially viable projects through joint-ventures, co-production and licensed-
production that potentially could generate high level of employment.
Nevertheless, Section 5.4.6 also indicates that high and low technology work
have been generated, mainly in areas such as CNC machining, welding, software
development and programming, as well as simulator development.
● Sustainability (Chapter 5, Section 5.6)
Finally, in relation to the issue of sustainability, the research findings indicate
that offsets have been less successful in sustaining Malaysia’s defence industrial
base. Section 5.6 offers several in-depth case studies on offsets-related projects
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that have faced survival challenges. The difficulty in transferring defence
technologies, the high cost involved in terms of technology and infrastructural
investments, and the long-lead time for returns on investment have made the
survivability of Malaysian defence businesses more difficult. Production or
assembly of defence equipment is rarely sufficient to ensure a company’s long-
term survival.
Acquisition orders are often not large enough to compensate for infrastructural
investment to ensure a significant revenue stream over more than a few years.
The potentially short-term nature of defence business also impacts on the
retention of skilled workers, such as welders, engineers and software and systems
specialists. Sustainable business is often only possible if there is a high level of
commitment from the government to invest in such industries. For their part,
Malaysian companies have to aggressively embark on indigenous technological
development with a view towards becoming part of an international defence
supply-chain. For this to happen, local defence firms must also be equally willing
to invest in R&D and marketing.
As Malaysia’s offsets activities are closely managed by the government, the
selection of technology, and, to a large extent, the selection of the technology
recipient companies are determined by the government. To ensure effectiveness,
the government must ensure:
● A systematic technology selection process incorporating relevant
macro policies.
● Transparency in the technology recipient selection process and
auditing of the recipient’s capability to absorb the technology.
● Consultation with local companies and OEMs over the transfer
process, obtaining frequent feedback on issues that could affect the
transfer process.
● Coordination and collaboration on technology selection and
development between local companies and government agencies, such
as STRIDE and MIGHT.
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Based on these conclusions, this study puts forward several policy recommendations
that could increase the effectiveness of offsets in strengthening Malaysia’s defence
industrial base.
6.3 Policy Recommendations
Malaysia’s progress towards developing its defence industrial base has been
measured rather than dramatic. The country’s efforts to enhance its defence industrial
and technological capability have been solely linked to defence procurement and
offsets. Much of Malaysia’s defence industrial growth over the past 30 years has
been focused largely on basic technology development, particularly training and
basic through-life support of weapon systems. As a result, defence capability is
largely centred on MRO activities, with limited investment in joint-ventures,
collaboration and R&D work as well as minimal progress in promoting exports and
marketing. Constraints on indigenisation through technology transfer are largely
because of the weaknesses following:
● Progress identifying suitable offsets projects capable of enhancing
capabilities within the different defence industry sectors
● Lack of a clear offsets implementation strategy able to realise offsets policy
objectives
● Absence of a defence industrial blueprint or policy that would direct defence
industrial development
● Absence of a Defence Science and Technology Policy outlining the types of
technology and R&D activities required by the Malaysian defence sector.
This study’s findings suggest that Malaysia needs a Defence Offsets Policy (DOP)
coordinated and supported by a Defence Policy (DP), Defence Industrial Blue-Print
(DIBP) and a Defence Science and Technology Policy (DSTP); this being required to
enhance defence industrial and technological development.
The existing offsets policy provides little emphasis on commercial projects,
especially in direct-offsets related activities. As a result, many of the offsets projects
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are focused on technology transfer in areas such as ‘one-off’ training to the
Malaysian Armed Forces or industry personnel. On many occasions, the ‘know-how’
gained is not converted into tangible commercial outputs. The offsets policy needs to
consider objectives beyond basic training and ‘know-how’, focusing instead on the
utilisation of technology gained for further development, leading to indigenisation.
6.3.1 Review of the Malaysian Offsets Policy
This study’s findings suggest that the Malaysian offsets policy needs to be reviewed.
For this, the offsets policy should comprise the following components:
 Technology Capability Development: the emphasis is on joint-ventures, co-
production and R&D-based collaborative offsets projects. This could be done
through offering the OEMs higher multipliers for such projects. Additionality
and causality must be established when acquiring such technologies. The
offsets policy should extend the National Innovation Systems to defence
R&D applications. This should be carried out by offering attractive incentives
for R&D-based partnerships between local companies and OEMs.
● Attractive Multipliers: the Malaysian government should consider providing
higher value but nevertheless realistic multipliers to encourage OEMs to
introduce more attractive investments, especially in the high-technology
sectors. Multipliers should be tied to long- and short-term outputs, such as
work- generated profits, exports, buy-backs and R&D activities, leading to
indigenisation, particularly in dual-use technology. Multipliers should not be
fixed but be subject to negotiation between the buyers and sellers to ensure
maximum returns.
● Value-Added Activities: there is a need to introduce transaction value
measurement mechanisms to achieve on tangible results from value-added
offsets activities. This includes incorporating mechanisms or formulae to
count the value-added output of each recipient industry.
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● Enhancement of Backward Linkages: there is a need to incorporate
mechanisms in the offsets policy to ensure the promotion of sub-contracting
activities. There must be procedures to monitor the trickle-down effect of
work from Malaysian prime to sub-contractors. Perhaps awarding points or
rewarding primes that could generate substantial sub-contracting work based
on the size and value of the offsets projects. The MOF and MOD Malaysia
should together study the success models of SME development.
● Pre-Offsets Credits: there is a need to create mechanisms within the
Malaysian MOD, for the banking of offsets credits. As Malaysia is constantly
procuring arms and related systems from overseas, there is a tendency for
OEMs to continue to seek investment opportunities within the country
irrespective of future defence procurement contracts. In such instances, the
government should offer offsets credits banking in lieu of future purchases as
a means of securing good projects. Credits could be given a shelf-life of
between 3-5 years, after which they automatically expire in the absence of
procurement contracts.
● Enforcing Sustainability: a through life study should be undertaken to
evaluate the sustainability of projects to be carried-out. The outcomes of the
study should be presented to the Countertrade Committee, outlining the
strengths and weaknesses of the projects as well as short- and long-term
outcomes. Such action will hinder investing into unsustainable projects and
redirect offsets into projects that are more long-term and viable. The DID,
MINDEF, should undertake this study.
● Offsets Monitoring Process: there is a need to identify and implement
processes for the monitoring of periodical submission of documents, constant
follow-ups and follow-throughs with the OEMs and recipients with respect to
offsets projects development.
● Offsets Implementation Process: there is a need to ensure that the offsets
objectives are translated into tangible outcomes. The Defence Industry
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Division, MOD, should put in mechanisms and processes to ensure offsets
projects are carried out according to the policy objectives.
● Formation of an Offsets Team: there is a need to ensure that sufficient
importance is given to the offsets team to identify and plan local content as
part of the formal defence procurement process. The offsets team should be
formed in parallel with the price and technical negotiation teams. The offsets
team should comprise Armed Forces personnel, officers from the Defence
Industry Division, MINDEF, and selected Malaysian companies.
● Formation of the Countertrade/Offsets Committee: there is a need to
formalise the Countertrade/Offsets Committee, requiring that it be chaired by
either the Minister of Defence or the Secretary General, MOD. This will
ensure clarity and transparency in the selection and awarding of offsets-
related projects to qualified recipients. It is suggested that the Defence
Industry Division should provide the secretariat to this committee and
members should be elected at two levels: permanent members and ad-hoc
members.
● Continuous Offsets Education: there is a need to provide continuous
education on offsets to officers negotiating offsets. This should be carried out
through workshops, conferences and forums on an annual basis. The National
Defence University, Malaysia, should run annual conferences on Offsets at
the regional level. Further, a short course on offsets should be offered by the
MNDU, catering to the Asia Pacific region, educating government and
industry members within the region on offsets policies and practices. A
regional offsets grouping championed by Malaysia with joint secretariat by
the Ministry of Finance and MOD, Malaysia, should be formed to exchange
ideas on issues related to Countertrade/Offsets activities in the Asia-Pacific
region.
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6.3.2 Formulation of a Malaysian Defence Industrial Strategy (MDIS)
It is recommended for a Formulation of the Malaysian Defence Industrial Strategy
(MDIS). Based on the National Industrial Master Plan (IMP), the Malaysian
government should formulate a MDIS, to operate in tandem with the IMP. The
MDIS should be utilised as a fundamental document to chart the direction of
Malaysia’s defence industrial development.
The MDIS should:
● Define the parameters of Malaysia’s defence and national security policy
and the role of defence industry in supporting national security.
● Craft its own vision, mission and objectives.
● Develop macro and micro level policy, strategy and implementation
processes.
● Identify and articulate Malaysian defence industry capabilities according to
the various sectors at the different levels of capability development
● Direct the future capability of different defence industrial sectors.
● Develop strategic action plans.
6.3.3 Formulation of a Malaysian Defence Science and Technology Strategy
(DSTS)
It is recommended that a Malaysian Defence Science and Technology Strategy
(DSTS) be formulated. It is vital that the Malaysian Defence Industrial Strategy be
supported by a MDTS. This study’s findings suggest that the DSTS operate in
tandem with the National Science and Technology Policy. The MDTS should be
used as a vital policy document to guide Malaysia’s defence industrial development
and progress. The lack of R&D initiatives within the Malaysian defence sector points
to the absence of a DSTS to offer a coordinated approach towards the development
of an indigenous defence industrial base.
The MDTS should promote:
369
● Scientific research and experimental design work
● The financing of S&T research projects through defence procurement/
offsets
● Capital investments in the development of defence S&T
● Technology transfer through defence procurement/offsets, identifying and
selecting the most appropriate technology
● Policies to ensure appropriate absorption, adaptation and assimilation of
technology to suit the Malaysian environment
● Policies for developing human resources and infrastructure
● Provision for specialist advice to the Minister and policy-makers
● Greater visibility and clearer understanding of research outputs and their
costs.
The Malaysian Defence Science and Technology Strategy should support the offsets
policy in creating spin-offs for macro-economic development, human resource
development in high-technology sectors, particularly defence and aerospace, and
improvements in defence industrial infrastructure. STRIDE should become the
central coordinator and lead player for this policy. STRIDE should coordinate all
defence S&T related activities within and outside Malaysia in partnership with
Malaysian companies, OEMs, overseas governments and other defence think-tanks.
STRIDE should also form a steering-committee for all defence R&D projects. The
Defence Science and Technology Strategy and its steering committee should assist in
identifying suitable R&D projects from offsets activity.
6.4 Proposals for Further Research
Limited research has been undertaken in the field of offsets. This is one of the few
empirical studies evaluating the effectiveness of offsets in developing countries, and
thus more research is required on:
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6.5 The Impact of of Counterpurchase
As counterpurchase forms a substantial portion of Malaysia’s countertrade activity,
there is a need to look into the impact of this tool on Malaysia’s economic
development. Counterpurchase will continue to feature as an important element
within the overall countertade programme. To this effect, the impact of issues such as
additionality and causality on counterpurchase activities will be of continuing
concern, requiring a detailed study of how counterpurchase impacts on the Malaysian
economy.
6.6 Focused Case-Study
This study adopted a broad approach in the survey of offsets recipient companies.
Therefore, many of the issues have been addressed at a broad cross-sectional level of
analysis instead of deeper longtitudinal study. A case study would have provided a
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Appendix A: List of items procured by Ministry of Defence, Malaysia
Num Country Equipment Ord Delv Num Comments
1 France AS-555UN Fennec Light helicopter 2001 2003 6 Deal worth $38m
2 France MM-40 Exocet Anti-ship missile 1993 1996 16 For Lekiu Class frigates
3 France MM-40 Exocet Anti-ship missile 1993 1998 4 For Lekiu Class frigates
4 UK Seawolf VL SAM 1993 1998 1 For Lekiu Class frigates
5 UK Seawolf VL SAM 1993 1999 33 For Lekiu Class frigates
6 UK Starburst Portable SAM 1993 1995 150
7 UK Starburst Portable SAM 1993 1996 177
8 UK Starburst Portable SAM 1993 1997 177
9 USA AIM-9S Sidewinder SRAAM 1993 1997 40
"For F/A-18D FGA aircraft; no. delivered could be
86"
10 Russia MiG-29S/Fulcrum-C FGA aircraft 1994 1995 18
"Deal worth $600m (offsets $220m including
$150m barter); MiG-29N version; including 2
MiG-29NUB version; deal including
modernization within few years"
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11 USA AIM-7M Sparrow BVRAAM 1993 1997 20
"For F/A-18D FGA aircraft; no. delivered could be
51"
12 USA RGM-84 Harpoon Anti-ship missile 1994 1997 25
X "AGM-84A Block-1C version; for F/A-18 FGA
aircraft"
13 USA F/A-18C Hornet FGA aircraft 1993 1997 8 F/A-18D version (offsets $250m)
14 USA AGM-65D Maverick ASM 1993 1997 30 For F/A-18D FGA aircraft
16 South Korea KIFV APC 1993 1993 42
"Deal worth $25m; for use with Malaysian UN
forces in Bosnia; including 4 APC/mortar carrier, 2
ARV, 2 APC/CP and 2 ambulance version"
17 Indonesia CN-35 Transport aircraft 1995 1999 6
"Option on 12 more; deal worth $101m
(barter/offsets including 20 MD-3-160 trainer
aircraft and 500 cars to Indonesia; offsets worth
RM500m); delivery delayed from 1997 to 1999;
CN-235-220 version"
18 South Korea KIFV APC 1994 1994 21
X "Deal worth $13.2m; including 1 ARV, 1
APC/CP and 1 ambulance version"
19 Switzerland MD-3-160 Aero Tiga Trainer aircraft 1993 1995 4 More produced for export and civil customers
20 Switzerland MD-3-160 Aero Tiga Trainer aircraft 1993 1996 4 More produced for export and civil customers
21 Switzerland MD-3-160 Aero Tiga Trainer aircraft 1993 1997 4 More produced for export and civil customers
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22 Switzerland MD-3-160 Aero Tiga Trainer aircraft 1993 1998 4 More produced for export and civil customers
23 Switzerland MD-3-160 Aero Tiga Trainer aircraft 1993 1999 4 More produced for export and civil customers
24 Russia AA-11 Archer/R-73 SRAAM 1994 1995 216 For MiG-29N FGA aircraft
25 Ukraine AA-10a/b Alamo/R-27 BVRAAM 1994 1995 131 For MiG-29N FGA aircraft
26 USA Newport Class Landing ship 1994 1995 1
"Ex US; deal worth $18.3m; Malaysian
designation Sri Indrapura Class
27 UK FH-70 Towed gun 1993 1994 3
28 Italy Assad Class Corvette 1995 1997 2
"Originally built for Iraq but embargoed;
Malaysian designation Laksamana Class; deal
worth $253m including 2 ordered 1997
29 South Korea KIFV APC 1995 1995 47 "Deal worth $29.4m; including some CP versions"
30 USA
C-130H-30 Hercules Transport
aircraft 1995 1995 5
31 Italy Aspide Mk-1 BVRAAM/SAM 1995 1997 18 For Assad Class corvettes
32 Italy Otomat Mk-2 Anti-ship missile 1995 1998 4 For 2 Assad Class corvettes
33 Italy Otomat Mk-2 Anti-ship missile 1995 1999 4 For 2 Assad Class corvettes
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34 Italy Otomat Mk-2 Anti-ship missile 1995 2000 16 For 2 Assad Class corvettes
35 Italy Otomat Mk-2 Anti-ship missile 1997 2000 24 For 2 Assad Class corvettes
36 Italy Aspide Mk-1 BVRAAM/SAM 1997 1999 18 For Assad Class corvettes
37 Turkey AIFV IFV 2000 2002 15
"Deal worth $158m including 167 other versions;
Malaysian designation Adnan; option on more"
38 Turkey AIFV IFV 2000 2003 29
"Deal worth $158m including 167 other versions;
Malaysian designation Adnan; option on more"
39 UK Super Lynx ASW helicopter 1999 2002 2 "Deal worth $158m ; delivery 2002-2003"
40
South
Africa G-5 Towed gun 2000 2002 22 "Deal worth $50m; Mk-3 version"
41 France Eryx Anti-tank missile 1995 1996 100
Including for use with Malaysian UN forces in
Bosnia (UNPROFOR)
42 France Eryx Anti-tank missile 1995 1997 100
Including for use with Malaysian UN forces in
Bosnia (UNPROFOR)
43 Italy RAT-31S Air surv radar 1996 1998 2
44 Turkey AIFV-APC APC 2000 2002 50
"Deal worth $278-300m including 44 IFV version;
including ambulance, ALV, 81mm mortar carrier
and CP version; assembly of 65 in Malaysia;
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Malaysian designation Adnan; option on more"
45 Turkey AIFV-APC APC 2000 2003 117
"Deal worth $278-300m including 44 IFV version;
including ambulance, ALV, 81mm mortar carrier
and CP version; assembly of 65 in Malaysia;
Malaysian designation Adnan; option on more"
46 Russia Mi-17/Hip-H Helicopter 1999 1999 2
47 Pakistan HN-5A/Anza-1 Portable SAM 2001 2002 100 Deal worth $12.8m
48 Italy A244/S 324mm ASW torpedo 1995 1997 16 For Assad (Laksamana) Class corvettes
49 Italy A244/S 324mm ASW torpedo 1995 1998 16 For Assad (Laksamana) Class corvettes
50 Italy A244/S 324mm ASW torpedo 1995 1999 16 For Assad (Laksamana) Class corvettes
51 Russia
AT-13 Saxhorn/9M131 Anti-tank
missile 2001 2001 100 Deal worth $30m
52 Russia
AT-13 Saxhorn/9M131 Anti-tank
missile 2001 2002 400 Deal worth $30m
53 Pakistan Red Arrow-8 Anti tank missile 2001 2002 250
54 Sweden ARTHUR Arty locating radar 1999 2000 2
55 UK Sea Skua Anti-ship missile 2001 2002 48
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56 Russia Mi-17/Hip-H Helicopter 2002 2002 10
57 Switzerland PC-7-2 Trainer aircraft 2000 2001 9
58 France Eryx Anti-tank missile 2000 2000 74
59 Russia N-019ME Topaz Combat ac radar 1999 2002 5
60 Brazil Astros-2 MRL 2000 2002 18
Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 2005
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Appendix B: Malaysia’s Route to National Prosperity



















Source: Ahmad Sarji Abdul Hamid (Ed), Malaysia’s Vision 2020: Understanding the Concept, Implications and Challenges, KL:
Pelanduk Publication, 1993, pp.279.
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Appendix C: List of Offsets Programmes, by Beneficiary
No Beneficiary Procurement Date/Year Seller
1 SME Aerospace Hawk Aircraft
Starburst Missile
F/A 18




































3 SME Technologies Hawk Aircraft 10 Dec 1990 British Aerospace
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7 University Utara Hawk Aircraft 10 Dec 1990 British Aerospace
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No Beneficiary Procurement Date/Year Seller
Malaysia(UUM)
8 AIROD Hawk Aircraft
Beechcraft
C-130














































































































No Beneficiary Procurement Date/Year Seller
14 Sapura Technologies Hawk Simulator 19 Jun 1992 Reddifussion Simulation
Ltd
15 CTRM Starburst Missile












16 MMC Engineering KIFv (1st purchase) 26 Oct 1993 Daewoo corp
17 SIRIM F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
18 PHN Industries F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
19 PROTON F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
20 MOSTE F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
21 Serampang Hughes F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
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22 PERODUA F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
23 UIA F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
24 ATSC F/A 18D 28 Oct 1993 McDonnel Douglas
25 USM MIG 29 7 Jun 1994 Roosvoorouzhenie
&Moscow Aircraft
26 ANCOM Energy MIG 29 7 Jun 1994 Roosvoorouzhenie
&Moscow Aircraft
27 Royal Malaysian Army
(RMA)
KIFv (2nd purchase) 26 Oct 1993 Daewoo Corp
28 Malaysian Airlines System
(MAS)
C-130 26 Oct 1993 Lockheed Corp
29 University Malaya(UM) C-130 26 Oct 1993 Lockheed Corp
30 Marconi Malaysia Corvette 26 Oct 1995 Fincantieri-Cantier
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34 Comintel Sdn Bhd Corvette 26 Oct 1995 Fincantieri-Cantier






36 Sigma-Xi Engineering Corvette 26 Oct 1995 Fincantieri-Cantier
37 Sapura Thompson Frequency Hopping Manpack &
Vehicular Transceivers
17 Oct 1997 Thompson-CSF Comm,
France
38 Defence Technology Electronics Support Measures 14 Jan 1999 Thomson-CSF RCM
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&System Sdn Bhd
39 Safrimas Sdn Bhd IBIS Minehunting System 8 Apr 1999 Altech Defence System,
South Africa
40 RMS Technologies Sdn Bhd Artillery Location Radar 16 Apr 1999 Ericson Microwave
System Ab Sweeden
41 Sapura Advanced System
Sdn Bhd
Super Lynx Helicopter 2 Sept 1999 GKN-Westland








43 Yuasa Power System 155m,45 Calibre, G5 MKIII Gun System 22 Nov 2000 Denel (Pty) Ltd, South
Africa
44 Pesaka Astana(M) Sdn Bhd 155m,45 Calibre, G5 MKIII Gun System 22 Nov 2000 Denel (Pty) Ltd, South
Africa
45 Malaysia Optronic Systems 155m,45 Calibre, G5 MKIII Gun System 22 Nov 2000 Denel (Pty) Ltd, South
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Armoured Infantry Fighting May 2000 FNSS Savunma
Sistemleri A.S, Turkey
47 Simex Tyres, Silverstone
Bhd
MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
Arospacial
48 Rubber Metal Technic Sdn
Bhd
MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
Arospacial
49 Watta Batteries Industries
Sdn Bhd
MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
Arospacial
50 Metro Koats Technology
(MKT)
MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
Arospacial
51 Tenaga Kimia Bhd
-Mastra Corp Sdn Bhd
-Felda Agricultural Services
Sdn Bhd
MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
Arospacial
52 Arrow Components (M) Sdn MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
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Bhd Arospacial











MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
Arospacial
54 Betton Tools Sdn Bhd
-Hes Wilayah Sdn Bhd
-W.K.C Enterprise
MLRS (ASTROS II) 24 Nov 2000 Avibras Industrial
Arospacial
Source:
Malaysian Industry Group for High Technology (MIGHT), A Study on Offsets Programme of the National Defence Procurement, Putra
Jaya, November, 2001.
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Appendix D: List of Companies Surveyed and Nature of Business
Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
1 Airods Aerospace  Aircraft Maintenance, Modification and
Upgrades,
 Engines & Component Repair and Overhaul,











2 CTRM Aerospace  Eagle 150B TO2, 3rd. Floor 2310,
Century Square, Jalan
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 Two seater, all composite, GA aircraft with a
cruise speed of 125 knots
 Lancair Columbia 300
 Four seater, all-composite, GA aircraft
 Eagle ARV System
AEROSPACE SERVICES
Research & development








3 SME Aerospace Aerospace -Aerospace ground support equipment;
Air-borne ordnance and parts (including
training rockets & bombs);
Machining and assembly;
Hydraulic actuators;
Sheet metal fabrication services;





Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
Welding services.
4 Zetro Services Sdn Bhd Aerospace  Design, fabrication, overhaul, repair, calibration,
upgrading and maintenance of avionics
components systems for all aircrafts in RMAF.
 Design, fabrication, overhaul, repair, calibration
and maintenance of all ground electronic
equipment/systems in the RMAF including total
maintenance of Air Traffic Control Equipment
and Systems.
 Repair and Overhaul of Army Artillery
Electronic Equipment & Systems and
Communication Equipment & Systems for the
Royal Malaysian Police and the Oil & Gas
Industry.
 Design, Installation, Integration and
Commissioning of radar systems for air defence,
air traffic control and maritime surveillance
KL International Airport
Berhad






Maritime Building, repairing and overhauling of naval ships
and patrol craft.
4567, Jalan Chain Ferry
P. O. Box 43
12700 Butterworth,
Pulau Pinang.
6. Malaysia Shipyard &
Engineering
Sdn Bhd
Maritime Ship repair, shipbuilding and heavy engineering
-works for onshore and offshore projects. Other





Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
1) Processed copper blasting grit
2) Oil sludge treatment plant
3) Tugs and towage services
7 ME & O Fleet Support
Sdn Bhd
Maritime Inventory control and management system/Bar
coding;






8 PSC - Naval Dockyard Sdn
Bhd
(taken over by Bousted
Group as of September
2005)
Maritime  Dockyard services and-engineering services -
mechanical / electrical
 engineering, hull and docking services,
electronic and weapon system
 Specializes in complete overhaul, upgrading
and maintenance of medium calibre canons,
naval-gun, artillery equipment and its
associated systems.
 Universal tests electronic defence industry








9 Sigma Xi Engineering Sdn
Bhd
Maritime Maintenance of naval communication equipment
integration of communication and weapon
systems.
No. 4113, Jalan Tun Mohd
Fuad 3,
Taman Tun Dr. Ismail
60000 Kuala Lumpur
10 SME Ordnance Sdn Bhd Weapons Manufacturing of: Lot 5065 Locked Bag No.
101
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-Small Arms Ammunition:-
- 5.56 mm Ball M193 (Loose/Link)
- 5.56 mm Tracer M196
- 5.56 mm Ball M855/SS109
- 5.56 mm Blanks (Long Nose)
- 5.56 mm Blanks M200
- 7.62 mm Ball (All Natures)
- 7.62 mm - Link Belt 4 (BIT)
- 9 mm. Ball (Luger / Parabellum)
- .38 Special (Lead Round Nose)
Medium Calibre Ammunition
- 12.7 mm APIH / IT,
- 20 mm Oerlikon HEI-T
- 30 mm ADEN TP
- 25 mm all types
- 35 mm all types
Shotgun Cartidges
- 12 Gauge Shotgun Cartridge (various type)
Pyrotechnics & Grenades
- Coloured Smoke Grenades All Colour
- Mini Flares (set of six)
- Wire Tripflares
- Day & Night Signal Distress
- Ground Illuminating Flares
- Aviation Smoke Generator




Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
- Signal Cartridges 1 1/2"/38 mm
- Cart. C.S. Anti Riot 38 mm
- Grenade Hand C.S Anti Riot
- Grenade Hand High Explosives
- Detonating Cord
- Electric Detonator
- Non Electric Detonator
- Safety Fuze (per meter)
- Handflare Red Para
- Thunderflash
Large Calibre Ammunition
- Mortar Bombs 81 & 60 mm
- Rounds 40 mm L70 HEI-T
- Rounds 105 mm HE MI
- Mortar Bombs 81 mm HE 71 b
- Rounds 40 L70 TP-T
- Rounds 57 mm L70 TP
- Cartidges 105 mm Blank PH
- Scare Charge Demolition TNT 1 lb
- Charge Demolition 10 lbs and 25 lbs
- Cast Booster 250g TK 1 and 500g TK2
- Round 90 mm HE-T
- Round 90 mm HESH-T
- Round 90 mm HEAT-T
- Round 90 mm HEAT-TP-T
- 84 mm HEAT 551
- Rd 76 mm TP-T
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Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
- Rd 155 mm HE M107
Weapon
- Steyr AUG A1 Rifle, Mess Tin Complete,
Water Bottle Complete
Engineering Plastic Division (EPD)
Defence Related
- Steyr AUG Rifle Butt and Other Components
- PPC Canister for ammunition 105 mm, 40mm
L70, 81 mm Mortar, Toilet seat
Metal Boxes
- M2A1, BG




Automotive -A flexible manufacturing plant for the assembly of
armoured vehicles (wheeled and tracked) of up to
50-ton Main Battle Tank as well as for system
integration of specialist vehicles.
A workshop for the repair (including
base overhaul), maintenance and refurbishment
of soft-skin and armoured vehicles.
A warehouse with the requisite facilities for the
stocking and distribution of spare parts nationwide.
57th Floor Empire Tower
City Square Centre
182, Jalan Tun Razak
50400 Kuala Lumpur
Facilities in Pekan, Pahang
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Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
A computerised materials resources
planning system (MRP) for production and
control planning and inventory management.
A NATO standard vehicle test track in
close proximately to the plant.
12 MMC Defence Sdn Bhd Automotive  Base maintenance, refurbishment, upgrade and
Research & Development works for armoured
vehicle variants, both track as well as wheeled
vehicles.








13 Pesaka Astana (M) Sdn
Bhd
Automotive  Manufacturer of Customised and specialised
vehicle
Military truck, Fire & Rescue Vehicle, Medium
and Heavy Recovery Vehicle, Port Terminal
Tractors
 Manufacturing truck and total after sales services





14 Scomi Automotive -Manufacturing and fabricating of quality road
transport hardware. Providing related engineering
Lot 519, Jalan TUDM
Kampong Baru Subang
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Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location




Aluminum tankers (petroleum products)
Mild steer tanker (palm oil, latex, diesel etc)
Stainless steel tank























































Consultation, designing, problems solving, parts
repairs and training in specialised transportation
engineering field.
15 Caidmark ICT For military-Focus in Condition Based Maintenance
(CBM).
ECMS, which is a general-purpose database system,
designed to track the location, configuration, life
usage status, and condition and maintenance history
of serialized aircraft components. ECMS covers
both engine and structural components and is
applicable to naval and Fort OGP sectors –
Caidmark’s emphasis will be in providing solutions
in reliability engineering.
Plant Information Management System, CBM,
Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) and expert
system based framework for the side wide
deployment of reliability and operation management
application.





Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
16 Comlenia ICT Integrated logistics support, electronic systems,
repairing and testing including combat systems
upgrading activities.
Capable of 3rd level repair and testing for all
ranges of electronic cards from analog, digital and
IF/RF using latest state of the art, fully






17 IKramatic Systems Sdn
Bhd
ICT Simulation technology provider. Specialising
in cost-effective Flight Simulator including:
Fixed-wing type and Helicopters.
Develop Computer Assisted Training Systems for









ICT Assembling of laser range finder, night vision
binoculars and optical sighting devices
Upgrading of laser range finder, night vision device
to suit user requirement.






19 Sapura Technologies Sdn
Bhd
ICT Design, manufacture, integrate, supply and
maintain communications products and systems
Design, develop, integrate and maintain flight,
maritime, land-based and radar simulators –
provides computer-based training that utilises
Sapura @ Mines
No. 7, Jalan Tasik
The Mines Resort City
43300 Seri Kembangan
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Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
web-based technologies for the Armed Forces
Marketing, supply, operate and maintain various
radar and air traffic management systems
Performs various maritime business activities
especially in electronic and training
Development of Electronis Warfare
system pertaining to EW Support System
Full range of services to support
MalaysianArmed Forces non-core activities such
as marketing and supply of firearms
Training Systems and development & integration
of computerised logistics management system
20 System Consultancy
Services Sdn Bhd
ICT Specialising in consultancy in ICT,
development and integration of Command, control,
Communication and Intelligence (C31) system as
well as Information Warfare System with particular
emphasis on Electronic Warfare system.
Scada Systems, Industrial and Process Automation
Solutions, Buildings Security Solutions and Fiber
Glass Composite products manufacturing.
36, Jalan 1/27F




Builders (M) Sdn Bhd
Common users Providing engineering services and support :
Steel fabrications




Num Company Sector Nature of Business Location
Installation and commissioning of plant
Civil & structural works
Maintenance services Products Vessels, Shell
& Tube Heat Exchangers, Reactors,
Towers/Columns, Casting Ladles, Loading Arms,
Flare Stack, Piping Works and other steel fabricated
products.
Pahang
Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, List of Malaysian Defence Industry Council Members,[Online], (Accessed: 12 July 2005),
Avaliable at: http://www.mdic.gov.my
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Appendix E: Geographical Distribution of Malaysian Defence Companies
Included In The Survey
1. Airod (aerospace)
2. SME Aerospace (aerospace)
3. ME & O Fleet Services (maritime)
4. Sigma Xi (maritime)
5. SME Ordnance (weapons)
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Appendix F
To Whom It May Concern
PhD Research to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Defence Offsets in Malaysia
Do offsets really work? This question has loomed large in the minds of practitioners and
academics in the defence sphere. Offsets have today become synonymous with the
process of arms procurement. Despite the importance of offsets and the huge volumes
of money involved, there has been minimal empirical research to examine the
effectiveness of offsets. There is a huge gap in this area of research and certainly needs
further analysis.
Miss Kogila Balakrishnan, a PhD student at Cranfield University, is pursuing her
research on the effectiveness of offsets. As background, Kogila has served in the
Defence Industry Division, Ministry of Defence, and Malaysia since 2000. With her
core responsibility at the ministry encompassing coordinating, negotiating and
monitoring the implementation of offsets, it was logical to base her PhD research work
on her Defence experience. Kogila has therefore embarked on a programme to
Examine the Impact of Offsets on Malaysia’s industrial and technological
development.
The objectives of the research are to:
ix. illustrate and evaluate the various offset models, frameworks, tools,
processes and mechanisms by cross reference to offset practices in other
selected developed and developing countries;
x. critically analyse Malaysia’s current offset policy, processes, problems and
strategies by applying SWOT analysis and other appropriate business
models.
xi. determine the factors that contribute towards an ‘effective’ offset strategy;
xii. evaluate industrial and technological progress achieved through offset-
induced technology transfer.
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xiii. propose strategic approaches and make policy recommendations towards an
effective offset model enabling offsets to play a more robust role in meeting
Malaysia’s industrial and technological development needs.
In order to carry out her research successfully, the presenter intends to send out
questionnaires to selected offsets beneficiaries in Malaysia. She also intends to
interview relevant persons in defence agencies, Original Equipment Manufacturers and
offsets related-organisations. The aim is to gather sufficient evidence to support
research and compile the findings into a PhD thesis that will address the overarching
issues of defence offsets in development of both defence and civil infrastructure.
Cranfield University fully supports Kogila’s research. It is considered that the research
findings will be beneficial in further enhancing the negotiation and design of offsets
policy. At the same time, the issues raised through this research will also make valuable
contribution to the defence community in evaluating the future of offsets.
It would therefore be appreciated if your organisation would provide appropriate





Royal Military College of Science
Cranfield University
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To Whom It May Concern
February 2005
PhD Research Project: Examining the Impact of Offsets on Malaysia’s
Industrial and Technological Development
Miss Kogila Balakrishnan, who served the Defence Industry Division, Ministry of
Defence, Malaysia until 2003 is presently on a three year study leave pursuing PhD at
the Cranfield University, Defence Academy, UK. She is now embarking on her
fieldwork activities, seeking data from Malaysia’s defence-related companies.
As the Ministry has a special interest in monitoring the progress of offsets programmes
in Malaysia, her research will certainly be of interest to us. With this in mind, the
Ministry fully supports Miss Kogila’s PhD research Examining the Effectiveness of
Offsets in Malaysia. I believe this research will be helpful in further enhancing the
country’s future offsets policy and strategy.
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Questionnaire
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENCE OFFSETS IN MALAYSIA
Aim of the Questionnaire
This questionnaire is designed to gather evidence as to the effectiveness of defence
offsets as a mechanism to facilitate industrial and technological development in
Malaysia. The questionnaire is part of a PhD research programme. The outcome of this
research will be utilised to further assist the Government of Malaysia in enhancing its
national offsets policy and strategy for the development of Malaysian companies.
This questionnaire is directed to managers and engineers who have been involved in
offsets programmes. Your expert opinion is essential in assessing offset and technology
transfer issues that are important to the Government of Malaysia. Thank you for
completing this questionnaire. Please note that the name of your company will not be
mentioned in the report. Your cooperation is appreciated.
Instruction
Many of the responses in this questionnaire sample require a tick in a box 
However, some questions will ask for your written comments, detailing your insight
into a particular topic.
Sections covered in this questionnaire
PART A : Company Profile
PART B : Company Operations, Strategy and Human Resource
Development
PART C : Technology development Capability
PART D : Technology Transfer through Offsets/Others
PART E : Offsets Programme Impact/Others
PART F : Offsets Implementation
PART G : Final Suggestions
ANNEXURE : Offsets programme Profile/Others
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Please complete all questions according to the guidelines provided





1.05 Date Start Operation :
1.06 Type of Business (please tick one):
a. Individual proprietorship ❒
b. Public limited company ❒




1.08 Annual Turnover (for the last five years)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1.09. Profit (for the last five years):
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004









PART B: COMPANY OPERATION, STRATEGY AND HUMAN RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT
Please note that all questions in this section are about your firm (including your branch
or subsidiary)
2.01 Which of the following best describes your company? (tick all that apply)
Plant production ❒










More than 1000 ❒
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2.03 Please estimate the proportions of your company’s workforce according to level
of education attained. Please include all levels of workers:
Less than primary school. %
Secondary school %
High school completed %
Vocational school completed %
University degree completed %
Total number of workers %




Research and Development %
Total %
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2.05 Your company’s annual expenditure on management training and skill
development as a percentage of revenues(please tick the appropriate box)
Less than 10% ❒ 21-30% ❒ 41-50% ❒
11-20% ❒ 31-40% ❒ Greater than 51% ❒
2.06 For each of the following categories, please rate your company’s position versus







































2.07 Your company’s competitive strategy in its principal business is (choose the
most applicable answer)
Based on natural resources availability ❒
Based on favourable costs of skilled workers ❒
Based on product or process technology ❒
Based on marketing strategy ❒
Based on the infrastructure support ❒
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Others (please specify) ❒
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PART C: COMPANY TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITY
3.01 Your company’s annual expenditure on developing new technology as a
percentage of revenue
Less than 10% ❒ 21-30% ❒ 41-50% ❒
11-20% ❒ 31-40% ❒ Greater than 51% ❒
3.02 Your company’s annual R&D expenditure as a percentage of revenue
Less than 10% ❒ 21-30% ❒ 41-50% ❒
11-20% ❒ 31-40% ❒ Greater than 51% ❒
3.03 Does your company have R &D facilities?
Yes ❒ No ❒
If no, please indicate the reasons
…………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………….
3.04 Does your company collaborate with scientific research institutions (such as
SIRIM, USM, UTM, STRIDE, MINDEF and others)?
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Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, please specify which organisation and details of collaboration:
Organisation Details of the project
3.05. Does your company receive R & D assistance from government?
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, please provide details of the assistance:
………………………………………………………………….…………………
3.06. Does your company receive Government R&D tax credits:
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, please specify the details:
………………………………………………………………………………
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3.07 Does your company source the following? (tick the appropriate box):










3.08 Does your company have any patent registrations?
Yes ❒ No ❒ Total number
If yes, please give details and indicate when acquired, where the registration is lodged
and the nature of the technology patented.
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Source of patent When acquired Where registration
lodged
Nature of technology
PART D: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER THROUGH OFFSET/ OR OTHERS
(PLEASE SPECIFY)
(For the purpose of this survey, technology includes hard and soft technology.
Hard technology includes machinery, tools, jig, other hardware and techniques.
Soft technology includes manuals, training, know-how, attachment, foreign
consultancy services and conference).
4.01 In the last five years, did your company introduce a new product, service or
production method?
Yes ❒ No ❒
.4.02 If yes, this innovation originated from:
Within the firm ❒
Another source in your country ❒
Another country ❒
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Foreign Direct Investment ❒
Others (please specify) ❒
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4.04 Please specify the country engaged in the highest level of offsets, whether















4.05 To what extent do you agree with the following statements (please tick)?
i. Was the technology transferred through offsets readily available from
several other sources in the world
Yes ❒ No ❒
ii. The technology has narrow applicability to the specific defence system
produced by your company
Yes ❒ No ❒
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4.06 Transfer of technology through offsets has resulted in the following (please tick
all applicable categories listing them in order of priority):




















17. Built, Operate, Transfer (BOT)
18. Others (please specify)
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4.07 In your company, does offsets transfer the following types of technology (tick
and number them in order of most importance)?







4.08 Have you used the technology, or know-how, gained through offsets to develop
technology locally?
Yes ❒ No ❒
4.09 If yes, please give examples and indicate the source responsible and what type of
work was undertaken
Source responsible Type of work undertaken
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4.10 Has your firm faced any offset-related technology problems in production or
operation?
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, please give example and indicate the problems:
Problems Examples
4.11 Has your company experienced any major technology-sharing problems with a
foreign partner?
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, please give example and indicate the problems:
Problems Examples
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4.12 Has your firm experienced difficulties with the government sector in technology
acquisition?
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, please give example and indicate the difficulty faced
Difficulty faced Examples
4.13 Are you planning, to independently market the products, technology or know-
how gained as a result of offsets programme?
Yes ❒ No ❒




4.14 Does your company have plans to extend its participation in offsets programme
to include the following areas? (Please tick the appropriate column)







Human Resource development and
Training
Others, please specify
PART E: OFFSET PROGRAMME IMPACT:
5.01 Indicate the benefits of offsets on company performance:
More profit
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, provide figures for the 5 years
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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5.02 More export:
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, provide export figures for the past 5 years:
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
5.03 Technology innovation (Innovation here refers to new product, process, system
or device).
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, provide examples of such innovation
5.04 Creation of new jobs:
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, what type of jobs and numbers over the past five years?
Type of work Numbers
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
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5.05 Creation of skilled manpower in your organisation:
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, provide the number of workers and type of skills obtained:
Type of skills Number of workers
5.06 How were the skills generated /upgraded?
……………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
5.07 Enhancing existing product lines:
Yes ❒ No ❒





5.08 Strengthening of the local sub-contractor base:
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, please provide examples of such strengthening:
Type of work Company involved
5.09 Ability to use technology gained for dual use application, mainly civil related
projects.
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, provide examples of the projects:
Types of technology Examples
5.10 Market penetration
Yes ❒ No ❒
If yes, provide examples of where and how it happened?
Local market Foreign Market
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PART F. OFFSETS IMPLEMENTATION
6.01 Tick the appropriate box
Implementation Yes No Someti
mes
Comments
Does your company participate during the
offsets negotiation process
Is your company informed of the final
outcome after the offsets negotiation
process
Does your company have the adequate
resources to undertake the offsets
programme
In terms of
-Infrastructure, plant and machinery
-Financial resources
-Skilled workers
-Commitment (marketing, R and D,
training)
Is your company’s offsets programme
completed on time
Does your company’s offsets project get
completed within budget
Was there adequate planning before the
project begun
Is there constant follow up and follow
through from the OEM
Does the MOD constantly monitor your
company’s offsets projects
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Components and parts ❒
Specialised technical services ❒
Transfer of technical instructions and manuals ❒
Transfer of hardware/machinery ❒




Local participation in R&D ❒
Local participation in design and construction ❒
Local participation in management ❒
Others ❒
6.03 Does the offsets agreement restrict the use of?
Local material resources ❒
Outside material resources ❒
Local machines and equipment ❒








6.04 Does the offset agreement provide opportunities for future businesses?
If yes,
Explain in which field.
………………………………………………………………………….. …
……………………………………………………………………………..
6.05 Are the obligations in the offset agreement strictly followed by the OEMs?




PART G: FINAL SUGGESTION






Thank you for your cooperation
Kindly return this questionnaire as soon as possible to:
Kogila Balakrishnan
Ministry of Defence, Malaysia
Bahagian Industri Pertahanan
Jalan Padang Tembak
Tingkat 8, Wisma Pertahanan
50634 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Or via e-mail to K.Balakrishnan@cranfield.ac.uk/ kogilab@yahoo.com
468
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Appendix G: Defence Contractor’s Questionnaire
EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENCE OFFSETS
Sections covered in the questionnaire
PART A: Company Details
PART B: Offsets Programme Obligations
PART C: Offsets Strategy
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PART A: COMPANY DETAILS





1.04 Nature of Business :………………………………………………………..
1.05 Year Established :………………………………………………………..
1.06 Ownership :………………………………………………………..
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PART C: Offsets Strategy
Questions in section relate to technology transfer through Offsets
3.1 How does your company define ‘core intellectual property’ and what are the
conditions under which your company may consider technology transfer?
3.2 To what extent does your government promote or restrict technology transfer?
(eg: export control policy))
3.3 To what extent do indigenous Malaysian company capabilities promote or
discourage technology transfer?
3.4 How does your company build the cost of offsets in its commercial packages?
3.5 What is considered an acceptable level of cost, as a percentage of contract value,
when planning for executing an offset programme? How does your firm defray?
If yes, please provide a percentage?
………………………………………………………………………………..
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3.6.1 What are the strengths of the Malaysian companies that you have worked with
on offsets programme?
3.7 Do you intend to establish long term supplier relationship with Malaysian
companies through offsets?
3.8 What are the weaknesses and challenges you have faced by working with the
Malaysian companies?
3.9 Do you have offsets obligation with ASEAN or other countries in the region?
If yes, which countries?. How do their offsets programmes differ from Malaysia
3.10 Are Malaysian companies competitive in comparison to their ASEAN and
regional neighbours?
3.11 What should Malaysian companies do to be the subject of a successful long-
term benefit of offsets programme?
3.12 What are your observations about Malaysia’s offsets policy and processes?
3.13 Explain the nature of any problems faced by your company during the offsets
negotiation phase?
3.14 How do you view Malaysia’s offsets policy and implementation process?
3.15 What aspects of your offsets obligations have been more challenging than the
others?
3.16 List the advantages and disadvantages of requiring offsets as a part of major
contract
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3.17 Do you see any other formal alternative to offsets when selling defence
equipment, systems or services?
3.18 Would you agree that offsets are the way forward for developing countries to:
3.18.1 built their indigenous defence industry capability?
3.18.2 as an economic development tool into other sectors?
a. Do you intend to incorporate buy-back provisions into offsets programme?
b. Would you explain your best (most successful) offset project, and would you
describe generally the worst.
475
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Appendix H: Details of Defence Suppliers Interviewed During Fieldwork Research





1 ARMARIS France 2002 Naval systems DCN and Thales 600 million USD





3 BAE Systems UK 1850 Aerospace and
defence










BAEs USD 30 million
6 Bumar Labedi Poland 1950 automotive State owned
7 Rosoboronexport Russia 1980 Weapon system
sales
State owned USD 900,693,415.00 million
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8 Whitehead Alenia Italy 1875 Under sea
defence systems
Finmeccanica
9 Navantia Spain 1947 Military naval
construction
Navantia S.l 129 million Euros






51% UDLP of US
49% Nurol Holding
of Turkey
11 GKN Westland UK aerospace
12 Environment
Tetronics Corporation





13 DENEL South Africa NA
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Appendix I: List of Malaysian Offset-Related Agencies Interviewed
Num Organisation
1 Ministry of Defence
 Procurement Division
 Defence Industry Division
 STRIDE
 Policy Division
2 Ministry of Finance
 Contract Division
3 Economic Planning Unit, Prime Ministers Department
4 Ministry of International Trade and Industry
 Bilateral Trade Division
5 National Aerospace Council
6 Malaysian Industry Group for High Technology(MIGHT)
7 Ministry of Science and Technology (MOSTE)
8 Malaysian Defence Industry Council
9 Technology Park
10 University Technology Malaysia
11 University Science, Malaysia
12 Multimedia Development Corporation
13 SIRIM
479
This page is intentionally left blank
480
Appendix J: List Foreign Offset Offices Interviewed
Num Organization
1 Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO), UK
2 Department of Trade and Industry, UK
3 ARMSCOR, South Africa
4 American Countertrade Association (ACA)
5 Defence Manufacturers Association(DMA),UK
6 DGA, France
7 ISDEFE, Spain
8 Department of Commerce’s Defence Trade (BXA) ,US
9 Defence Material Organisation, Department of Defence, Australia
10 Asia Pacific Countertrade Organisation (APCA)
11 Defence Division, Confederation of Indian Industry
12 Swedish Defence Material Administration, Sweden
13 United Arab Emirates Offsets Group, UAE
14 Deutsches Kompensations Forum e.V (DKF)
15 Ministry of National Defence, Republic of Turkey
481
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Appendix K: SUMMARY OF RESEARCH PLAN






















 prepare cover letter
 send out the draft to the
relevant organisations
 receive input and make
necessary amendments
Letter will be written to MOD,
Malaysia to seek official
permission for attachment








 sent out questionnaire
by post and e-mail and
provide 2 weeks time to
return questionnaire
 identify the problems
and rectify the
questionnaire
This questionnaire will be sent
out from UK and therefore
follow-up telephone calls will
have to be made to ensure the
progress
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Questionnaire will be sent out
from Malaysia by using the













that has been identified
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Appendix L: Study Implementation Schedule
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Appendix M: MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES INVENTORY
Source: Military Balance 2005.2006, The International Institute of Strategic
Studies
MALAYSIAN ARMY
TK.LT.TK. 26 Scorpion 90
RECCE 418




APC (T) 347; 211 Adnan (incl variants); 25 FV 4333 Stormer;
111 KIFV (incl variants)
APC (W) 673:452 Condor 9150 upgraded); 37 m-3 Panhard;
184 LAV -150 Commondo/V-100 Commando
ARTY 414
TOWED 164
105mm 130:130 Model 56 pack Howitzer
155mm 34:12 FH-70; 22 G-5
MRL 18: 18 ASTROS II (equipped with 127mm SS-30)
MOR 232: 232 81mm
AT
MSL 60:18 AT-7 Saxhorn; 24 Eryx; 18 HJ-8
RCL 260
106mm 24:24 M-40
84mm 236: 236 carl Gustov
RL.73mm 584: 584 RPG-7 Knout
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AMPHIBIOUS.CRAFT.LCA 165
165 Damen assault craft 540 (capacity 10 troops)
HELICOPTERS.UTL.SA-316 9: 9SA -316B Aloutte III
AD
SAM. MANPAD.48+: some Anza; some SA-18 Grouse
(Igla); 48 Starburst
GUNS 60
35mm: 24 GDF-005 towed
40mm: 36 L40/70 towed
MALAYSIAN NAVY (15,000)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10
FRIGATES 4
FFG 2:
2 lekiu (capacity 1 super lynx utl hel) each with 2 B515
ILAS -3 triple 324 mm each with 1 sting ray LWT, 2
quad (8eff.) each with 1MM -40 Exocet tactical SSM,
1 Sea Wolf VLS with 16 sea wolf SAM
FF 2
1 hang Tuah trg with Limbo non-operational, 1
57mm gun, 1 hel landing platform (for Wasp or super
Lynx)




4 laksamana each with 2 B515 ILAS-3 triple 324mm
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Each with A244LWT, 1 quat (4 eff.) with 12 Aspide
SAM, 3 twin (6 eff) each with 1MK 2 Otomat SSM,
176mm gun
FS 2
2 kasturi each with 2 twin (4eff).each with 1 MM-
38 Exocet tactical SSM, 1 Mle 54 Cruesot-Loire 375mm
Bofors (6 eff.) 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
(for 1 westland wasp HAS Mk 1)
PA|TROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS
PCC 18: 14 kris; 4 sabah
PC1 1 : 1 Kedah
PFC 6 : 6 Jerong
PFM 8:
4 handalan each with 2 twin (4 eff.) each with MM-38
Exocet tactical SSM, 157 mm gun
4 Perdana each with 2 single each with 1MM -38 Exocet
tactical SSm, 1 57mm gun
PCO 2
2 Nustytari each with 1 100mm gun, 1 hel landing platform
MINE WARFARE. MINE COUNTERMEASURES.
MCO 4: 4 Mahamiru
AMPHIBIOUS
LS.LST 1: 1 Sri Inderapura (capacity 10 tanks;400 troops)
AGHS (Svy) AGOS 2
AMPHIBIOUS
CRAFT 115: 115 LCM/LCU
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 3: 1 diving tender/spt;2 Spt
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MALAYSIAN AIR FORCE (15 000)
Flying hours- 60 hours/ year
FORCES BY ROLE
Ftr 2 Sqn with 15 MiG-29n (MiG-29) fulcrum; 2 MIG-29U Fulcrum
FGA 1 sqn with 8 f/A-18D Hornet; 2 sqn with 8 Hawk MK108; 17 Hawk
MK208
FGA/ 1sqn with 13 F-5E Tiger II; 2 RF-5E
Recce Tigereye
MR 1sqn with 4 Beech 2000T Maritime Patrol
SF 1 (Air Force Commando) unit (air field defence)
Tpt 2 sqn with 4 KC-130H Hercules (tkr); 4C-130H
Hercules; 8C -130H-30 Hercules ; 9 Cessna 402B
(2 modified for aerial survey); 1 (VIP) sqn with
1 b 737-700 BBJ; 1 BD700 Global Express; 1 F-28
Fellowship; 1 Falcon 900; 2 S- 61N; 2 S-70A Black
Hawk; 1A-109; 1sqn with 6 CN-235
Trg some sqn with 8MB-339A;20 MD3-160; 45Pc-7
MK II Turbo Trainer; 13 SA-316 Aloutte III
Hel 4(tpt/SAR) sqn with 31 S-61A-4 Nuri; 2S-61N;2
2-70A Black Hawk
SAM 1 sqn with Starburst
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EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 63 combat capable
FTR 28
F-5 13: 13 F-%E Tiger II/F-5F Tiger II
MIG-29N (MIG-29) Fulcrum 15
FGA 16
F/A-18 8:8 F/A-18D Hornet
Hawk MK108 8
RECCE 2: 2 RF-5E Tigereye
MP 4: 4 Beech 200T Maritime Patrol
TKR.KC-130 4: 4 KC-130H Hercules (tkr)
TPT 31
B-737 1:1 B -737-700 BBJ
BD700 Global Express 1
C-130 12: 4C -130H Hercules; 8 C-130H-30 Hercules
CN-235 6








PC-7 45:45 PC-7 MK II Turbo Trainer
HELICOPTERS
ASW.S-61.S-61A 31:31 S -61 A-4 Nuri
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SPT 8: 4S -61N; 4 S-70A Black Hawk
UTL 14: 1A-109; 13 SA-316 Aloutte III
UAV.RECCE.TAC 3: 3 eagle 150
AD.SAM. MANPAD: some starburst
MSL.TACTICAL
ASM: some AGM-65 Maverick; AGM-84D harpoon
AAM : some AA-10 Alamo; AA-11 Archer; some AIM-7
Sparrow some AIM-9 Sidewinder
Source: Military Balance, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge,
London, 2007
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Appendix N : Stages In Arms Procurement Process In Malaysia
Source: Mak, J.N, ‘Security Perceptions, Transparency and Confidence-Building: An
Analysis of the Malaysian Arms Acquisitions Processes, SIPRI Arms Procurement
Decision Making Project, Working paper no.82, 1997.
Approval in principle by executives for project/programme






Technical Committee Financial Committee
Recommendation
Final approval by treasury (MOF)
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There are a total of seven stages in the overall procurement process
Stage 1:
The General Staff Requirements (GSR) at Armed Forces level for single services are
generally for the purchase of equipment off-the-shelf. For army, GSRs are examined
in the Army Operational Equipment Committee, consisting of Deputy Chief of
the Army and heads of the relevant departments –logistics, equipment, mechanical
and other specialisations. The GSRs are examined in line with army doctrine,
operational factors and training requirements and then passed to the procurement
division of the MOD to be processed by a technical evaluation committee. For the
Air force, procedure involves the Technical Specification Committee which passes
the Air Staff Requirements to the Air Specification Committee and then to the MOD
procurement division to be processed by the technical evaluation committee. For the
Navy, GSRs are evaluated by the Chief of Navy Committee, which passes them on
to the procurement division, MOD for the same process
Stage 2
For capital items made to order, a specification committee for each service drawn
from different equipment departments of the services according to requirements and
one for the three services jointly will test the viability and local content. Deputy
heads of the services coordinate the recommendations and pass them on to the
procurement Division of the Ministry of Defence.
Stage 3
The Procurement Division is headed by an under secretary who reports to the
Secretary General. A technical committee is formed to evaluate the Members of the
Specification committee are drawn from executive offices of MOD and Diplomatic
and Administrative services. The division will than decide on method of
procurement and type of tender. MOD handles procurement below 5 million (US
1.3 million); proposals for items costing more than that must be approved by
Treasury. Then proposals are evaluated by the Technical Committee of the
Procurement Division
Stage 4
Technical evaluation committee carries out technical evaluation and field test for the
suitability of the equipment in terms of specifications and user requirements. It also
examines life-cycle costs, local content, infrastructure and other logistical
requirements. The technical evaluation team comprises end-users and technical
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experts from relevant MOD departments, such as the Defence Science and
Technology Centre (STRIDE), Defence Industry Division and IT Division.
Membership to this committee is determined by MOD and rarely, does involve
experts from outside the government. Debate over government purchases is usually
confined to the technical committee established for a particular tender, whose
composition varies according to the type of equipment purchased.
Stage 5
The procurement division will than decide on method of procurement and type of
tender;
i. open tender: bidders required to meet basic criteria
ii. restricted tender :designed to save time when potential suppliers are
few because the equipment involved is highly specialised
iii. direct/ negotiated tender: supplier identified as the only one offering
the equipment that meets the specific requirements of a user agency-
spare arts for vehicles that are not available from any other sources.
Negotiations carried out to establish price, delivery dates, support and
etc. can also apply in a government to government purchase.
Negotiations for tenders below RM 5 million will be chaired by
Secretary General and negotiations for tenders above that will be chaired
by Treasury. The end users identify and write out technical specifications
and operational criteria which are then incorporated into the tender
document.
Stage 6
For tender evaluation to take place, the procurement division forms a tender board
comprising technical committee and financial committee. The technical committee
comprises technical experts from services, STRIDE, IT and than submits a tender
brief to the tender board. Financial evaluation committee evaluates the financial
merits of the proposals such as industrial offsets, financial packages including
modes of payment schedule, and other cost-related criteria. The tender board is
chaired by Secretary General of MOD and comprises the Deputy Secretary General
for Development, representatives from the Armed Forces HQ, the services and the
treasury.
Stage 7
The tender board will consider the tender brief and either approves or rejects the
recommendations, or calls for re-tender. Treasury has the right to accept or reject
any or all proposals against the recommendations of the tender board and tender
sub-committees (technical and financial evaluation). For tenders called by treasury,
MOD will forward technical evaluation report directly to the treasury. If treasury
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handles procurement of certain high-value equipment, a special committee will be
appointed to look into the commercial proposal before the request for proposals
(RFP) is made. Committee looks into delivery, costs and terms of payment,
warranty and aspects of offsets and countertrade, TOT and local content.
Stage 8
The final approval for the procurement will than be made by the Ministry of
Finance(MOF)
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Appendix O: MDIC Members
Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities




Aircraft Maintenance, Modification and Upgrades,
-Engines & Component Repair and Overhaul,










Aerospace 1991 Eagle 150B
Two seater, all composite, GA aircraft with a cruise
speed of 125 knots, fitted with sleek features that
are perfect for
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
leisure and sports flying.
-Lancair Columbia 300
Four seater, all-composite, GA aircraft, fastest and
sleekest aircraft in its category.
-Eagle ARV System
Provides a flexible airborne surveillance and
reconnaissance system with dual capability for
manned and unmanned operations, day and night
capability, range 200 km and endurance 10 hours.
-AEROSPACE SERVICES
Research & development





3 SME Aerospace Aerospace Aerospace ground support equipment;
Air-borne ordnance and parts (including
training rockets & bombs);
Machining and assembly;
Hydraulic actuators;
Sheet metal fabrication services;
Welding services.
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
4 Zetro Services Sdn Bhd Aerospace 1981 Design, fabrication, overhaul, repair, calibration,
upgrading and maintenance of avionics components
systems for all aircrafts in RMAF.
Design, fabrication, overhaul, repair, calibration
and maintenance of all ground electronic
equipment/systems in the RMAF including total
maintenance of Air Traffic
Control Equipment and Systems.
Repair and Overhaul of Army Artillery Electronic
Equipment & Systems and Communication
Equipment & Systems for the Royal Malaysian
Police and the Oil & Gas Industry.
Design, Installation, Integration and
Commissioning of radar systems for air defence, air
traffic control and maritime surveillance
5 ATSC Aerospace
6 SME Aviation Aerospace
7 UPECA Engineering Aerospace 1990
8 Hong-Leong-Lurssen
Shipyard (1992)
Maritime Building , repairing and overhauling of naval
ships and patrol craft.
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9 Malaysia Shipyard &
Engineering
Sdn Bhd
Maritime 1953 Ship repair, shipbuilding and heavy engineering
-works for onshore and offshore projects. Other
support services are: -
1) Processed copper blasting grit
2) Oil sludge treatment plant
3) Tugs and towage services
ME&O Fleet Support
Services Sdn Bhd
Maritime Inventory control and management system/Bar
coding;
Lighting protection system ship preservation
system.
PSC - Naval Dockyard
Sdn Bhd
Maritime Dockyard services and -engineering services -
mechanical / electrical
-engineering, hull and
docking services, electronic and weapon system.
-Specializes in complete overhaul, upgrading and
maintenance of medium calibre canons, naval
-gun, artillery equipment and its
associated systems.
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
-Universal tests electronic defence industry




Maritime Maintenance of naval communication equipment;




SME Ordnance Weapons 1969 Manufacturing of:
-Small Arms Ammunition:-
- 5.56 mm Ball M193 (Loose/Link)
- 5.56 mm Tracer M196
- 5.56 mm Ball M855/SS109
- 5.56 mm Blanks (Long Nose)
- 5.56 mm Blanks M200
- 7.62 mm Ball (All Natures)
- 7.62 mm - Link Belt 4 (BIT)
- 9 mm. Ball (Luger / Parabellum)
- .38 Special (Lead Round Nose)
Medium Calibre Ammunition
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
- 12.7 mm APIH / IT,
- 20 mm Oerlikon HEI-T
- 30 mm ADEN TP
- 25 mm all types
- 35 mm all types
Shotgun Cartidges
- 12 Gauge Shotgun Cartridge (various type)
Pyrotechnics & Grenades
- Coloured Smoke Grenades All Colour
- Mini Flares (set of six)
- Wire Tripflares
- Day & Night Signal Distress
- Ground Illuminating Flares
- Aviation Smoke Generator
- Signal Cartridges 1"/26.5 m
- Signal Cartridges 1 1/2"/38 mm
- Cart. C.S. Anti Riot 38 mm
- Grenade Hand C.S Anti Riot
- Grenade Hand High Explosives
- Detonating Cord
- Electric Detonator
- Non Electric Detonator
- Safety Fuze' (per meter)




Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
- Mortar Bombs 81 & 60 mm
- Rounds 40 mm L70 HEI-T
- Rounds 105 mm HE MI
- Mortar Bombs 81 mm HE 71 b
- Rounds 40 L70 TP-T
- Rounds 57 mm L70 TP
- Cartidges 105 mm Blank PH
- Scare Charge Demolition TNT 1 lb
- Charge Demolition 10 lbs and 25 lbs
- Cast Booster 250g TK 1 and 500g TK2
- Round 90 mm HE-T
- Round 90 mm HESH-T
- Round 90 mm HEAT-T
- Round 90 mm HEAT-TP-T
- 84 mm HEAT 551
- Rd 76 mm TP-T
- Rd 155 mm HE M107
Weapon
- Steyr AUG A1 Rifle, Mess Tin Complete,
Water Bottle Complete
Engineering Plastic Division (EPD)
Defence Related
- Steyr AUG Rifle Butt and Other Components
- PPC Canister for ammunition 105 mm, 40mm
L70, 81 mm Mortar, Toilet seat
Metal Boxes
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- 69/M61, H84, 9 mm, M548, A125
DRB - Hicom Defence
Technologies
Sdn Bhd
Automotive 1996 -A flexible manufacturing plant for the assembly of
armoured vehicles (wheeled and tracked) of up to
50-ton Main Battle Tank as well as for system
integration of specialist vehicles.
A workshop for the repair (including
base overhaul), maintenance and refurbishment
of soft-skin and armoured vehicles.
A warehouse with the
requisite facilities for the stocking and distribution
of spare parts nationwide.
A computerized materials resources
planning system (MRP) for production and
control planning and inventory management.
A NATO standard vehicle test track in
close proximately to the plant.
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
MMC Defence Sdn Bhd Automotive 1986 Base maintenance, refurbishment, upgrade and
Research & Development works for armoured
vehicle variants, both track as well as wheeled
vehicles.




Automotive 1992 Manufacturer of Customized and specialized
vehicle
Military truck, Fire & Rescue Vehicle, Medium
and Heavy Recovery Vehicle, Port Terminal
Tractors
Manufacturing truck and total after sales services
Scomi Automotive -Manufacturing and fabricating of quality road
transport hardware. Providing related engineering




Aluminum tankers (petroleum products)
Mild steer tanker (palm oil, latex, diesel etc)
Stainless steel tank
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
Chemicals
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Consultation, designing, problem solving, parts
repairs and training in specialized transportation
engineering field.
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
Land Rover Malaysia Automotive 1991
Caidmark ICT 1986 -For military- Focus in Condition
Based Maintenance (CBM).
ECMS, which is a
general-purpose database system, designed to track
the location, configuration, life usage status, and
condition and maintenance history of serialized
aircraft components. ECMS covers both engine
and structural components and is
applicable to naval and
Fort OGP sectors – Caidmark’s emphasis will
be in providing solutions in reliability
engineering.
1. Plant Information Management System,
CBM, Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) and
expert system based framework for the side wide
deployment of reliability and operation
management application.
2. Intelligent Building Management System
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
Comintel ICT System engineering design and integration for
telecommunication equipment and weapon
systems
Comlenia ICT Integrated logistics support, electronic systems,
repairing and testing including combat systems
upgrading activities.
Capable of 3rd level repair and testing for all
ranges of electronic cards from analog, digital and
IF/RF using latest state of the art, fully
computerized Automatic Test Equipment.
Ikramatik Systems Sdn
Bhd
Simulation technology provider. Specialise in cost-
effective Flight Simulator including
- Fixed-wing type and Helicopters.
Develop Computer Assisted Training Systems for
aircrew and ground support person
Malaysian Optronics
Systems Sdn Bhd
ICT Assembling of laser range finder, night vision
binoculars and optical sighting devices
Upgrading of laser range finder, night vision
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
device to suit user requirement.
M.A.R. Communication
Support & Services Sdn
Bhd




maintenance of telecommunication equipment




ICT Design, manufacture, integrate, supply and
maintain communications products and systems
Design, develop, integrate and maintain flight,
maritime, land-based and radar simulators –
provides computer-based training that utilizes
web-based technologies for the Armed Forces
Marketing, supply, operate and maintain various
radar and air traffic management systems
Perform various maritime business activities
especially in electronic and training
Development of Electronis Warfare
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Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
system pertaining to EW Support System
Full range of services to support
Malaysia Armed Forces non-core activities such
as marketing and supply of firearms
Training Systems and development & integration
of computerized logistics management system
SCS Consultancy
Services Sdn Bhd
1991 Specializing in consultancy in ICT,
development and integration of Command, control,
Communication and Intelligence (C31) system as
well as Information Warfare System with particular
emphasis on Electronic Warfare system.
Scada Systems, Industrial and Process Automation
Solutions, Buildings Security Solutions and Fiber


























IT network and system











Ships control and monitoring system
Integrated Communication System





Builders (M) Sdn Bhd
Common Users Providing engineering services and support :
Steel fabrications
Installation and commissioning of plant
Civil & structural works
513
Num Company Sector Year
Established
Capabilities
Maintenance services Products Vessels, Shell
& Tube Heat Exchangers, Reactors,
Towers/Columns, Casting Ladles, Loading Arms,





Common Users Manufacturer of retort pouch rations and tin food;
-Processing of combat rations.
Glowtrade (M) Sdn. Bhd Common Users Manufacturer of Parachute, parachute systems,
components and accessories, canopy, tents, military
webbing equipment/load carrying equipment,
ammunition pouches, rucksacks, flying suit and
universal kit bag.
Kulitkraf Sdn Bhd Common Users Manufacture of combat boots/ Drill Boots/ Spike
Proof/ Flying Boots & Safety Shoes (SIRIM MS
967:1985 & EN 345/ MS ISO 9002 REG. NO. AR
1819 & A member of SATRA – Footwear
Technology Centre.
Pakaian Saling Erti Common Users
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Semenanjung Selatan Common Users
Source: Ministry of Defence, Malaysia, Members of the Malaysian Defence Industry Council, [Online], (Accessed: 29 September 2005),
Available at: http://www.mdic.gov.my.
515
This page is intentionally left blank
516
Appendix P: Ministry of Finance, Malaysia’s 1999 Offsets Document
Offsets Programme in Government Procurement
1. Introduction
1.1 The Government Procurement Management Division, Ministry of Finance is responsible in the
management of procurement of the Federal Government
1.2 The primary objective of government procurement management is to get value for money.
However, it also aimed at achieving the following objectives:
1. encourage greater participation of Bumiputera in trade and industries;
2. maximise the utilisation of local resources (local content)
3. promote the development of local industry
4. transfer of technology to local industry
5. minimize the outflow of foreign exchange through greater utilisation of
transportation and insurance services provided by local companies
6. creating opportunities of local companies in the services sector; and
7. generating concessions through reciprocal trading arrangements. Offsets Programme
and industrial cooperation to enhance further Malaysia’s export capabilities.
2. BACKGROUND OF OFFSETS PROGRAMME
2.1 Definition
 Offset is one form of countertrade whereby it is a buyer’s attempt to control the site of
production or flow of technology where the buyer compels the seller to manufacture
certain components in the buyer’s country and agrees to transfer the latest production
technology and to buy the goods produced either to be exported to the country of origin
or to some third countries
 Under OP the buyer could request the supplier to make purchases of unrelated goods
from the buyer’s country to be marketed in the seller’s country or in some third
countries
 OP is commonly seen in aircraft defence equipment procurement. However, its
application has now spread to procurement of other items.
2.2 Types of OP
There are two types of OP, namely, Direct Offsets and Indirect Offsets
2.2.1 Direct OP
Direct OP refers to activities which are directly related to the equipment purchased. The
activities could be in the following forms:
 Purchase of parts and components with local content for use in the Equipment.
 Co-production undertaking by the COMPANIES and/or the Eligible parties to co-
produce parts and components of the Equipment.
 Investment by the COMPANIES and/or the Eligible Parties in Malaysia to manufacture
parts and components of the Equipment purchased.
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 Transfer of technology to Malaysian firms, agencies or institutions of specialised
knowledge relating to processes of certain parts and components, of the Equipment.
This includes patents, licenses, software, technical access to current expertise and data.
 Enhancement of Malaysian technical services and maintenance capabilities
 Technical assistance or training associated with activities which contribute directly to
the equipment and / or the parts and components for such Equipment
 Buy-backs of the parts and components of the Equipment produced or assembled in
Malaysia
 Assistance in marketing of the parts and components for the equipment overseas; and
 Any other activities mutually agreed upon by the PARTIES.
2.2.2 Indirect OP
‘Indirect OP’ refers to activities which are unrelated to the equipment purchased. The activities
could be in the following forms:
 Co-product and/or direct investment by the COMPANIES and the Eligible Parties in
Malaysia to manufacture unrelated products of technology currently not available in
Malaysia
 Transfer of technology to Malaysian firms, agencies or institutions of specialised
knowledge relating to processes of products unrelated to the Equipment purchased
under the CONTRACT which are applicable to both the defence and/or other industries.
This include patents, licenses, software, technical data, process instruction and the
continuing access to current expertise and data
 Technical assistance or technical training with the manufacture of unrelated products
and/or parts and components
 Buy-back of the resultant products
 Assistance in the marketing of the resultant products overseas
 Research and development programmes which have the potential to contribute to
Malaysian industrial development by generating new activities or enhancing existing
activities associated with exports
 Exports of unrelated Malaysian products under a special arrangement
 Assistance to Malaysian institutions of higher learning in certain educational fields; and
 Any other activities mutually agreed upon by the PARTIES.
3. OP IN THE MALAYSIAN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
3.1 OP is only imposed on government procurement from foreign companies with contract value
more than RM 10 million
3.2 The Government of Malaysia introduced OP mainly to achieve the following objectives:
(a). to promote technology transfer
(b). to increase the utilisation of local parts/contents and local labour; and
( c). to help Malaysian companies penetrate foreign market through counter
purchase
3.3 OP proposal is normally studied thoroughly by a technical committee before it is
submitted to steering committee for approval
3.4 The functions of the Steering Committee are as follows:
(a). evaluate and approve or reject proposal for implementation
(b). provide alternative plans if proposal is rejected
( c). evaluate the financial status of the project
(d). identify beneficiaries
(e). extend professional/expert assistance
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(f). monitor the implementation of OP
3.5 The function of the Technical Committee is to evaluate OP proposals, identify relevant
beneficiaries, negotiate with the technology provider on credit value and other terms and
conditions and finally submit its recommendations to the Steering for approval. During
the implementation of the OP activities, the Technical Committee is responsible in
monitoring the progress of the activities and submits report to the Steering Committee.
3.6 The OP beneficiaries are as follows:
(a). Government agencies-e.g. MINDEF, Department of Civil Aviation, UTM etc
(b). Government companies-e.g: Petronas
(c ). Prime companies-e.g: Airod, SAPURA, CTRM, Zetro, Ancom etc
4. COUNTERPURCHASE IN GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
MOF has also undertaken counterpurchase (CP) arrangements in executing Government
procurement. It is merely carried out to help Malaysian companies penetrate foreign
market.
In CP arrangements the supplier purchases Malaysian goods and commodities directly
from Malaysian companies in return for the sales of the supplier’s goods.
Terms and conditions of the CP are being negotiated in terms of value, types of goods and
commodities. The Government then provides the list of countertrade companies /. trading
house and the supplier would then select and gets the necessary approval to implement the
CP.
5. CONCLUSION
Observed that OP has so far benefited Government as well as private companies.
Therefore, the Government will continue the application of OP in the future procurement.
Government Procurement Management Division,
Ministry of Finance, Malaysia
Date: 23 October 1999
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Defence offsets are of paramount importance in the arms trade of the 21st Century. As a
condition of purchase, the seller agrees to compensate the buyer either through an
economic compensation package or reciprocal trade practice. Of late, there has been
increasing awareness on the subject of offsets due to the huge sums of cash transactions
involved in these deals. Given the fact that offsets are normally tied to arms sales, with
secrecy and non-transparent data, there has been a poverty of research in this field. Most
research conducted has focused on the effectiveness of offsets in the developed
countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom. For example, the US
Department of Commerce produces an Annual Report examining US offset activities
around the world. Similarly, UK Defence Export Services Organisation or DESO keeps
track of its offsets (Industrial participation) programmes and provides valuable
assistance to British and offshore trading partners. There has been very little empirical
research to objectively analyse the impact of offset agreements in developing countries,
which would provide evidence to formulate future policies and develop best practices in
offsets.
This paper attempts to provide a critical evaluation of Malaysia’s offset practices and
explore their impact on technological and industrial development The paper will also
look at ways to harness available resources to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of offset practices in Malaysia. It will provide preliminary policy recommendations
towards this end by drawing relevant international offset experiences in other parts of
the world.
1. INTRODUCTION
Offsets have become a subject of growing importance both in global industry and in the
arms trade. The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security in its
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March 2005 Report on offsets indicated that US prime contractors alone have signed
466 new offsets agreements totalling USD 50.7 billion from 1993-2003 as compared to
total defence exports of USD$ 70.9 billion12. As offsets are clearly of some
significance, we thus need to understand the nature of this trading phenomenon. Offsets
are an economic enhancement package whereby the seller agrees to compensate the
buyer for goods or services purchased13. Other terms used to refer to offsets include
countertrade, industrial participation and economic enhancement. Offsets are cluttered
with terminologies. Offsets can either be direct or indirect. Direct offsets involve all
activities directly related to the equipment purchased such as co-production, licensed
production, subcontracting, technology transfer and training. Indirect offsets involve
activities that are not directly related to the equipment purchased such as
marketing/export assistance, investments, purchases, training and technology transfer.
This practice was initiated by the Western European countries during the period of the
Second World War whilst nations worked to rebuild the international economy.
The need for offsets had increased in the post Cold War era due to a more difficult and
competitive international defence market environment. The shrinking defence industry,
continuous efforts of mergers and acquisitions and rising weapon costs due to greater
technological demand and R&D activities has forced defence contractors to offer more
attractive trade deals such as offsets. ‘Smart’ customers, on the other hand, realizing the
economic benefits of offsets, have resorted to an ‘arm twisting’ approach in acquiring
offsets. This practice is viewed as ‘win-win’ strategy by both sellers and buyers.
2. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF OFFSETS
Developed and developed countries require offsets for various reasons. Evidences
indicate that the nature of offsets demand varies according to the objectives of the
purchasing government and to certain extend the level of economic development14.
Supporters view offsets as benefiting the purchasing countries in terms of creating an
indigenous defence industrial base, advanced technological development, increasing
defence-civil integration, especially job-creation, promoting exports, enhancing R&D
and generally high value added backward linkages.15 In a political sense, offsets are
used to justify the huge outflow of currency is balanced via economic returns to the
buyer countries. Critics claim offsets to be ‘economically inefficient’, ‘market
distorting’, increases equipment cost thus further escalating defence equipment costs
and that it takes away jobs and technology from the more advanced countries16.
12 US Bureau of Industry and Security, (2005) , March
13 see Ron Matthews (2003) “Home Guard”, Financial Management, June ,p.23; see also Stephen Martin
(1996) Economic of Offsets, Harwood Academic Publishers,p.31;Hall and Markowski (1996) “Some
Lessons from the Australian Defence Offsets Experience” Defence Analysis, Volume 12(3),p.289-314
14 United States General Accounting Office(2004) ‘ Defence Trade: Issues Concerning the Use of Offsets
in International Defence Sales’ July 8, p.3
15 See Hirshman A.O, (1958) the Strategy of Economic Development, Clinton, MA and Yale University
Press for poles of development argument on how defence production is meant to trigger ‘backward and
forward linkages’ to other industries. See also J.Paul Dunne and Guy Lamb (2004) ‘Defence Industrial
Participation: The South African Experience in Jurgen Brauer and Paul Dunne J, (2004) Arms Trade and
Economic Development: Theory, Policy and Cases in Arms Trade Offsets, Routledge.
16 see also Jurgen Brauer and J Paul Dunne,(2002) “Saudi Arabia: Defence Offsets and Development in
Arming the South”: The Economics of Military Expenditure, Arms production and Arms Trade in
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3. OFFSETS: THE CASE OF MALAYSIA
3.1 Background
Most developing countries view offsets as the ‘third wave’17 towards technology
acquisition. The newly industrialised countries, namely Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
with high technology absorption capability have pursued this strategy to develop their
technology and industrial base. Others, in the second tier of industrialization such as
Malaysia view offsets as a major thrust for economic development and technology
acquisition with a specific focus on defence technology spin-offs, skill development and
sub-contracting work with a view to becoming part of the global supply chain network.
18
Offsets19 were first introduced to Malaysia through the purchase of Hawk aircraft from
BAE Systems in 1992. However, Malaysia has been involved in counter purchase
activities since the 1980s. At that time, it was managed by a special unit (UKC) set up
by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). After the economic
recession, this unit was disbanded and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of
Finance (MOF). From 1990 till 2001, offsets policy and implementation were carried
out by MOF with input from operating ministries. In 2001, MOF decided to decentralize
the management of offsets to six key ministries20. To date, the Ministry of Defence
(MOD) is the largest beneficiary of the offsets programme.
Malaysia’s offsets strategy is quite similar to many other developing countries. It views
offsets as a tool to acquire technological and industrial development via strategic
partnerships, maximization of local contents, establishing a defence industry with
through-life support capable of supporting its armed forces, obtain technology with
strategic dual-use purposes and to develop its human resource in high technology areas.
Malaysia does not have a written offsets policy/guideline offsets. Its offsets
requirements are based on past practices. Therefore the requirement may vary form one
procurement contract to another. Some contractors consider this a flexible approach yet
others claim it as being less transparent.
As a general rule, offsets are imposed on all defence procurement above 10 million
Euros. Offsets value may vary between 30-60%. The offsets agreement imposes a
penalty with bank guarantees, normally between 5-8%. Multipliers are flexible
Developing Countries, Palgrave; Martin S (Ed)(1996) The Economics of Offsets: Defence Procurement
Options for the 1990s Harwood Press, London,p.54
17 see also Michael W.Chinworth and Ron Matthews (1996) “ Defence Industrialisation Through Offsets:
The Case of Japan” in Martin S (Ed)(1996) The Economics of Offsets: Defence Procurement Options for
the 1990s Harwood Press, London,p.177-218
18 See Richard A.Bitzinger, “Offsets and Defence Industrialisation in Indonesia and Singapore” in Jurgen
Brauer and Paul Dunne J, (2004) Arms Trade and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and Cases in
Arms Trade Offsets, Routledge,p.257
19 In the case of Malaysia, offsets fall under the umbrella term of countertrade. The other main component
is counterpurchase.
20 The six key ministries are Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Transport,
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Defence.
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depending on the value and importance of the project, which in some cases can be as
high as 20. A larger proportion of offsets, are allocated towards indirect offsets. The
government also stresses ‘additionality’ and ‘causality’ in offsets agreements
Defence offsets management falls under the prerogative of the Defence Industry
Division (DID), MOD. The offsets unit is headed by a full colonel and assisted by an
assistant secretary from the Administrative and Diplomatic service. is responsible for
the operations of offsets. The offsets unit’s function is to accept offsets proposals,
evaluate, negotiate, coordinate and monitor the progress and completion of offsets
programmes. DID seek the advice of various Malaysian government and commercial
entities during the evaluation process. An offsets committee headed by the Secretary
General, MOD with members from various agencies was formed in year 2002 to
formally evaluate and approve all offsets programme with the intention of increasing the
transparency of offsets management. Unfortunately, the committee only convened once.
To date, most offsets programmes have been approved on an ad-hoc basis by the
Deputy Secretary General (Development) and Secretary General, after consultation with
the Minister of Defence. However, offsets policy matters are still under the prerogative
of the MOF.
Offsets also features as an important subject in all defence industry bilateral platforms,
whereby, offshore vendors and Malaysian companies are blessed with opportunities to
seek partnerships and strategic business collaborations before the actual procurement
takes place. Besides, the Malaysian Defence Industry Council (MDIC) 21also
consistently monitors the development of offsets in Malaysia. This council constantly
proposes way and means of increasing offsets effectiveness and efficiency.
3.2 Impact Analysis
In the case of Malaysia, it is unrealistic to claim that offsets had been a total failure, but
neither have they been a complete success. In practice, offsets programmes represent a
‘mixed bag’. An impact analysis conducted through questionnaires with offsets
beneficiaries, all of them defence related companies, revealed that offsets had the
highest impact in terms of skill enhancement followed by sub-contracting , employment
generation, profit increase, technology innovation, technology absorption for dual –use
and finally potential for export. Skill enhancement were mainly in form of training to
undertake the through life support of the equipment purchased, consultancy services to
train officers in certain specialized technology. It was claimed that most of this training
was classroom-based rather than a hands-on approach. Subcontracting work was mainly
to produce parts and components such as pylons, composite parts, seats, tools and jigs
which do not involve high end technology. However, the detailed figure on total profit
and employment generation was not available as most of these companies tend to lump
defence and civil work together.
21 MDIC was formed in 1999 to ensure the coordinated development of defence industry in Malaysia. It is
chaired by the Minister of Defence and the Defence Industry Division acts as the secretariat.
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The research also revealed that as of 2004, Malaysia had acquired 43 defence equipment
involving 430 offsets projects. Of this, 109 projects were direct offsets whilst 321 were
directed towards indirect offsets.22 However, to the contrary, in terms of offsets
beneficiary23, the local defence companies were the largest beneficiary with 40%
followed by non-defence related commercial entities (30%), government organizations:
mainly the armed forces and Science Technology Research Institute for Defence
(STRIDE)24 (25%) and finally universities and other research organizations (5%). This
suggests that the defence related companies and government organizations have been
the largest beneficiaries of offsets. More than 50% of the offsets were channelled
towards training, followed by maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO), manufacturing,
sub-assembly with very minimal work into systems integration and research &
development. Malaysia’s offsets priority in the past has been to train human resource
development in high technology areas especially aerospace and information
communication technology as well as for second and third line MRO activities to
maintain its equipments locally.25
3.3 Current Issues of Offsets Management
There are many unresolved issues in offsets management not least of which is the
pending offsets policy/guidelines. After almost twenty years, Malaysia is yet to publish
its policy/guidelines. A study conducted by Malaysian Industry Group for High
Technology (MIGHT) in 2001, produced a Report outlining several recommendations
to improve the offsets management as well as providing inputs to the guideline.
However, except for the formation of the Technology Depository Agency (TDA)26
under MIGHT, none of its other recommendations have yet to be implemented. The
draft guideline was formulated by DID with the assistance of consultants from DESO,
UK, Denel of South Africa and reviewed by the Offsets Guideline Committee headed
by Economic Planning Unit (EPU) which was later send for MOF approval. However,
the draft guideline is still pending due to several implementation issues that are yet to be
resolved between the MOF and MOD. Most defence contractors claim to be confused
due to inconsistent and lack of transparency in the overall offsets management. Yet,
some of the other contractors claim this practice as being flexible, providing
opportunities for creativity and maximum utilization of offsets for the country’s
22 It was not possible to give a figure as to the total offsets value as some of the earlier contracts did not
have offsets value or percentage.
23 A 3 month research was undertaken via an attachment with the Ministry of Defence, Malaysia to
evaluate the impact on Malaysia’s offsets programme. Overall, 17 local companies, 15 offshore vendors,
4 research organizations and 5 government agencies were interviewed.
24 STRIDE or formally known as DSTC is the only organisation with the function to supply scientific and
technical expertise to the Malaysian Armed Forces
25 There have been criticisms from industry members that MRO and basic training should be part of the
main contract and not included as offsets.
26 TDA was formed after a cabinet decision in November 2002. MIGHT has taken over the managing of
TDA since April 2004. TDA role is to ensure that technology acquisition meets the country’s
development objectives by compiling the country’s technology wish list and linking the technology needs
to Government acquisition.
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benefits27. Overall, the absence of a policy, may, in the long run create losses for the
government due to the lack of through-life planning, especially when there is high turn
over of officers within the DID.
Another issue is that offsets have yet to be incorporated into Malaysia’s national
industrial, economic and technology related policies. It is still felt that the impact of
offsets is very minimal and has no significant contribution to the overall economic
development. This is also blamed on the lack of data and empirical evidence on its
impact. Other issues related to offsets include the lack of understanding on the subject
by officers handling offsets and those from the procurement project team. The high turn
over of officers at the MOD calls for constant training on a subject which is highly
technical and involves high negotiation skills to deal with offshore vendors.
A key issue in any new offsets proposal is that it has to be incorporated into the main
tender document and negotiated in tandem with price and technical negotiations.
However, there is still lack of coordination and awareness amongst officers within the
procurement project team to do so. Offsets are normally left until the tail-end and
negotiated in a hurry. Another unresolved issue is on the offsets implementation
whereby there is lack of ‘follow-up’ and ‘follow-through’ after each offsets programme
has been signed. It is normally easier to close an offsets deal but it is very difficult to
see through the completion of the project.
Some of the enduring issues for the defence contractors include the lack of local
industry absorption capability, not being given a free hand to choose their right partners,
mismatch of projects whereby companies with no experience at all on certain
technologies were assigned to undertake work, unwillingness of local companies to
invest and take risks, and the lack of consistency and transparency in offsets
management.
Difficulties faced by local companies include the claim that offshore vendors are not
willing to part with their technology, very high royalty payments, inconsistency in the
awarding of offsets, having to absorb huge investments for ‘one-off’ projects.
Contractors fail to look at forging long term sustainable partnerships. Examples include
the offsets programme for the ACV 300 from Turkey. DEFTECH was provided with
technology transfer to carry out sub-assembly work but no future work has come though
after the completion of the offsets programme. Another example is where Vickers
Defence provided work to CTRM to manufacture composite rail for the single –span
tactical bridge. However, after the completion of the project, the site is left abandoned
with new work.
Finally, research organisations such as STRIDE claim that offsets do not provide
sufficient allocation for defence related R & D. Non defence research organizations
such as MINT is said to benefit more from the offsets deals. Offshore vendors are said
to be happier to depart with non-defence technology as compared to sensitive defence
technologies which they want to protect.
27 US based defence companies prefer to be given a free hand to design and package their offsets
programme. Most of them are more comfortable to work without an official policy or guideline and claim
to create offsets programmes based on the country’s current economic needs.
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4.CONCLUSION
Malaysia has taken offsets seriously since the 1990s and attempted to strike a good
bargain by insisting on offsets obligations tied to its primary acquisitions. Malaysian
offsets negotiators, having studied the models and experiences of many other developed
and developing countries, have requested more indirect offsets. They realise that
defence-related industry capabilities within the country is difficult to sustain over time
as export opportunities are limited while domestic demands are small and often very
capricious. Offsets have been largely used to develop Malaysia’s human resources in
specialized high technology areas such as aerospace, electronics and through life
support of equipment purchased. The argument presented here could probably also
apply to small and medium sized developing countries with lesser defence technology
absorption capacity. It will simply not be rationalistic to convince such countries to drop
offsets requirements, but to channel them towards indirect offsets. However, Malaysia
has yet to maximize offsets fully for its economic development and indigenization
goals. This could be due to the absence of a genuine technology and industrial policy
incorporating offset- often giving rise to short term procurement and offsets strategies.
However, given the nature of offsets, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the offsets programme towards economic development and indigenization
considering the multitude of other determinants that can influence these goals. In the
case of Malaysia, to ensure that the overall offsets management is carried effectively,
several issues need to be reviewed including the procurement and offsets policy and
process as well as the technology, industrial and human resource development strategy.
In sum, to create long term ‘sustainability’, there must exists a suitable environment in
which all players: the government, seller, subcontractors and research organisations
work together based on ‘best endeavours’ rather than mandatory obligations.
